G. R. No. L-7310. December 28, 1957

Plaintiff brought this action originally in the Municipal Court of Manila to  recover from  defendant the sum of P11,446 as unpaid balance of his compensation for the loss of sight of his eyes,  under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.  The municipal court dismissed the case, and on appeal, the Court  of First Instance of Manila likewise dismissed  it.

Briefly stated, the undisputed facts clearly  shown by the  evidence  on  record are as follows:

Plaintiff-appellant  was  an  employee of defendant-appellee Co Cho Chit at the latter’s shop named Grace Park Engineering,  Inc.  On  May  27,  1948, at  about  eleven o’clock  in  the morning, while plaintiff was sharpening an auger on  the  grinding machine  in  defendant’s shop, a flying piece of metal pierced his right eye.  He reported the  matter immediately to Manuel  Castro, his foreman, and  upon  defendant’s  instructions,  he was sent  to the Chinese General  Hospital.  There he was operated on by Dr.  Amando  V.  Santos, who extracted the foreign  body at the  cornea.  After  iridectomy,  it  was found that the lens  was  completely opaque, thus the injury resulted in the  total loss of vision of his right eye.  He stayed nine days in the hospital, and  appellee  paid for the hospital and doctor’s bills, as well as his wages during his confinement.  Immediately  after  his  operation, plaintiff began feeling pains on his left eye.  After his discharge  from the  hospital,  he went  to inform defendant  that  he was willing to work but  cannot do so in view  of his continued vomiting and dizziness and the condition of his aching left eye which  was bothering him;  so  he was  informed that he should  not  resume his work as the company had  no funds  to pay to idle workers.

On June 14,  1948, plaintiff went to the Bureau of Labor for help and was accordingly examined by  Drs.  Teofilo V. Gonzales and Jose S. Santillan of the Medical Division who found that there was—

1. Total blindness of the  right eye.
2. Right pupil  is widely dilated and  cannot react to light.
3. Presence of  an irregular opacity as big  as a seed of maize.
4. Pain on the right eye  (injured)  and  also  in  the left  eye (normal).”

This finding is embodied in  Exhibit  J.  Appellant was then given a blank No. 77-B form to be filled up by his attending physician  at the Chinese General Hospital (Exhibit I).  This  form was duly accomplished by Dr. Amando V. Santos  of the hospital on June  15, 1948, wherein said doctor certified that “a small foreign body was found at the cornea; detachment of 1/3 of iris above with opacity of the  lens of the right eye,  and  that after four days’ observation he  found that the optic nerve was atrophied, and therefore the extraction of the cataract was  no longer advisable.”  On June 17th,  upon appellant’s return to the Bureau, he was again examined and his left eye was subjected  to the Snellen’s test as he was already complaining of dimness of  sight on  that eye.  He was  also told to report again should any  untoward symptoms develop  on his left eye.   On September’  20th, he returned  to  the Bureau and  Dr. Alfredo A.  Gorospe, medical  officer  in charge of eye injury cases,  examined him and found that there was “light perception” of his  left  eye  (Exhibit F-1). On November 22nd, he was again examined by Dr. Gorospe (Exhibit  E)  and was given  a letter  addressed  to  the Director of the  San  Lazaro Hospital  (Exhibit D)   requesting examination of  plaintiff’s  blood for Kahn’s test to determine syphilitic  infection.  On that same day, appellant  accomplished the printed form  of notice of injury and claim for compensation (Exhibit A-1)  which he just thumb-marked as he could no  longer see with his left eye.

On December 13th he saw Mrs. Baens-Del Rosario, then Head  of  Compensation  of the Bureau of Labor,  about his case,  and was  referred to  the  Medical Division  for opinion (Exhibit G).  On the same day,  he was  finally examined by Dr. Gorospe who found that the loss of sight of the left eye was due to sympathetic ophthalmia (Exhibit F), meaning that “the infection was transferred from  the injured eye  by way  of the optic  nerve or optigism  of the blood stream”  (17 t.s.n.).  And he arrived  at this conclusion in view of the absence of syphilitic infection as shown by the negative Kahn’s test.  Hence, on December  16th, the  Chief  of  the Medical Inspection  Division returned the papers to Mrs. Baens-Del  Rosario thru  the Director of  Labor, for  action  (Exhibit H).

In  the meanwhile, however,  or as early  as July,  1948, defendant made overtures to settle the case amicably and caused his lawyers, thru Atty. Alberto E. Galban, to prepare  a written agreement  whereby, for a consideration of the sum  of P1,402.47, appellant would  agree  to  settle the matter and waive his right  to any further compensation arising out  of the  accident.   This  document, Exhibit X, was brought to  Mrs. Baens-Del Rosario  by Atty. Galban, and a check for the same amount was deposited with  the Bureau on July 12, 1948, as shown by official receipt No. A-769621 Exhibit “8”.  When appellant saw Mrs. Baens-Del Rosario  on July 14th, the check was  shown  to him and  was told by her  to  sign  the  document  “as an  ac- knowledgement of the receipt of the check for the sum of P1,402.47  in compensation for the loss  of  the vision of the right eye” (17  t.s.n.).  Upon his reluctance to do so by reason of the fact that he was feeling pains in his left eye,  he was  assured by  her “that  this  amount was not in payment  for his left eye but for his right eye” (19 t.s.n.).  Belying on  this assurance, he signed the document as payment for his  right eye (20 t.s.n.).  We have, there- fore, that while the claim for the left eye was  being processed and studied by the Bureau of Labor, there existed already a written agreement (Exh. X)  signed on July 14, 1948.   This document was not  however notarized  on that date but on March 2, 1949,  a delay  not explained in the record.

The municipal court, in dismissing the case, relied mainly on the release agreement,  Exhibit  X,  and on the alleged absence of statutory  provision authorizing compensation for  aggravated injury.  Upon  appeal,  the court  of first instance dismissed the same quite  on the  same grounds, and on the finding that Dr. Gorospe  who testified  for the plaintiff, was  not an  eye specialist  and therefore “his conclusion that the blindness of the left  eye was due  to sympathetic ophthalmia  could  not  be given  due weight and consideration.   Consequently,  plaintiff  appealed   to  this Court  contending that the  lower  court erred—

1. In not considering’ the  educational qualifications, training and experience of Dr. Alfredo Gorospe as sufficient background to testify as an expert;
2. In not  declaring that the loss  of vision  of plaintiff’s left eye was  due to  transferred  infection  (sympathetic ophthalmia)  from the injured eye  to  the  normal  eye, and as  such, is compensable under the provisions of the “Workmen’s Compensation Act No.  3-128, as amended;
3. In  holding  that the release agreement  marked  Exhibit “X” operates to  exempt  the defendant from any future liability which may  arise from  the same injury,  and consequently shall constitute a bar to any claim for  additional  compensation; and
4. In not sentencing the defendant to pay  plaintiff the sum of one thousand four hundred forty six pesos (P1,446) with legal interest from the filing’  of the complaint, with costs  of  the suit.”

Carefully considered, the  questions are reduced to  the following propositions:  first, whether defendant is liable for the loss of sight of plaintiff’s left eye which, according” to the  latter’s  contention, originated  from  the  injury he suffered on his right eye; and second,  whether plaintiff is entitled  to compensation for the loss of sight of  his left eye notwithstanding that the parties  had already entered into an amicable  settlement as shown by the so-called release agreement of July 14, 1948,  which was ratified on

March 2, 1949, the concluding paragraph of which reads as follows:

“NOW, THEREFORE, for  and  in consideration of  the sum  of ONE THOUSAND  FOUR HUNDRED TWO  PESOS AND  FORTY-SEYEN CENTAVOS (P1,402.47) paid by  the EMPLOYER  to  the  EMPLOYEE, receipt of which sum is  hereby acknowledged by  the  latter to his entire satisfaction, the EMPLOYEE docs hereby freely and voluntarily and without force and intimidation release completely and forever what- ever  claim or claims for  compensation the EMPLOYEE has or might have  in the premises; and docs further waive any and all claims for compensation or benefit for any cause arising directly or  indirectly from  the  above-mentioned accident.”

There is  no  dispute  regarding  the relation between plaintiff and defendant as  employee and employer, nor that on May 27, 1948, plaintiff’s right eye was  injured  and as a consequence thereof its vision was lost despite medical attendance.   In fact,  defendant admitted his liability for the loss of sight of plaintiff’s right eye when he paid the sum of P1,402.47.   By the testimony of Dr. Gorospe, in nowise  refuted or  contradicted by any evidence  on the part of defendant, it has  been established that  the  loss of vision of the left eye was due to transferred infection from the  right eye to the  left eye  or  to what  he calls “sympathetic ophthalmia.”  Dr. Gorospe testified that  “there was  practically no  injury on the left  eye  but there was traumatism on the right eye which, according to authorities, had penetrated the dangerous part of  the other eye, which, in few cases I would say,  may result to that,  and that in the absence of syphilis as determined by  the  Kahn’s test  of the examination and also  in  the absence of other diseases, we  came to the conclusion  that the infection was transferred from  the  injured eye  to  the   uninjured  eye by way of the optic nerve  or optigism of the blood stream.” (17  t.s.n.).   When asked by the lower court  about the meaning  of  sympathetic  ophthalmia,  Dr.  Gorospe  explained—”That means a  pathologenie agent or probably a filtrable virus has come to the first  eye  or the exciting eye through the wound and after its development it reaches the second  eye or sympathizing eye  through the optic nerve or optic chiasm of the blood vessel or blood stream” (39 t.s.n.).  This conclusion, however, is  assailed by defendant on the grounds that Dr. Gorospe is not sufficiently qualified or competent to testify on the cause of the loss of vision of plaintiff’s left eye, the doctor not  being  a specialist on eye  diseases; that his equipment in his clinic is direly  deficient; that his knowledge on the particular subject is likewise deficient, for he does not know how to define  “aqueous flare” nor the causes of “aqueous flare”; neither could he define a  “photopic”  or “scotopic  eye” nor has he read Adler’s “Text  Book  of  Ophthalmology” which is the textbook used on this subject in the University of the Philippines; that Dr. Gorospe  has examined and diagnosed only about 48 eye cases in the Bureau of Labor and there was not one of them that he  did not recommend for compensation.  It appears  of record, however,  that Dr. Gorospe became a physician in 1926 and  had a private practice in  Ilocos Sur for  one  year; from  1927 to  1944 he was the Preaident of the  Sanitary  Division in Cagayan; in 1946 he joined the Bureau of Labor and up to  the time of the  hearing  of this case,  all  the  eye  injury cases coming to the  Bureau were assigned to him,  and during that period  he  has  had  occasions to  treat traumatic and non-traumatic  eye diseases, some  of  which  required surgical  operation, such as glaucoma, cataract, pthisis bulbis, iridocylitis, optic  atrophy, sympathetic  ophthalmia, herpes,  zooster, ophthalmitis; he has also  read the works of Drs. Ubaldo and Yambao on  eye injuries, the work of Dr. Geminiano de Ocampo  on cataract and glaucoma as well as the  works of these  specialists on Iris in Ophthalmology, and Godar’s  Ophthalmology.  Accordingly, we hold that Dr. Gorospe, by  his professional  training and practical  experience,  is  fully qualified to testify on  the cause of the loss of vision of plaintiff’s left  eye which  he personally observed  and  examined  on  several  occasions before reaching his conclusion on the  matter.  Moreover we find  that  Dr. Gorospe’s opinion is not contradicted by any expert testimony of a  specialist on eye  diseases, thus  such opinion remains  in  all force and  effect.

Anent the second question as to whether defendant should be held liable  for compensation for the loss  of  sight  of plaintiff’s left eye, he having already settled and paid for the latter’s  right eye, we find that the loss of vision of the left eye  might be termed  as an aggravation of disability or the immediate  sequence  of  the  loss  of  vision  of the right eye which was admittedly due to the injury  caused thereon while  plaintiff  was in the performance of duty in the defendant’s shop.  The  evidence shows that after the operation of plaintiff’s right eye at the Chinese General Hospital,  he has been all along complaining of  pains in his left eye; that such pains persisted up to and after he signed Exhibit X on July 14,  1948; and that accompanying such pains was the gradual dimness of his sight on that remain- ing eyfi  until  he  was  completely  disabled for industrial purposes.  On  the other hand, there is  no  showing  that before plaintiff suffered injury on May 27,  1948, his left eye was abnormal, or that the loss of vision  of.  that eye was due  to causes  other  than the  transferred  infection from the  right eye.  The disability, therefore, of plaintiff’s left eye  is  only traceable  to the injury  of his right eye, hence the general  rule that compensation must be allowed for all the  consequences flowing from  ‘the original  injury and not attributable to other  intervening causes  should be applied.

Defendant contends, however, that there is no provision in our  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act covering  cases  of aggravation of disability,  but Section 2 of Act  3428,  as amended by Act 3812, provides “compensation for personal injury from any accident suffered by an employee arising out of and  in the course of his employment”, which embraces a  wide scope, and  because, as stated  above, the loss of sight  of plaintiff’s left eye  was  not  due to any other cause than the transferred infection from the right eye, the present case is certainly within the  purview  of said Sec. 2 of Act 3428 as amended, which Act should be interpreted liberally in order that the  laborer  may not remain unprotected, otherwise the purposes for which the law was promulgated  might be defeated.

With  reference to appellee’s contention that  by reason of the release agreement Exhibit X he is no longer liable to plaintiff for further compensation, we  find the  same to be untenable, not only because appellant positively and convincingly asserted that he signed said document on the honest belief  that it merely referred to  compensation for his right eye, otherwise he would not have signed it on July  14,  1948 as all  along he has been suffering pains on his left eye and as early as June 17th he already noted dimness  on that eye, but also because  the record strongly indicates that defendant procured the signing of the agreement on July 14, 1948  due to his eagerness to compromise the case, as soon as possible, in order  to avoid more  compensation than was expressed in the  document,  and this could be gathered from the fact that said agreement was only ratified on March 2, 1948, after he  had received the amended  demand  Exhibit A, dated  January  4,  1949, wherein  the claim for the disability of  the  left eye was formally included.   On the other hand,  Section 7 of Act 3428  provides:

“SEC. 7. Contract Prohibited—Any contract, regulation, or device of any sort intended to exempt the employer from all or part of the liability created  by this Act shall be null and void.” Exhibit X clearly runs counter to the aforequoted provision and cannot be invoked by defendant to secure exemp- tion  from  the compensation in  question.

In view of the foregoing,  the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and defendant ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,446.00 sought for in the complaint, with costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.