G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484. February 14, 1958

From the records of the above-entitled cases,
it appears that as of 1913, Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen,
was already residing in Davao and on the following year became the
manager of the Mindanao Estates located in the municipality of Padada
of the same province. At a certain time, which the lower court placed
at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to
work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl, Bernarda
Camporedondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, this
girl and Edward E. Christensen, who was also unmarried started living
together as husband and wife and although the records failed to
establish the exact date when such relationship commenced, the lower
court found the same to have been continuous for over 30 years until
the death of Christensen occurred on April 30, 1953. Out of said
relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.

G. R. No. L-11484.

Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount
of properties, his will naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor was duly
presented for probate In court and became the subject of Special
Proceedings No. 622 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will
contains, among others, the following provisions:

* * * * * * *

“3. I declare
* * * that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now
Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight
years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.

“4. I further declare that I now
have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHIRISTENSEN DANEY.

* * * * * * *

“7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age
and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is
not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600) Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos {P100),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as
any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.

“8.
I give, devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, now residing in
Padada, Davao, Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000),
Philippine Currency.

* * * * * * *

“12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my
well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Eodger Young
Village Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of
which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from
any source whatsoever, during her lifetime, Provided, however, that
should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to her
decease having living issue, then, and in that event, the life interest
herein given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give,
devise, and bequeath to my said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest, remainder and residue of my property, with
the same force and effect as if I had originally so given, devised and
bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should the said Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney die without living- issue, then, and in that
event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue
of my property, one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE
LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124 Twentieth Street,
Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children of
my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTEN SEN, * * *,

“13. I
hereby nominate and appoint Mr. Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of DavaoCity,
Philippines, my executor, and the executor of this, my last will and
testament.

* * *

(Exh. A)

Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia and Bernarda Camporedondo, the first
contending that the will lacked the formalities required by law; that
granting that it had, the dispositions made therein were illegal
because although she and Lucy Christensen were both children had by the
deceased with Bernarda Camporedondo, yet she was given only a meager
sum of P3,600 out of an estate valued at $485,000 while Lucy would get
the rest of the properties; and that the petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar
was not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate
because he had an interest adverse to that of the estate. It was
therefore prayed by this oppositor that the application for probate be
denied and the will disallowed; that the proceeding be declared
intestate and that another disinterested person be appointed as
administrator.

Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over
one-half of the entire estate in virtue of her relationship with the
deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having lived
together as husband and wife continuously for a period of over 30
years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was dismissed by
the probate court on the ground that she had no right to intervene in
said proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional
right that might be affected by the probate of the will, and likewise,
she could not be allowed to establish her title and co-ownership over
the properties therein for such questions must be ventilated in a court
of general jurisdiction. In view of this ruling of the Court and in
order to attain the purpose sought by her overruled opposition Bernarda
Camporedondo had to institute, as she did institute Civil Case No. 1076
of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G. R. No. L-11483) which we
will consider and discuss hereinafter.

In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special
administrator of the estate after filing a bond for P5,000 pending the
appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administration
were correspondingly issued to him on May 21, 1953.

The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition,
Helen Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental opposition and motion to
declare her an acknowledged natural child of Edward E. Christensen,
alleging that she was conceived during the time when her mother
Bernarda Camporedondo was living with the deceased as his common-law
wife; that she had been in continuous possession of the status of a
natural child of the deceased; that she had in her favor evidence
and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father; and that she and
Lucy had the same civil status as children of the decedent and Bernarda
Camporedondo. This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the
conception and birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was
generally known to be carrying relations with B different men; that
during the lifetime of the decedent and even years before his death,
Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing disavowed
relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used
the surname Christensen illegally and without permission from the
deceased. Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to
the deceased; and that the motion of said oppositor be denied.

After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28,
1953, found that oppositor Maria Helen Christensen had been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased
Edward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by
him in his will, for such action must have been brought about by the
latter’s disapproval of said oppositors marriage to a man he did not
like. But taking into consideration that such possession of the status
of a natural child did not of itself constitute acknowledgment but may
only be availed of to compel acknowledgment, the lower Court directed
Maria Lucy Christensen Daney to acknowledge the oppositor as a natural
child of Edward E. Christensen. The will was, however, allowed and
letters testamentary consequently issued to Adolfo Cruz Aznar, the
executor named therein. From the portion of the decision .requiring
Lucy Christensen to acknowledge Helen as a natural child of the
testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevated
the same to Us on the ground that the case involves an estate the value
of which far exceeds P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5),
Republic Act No. 296.

The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower Court
erred in finding that the oppositor Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had
been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen and in directing Maria. Lucy Christensen
Daney, recognized daughter and instituted heir of the decedent, to
acknowledge the former as such natural child.

Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen
Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the same mother, Bernarda Camporedondo,
during the period when the latter was publicly known to have been
living as common-law wife of Edward E. Christensen. From the facts of
the case there can be no question as to Lucy’s parentage, but
controversy arose when Edward Christensen, in making his last will and
testament, disavowed such paternity to Helen and gave her only a legacy
of P3,600. In the course of the proceeding for the probate of the will
(Exh. A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to
support her claim that she, like Lucy, was a natural child of the
deceased and, therefore, entitled to the hereditary share corresponding
to such descendant. Several witnesses testified in her favor, including
her mother Bernarda Camporedondo, her former teachers and other
residents of the community, tending to prove that she was known in the
locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by the latter to
the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family
portraits, greeting cards and letters were likewise presented to
bolster her assertion that she had always been treated by the deceased
and by Lucy herself as a member of the family.

Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to
repudiate her claim by introducing evidence to prove that on or about
the period when she was conceived and born, her mother was carrying’ an
affair with another man, Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue
plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and even took the witness stand
to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to show that the
decedent’s solicitations for Helen’s welfare and the help extended to
her merely sprang out of generosity and hammered on the fact that on
several occasions, the deceased disclaimed any relationship with her
(Exh. O-Daney, Exh. Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney, Exh. 8-Helen).

Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears
indubitable that on or about the period when Helen was born, Bernarda
Camporedondo had established residence at her plantation at Paligue,
Davao, and that although Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to
manage his merchandising business, he spent the weekends with the
former and their child Lucy in the Christensen plantation. Even
granting that Zosimo Silva at this stage fitted himself into the
picture, it cannot be denied that Helen’s mother and the deceased were
generally and publicly known to be living together as husband and wife.
This must have been the reason why Christensen from Helen’s birth in
1934 provided for her maintenance; .shouldered the expenses for her
education to the extent that she was even enrolled as an intern in an
exclusive college for girls in Manila; tolerated or allowed her
carrying the surname “Christensen”, and in effect gave her the
attention and care that a father would only do to his offspring. We
should take note that nothing appears on record to show that
Christensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed Helen’s paternity.
His repudiations of her relationship with him came about only after he
and Bernarda Camporedondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently
after Helen took sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that
despite the decedent’s desire that she continue her studies, Helen
ignored the same and got married to a man for whom Christensen held no
high esteem. We may state at this juncture that while it is true that
herein appellants introduced witnesses to disprove oppositor’s claim,
the lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the
witnesses while testifying and could better gauge their credibility and
impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria Helen
Christensen had established that she had been in continuous possession
of the status of a natural child of the deceased. Considering the
preponderant evidence on record, We see no reason to reverse said
ruling. The testator’s last acts’ cannot be made the criterion in
determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for human frailty
and parental arrogance sometimes may draw a person to adopt unnatural
or harsh measures against an erring child or one who displeases him
just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In the consideration
of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or direct acts of
the person against whom such action is directed or that of his family
before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases
the claimant, and not at a single opportunity or on isolated occasions
but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such
status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of
the child, of compulsory recognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).

The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent, to recognize oppositor
as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code
provides for 2 kinds of acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary
and compulsory. In the first instance, which may be effected in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in an
authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code), court intervention is very
nil if not altogether wanting, whereas in the second, judicial
pronouncement is essential, and while it is true that the effect of a
voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment on the rights of the child so
recognized is the same, to maintain the view of the lower Court would
eliminate the distinction between voluntary acts and those brought
about by judicial dicta. And if We consider that in the case where the
presumed parent dies ahead of the child and action for compulsory
recognition is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the
instant case, the situation would take an absurd turn, for the heirs
would be compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the
deceased without a proper provision of the law, for as it now stands,
the Civil Code only requires a declaration by the court of the child’s
status as a natural child of the parent who, if living, would be
compelled to recognize his offspring as such. Therefore, We hold that
in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be
sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the
evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances
specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the
status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is
entitled to all rights granted to it by law, for such declaration is by
itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent
concerned which is hers against whom the action is directed, are bound
to respect.

G. R. No. L-11483

Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of
Bavao, Bernarda Camporedondo claimed in her complaint 1/2 of the
properties of the deceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her
relations with the deceased. She alleged as basis for her action that
she and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had lived and cohabited as
husband and wife, continuously and openly for a period of more than 30
years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased acquired
real and personal properties through their common effort and industry;
and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner of said
properties. As the executor refused to account for and deliver the
share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeated demands, she
prayed the court that said executor be ordered to submit an inventory
and render an accounting of the entire estate of the deceased; to
divide the same into 2 equal parts and declare that one of them
lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor
denied the averments of the complaint, contending that the decedent was
the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were acquired
through his own efforts; that plaintiff had never been a co-owner of
any property acquired or possessed by the late Edward Christensen
during his lifetime; that the personal relationship between plaintiff
and the deceased was purely clandestine because the former habitually
lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired
the same in 1928; that she also maintained relations with 2 other men;
and that the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article
2253 of the Civil Code as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of
the deceased would be impaired. Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum of P70,000.00
representing actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties had
submitted their respective memoranda, the lower Court on August 25,
1954, rendered judgment finding that the deceased Edward Christensen
and Bernarda Camporedondo, not otherwise suffering1 from any impediment
to contract marriage, lived together as husband and wife without
marital ties continuously for over 30 years until the former’s death in
195-3; that out of such relations 2 children were born; and that the
properties in controversy were acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of the Civil
Code which said court considered to have created another mode of
acquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled to one-half of
said properties as co-owner thereof in view of her relationship with
the deceased and ordered the executor to account for and deliver the
same to her. From this decision, defendant Aznar, as Executor of the
will, perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but as the property
involved in the litigation exceeds P50,000.00, said tribunal elevated
the case to Us for consideration.

It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward
Christensen was the owner of certain properties, including shares of
stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general merchandising
store in Davao City. It is also undeniable that the deceased and
appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married state, maintained
relations as husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a
considerable number of years which the lower Court declared to be until
the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate
courts do not usually disturb the lower court’s findings of fact,
unless said finding is not supported by or totally devoid of or
inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must of
necessity be modified to conform with the evidence if the reviewing
tribunal were to arrive at the proper and just solution of the
controversy. In the instant case, the court a quo overlooked
or failed to consider the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen
Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother Bernarda
Camporedondo had some .sort of quarrel or misunderstanding and parted
ways as of March, 1950, a fact which appellee was not able to overcome.
Taking into account the circumstances of this case as found by the
trial court, with the modification that the cohabitation should appear
as continuous from the early 20’s until March, 1950, the question left
for our determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, by reason of
such relationship, may be considered as a co-owner of the properties
acquired by the deceased during said period and thus entitled to
one-half thereof after the latter’s death.

Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of
a certain kind of relationship brought about by couples living together
as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage, acquiring and
bringing properties unto said union, and probably realizing that while
same may not be acceptable from the moral point of view they are as
much entitled to the protection of the laws as any other property
owners, the lawmakers incorporated Article 144 in Republic Act No. 386
(Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their, property relations.
Said article read as follows:

Art. 114. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and the woman thus living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized
during their cohabitation be acquired through the work, industry,
employment or occupation of both or either of them. And the same thing
may be said of those whose marriages are by provision of law declared
void ab initio. While it is true that these requisites are fully met
and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the deceased
and herein appellee were already estranged as of March, 1950. There
being no provision of law governing the cessation of such informal
civil partnership, if it ever existed, same may be considered
terminated upon their separation or desistance to continue said
relations. The Spanish Civil Code which was then in force contains to
counterpart of Article 144 and as the records in the instant case
failed to show that a subsequent reconciliation ever took place and
considering that Republic Act No. 386 which recognized such form of
co-ownership went into operation only on August 30, 1950, evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee’s claim.

In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon
the jurisprudence then obtaining on the matter. As early as 1925, this
Court already declared that where a man and a woman, not suffering from
any impediment to contract marriage, live together as husband and wife,
an informal civil partnership exists and made the pronouncement that
each of them has an interest in the properties acquired during said
union and is entitled to participate therein if said properties were the product of their JOINT efforts (Marata vs.
Dionio G. R. No. 24449, Dec. 31, 1925). In another case, this Court
similarly held that although there is no technical marital partnership
between persons living maritally without being lawfully married,
nevertheless there is between them an informal civil partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest where the property is acquired through their JOINT efforts (Lesaca vs. Felix Vda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135).

Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the
product of their joint industry apparently in her desire to tread on
the doctrine laid down in the aforementioned cases, would lead Us to
believe that her help was solicited or she took a hand in the
management and/or acquisition of the same. But such assertion appears
incredible if We consider that she was observed by the trial Court as
an illiterate woman who cannot even remember simple things as the date
when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when she commenced
relationship with the deceased, not even her approximate age or that of
her children. And considering that aside from her own declaration,
which We find to be highly improbable, there appears no evidence to
prove her alleged contribution or participation in the acquisition of
the properties involved therein, and that in view of the holding of
this Court that for a claim to one-half of such property to be allowed
it must be proved that same was acquired through their joint efforts and labor (Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,^[*]
50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We have no recourse but reverse the holding of the
lower Court and deny the claim of Bernarda Camporedondo. We may further
state that even granting, for the sake of argument, that this case
falls under the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code, same would
be applicable only as far as properties acquired after the
effectivity of Republic Act 386 are concerned and to no other, for such
law cannot be given retroactive effect to govern those already
possessed before August 30, 1950. It may be argued, however, that being
a newly created right, the provisions of Section 144 should be made to
retroact if only to enforce such right. Article 2252 of the same Code
is explicit in this respect when it states:

SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules
laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no
retroactive effect.

* * * * * * *

As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the
compulsory heirs of the deceased Edward Christensen would be impaired
or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would succeed, the answer
to such argument would be simply obvious.

With regard to appellant Aznar’s contention that the lower Court
erred in admitting the testimony of appellee Bernarda Camporedondo
dealing with facts that transpired before the death of Edward
Christensen on the ground that it is prohibited by Section 26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, We deem it unnecessary to delve on the same because even admitting that the court a quo
committed the error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the
outcome of the case in view of the conclusion We have already arrived
at on the main issue.

On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the
decision of the lower Court in case G. R. No. L—11484, with the
modification that Maria Lucy Christensen Daney need not be compelled to
acknowledge her sister Maria Helen Christensen Garcia as a natural
child of her father Edward E. Christensen, the declaration of the Court
in this respect being sufficient to enable her to all the rights
inherent to such status.

The decision appealed from in case G. R. No. L-11483 is hereby
reversed and another one rendered, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.

Costs are taxed against appellants in G. R. No. L-11484 and against
appellee Bernarda Camporedondo in G. R. No. L-11483. it is so ordered.