G.R. No. L-11264. February 10, 1958

This is an appeal from the order of the Court
of First Instance of Samar, dated February 2, 1955, denying the
petition for review of a decision of said court in Cadastral Case No.
5, GLRO Record No. 1379, of the same province, regarding Lot No. 2040
of said cadastre. The appeal was originally sent to the Court of
Appeals which later, by resolution of July 30, 1956, certified the
appeal to us on the ground that it involved only questions of law.

The facts involved are simple and undisputed. In the barrio of
Pangdan, Catbalogan, Samar, Dionisio Centino claimed a parcel said to
contain about five hectares, bounded by the sea, swampy land—part of
the public domain and the Pangdan River. In the same vicinity, one
Emeterio Cui also claimed a parcel much bigger in area. The cadastral
survey later came around the year 1933 or prior thereto, and included
the area in question, designating it as Lot No. 2040. Centino filed his
answer with the Cadastral Court for the portion claimed by him; so did
Cui. It would appear that the Director of Lands also filed a claim for
the portion he believed to be part of the public domain. The case was
heard in 1933, and on April 8, 1933, a decision was rendered on said
Lot No. 2040, ordering its division into three portions, and indicating
how the division should be made—one portion to be designated as Sublot
No. 2040-A with its improvements, adjudicated to Dionisio Centino
married to Sinforosa Dacanay, Sublot No. 2040-B was declared public
land, and the remaining portion, Sublot No. 2040-C with improvements
thereon, adjudicated to Emeterio Cui married to Casilda Gabieta. The
decision seems to have been based upon what occurred during the
hearing, for it stated that after hearing, Cui withdrew his answer to
the portion claimed by Centino, at the same time that the mangrove
swamp within the strip bordering the Pangdan River be also segregated
and declared public land.

Then on January 6, 1955, for the first time, Centino filed a petition to review the decision on said Lot No. 2040, alleging:

“That in the hearing of claims on Lot No. 2040,
Emiterio Cui had recognized the claims of the movant herein as well as
that of the Bureau of Lands but the decision rendered is incorrect,
confusive and contrary to the evidence and facts, and susceptible of
varied interpretations which may prejudice the rights of ownership of
the movant herein over the wholeness and substantial portions of his
land;

“That Lot No. 2040 has not as yet been subdivided
pursuant to the decision rendered thereon, much less have the final
decrees thereof been entered up to the present time, as prescribed by
Section 38 of Act No. 496;

“That by virtue of the provisions
of law just cited, equity and! justice demand that the same decision on
Lot No. 2040 be reviewed and proper and corresponding adjudications,
consonant with the respective proprietary rights of each and every
claimant on same lot, promulgated.”

Alejandro Cui, Jr., in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
intestate estate of Alejandro Cui, successor in interest of the
deceased Emeterio Cui, opposed the petition for review, claiming that
petitions for review in cadastral and registration cases must be based
only on actual fraud, and that the allegation of Centino in support of
his petition does not or did not constitute fraud. After hearing, the
trial court issued the appealed order denying the petition.

We fully agree with the trial court and counsel for oppositor
Alejandro Cui, Jr. When the petition for review was filed in 1955, more
than twenty years had passed since the decision was rendered, and
naturally, said decision had become final and executory. Centino
however claims that he never received notice of the decision and became
aware of it only when Civil Case No. 4415 was brought against him on
November 10, 1954, to have him ejected from a portion of the lot which
he believed was included or should have been included in his claim
before the Cadastral Court in 1933. His bare assertion that he was
never notified of the decision rendered in 1933 is not enough to
successfully controvert the legal presumption that the Cadastral Clerk
of Court had duly notified all the cadastral claimants, including
Centino, of the decision. Moreover, to refute said presumption, Centino
could have introduced evidence to show that the records of said
Cadastral Clerk of Court do not show notification of the decision to
him, or testimony of said Clerk of Court himself that for one reason or
another, Centino was not duly notified.

The claim of Centino that the decision did not conform to the
evidence presented during the hearing, that it was confusing and was
subject to various interpretations, if true, might be considered
judicial error subject to correction by the trial court itself if its
attention had been called to it, on time, or on appeal within the time
prescribed by law, but surely is not fraud within the meaning of
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, so as to warrant a reopening
of the case and a review of the decision now long final. There is every
reason to believe, however, that Centino’s claim before the Cadastral
Court and any evidence submitted by him to support his claim was duly
considered by the trial court, as shown by the decision itself, which
ordered the segregation from the whole Lot No. 2040 of a strip “fifteen
(15) meters wide down the 1st street of the barrio of Pangdan and
touching the seashore”, with the improvements thereon, and adjudicating
the same to him. In his petition for review and in his appeal brief,
Centino did not even bother to submit a copy of the decision of Lot No.
2040, which is sought to be reviewed. It remained for the oppositor
Alejandro Cui, Jr. to submit such copy as Annex 1 in his brief.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed order of denial is hereby
affirmed. The reason we do not assess costs against appellant is that
he had been allowed to appeal as a pauper.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.