G. R. No. L-11435. December 27, 1957

On October 18, 1954, herein respondents  filed an application in the Court of First Instance of Albay  for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of one of them, Jesus V. Samson, for the estate  of the late Jose V. Samson.  On the same date, Jesus V.  Samson was  appointed special  administrator of  the estate.

The application was  opposed by petitioners  Josefina N. Samson, the widow of Jose V.  Samson and her three minor children  Glenda N.  Samson, Manuel N.  Samson and Felix N. Samson.   They asked for the granting of letters of administration in favor of Josefina N.  Samson, in the place of  Jesus  V.  Samson.  After  hearings that dragged for  almost two years, Judge  Alcasid, on March 12,  1956,  issued an  order  appointing  Antonio  Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon,  Albay,  as regular administrator.  In that order the special administrator Jesus V. Samson was  instructed, at the  same thing, that  “twenty (20)  days from the receipt  of  this order  he shall turn over all properties  and funds  of the  estate in his possession to the regular administrator as soon as the latter qualified.” Antonio Conda put up  the bond  fixed by the court and, on March 19, 1956,  letters of administration were issued in his favor.  On April 3,1956, upon motion of the widow, the court issued an order requiring the special administrator  to “deliver the properties and funds of the estate now in  his possession to the regular administrator within three (3) days  from receipt of this order”  (Annex B).

It also appears that on March 27, 1956, respondents filed an appeal from the order of the court granting letters of administration in favor of Antonio Conda, and their record on appeal  was approved  on April 17, 1956.   On April 20,  1956, they filed a  motion  seeking  to set aside the approval of the bond posted  by Antonio Conda as well as the letters of administration  issued in his favor.   This motion having been denied  througn an order issued  on May 9, 1956, respondents resorted to the appellate courts.

The Court of Appeals, upon certiorari  applied for  by the special administrator and  the heirs  siding with  him, held that, on the authority  of our decision in Cotia vs. Pecson,¹  49 Off. Gaz., 4318, the order appointing Antonio Conda as regular administrator was stayed by the appeal taken  against  it,  and thereafter, Conda should not  have been allowed to qualify  in  the  meantime, unless execution pending appeal should be ordered for special reasons pursuant  to  Rule  39, section²  of the Rules  of Court; and that “should the special administrator be found, after due process of law, unfit to  continue”, he “could be dismissed and another appointed to look after the interests of the estate  until the appeal filed against Conda’s appointment is finally disposed of.  For these  reasons, the Court  of Appeals  set aside the appointment of Conda and annulled his  bond.

Against this decision, the  interested parties applied  to this Court for a review.  We  granted  certiorari.

This Court has repeatedly decided that the appointment and removal of a special administrator  are  interlocutory proceedings incidental to  the main case,  and lie in the sound discretion of the court.   (Roxas vs. Pecson,2 46 Off. Gaz. 2058; Junquera vs. Borromeo,³ 52 Off.  Gaz., 7611; De Gala vs. Gonzales,  53 Phil.  106; Garcia vs. Flores,  101 Phil., 781,  64 Off.  Gaz.,  4049).

Thus, in Roxas  vs.  Pecson, supra,  this  Court ruled:

“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons  to  the  appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as  the statutory provisions as to causes for  removal of  an executor  or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section  2, Rule 83,  do not apply to the  selection or  removal  of special administrator.  (21  Am. Jur., 8SS; De Gala vs.  Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106).  As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee  must have,  the  judge or court has discretion  in  the selection of the  person to  be appointed, discretion which must be sounds that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or  equity.”

It is well to mark that, in the present case,  the special administrator was not actually removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the regular administrator by operation  of  law.   Rule 81, section  3, of  the  Rules of Court  specifically  provides  that—

“When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the  deceased, the power of the special  administrator shall cease, and  he shall  forthwith  deliver  to  the  executor  or administrator the goods, chattels, money and estate of the deceased in  his  hands.”

No question  of  abuse of  discretion can therefore  arise on account of the order of  April 8, 1958, requiring Jesus V. Samson to turn over the  administration to  the regular administrator, such result  being ordained by  law.  Upon the other  hand, the conditions of the estate justified  the appointment and qualification of a  regular administrator, because the  special  administration  had lasted  nearly  two years,  and the  prompt settlement of the estate  had been unduly delayed.  The Albay court  said in  its  order of March  12:

“* *  *.  It is also the sense of this Court that the appointment of any  of their immediate relations would  not end the bitter conflict that has so  far raged  as  can  be seen  from the voluminous records of  this case  which  have accumulated  within  a very short time,   The appointment of a disinterested person as regular administrator would be conducive to a smooth and peaceful administration of the properties  of the estate.  At any rate, the appointment  of Jesus V. Samson as special administrator was but done in a. state of emergency.”

These  reasons were supplemented by the order of May 9, 1956:

“It  is certainly  against the. interests of justice and a frustration of the policy  of those rules to extend  unduly the time within which estates should be  administered and to keep  thereby the property from the possession and use of those who are entitled thereto.  The view advanced by counsel for the special  administrator that  the appointment of  a regular administrator cannot be  effective until after the appeal interposed  by the special administrator  is finally determined by the  appellate court is contrary to  the  spirit  of policy  of the Rules  of  Court above referred  to and would  unduly delay  the prompt  settlement  of the estate  of the  deceased Jose  V. Samson,  specially considering  that  this special proceeding  was commenced  as far back as  October 18, 1954,  or  more than one and one-half years ago, and that  the notice of the creditors, as provided in section  1, Rule  87, cf the  Rules of  Court, cannot even  be issued until after letters of administration  have  been granted by  the Court to the regular  administrator.”   (Decision,  Ct. App., p,   4)

Even assuming1 that the rule in Cotia vs. Pecson, 49 Off. Gaz.  4313  (tho it  actually dealt with  the removal  of a regular administrator) is applicable to the  case at bar,  in the sense that  the appointment  of a  new administrator should be made effective pending appeal  only  if  Rule 39, section 2  (execution  pending  appeal)   is  complied  with, such  compliance exists  in the present  case, for the order of April 3, 1956 (issued upon motion of herein petitioners) that required  the special administrator to  turn over the properties and funds of the estate to the regular  administrator, was  in  effect a  special order  for the carrying out of the regular  administration notwithstanding the appeal of respondents  that  was not  perfected  until  April 12, 1956;  while the special  reasons  for  immediately carrying the order  into effect  are given in the order of March 12, as supplemented by  that of  May 9,  1956,  heretofore quoted.  We find these reasons  sufficient  (cf. De Borja vs. Encarnacion, 89 Phil., 239).

The fact that  these reasons were  not  expressed in the very  order of  April 3, 1956, is not  by  itself fatal or constitutive of  abuse of discretion; for  while Rule 39, section 2,  prescribes that execution  pending  appeal may issue for good reasons to be  stated in a special order, this Court has  decided that the element that gives validity to an order of immediate execution  is the existence of good reasons, if they may be found distinctly somewhere in the record, altho not expressly stated in the  order of execution itself  (Lusk vs. Stevens, 54  Phil. 154; Guevarra vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna,  70 Phil. 48; People’s Bank vs. San Jose,  96  Phil.,  895, 51 Off.  Gaz., [6] 2918; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court  [1957 ed.,] Vol. I, p.  540).

All  told,  the case boils  down  to this:  The removal of the special administrator is at the court’s sound discretion, and the orders of March 12  and  May  9,  1956 show that there were good  reasons to  terminate  the special  administration.  This being so, the  heirs can  not seek to  prolong the tenure  of the removed special  administrator by appealing  Conda’s appointment as regular  administrator.  It may be  argued  that during  the appeal, the estate  should be under special administration; but it  does not  appear that Amadeo Samson and his partisans have so asked the court nor  have  they proposed another administrator and therefore,  their  complaint  against  the court’s action is unmeritorious.

A minor procedural point must  be noted.  In  special proceedings, the judge whose  order is under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his  official capacity should not  be made to appear  as  a party  seeking reversal of a decision  that  is unfavorable  to the  action taken by him.  A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from  suing against the  adverse opinion of a  higher court,  and counsel  should  realize the fact  and not include the Judge’s name in ulterior proceedings.

We see no abuse of discretion in the orders of the Court of  First  Instance  complained  of.   The decision  of  the Court of Appeals is reversed and the original petition for certiorari  filed by the special  administrator  is ordered dismissed, and the writ  denied, with  costs  against  the respondents  in this  Court, Jesus  V.  Samson, et  al.  So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista  Angelo,  Labrador,  Concepcion,  Endencia  and Felix, JJ., concur.

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¹ 93 Phil., 881
² 82 Phil., 407
³ 99 Phil., 276