G. R. No. L-8451. December 20, 1957

This is a petition  for mandamus filed  by  the  Roman Catholic  Apostolic Administrator  of Davao  seeking  the reversal of a resolution issued by the Land Registration Commissioner in L.R.C.  Consulta  No. 14.   The facts of the  case are as follows:

On October 4, 1954, Mateo  L.  Rodis, a  Filipino citizen and resident of  the City of Davao, executed a deed of  sale of a parcel of land  located in the same city  covered by Transfer  Certificate  of Title  No.  2263,  in  favor  of  the Roman Catholic  Administrator of Davao, Inc., a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as  actual  incumbent.  When  the deed  of  sale  was  presented to the Register of Deeds  of Davao for registration, the latter

having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Brunch of the Court of First  Instance of Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao were, made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60 per cent of  the members  of their  corporation were  Filipino  citizens when they ‘sought to register in favor of  their congregation a deed of donation  of a parcel of land—

required said  corporation sole  to submit  a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent  of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.

The vendee  in a  letter  dated  June 28, 1954, expressed willingness to submit an  affidavit,  but  not in the  same tenor as that made  by the Prioress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not  similar, for whereas  the congregation of the  Carmelite  Nuns had five incorporators, the corporation sole has only one; that according to their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns became the owner of properties donated to it, where as the case at bar,  the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would become the owner of the property sought to be registered.

As the Register  of Deeds  entertained some doubts as to  the registerability of  the  document, the matter  was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en  consulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151.  Proper  hearing  on  the  matter  was  conducted  by  the Commissioner and  after  the petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum,  a  resolution  was rendered on  September 21,  1954, holding that in view of the provisions of Sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII  of  the Philippine Constitution, the  vendee was not  qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines  in  the absence of proof that at least 60 per  centum of the capital,  property, or assets of the Roman  Catholic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen.   It was also the opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that section 159  of the Corporation  Law  relied  upon by the vendee was rendered inoperative by the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the precise condition set therein—that at least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens—be present, and, therefore, ordered  the Register of  Deeds of Davao to deny registration  of the deed of sale in  the absence  of  proof of compliance with such condition.

After the  motion  to reconsider  said  resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was instituted with this Court by said corporation  sole,  alleging  that under the Corporation  Law,  the  Canon  Law as well as the  settled jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale  executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of petitioner is  actually a deed of sale in favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private  agricultural lands  for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that judgment  be rendered  reserving  and  setting  aside the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question.  In its resolution of  November 15, 1954, this  Court gave due course to this petition  providing  that the procedure prescribed  for  appeals from the Public Service Commission  or  the Securities  and Exchange  Commission (Rule 43), be followed.

Section  5 of Article XIII  of the Philippine  Constitution reads as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession,  no private agricultural land shall be  transferred or assigned except to  individuals, corporations, or  associations qualified to  acquire or  hold lands  of the public domain in the  Philippines.

Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:

Section 1. All  agricultural, timber, and mineral  lands  of  the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all  forces of potential  energy, and  other natural  resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and  their  disposition, exploitation, development,  or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital  of which in  owned  by  such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, GRANT, LEASE, OR CONCESSION AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  ESTABLISHED  UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION.  Natural  resources,  with  the  exception of  public agricultural land,  shall  not be alienated, and no license, concession, or  lease  for  the  exploitation,  development,  or  utilization  of  any of the natural  resources shall  be  granted for a period  exceeding twenty-five  years,  renewable for another  twenty-five years,  except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial  uses other than the development of water power, in which cases  beneficial  use may be  the measure and  limit  of the  grant

In virtue of the  foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are considered “qualified”  to acquire and hold agricultural lands  in  the  Philippines?  What is  the effect  of these constitutional prohibition on the right  of a religious corporation  recognized by  our Corporation  Law  and  registered as  a corporation  sole, to  possess,  acquire and register real estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or  actual  incumbent  is  an alien?

Petitioner  consistently maintained  that a corporation sole,  irrespective  of  the citizenship  of  its incumbent,  is not  prohibited  or  disqualified  to  acquire  and  hold  real properties.  The Corporation  Law  and the  Canon Law are explicit  in their  provisions that  a corporation  sole or “ordinary” is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof.  The Canon Law  also  specified that  church temporalities are owned by the  Catholic Church  as  a  “moral person”  or  by the dioceses as  minor  “moral  persons”  with the ordinary or bishop  as administrator.

And  elaborating on  the  composition of  the Catholic Church  in the  Philippines, petitioner  explained  that as a  religious  society or  organization,  it  is made up  of 2 elements or  divisions—the  clergy  or  religious members and the faithful or  lay members.  The 1948 figures of the Bureau of Census and Statistics showed that there were 277,551 Catholics in  Davao  and aliens  residing therein numbered 3,465.  Even granting that all  these foreigners are  Catholics,  petitioner contends  that  Filipino  citizens form more than 80  per cent of the entire Catholics population of that area.   As  to  its clergy and religious composition,  counsel for petitioner  presented the  Catholic Directory of the Philippines  for 1954  (Annex A)  which revealed that as  of that year, Filipino clergy  and women novices comprise already  60.5  per cent  of  the  group. It was, therefore, alleged that the  constitutional requirement was fully met  and satisfied.

Respondents, on  the other  hand,  averred that  although it might be true that petitioner is  not the owner  of  the land purchased, yet  he  has control over  the  same, with full  power  to administer,  take possession of,  alienate, transfer,  encumber,  sell  or  dispose of any or all lands and  their improvements  registered in the name of  the corporation  sole  and can collect, receive,  demand or  sue for all money or values of  any kind that may become due or owing to said corporation,  and vested with authority to  enter  into agreements  with any  persons,  concerns or  entities  in connection with  said  real properties,  or in other words, actually exercising all rights of ownership over the properties.   It  was  their stand  that  the  theory that properties registered in  the name of the  corporation sole  are held  in trust  for  the benefit  of the  Catholic population of a  place, as of Davao in the case at  bar, should  not  be  sustained because  a  conglomeration  of persons cannot just be pointed out as the  cestui que trust or recipient  of the benefits  from  the  property  allegedly administered in their behalf.   Neither  can it be said  that the mass of people referred to as such beneficiary exercise any  right of  ownership  over  the same.  This set-up, respondents argued,  falls short of  a trust.  Respondents instead tried to prove that in reality, the beneficiary  of ecclesiastical  properties are not  the members or faithful of  the church  but  someone  else,  by  quoting a  portion of  the oath of fidelity subscribed by  a bishop upon his elevation to the episcopacy wherein he  promises to  render to  the  Pontifical  Father or  his successors an account of his pastoral office and  of  all things appertaining  to the state of this church.

Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing  the  constitutional  provision  calling for  60  per cent  Filipino  citizenship,  the criterion  is  not membership  in  the  society  but ownership of  the  properties  or assets thereof.

In  solving the  problem  thus submitted  to  our  consideration, We can say  the  following:  A corporation sole is a  special  form of corporation usually  associated  with the clergy.  Conceived  and  introduced  into  the  common law by  sheer necessity, this  legal  creation  which  was referred to as “that unhappy freak of English law”  was designed  to  facilitate the  exercise of the functions  of ownership carried on by the clerics for and  on  behalf of the church which was  regarded as the property  owner (See  I Bouvier’s Law  Dictionary, p.  682-683).

A corporation sole  consists of one person only, and his successors (who will  always be one at a  time),  in some particular station, who  are  incorporated by law in order to give them some  legal capacities and advantages,  particularly  that of perpetuity, which in  their  natural  persons  they could  not  have  had.  In this sense,  the  king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop,  or deans, distinct from  their several chapters  (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla.  849, 112 So.  846).

The provisions of  our  Corporation  law  on  religious corporations  are  illuminating  and  sustain  the  stand  of petitioner.  Section  154 thereof provides:

SEC. 154.—For the administration of  the  temporalities  of  any religious denomination,  society or church and the  management of the estates and properties thereof, it shall be  lawful for the bishop, chief  priest,  or presiding elder of any  such religious  denomination, society or  church to become  a corporation sole, unless  inconsistent with the rules, regulations or discipline of his religious denomination, society, or church or forbidden by competent  authority thereof.

See also the pertinent provisions of the  succeeding sections of the same Corporation Law copied hereunder;

SEC. 155. In order to  become a corporation  sole  the bishop, chief priest, or presiding- elder of any religious denomination, society, or church  must  file with  the Securities  and Exchange  Commissioner articles of incorporation setting forth the following facts:

*       *        *        *            *            *          *                 *
(3)  That as such bishop,  chief priest, or  presiding  elder  he is charged with the  administration of the temporalities and the management  of the  estates and properties of  his religious  denomination, society, or church  within its  territorial jurisdiction, describing  it;

*       *        *        *            *            *          *                 *
    (As  amended by  Commonwealth Act No.  287).

SEC. 157. From and   after  the filing  with  the Securities &  Exchange  Commissioner of the  said articles of  incorporation, verified by  affidavit  or  affirmation as aforesaid and  accompanied by  the copy of the commission,  certificate of election, or letters of appointment  of the bishop, chief priest, or  presiding  elder,  duly certified as  prescribed in the section immediately  preceding such bishop, chief  priest, or  presiding elder, as the  case  may  be, shall become a corporation sole, and  all temporalities, estates, and properties of the religious denomination, society, or church therefore administered or managed by him as  such bishop,  chief priest, or presiding elder shall  be held hi, trust   by him as a  corporation  sole,  for the  use, ‘purpose,  behalf,  and sole benefit  of  his  religious  denomination, society,  or church,  including  hospitals, schools,  colleges, orphan asylums, parsonages, and cemeteries thereof.   For the filing of such articles of incorporation, the  Securities & Exchange  Commissioner shall  collect twenty-five  pesos.   (As amended by Commonwealth  Act No. 287) ;  and

SEC. 163. Tho right to  administer all temporalities and  all property held or owned by  a religious order  or society, or by  the diocese, synod, or  district  organization  of any  religious  denomination or church shall,  on  its incorporation, pass  to the corporation and shall be  held  in trust for the use, purpose,  behoof, and benefit  of  the religious  society, or order  so incorporated  or of the  church of which the diocese, synod,  or  district organization is  an organized and constituent part.

The  Canon Law contains  similar  provisions regarding the  duties  of the  corporation  sole  or  ordinary as  ad- ministrator of the  church properties, as  follows:

“Al Ordinario local  pertenence  vigilar  diligentemente  sobre  la administracion de  todos los bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en  su territorio y  no  estuvieren  sustraidos  de  su jurisdiccion,  salvas las proscripciones legitimas que le concedan  inas amplios  derechos,
“Teniendo an cuenta los derechos  y  las  legitimas . eostumbres y circunstancias, procuraran los Ordinarios  regular todo  lo coneer- niente  a la administracion de  los bienes eelesiasticos,  dando laa oportunas instrucciones particulares dentro del  marco del derecho comun”,  (Title XXVIII,  Codigo  de Derecho  Canonico,  Lib. Ill, Canon 1519).^*

That leaves no  room for doubt that the  bishops or archbishops, as  the  case  may  be,  as  corporation’s  sole  are merely administrators  of  the church properties that come to their possession, and which they  hold  in trust for the church.  It can also  be  said that  while  it is  true  that church  properties  could  be  administered  by  a  natural person, problems regarding  succession to said properties can  not be avoided  to  rise  upon  his   death.   Through this legal fiction, however, church  properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation  sole  pass, by operation  of law, upon  his death not  to  his  personal  heirs but to his successor in  office.   It could  be seen,  therefore, that  a corporation  sole  is created  not only to  administer  the temporalities of the  church  or religious  society  where he belongs  but also  to  hold  and  transmit  the same  to his successor in said  office.  If  the ownership or  title  to the properties do not  pass to the administrators, who are the owners of  church properties?

Bouacaren and Elis, S. J., authorities on canon law, on their treatise  comment:

“In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to  the Apostolic  See, the  Supreme Pontiff exercises his  office of  supreme administrator through the Roman Curia;  in matters regarding other  church  properly,  through  the administrators of ths individual moral persons in the Church according to that norms, laid  down ia the Code of Cannon Law.  This does  not  mean, however, that the Roman Pontiff is this owner of ad church property; but,  merely   that  he  is  the supreme guardian”  (Bouscaren  and Ellis, Canon  Law,  A  Text and Commentary, p.  764).

And this Court,  citing Campos y  Pulido, Legislation y Jurisprudencia  Canonica, ruled  in  the  case of  Trinidad vs.  Roman  Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63  Phil.  881, that:

“The  second question  to  be  decided is  in whom the ownership of the properties  constituting  the endowment  of  the  ecclesiastical or collative chaplaincies  is rested.

‘Canonists entertain different opinions as to the person in whom the ownership of the  ecclesiastical properties is vested, with  respect to which  we  shall,  for  our purpose, confine ourselves  to  stating with  Donoso  that,  while many doctors cited by Fagnano  believe that it  resides in  the Roman  Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is  more probable that  ownership,  strictly speaking,  does not reside in  the latter,  and, consequently, ecclesiastical properties are  owned by churches, institutions and canonically  established private  corporations to which said properties have been donated’.”

Considering  that nowhere can We  find  any provision conferring ownership  of church properties on  the Pope although he appears  to  be  the  supreme  administrator or guardian of  his nock, nor on the corporations sole or  heads of  dioceses  as  they are  admittedly  mere administrators of  said  properties,  ownership  of   these  temporalities logically  fall and   devolve  upon  the  church,  diocese or congregation  acquiring the same.  Although this question of ownership  of ecclesiastical properties has  off  and  on been mentioned in several decisions of this Court yet in no instance was the subject of citizenship of this religious society been passed  upon.

We  are not  unaware of  the opinion  expressed  by the late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in the case of Agustines vs.  Court  of First Instance of Bulacan,  80 Phil. 565, to the effect that  “the Roman Catholic Archbishop  of Manila is only  a  branch  of  a  universal  church  by ‘ the  Pope, with  permanent  residence in Rome,  Italy”.  There is  no question  that the Roman  Catholic Church existing in the Philippines is  a  tributary and  part of that international religious  organization, for the word  “Roman”  clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes the authority of the Pope in Rome.   However, lest We become hasty in drawing conclusions, “We  have to analyze and take  note  of the nature of the government established in the Vatican  City, of which it was  said:

“GOVERNMENT. In  the Roman Catholic Church supreme  authority and jurisdiction over clergy and laity alike is held by the  pope who (since  the Middle Ages) is elected  by the cardinals assembled  in conclave, and holds office until  his  death or legitimate abdication, * * *.  While the pope is obviously independent of the laws  made, and the officials appointed, by  himself or his predecessors, he usually exercises his administrative authority according to the code of  canon law and through the  congregations,  tribunals and  offices of  the Curia  Romana.   In their  respective  territories  (called  generally dioceses)  and over their respective  subjects, the  patriachs, metropolitans or archbishops and  bishops exercise  a jurisdiction  which is called  ordinary  (as  attached by law  to  an office and so distinguished  from  delegated jurisdiction which is given to  a person, * * *” (Collier’s Encyclopedia,  Vol. 17, p. 93.)

While  it is  true and We have to concede  that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head;  that in  religious matters,  in  the exercise  of  their belief, the Catholic  congregation of  the faithful throughout  the world seeks the guidance and  direction of their Spiritual  Father  in the Vatican, yet it cannot be said that there is a merger  of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said  that the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws  of their country,  are affected by that relationship with  the Pope.  The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in  almost every  country springs from that society that saw  its beginning in  Europe  and the fact that the clergy  of this faith derive  their authorities and receive orders from the Holy See do not give  or bestow the citizenship  of  the Pope upon these branches.   Citizenship  is a political right which  cannot be  acquired by a  sort of  “radiation”.   We have to realize that although there is a fraternity  among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over the globe, this universality that the word “catholic” implies, merely characterize their faith,  a  uniformity  in  the practice  and  interpretation  of  their  dogma  and   in  the exercise of  their  belief, but certainly they  are separate and independent from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different laws  under  which they are  incorporated, and entirely independent of the others in the management and ownership  of their  temporalities.  To allow theory that the Roman  Catholic Churches all over  the world  follow the  citizenship  of  their  Supreme Head,  the  Pontifical Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic  faith and become members  of that religious  society,  likewise citizens  of the Vatican or of Italy.   And this is  more so if We con- sider that the Pope  himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of  the world.  The same thing may be said with  regard to  the  nationality or citizenship  of the corporation sole  created under the laws of the Philippines,  which is not  altered by  the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or heads of  said  corporations sole.

We must, therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal  Roman  Catholic  Apostolic  Church, every Roman  Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws  of the country where it  is located, is  considered  an entity  or  person with all the  rights  and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that  country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman  Pontiff or the Holy See,  without prejudice to its religious relations with the  latter which are governed by the  Canon  Law or their rules and regulations.

We certainly are  conscious  of the fact  that whatever conclusion  We  may draw on this matter will  have  a far-reaching influence,  nor  can We  overlook  the pages of history  that arouse  indignation  and  criticisms  against church  landholdings.  This  nurtured feeling  that snow- balled into a  strong nationalistic sentiment  manifested itself when  the provisions  on  natural resources  to be embodied in the Philippines  Constitution were framed, but all  that has  been  said on  this  regard  referred  more particularly  to  landholdings  of  religious  corporations known  as  “Friar Estates” which have already been acquired by our  Government, and  not  to properties held by corporations sole which, We repeat, are  properties  held in trust for the benefit of the faithful residing  within its  territorial  jurisdiction.   Though that  same  feeling probably precipitated and influenced to  a large extent the doctrine laid down  in the celebrated  Krivenko  decision, We have to take this matter in the light  of  legal provisions and jurisprudence actually obtaining, irrespective of sentiments.

The question now left for our determination is whether the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the  Philippines, or better  still, the corporation  sole named  the  Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of  Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural  lands in  the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.

We  see  from  sections 1 and 5 of  said  Article quoted before, that only persons or corporations  qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines may acquire or be assigned and hold  private agricultural lands.   Consequently, the decisive factor  in the  present controversy hinges on the  proposition  of whether or not the petitioner  in  this case can  acquire  agricultural  lands of the public domain.

From the data  secured  from the  Securities and Exchange Commission,  We find  that the Roman  Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a corporation sole)  in September,  1912, principally  to  administer its temporalities  and  manage its  properties.  Probably due to the  ravages  of the last war, its articles of incorporation were  reconstructed in the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on April 8,  1948.  At first, this corporation sole administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located in the island  of Mindanao.  Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new corporations sole were created to  correspond with the territorial  jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one  of  them being  petitioner  herein, the  Roman  Catholic  Apostolic  Administrator  of  Davao, Inc., which  was registered  with the  Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in  the  administration of all  the “temporalities”  of  the Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao.

According  to  our  Corporation  Law,   Public  Act No.  1459,   approved  April  ],   1906,  a corporation  sole

is organized and composed  of a single individual, the  head of any religious society or church,  for the administration of the  temporalities of such society or church.  By “temporalities” is meant estates and properties not  used  exclusively for’ religious  worship.   The successors in office of such  religious head or chief priest incorporal  as a corporation  sole shall  become  the corporation solo on to office, and  shall be permitted to transact business as such on filing with, the Securities and Exchange Commission a copy of bis  commission, certificate of election or letter of appointment duly certified by any  notary  public  or  clerk of  court of record (Guevara’s The  Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223).

The Corporation Law  also contains the follojwing  provisions :

SECTION 159.  Any  corporation sole  may  purchase  and hold  real estate and personal property for its  church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive  bequests or gifts for suck purposes.  Such, corporation may mortgage op sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order for  that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province  in  which  the  property is situated; but before making the order proof must ho made to the satisfaction of the  Court that  notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell  has been  given  by  publication  or otherwise  in such manner and for such time as  said Court  or  the Judge  thereof may  have directed, and that it is  to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage  or sell should  be granted.  The application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by  petition,  duly  verified  by  the bishop,  chief priest, or presiding elder, acting as corporation  sole, and may be  opposed by any member  of: the religious denomination, society or church  represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases where the rules,  regulations, and discipline of the religious denomination, society  or  church concerned, represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline  shall  control and the interventdtm of the Courts shall not he necessary.

It can, therefore,  be noticed that the power of  a corporation  sole to purchase  real property,  like the  power exercised in the case at bar,  is not  restricted  although the power  to  sell or mortgage   sometimes  is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and  discipline of the church concerned represented by said corporation  sole.   If corporations sole  can  purchase and  sell real  estate for  its church,  charitable,  benevolent,  or educational purposes, can they register  said  real properties?  As provided  by law,  lands  held  in  trust for  specific purposes  may  be subject of  registration (section  69, Act 496),  and the capacity of a corporation sole, like  petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to  it is  acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its name  (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular  Government, 26  Phil.  300-1913). Indeed it is absurd to conceive that while the corporations sole that might be in need  of acquiring  lands for the erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries  which  they are expressly  authorized  by law to acquire in connection with the  propagation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of religion, they could not register said properties in their name.  As  professor Javier  J. Nepomuceno very well says “Man  in  his search for the immortal  and imponderable, has, even before the dawn of  recorded history, erected temples  to  the Unknown  God, and  there  is  no doubt that he will continue to do so  for  all time  to come, as long as he continues ‘imploring the  aid of Divine Providence’ ”  (Nepomuceno’s   Corporation  Sole,  VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41,  September,  1956).   Under the circumstances of  this  case, We might safely  state that even before the  establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines  every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands  located in the territory in which  it exercised its functions or ministry  and for which it was created,  independently of the  nationality of its  incumbent unique  and single  member and head, the bishop of the diocese.   It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman  Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the   Constitution,  as  will  be hereunder  explained, did not  have  in mind the religious corporations sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be  owned by Filipino citizens.

There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered corporation sole is an  artificial being having the  right of  succession and the power, attributes,  and properties expressly authorized by law or incident  to ita existence (section 1, Corporation Law).   In  outlining the general  powers  of a  corporation. Public Act  No.  1459 provides  among  others:

Sec.  13. Every corporation has the  power:

* * *
(5) To purchase, hold, conyey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise deal with such real and personal property as the purposes  for which the corporation was  formed may permit, and the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and  necessarily  require,  unless  otherwise  prescribed  in  this Act:  * *  *.

In  implementation  of the  same and specifically  made applicable to a form of corporation recognized by the same law, Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole to  purchase and hold real as well as personal properties necessary for the  promotion of the objects for which said corporation  sole is created.  Respondent Land Registration Commissioner, however, maintained that since the  Philippine Constitution   is  a  later   enactment  than Public Act No.  1459,  the provisions of  Section  159 in amplification  of  Section  13  thereof, as regard  real  properties, should be considered repealed  by the former.

There is reason to believe  that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner was  under consideration,  the framers of the same did not have in  mind  or overlooked  this  particular form of corporation.  It is undeniable that  the nationalization and conservation  of our  natural  resources was  one of the dominating objectives of the  Convention  and in drafting the present Article  XIII  of the Constitution, the delegates were  goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino  posterity;  (2) to serve  as  an instrument of national  defense,  helping prevent the extension  into  the country of foreign control through, peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international  conflicts with the  consequent  danger to its internal  security  and independence  (See The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego, a Delegate  to  the Constitutional Convention,  Vol.  II.  P. 592-604).   In  the same book Delegate Aruego,  explaining the reason behind the first consideration, wrote:

“At  the time  of the framing of  the Philippine  Constitution, Filipino capital  had been  known  to be  rather  shy.  Filipinos hesitated as a general  rule  to invest  a considerable sura of their capital  for the  development,  exploitation and  utilization  of the natural resources of the country.  They  had not as yet been so used  to corporate enterprises as the peoples of the  west.  This general apathy, the delegates knew, would  mean the retardation of. the  development of the natural resources, unless foreign capital would be encouraged to come and help in that development.  They knew  that the nationalization  of the natural resources would  certainty not  encourage the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But there was a general feeling in  the Convention that  it  was better  to  have such a development  retarded or even  postponed together until  such  time when the  Filipinos  would  be ready  and willing to  undertake it rather than permit  the  natural  resources to be  placed  under the  ownership  or  control  of  foreigners in order  that they might be immediately developed, with the Filipinos of the future  serving not as owners but utmosts as tenants or workers under foreign  masters.  By all  means,  the:  delegates believed,  the natural  resources should  be conserved  for Filipino posterity”.

It   could  be distilled  from  the foregoing that  the framers  of  the Constitution intended  said provisions as barrier for  foreigners or corporations financed  by such foreigners  to  acquire,  exploit  and develop  our natural resources, saving  these undeveloped  wealth for our  people to clear  and enrich  when  they are  already prepared and capable of   doing so.  But that  is  not the  case of corporations sole  in the  Philippines,  for, We repeat, they are mere administrators  of  the  “temporalities” or  properties titled  in their name  and  for the benefit  of the members  of their  respective religion  composed  of  an overwhelming  majority  of  Filipinos.  No  mention  nor allusion whatsoever  is  made  in  the Constitution as  to the  prohibition  against  or   the  ability  of  the  Roman Catholic  Church in the  Philippines  to  acquire and hold agricultural lands.   Although there were some discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the inclusion  of  the provision allowing the Government to break big landed estates to put an  end to absentee  landlordism.

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of  Article XIII  of the  Constitution does have bearing  on  the petitioner’s case; even so the clause  requiring that  at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned by Filipinos  is  subordinated to the petitioner’s aforesaid right already  existing at the time  of the inauguration  of the Commonwealth  and  the  Republic of  the Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel  (a Delegate to  the  Constitutional  Convention),  in  his  concurring opinion  in the case  of  Gold  Creek  Mining  Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and  Quirico  Abadilla,  Director  of the Bureau  of Mines, respondent,  66  Phil.  259:

“The saving clause in the section involved of  the Constitution  was originally embodied in the report submitted by  the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of  Lands and Other  Natural Resources  to the  Constitutional  Convention  on  September  3 7, 1934.  It  was later inserted  in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated  as we find it now.  Slight have been the  changes undergone by the proviso from the time when it came out of the committee until it  was finally adopted.  When  first  submitted  and as  inserted in the first  draft of the Constitution  it reads:   subject to any right,  grant,  lease  or concession  existing  in respect thereto  on the date of the adoption of  the Constitution’.  As  finally  adopted, the proviso reads: ‘subject to any existing right, grant,  lease  or concession at the time of  the inauguration of  the Government established under this Constitution’.  This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs from tho just character of the government established.  The framers of the  Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility  by an  intense spirit of nationalism.  They well  knew that conservation  of  our natural  resources did not  mean destruction  or annihilation  of acquired  property  rights.  Withal,  they   erected  a  government neither episodic nor stationary but  well-high  conservative  in  the protection  of property rights. This  notwithstanding  nationalistic and  socialistic traits discoverable upon even a sudden  dip into a variety of the provisions  embodied in the instrument.”

The  writer  of  this decision  wishes  to  state at  this juncture  that  during the deliberation of this case he submitted  to the consideration of the Court the question that may be termed the “vested right saving  clause” contained in Section 1,  Article  XIII of the Constitution, but some of the  members of  this  Court either did not agree with the  theory  of  the writer, or were  not  ready  to take a definite stand  on the particular point I am now to discuss deferring our  ruling  on  such debatable question  for a better  occasion, inasmuch as  the determination thereof is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the problem involved  in this case.  In his desire  to face the  issues squarely, the writer will endeavour,  at least as a digression, to explain and  develop  his theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of  his  own,  for he deems  it better and  convenient to  go over  the  cycle  of reasons that are  linked to  one  another and  that step by step lead Us to conclude as We do in the  dispositive part of this  decision.

It will  be noticed  that  Section 1 of Article  XIII of the Constitution provides,  among; other things, that “all agricultural lands  of the public domain and  their disposition shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations at least  60 per  centum of  the  capital of  which is owned by  such  citizens,  SUBJECT  TO  ANY  EXISTING RIGHT  AT  THE  TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF  THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER  THIS CONSTITUTION.”

As recounted by  Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs.  Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, “this recognition (in the clause already  quoted),  is  not mere graciousness  but springs from the just character of  the  government established. The framers  of  the Constitution were not  obscured by the rhetoric of democracy  or swayed to  hostility  by an intense spirit of nationalism.   They well knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction’ or annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY RIGHTS”.

But  respondents’ counsel may argue that the preexisting right of acquisition of public or  private  lands by  a corporation which does not fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to  purchases or  acquisitions  made  prior  to  the effectivity of the Constitution and not to later transactions. This argument would imply that even assuming that petitioner  had  at the time of the enactment of the Constitution the right to purchase real property, that power  or right could not  be exercised  after  the effectivity  of our Constitution, because said power or right of corporations sole, like the herein petitioner, conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions of the Corporation Law, could no longer be  exercised in view  of the requisite therein prescribed that at Jeast 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation had to be  Filipino.  It has been  shown before that:  (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which are formed by no less  than 5 incorporators,  is composed of only one person, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion  for  the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever;  (2)  the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation  sole;  (3)   such temporalities  are  administered  for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or  territory  of  the corporation sole;  and  (4)  the latter,  as such, has  no nationality and  the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation,  management or administration of  the corporation sole,  nor affects the citizenship of the faithful connected with  their respective  diocese or corporation sole.

In  view of  these peculiarities  of the  corporation  sole, it would seem obvious  that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section  1,  Art.  XIII),  was  under consideration,  the framers of the same did not have  in mind or overlooked this particular form of  corporation.  If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove . it to  be  so, then the inescapable conclusion  would be that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the existence or  not of a vested right becomes unquestionably immaterial.

But let us  assume that the questioned proviso is material, yet We  might say that  a reading  of said Section  1 will show  that it does  not refer to any actual  acquisition of land but to the right, qualification or power to acquire and hold private  real property.   The population of the Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In the practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be  in need of more temples where to pray, more schools  where  the  children of the  congregation could  be taught in the principles of their  religion, more hospitals where their  sick could  be treated, more hallow or  consecrated  grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could  be buried,  many more than  those actually existing at  the time of the enactment of our Constitution.   This being the case,  could it be logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by express provision  of law, has  the power to hold and acquire real  estate and personal property for  its churches, charitable benevolent, or educational purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to stop “its growth  and  restrain its  necessities just because the  corporation sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only one person  who  in his unity  does not admit of  any percentage,  especially ‘when  that person  is not  the  owner but merely  an administrator  of  the temporalities  of the corporation  sole?   The writer leaves the answer to  whoever may read and consider this portion of the  decision.

Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in. disposing this case,  for even if We were  to disregard such saving clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right, grant, etc., at  the time of the inauguration of the Government  established under this Constitution, yet We would have, under the  evidence  on record, sufficient  grounds to uphold petitioner’s contention on this matter.

In this case  of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui  Si Temple,^* G. R. No. L-6776,  promulgated  May 21, 1955, wherein  this question was considered from  a different  angle, this Court,  through  Mr.  Justice J. B.  L. Reyes,  said:

“The fact that the appellant religious organization has  no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional  inhibition, since it  is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporation or associations allowed to acquired agricultural land or to exploit  natural resources shall  be  controlled by  Filipinos; and the  spirit  of the  Constitution  demands that in the absence  of capital stock,  the  controlling  membership should  be composed  of Filipino citizens“

In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a corporation  sole but a corporation aggregate, i.e.,  an  unregistered organization  operating through  3 trustees, all  of Chinese nationality,  and that is why this Court laid down the doctrine  just  quoted.   With regard to petitioner, the Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao, Inc.,  which  likewise is  a non-stock  corporation, the  case is  different,  because it is  a  registered  corporation  sole, evidently of no nationality and  registered  mainly to administer the temporalities and manage the properties be- longing to the faithful  of said church residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the record to inquire into the composing  membership  to  determine  whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we would find undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith  within  the territory of  Davao are predominantly  Filipino citizens.   As  indicated before, petitioner has presented evidence to  establish that  the  clergy and lay members of this religion fully  covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution. These facts are  not controverted by  respondents and our conclusion in this  point is sensibly obvious.

Dissenting Opinion—Discussed.—After having developed our theory in this  case  and arrived at  the  findings and conclusions already expressed in this decision.  We now deem it proper to analyze and delve into the basic foundation on  which the  dissenting opinion stands up.   Being aware of the transcendental and far-reaching effects that Our ruling  on  the  matter might have, this  case was thoroughly considered from all points of  view,  the  Court sparing no effort to solve the delicate problems involved herein.

At the  deliberations had  to attain this end,  two ways were open to a prompt  dispatch  of the  case:  (1) the reversal of the doctrine  We laid down in the  celebrated Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and properties from the grasp of the term  “private agricultural lands” used in section 5, Article XIII  of the Constitution; and (2) by driving  Our reasons to a point that might indirectly cause the appointment of Filipino bishops or  Ordinary  to head the corporations sole  created to  administer  the  temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. With regard to  the first way, a great  majority of the members of this Court  were not  yet  prepared  nor agreeable to  follow that course, for reasons that are obvious. As to the second way. it seems to  be misleading because the nationality of the head  of  a diocese constituted as  a corporation sole has no material bearing on the functions of the latter, which are  limited to the administration of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines.

Upon going over the grounds on  which the dissenting opinion is based, it may be noticed that its author lingered on the  outskirts of the  issues, thus throwing  the main points in controversy out of focus.   Of course We fully agree, as  stated by Professor Aruego, that the framers of our Constitution  had at heart  to insure the conservation of the natural resources  of Our motherland  for Pilipino posterity; to  serve them as an instrument  of  national defense,  helping  prevent  the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and to prevent making the Philippines  a source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security  and independence.  But all  these  precautions adopted by  the Delegates to Our Constitutional  Assembly could not  have been intended for or directed against cases like the one at bar.  The  emphasis and wonderings  on the statement that once the  capacity of  a corporation sole to acquire private agricultural lands is admitted there will be no limit to the areas that it may hold and that this will pave the way for the “revival or revitalization of religious landholdings that proved  so troublesome in our past”, cannot even furnish the “penumbra” of a threat to the future of the Filipino people.  In  the first place, the right of Filipino citizens, including those of foreign  extraction, and Philippine corporations,  to  acquire  private lands  is not subject to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and  We certainly do  not see  any wrong in that.  The right of Filipino citizens and corporations to acquire public agricultural lands is already  limited by law.  In the  second place, corporations sole  cannot be  considered  as  aliens because they have  no nationality at  all.  Corporations

sole are, under the law, mere administrators of the  temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. In the  third place,  every corporation, be it  aggregate  or sole,  is only entitled to purchase, convey, sell,  lease, let, mortgage,  encumber and otherwise  deal with real properties when it is pursuant to or in consonance with the purposes for which the corporation was formed,  and when the transactions  of the lawful business of the corporation reasonably  and necessarily require such dealing—section 13-(5)  of the Corporation  Law, Public Act No. 1459— and  considering  these  provisions   in  conjunction  with Section 159 of the  same law which provides that a  corporation sole may only “purchase and hold real estate and personal properties for  its church, charitable, benevolent or educational  purposes”, the above mentioned fear of revitalization of religious landholdings in the Philippines is absolutely  dispelled.  The fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequestsor  gifts of real properties   (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire  their  big haciendas  during  the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that  the requisite that  bequests or  gifts of real estate be  for charitable, benevolent, or  educational purposes, was, in  the  opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and  adequate  protection  against the revitalization of religious landholdings.

Finally,  and as  previously stated,  We have  reason  to believe that when the Delegates to the Constitutional  Convention drafted  and approved  Article  XIII of  the  Constitution, they did not have in mind the corporation  sole. We  come   to this finding   because  the  Constitutional Assembly,  composed as it was  by a great number  of eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any other legislative body  empowered to enact either  the Constitution of the country  or any  public  statute,  presumed  to know the conditions  existing as to particular  subject matter when it enacted  a statute  (Board  of  Com’rs of Orange County vs. Bain, 92 S. E.  176; 173 N. C. 377).

“Immemorial  customs are presumed to  have been always  in the mind of the Legislature in  enacting legislation,”   (In re Kruger’s Estate, 121 A. 109; 277 Pa. 326).

“The Legislative is  presumed  to  have a knowledge  of the state of  the law  on  the  subjects  upon  which it  legislates.”   (Clover Valley Land &  Stock  Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723, 726.)

“The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature acted’ with  full knowledge  of the prior legislation  on the subject and its construction by the courts.”  (Johns vs. Town  of Sheridan, 89  N. E. 899,  44 Ind. App. 620.)

“The Legislature is presumed to have  been familiar with the subject with winch it  was dealing * * *”  (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E.  778, 781.)

“The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory construction.”  (People vs.  Lowell, 230  N. W.  202,  250  Mich. 349, followed in  P.  vs. Woodworth, 230 N. W. 211,  250  Mich. 436.)

“It is not to be presumed  that  a provision  was inserted in a constitution or statute without reason, or that a result was  intended inconsistent with the  judgment of men of common sense guided by reason.”  (Mitchell vs. Lawden,  123  H, B. 566, 288 111.  326.)  See City of Decatur vs. German, 142 N.  E.  2S2, 310 III.  591, and many other authorities that can be cited in support  hereof.

Consequently,  the   Constitutional   Assembly  must  have known:

1. That a corporation sole  is  organized by  and  composed of a single individual, the  head  of any religious  society  or  church operating within  the  zone,  area or jurisdiction covered  by said ‘ corporation  sole  (Article 155, Public Act No.  1459);
2. That a  corporation sole is  a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary  (the corporation sole proper) does  not own the temporalities which he  merely administers;
4. That under the  law the  nationality  of said Ordinary  or of any administrator has  absolutely no bearing on the nationality of the person desiring to  acquire real property  in the Philippines  by purchase or other lawful means other than by hereditary  succession, who,  according to the Constitution must be a  Filipino  (sections 1 and 5,  Article XIII);
5. That section  159  of the Corporation Law expressly  authorised the corporation sole to purchase and  hold Teal estate for  its church, charitable, benevolent  or educational  purposes,  and to  receive bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our  Magna Carta the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention,  almost  all of whom were Roman Catholics.

could not have intended to curtail the propagation of the  Roman Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities of their church, knowing pretty well that with the growth of our population more places of worship, more schools where our youth could be  taught and trained; more hallow grounds where to bury our dead would be needed in the course of time.

Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized  the corporations sole even  to receive bequests or gifts of real estates  and this Court could not, without any clear  and specific  provision  of  the  Constitution, declare that  any real property  donated,  let us say this year, could  no longer be registered in the  name of the corporation  sole to which it  was conveyed.  That  would be an absurdity that should  not receive bur sanction  on the pretext that corporations  sole which have no nationality and are non-stock corporations composed of only one person  in the  capacity of administrator, have to establish first that at least sixty  per centum of their capital belong to Filipino citizens.   The new Civil Code  even provides:

“ART.  10.—In  case of  doubt in  the interpretation or application of lawn, it  is presumed that the lawmaking body  intended right and justice  to prevail.”

Moreover, under the laws  of the  Philippines,  the administrator of the properties  of a Filipino  can  acquire, in the name of the latter, private lands without any limitation whatsoever,  and  that is so  because the  properties  thus acquired are not for and would not  belong to  the administrator but to the Filipino whom  he  represents.  But the dissenting Justice inquires:  If  the Ordinary is only the administrator, for  whom  does  he administer?   And who can alter  or overrule his  acts?   We will  forthwith proceed to answer these questions.  The corporations sole by reason  of  their  peculiar constitution and  form  of operation  have no  designed   owner of its temporalities, although by the terms of the  law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary holds them in trust for the  benefit  of the Roman Catholic  faithful  of their  respective locality or  diocese.  Borrowing  the  very words of the  law,  We may  say that  the temporalities of every corporation sole are held in trust for the use, purpose, behoof and benefit of the religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church to which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an  organized and constituent part (section 163  of the Corporation Law).

In  connection with the powers of the  Ordinary over the temporalities of the corporation sole, let us  see now what is the meaning and scope  of the  word  “control”.   According to the Merriam-Webster’s New  International Dictionary,  2nd ed., p.  580, one of  the acceptations of  the word  “control”  is:

“4. To  exercise restraining or directing  influence  over;  to dominate; regulate;  hence, to hold from action; to curb;  subject; also, Obn.—to overpower.
“SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct;  check, subdue.

” It is  true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the intervention of the courts is not necessary, to mortgage or sell real property held by the corporation sole  where the rules,  regulations and discipline of the religious  denomination,  society or  church concerned  represented by such  corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding,  selling and mortgaging real estate, and  that  the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction  of the corporation sole  has no  say  either  in the manner of acquiring  or of  selling real property.  It  may be  also admitted that  the faithful of the diocese  cannot govern or overrule the acts of  the Ordinary,  but all this  does not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the corporation sole  without  check  or restraint.   We must not forget that when  a corporation  sole is  incorporated under  Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof subjects himself  to the jurisdiction  of the Philip- pine courts of justice and these tribunals  can thus enter- tain  grievances arising  out of  or with  respect to  the temporalities of the church which came into the possession of the corporation sole as administrator. It may be alleged that  the courts  cannot  intervene  as  to  the matters of doctrine or teachings of the Roman  Catholic Church.  That is correct, but the courts may step in, at the instance of the faithful  for whom the  temporalities are being held in trust, to check  undue exercise by  the corporation sole of its  powers as  administrator to insure that they are used for the purpose or purposes lor which the corporation sole was created.

American authorities have these to say:

It has been held that the, courts have jurisdiction  over an action brought  by persons claiming to be members  of a church, who-  allege a wrongful and fraudulent diversion of the  church ‘property to uses foreign to the purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical question is involved and equity will  protect  from  wrongful diversion of the property  (Hondryx vs. Peoples  United  Church, 42 Wash.  336, 4 L.R.A.—n.s. 4).

The courts of the State have no  general  jurisdiction and control over the officers of such corporations in respect  to the performance of their official duties; but as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may  exercise the same supervision as in  other cases of trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks,  174 Ind. 428, 91 N. E. 344, 92 N. E. 164, 30 L.R.A.—n.s.-665;  Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, supra.)

Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church rules or discipline unless civil rights become involved and which must be protected  (Morris St., Baptist Church vs.  Dart, 67 S. C. S38, 45 S. E. 753, and others).  (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, p.  960-964.)

If the Constitutional Assembly was aware  of all the facts above enumerated and  of the provisions of law  relative  to existing conditions as to  management and operation of corporations sole in the Philippines, and if, on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be imagined even for an instant that when  Article XIII of the Constitution  was approved the framers thereof intended  to prevent or curtail from then on the  acquisition by  corporations sole, either by purchase or donation, of real properties that they might need for the  propagation  of  the faith  and for  other religious and Christian activities such as the moral  education of  the youth, the  care, attention  and  treatment of  the sick and the  burial  of the dead of the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the respective corporations sole ?   The  mere  indulgence  in  said thought would impress upon Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity.  And that  is  precisely the leit motiv  that  permeates the  whole fabric  of the dissenting  opinion.

It  seems  from  the  foregoing  that the  main  problem We  are  confronted with  in  this  appeal,  hinges  around the necessity  of a proper  and adequate  interpretation  of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.  Let Us then be  guided  by  the  principles  of  statutory  construction laid  down by  the authorities on the matter:

“The  most  important single factor in  determining the intention of the people from whom the constitution emanated is the language in which it  is  expressed.   The words employed  are to be taken in their natural sense,  except that legal or technical  terms are to be given their technical  meaning.  The imperfections of language as a vehicle for  conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must be resolved by resort to extraneous aids  for discovering the intent of the  framers.  Among1 the  more important  of these  are a consideration of the history of  the times when the provision was adopted and of  the purposes  aimed  at in  its adoption.  The  debates  of constitutional  conventions,  contemporaneous  construction, and  practical construction  by the legislative  and  executive departments,  especially if long  continued, may be  resorted to to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities. * * *.   Consideration  of the consequences flowing from alternative constructions  of doubtful provisions constitutes an important interpretative  device.  *  * *.   The purposes  of many of the broadly phrased  constiiutional limitations were the promotion of policies  that do  not lend themselves to definite  and  specific formulation.  The courts have had to define those policies and  have  often drawn  on natural law  and natural rights theories in doing  so. The interpretation of constitutions tends to respond to changing conceptions of  political  and  social  values. The  extent to  which these extraneous aids affect the judicial construction of constitutions cannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in  describing the  essentials of the process” (Kottschaeffer on Constitutional  Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).

“There are times when  even the  literal expression of  legislation may be inconsistent with the general objectives of policy behind it, and  on the basis  of the equity or  spirit of the statute  the courts rationalize  a restricted meaning of the  latter.  A restricted interpretation is usually applied where the  effect of a  literal  interpretation will make for injustice and  absurdity  or, in  the words of one court, the language  must be so unreasonable  ‘as to  shock general  common  sense’”.  (Vol.  3,  Sutherland on  Statutory  Construction, 3rd ed.,  150.)

“A constitution  is not intended to be a limitation on  the development of a country  nor  an obstruction  to  its progress  and foreign relations”  (Moscow Fire Ins.  Co. of Moscow, Russia  vs. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 294 N.  Y. S.  643; 56 N.  E.  2d 745,  293 N. Y. 749).

“Although the meaning or  principles of a  constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its  adoption, a  constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a great  length of time, and it is progressive and not static.  Accordingly, it  should not  receive  too narrow or literal  an interpretation but rather  the meaning given it  should be  applied in such  manner  as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise” (U.S. vs. Lassie, 313  U.S. 299,  85  L.  Ed., 1368).

“Effect should be given  to the  purpose  indicated by a fair interpretation  of  the  language used and that  construction  which effectuates,  rather  than that  which destroys  a  plain  intent or purpose  of  a  constitutional  provision,  is  not only favored   but will  be  adopted”  (State  ex rel. Randolph Country, vs.  Walden,  206 S. W.  2d  979).

“It is quite generally held that in  arriving at the intent  and purpose  the  construction should be  broad  or liberal or  equitable, as  the  better  method  of ascertaining  that intent, rather  than technical” (Great  Southern  Life Ins. Co.  vs. City of Austin,  243 S.W.  778).

All these authorities  uphold our  conviction that  the framers of  the  Constitution  had  not in mind  the  corporations sole, nor intended to  apply  them the provisions of sections  1 and  5 of said Article XIII when they passed and  approved  the  same.   And if  it were so  as  We think it is,  herein  petitioner,   the  Roman  Catholic  Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.,  could not be deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its name with the Register of Deeds of  Davao, an  indispensable requisite prescribed  by the Land Registration Act for lands covered by the Torrens system.

We leave  as the  last theme  for  discussion the  much debated question above referred to  as “the vested right saving clause” contained in section 1,  Article XIII of the Constitution.   The dissenting Justice hurls upon the personal opinion  expressed on the  matter by the writer  of the decision the most pointed  darts of his  severe criticism. We think, however, that this strong dissent should have been  spared,  because  as clearly  indicated before,  some members  of this Court either  did  not  agree  with  the theory of the writer or were  not ready to take a definite stand  on  that particular point,  so  that  there  being  no majority  opinion thereon there  was no need  of  any dissension therefrom.   But as the  criticism has been  made the  writer  deems  it necessary  to say a few  words  of explanation.

The writer fully agrees with the dissenting  Justice that ordinarily “a capacity to acquire (property) in futuro, is not in itself a vested or existing property right that the Constitution  protects from impairment.   For a  property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a transition from the  potential or  contingent  to the  actual,  and the proprietary interest  must have  attached  to  a thing;  it must have become  ‘fixed and established’”  (Balboa vs. Farrales,  51 Phil.  498).  But the case at bar has  to  be considered as an  exception to the rule  because among the rights granted by  section 159  of the Corporation  Law was the right to receive bequests  or gifts of real properties for charitable,  benevolent and educational  purposes.   And this right to receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations in futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be  impaired without  any specific provision  in the Constitution to  that  effect, especially when the  impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of the religious faith of the immense majority  of the  Filipino  people and the curtailment of the activities of their Church.  That is why the writer gave as a basis of his contention what Professor Aruego said in  his book “The Framing” of the Philippine  Constitution” and the enlightening opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P.  Laurel, another Delegate to the Constitutional  Convention, in his concurring opinion in the case of Goldcreek Mining Company vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil.  259.   Anyway the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to pass upon  said “vested  right saving clause” for the final determination of this  case.

JUDGMENT
Wherefore, the Resolution  of  the  respondent Land Registration  Commission of September 21, 1954,  holding that  in view of the  provisions of sections  1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine  Constitution  the  vendee (petitioner)  is not qualified to acquire lands in the Philip- pines in the  absence of proof that at least 60  per  centum of the capital, properties or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, and  denying the registration  of  the deed  of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such  requisite,  is hereby reversed.  Consequently, the respondent  Register  of  Deeds  of the City of Davao is  ordered to register the deed of sale executed by  Mateo  L. Bodis  in favor  of  the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present litigation.  No pronouncement is made as to  costs.   It is so ordered.

Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ.,  concur.
Paras, C. J., and Bengzon, J.,  concur  in the result.

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^* Translation.—Unless by lawful provisions more ample rights are conferred  upon him,  to  the  local  Ordinary pertains  the  duty to exercise  diligence  in  the administration  of  all the  ecclesiastical properties located  within his  territory  and to  avoid their  removal from, his jurisdiction.

Taking  into account the rights and  the legitimate  customs  and circumstances, every Ordinary shall endeavour to regulate everything concerning  the administration of the ecclesiastical properties  and shall give, within the bounds of Common Law, timely and particular instructions  therefor.
^* 97 Phil., 58.

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CONCURRING
LABRADOR, J., :

The  case  at bar  squarely presents this important legal question:  Has  the  bishop  or  ordinary of  the  Roman Catholic  Church  who is  not a  Filipino citizen,  as  corporation  sole, the right to register land, belonging to the Church over which he presides,  in view of the Krivenko decision?  Mr. Justice Felix  sustains the affirmative view while Mr. Justice J. B. L.  Reyes, the negative.  As the undersigned  understands it, the reason given  for this last view is that the constitutional provision prohibiting   land ownership by foreigners  also extends  to control  because this lies within  the scope  and purpose of the prohibition.

To our way of thinking, the question at issue depends for its resolution upon another, namely, who is the owner of the land  or  property of  the  Church sought to be registered ?  Under the Canon Law the parish  and  the diocese have the right to  acquire and  own property.

“SEC.  1. La  Iglesia  eatdlica  y la Sede Apostolica,  libre e  inde- pendientementc de la potestad civil, tiene dcrecho innato de adquirir, retcner y administrar bienes temporales para el logro de sus propios fines.

“SEC.  2. Tambien las iglesias   particulares y  demas  personas morales erig’idas por la auloridad eclesiastica en persona juridica, tietien dcrecho, a tenor de los sagTados canones, de adquirir, retcner y  administrar  bienes  temporales.”   (Canon  1495)   (Codigo  de Derecho Canonieo por Miguelez-Alonso-Cabreros, 4a ed., p. 562.)

The  Canon Law  further  states that  Church property belongs to  the  non-collegiate moral  person  called  the parish, or to the diocese.

“In canon  law the ownership  of ecclesiastical  goods belongs to each separate  juridical  person  in the Church   (C.  1499).   The property of St. John’s Church does not belong to  the  Pope, the bishop, the pastor, or even  to  the people of the parish. It belongs to the non-collegiate  moral  person called the parish, which has been lawfully erected.  It is not  like  a stock company.  The civil law docs not recognize  this  canonical  principle; it insists on an act of civil incorporation or some other legal device.”   (Ready Answers in Canon Law by Rev. P.  J.  Lydon,  DP.,  3rd ed.,  194S, p.  576.)
“Parish. 3. A portion or subdivision of a  diocese committed to the spiritual jurisdiction or care  of  a priest or minister, called rector  or  pastor.  In  the  Protestant Episcopal  Church,  it  is a  territorial division usually following civil bounds,  as those  of a  town.  In the Roman Catholic Church, it is usually  territorial, but whenever, as in some parts of  the  United  States there arc different  rites  and languages, the boundaries and jurisdiction arc determined by  rite or language; as, a  Ruthenian or a Polish parish.
“5, The inhabitants or members  of a  parish,  collectively.”
“Diocese. 3.  Eccl.  The circuit or extent of  a bishop’s jurisdiction; the district in which a bishop has  authority.”  (Webster’s  New International  Dictionary.)

We are aware  of the  fact  that  some writers  believe that ownership of ecclesiastical  properties resides  in the Roman  Catholic Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, but the better opinion  seems to be that they do belong”  to the parishes and  dioceses as above indicated.

“Canonists entertain different opinions as  to the person in whom the ownership  of the ecclesiastical properties  is vested, with respect to which we  shall,  for our purpose,  confine ourselves  to  stating with Donoso  that, while many  doctors cited  by  Fagmano  believe that it  resides in the  Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church,  it is more probable that  ownership,  strictly speaking, does not  reside  in the  latter  and, consequently,  ecclesiastical properties are  owned by the churches, institutions and canonically established private corporations to which  said properties have  been donated.”   (3  Campos  y   Pulido,  Legislacion  y  Jurispnidencia Canonica, P. 420, cited  in  Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63  Phil.,  881, S88-889

The property in question,  therefore, appears to belong to the  parish  or  the diocese of  Davao.  But the  Roman Catholics of  Davao are  not organised as a juridical person, either  under the  Canon  Law or under the Civil Law. Neither is there any provision in either for  their organization as  a juridical person.  Registration of  the  property in the  name of the  Roman Catholics  of  Davao is,  therefore,  impossible.

As under  the Civil Law, however, the organization  of parishes and dioceses as juridical persons is not expressly provided for, the  corporation law has set  up  the fiction known as the “corporation sole.”

“It  tolerates  the  corporation sole wherever  and as long as the state law does  not permit the legal incorporation of tile  parish or diocese.   The bishop officially is the legal owner.”  (Ready Answers in Canon Law, supra, p.  577.)

and authorizes  it to purchase and hold real estate for the Church.

“SEC. 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable,  benevolent, or educational purposes,  and  may receive bequests  or  gifts  for such purposes.  Such corporation may  mortgage  or  sell real   property held by  it upon  obtaining an order  for  that  purpose  from . the Court  of First  Instance of the province in which the  property is situated;  but before making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the court that  notice of the application  for leave to mortgage or  sell  has been  given by publication or otherwise in such manner and  for such time as  said court or the judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the  corporation that leave to mortgage or  sell  should be granted. The application for  leave  to mortgage  or  sell must  be made  by  petition,  duly verified by the  bishop chief priest, or presiding elder, acting  as corporation sole,  and may be opposed by  any member of  the religious  denomination, society,  or church represented  by  the corporation  sole: Provided, however, That in  cases when the  rules, regulations and  discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned represented by such corporation  sole regulate the methods  of acquiring,  holding,  selling, and mortgaging  real estate and  personal property,  such rules, regulations,  and discipline shall control and the  intervention of  the courts shall  not  be  necessary.” (The Corporation  Law. )

And in  accordance  with the above section, the temporalities of  the  Church or of a parish or  diocese are  allowed to be registered in  the name  of the  corporation  sole for purposes  of  administration and  in  trust for  the  real owners.

The  mere fact that  the Corporation  Law  authorizes the  corporation sole  to  acquire  and  hold  real  estate or other  property does not make the  latter  the real owner thereof,  as his tenure of  Church property is merely for the  purposes  of  administration.   As   stated  above,  the bishop is  only  the legal   (technical)  owner  or   trustee, the parish or diocese being the beneficial owner, or cestui que trust.

Having arrived at the  conclusion that the property in question belongs actually either to the parish or the diocese of Davao, the next question that possess for solution is, In case of said property, whose  nationality must be considered for the purpose of determining  the  applicability of the constitutional provision  limiting ownership of land to Filipinos, that of the bishop or chief priest who registers as corporation sole,  or  that of the  constituents  of the parish or  diocese who are the  beneficial  owners of the land?  We believe that  that of the latter must be considered, and not  that  of the priest clothed with the corporate fiction  and denominated  as the corporation sole. The  corporation  sole  is  a mere contrivance  to enable  a church to acquire,  own and manage properties belonging to the church. It is only a means to an end.   The constitutional provision could not have been  meant to apply to the means through which and by which property may be owned or  acquired, but to  the  ultimate owner of the property.   Hence, the citizenship  of  the priest forming the corporation sole should be no impediment if the parish or diocese which  owns the property  is qualified to own and possess  the property.

We can take judicial  notice of  the fact that  a great majority of the constituents of  the parish or  diocese of Davao are Roman Catholics.   The affidavit demanded  is, therefore, a  mere  formality.

The dissenting  opinion sustains the proposition that control, not actual ownership, is the factor that determines whether the constitutional prohibition against  alien ownership of lands should or should not apply.  We may assume the correctness of  the  proposition  that  the  Holy  See exercises  control  over  Church  properties  everywhere, but the control cannot be real and actual but merely theoretical. In any case, the constitutional prohibition is limited by its terms  to  ownership  and  ownership  alone.   And should the  corporation  sole  abuse  its  powers and  authority in relation to the administration or disposal of  the property contrary to the  wishes of the  constituents of the parish or the diocese, the act may  always be questioned  as  ultra vires.

We agree, therefore, with the reversal of  the  order.

Montemayor and Reyes,  A., JJ., concur.

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DISSENTING
REYES, J.  B. L., J.,:

I  regret not being  able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix.  The decision of the Supreme Court in this case will be of far reaching results, for once the  capacity of corporations sole to acquire  public and private agricultural lands is admitted, there will be no limit to the areas they may  hold until  the Legislature  implements  section 3  of Article XII of  the Constitution, empowering  it to set  a limit to the size of  private agricultural land  that may be held; and even then it can only be done without prejudice to rights acquired prior to the enactment of such law.   In other words, even if a limitative law  is  adopted, it will  not affect the  landholdings acquired  before the law become effective, no matter how vast the  estate should be.

The  Constitutional  restrictions  to  the acquisition of agricultural land are well  known:

“SECTION  1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands  of thel public domain,  waters, minerals,  coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,  all forces  of potential energy, and other natural resources  of the Philippines belong  to the State, and their disposition, exploitation. development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to  corporations or associations at  least sixty per centum of the capital of which  is owned by such  citizens,  subject to any existing right,  grant,  lease,  or concession  at the  time  of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,  with the exception of public agricultural  land, shall  not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,  development, or  utilization  of any of  the natural resources shall be granted for a  period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as  to water rights for  irrigation,  water supply  fisheries,  or  industrial  uses  other than  the development of water  power, in which  cases  beneficial use may be  the measure and the limit of the grant.”  (Article XII,  Constitution of  the Phil.)

“SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural  land  shall be transferred or assigned except to  individuals, corporations, or associations  qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in  the Philippines.”  (Art. XII,  Constitution of the Phil.)

In requiring corporations  or associations  to have sixty per cent (60%) of their capital owned by Filipmo citizens, the   constitution  manifestly  disregarded  the  corporate fiction,  i.e., the juridical  personality  of such corporations or associations.   It went behind the  corporate entity  and looked  at the  natural persons that composed it,  and  demanded that a clear majority  in interest (60%)  should be Filipino.   To me this  was done  to ensure  that   the control of its properties  (not merely  the beneficial ownership  thereof)  remained  in  Filipmo  hands.   (Aruego, Framing  of the  Constitution,  Vol. 2. pp.  604,  606.)

“The  nationalization  of the natural resources  of the country , was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve  as  an  instrument of national  defense,  helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration;  and  (3) to prevent making  the  Philippines a source of international conflicts with  the consequent danger to Its internal  security  and independence.  * *  *’

“The  Convention  permitted aliens  to  acquire an  interest in  the natural  resources of the country  and in private agricultural lands as component elements  of corporations  or  associations.   The   maximum limit  of interest  that  they could  hold in  a  corporation  or association  would be  only  forty  per centum  of  the capital.   Accordingly in control of the corporation or association would remain in Filipino  hands.

In  its report  the committee on nationalisation  and preservation of lands and other natural resources recommended that the maximum limit  of interest that aliens  could  hold in  a corporation or  association should be only twenty-five per centum of the capital.  The purpose  of  tlio  committee  was  to enable Filipino-controlled  cor- porations or  associations, if necessary,  to  interest aliens to  join their technical or managerial staff hy giving: them a part interest in the  same.  The  sub-committee  of  seven embodied this  recommendation in tile first draft of  the Constitution; but in the revised article  on General  Provisions,  it raised the  amount to forty per centum.”  (emphasis supplied.)

It was in recognition of  this basic rule that we held in Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu  Si  Temple,  51 Off. Gaz. p. 2866, that if the  association  had no capital,  its controlling  membership   must  be  composed  of Filipinos. Because ownership divorced  from  control  is not true ownership.

From these premises it  can be deduced that the preliminary question to  be decided  by  the court is  the following:  what  and  who  exercises  the power of  control in the corporation sole known  as  “The Roman  Catholic Apostolic Administrator  of Davao,  Inc.”?

Under section  155 of the Corporation Law, the bishop, or other religious  head, as corporation sole, is  “charged with the administration of the temporalities of his church.” It becomes then pertinent to inquire: if he is only an administrator, for whom does he administer?   And who can alter or overrule his  acts?

If his acts as administrator can not be overridden, or altered, except by himself, then obviously  the control of the  corporation  and  its temporalities is   in the bishop himself, and he must be  a Filipino citizen.  If,  on the other hand, the final  say as to management, exploitation, encumbrance or disposition of the temporalities resides in another individual or  body  of  individuals, then the control resides there.  To possess  constitutional capacity  to acquire  agricultural  land or  other natural  resources, that body making the  final decision  for  the corporation must have at least 60 per cent Filipino  membership.

By this test, the body of members professing the Catholic faith  in the  diocese  of Davao  does  not  constitute the controlling membership.  For under the rules of the Roman Catholic Church the faithful  can not control the  acts of the  Ordinary; they  can not override  his  decision, just as they do not elect or remove him.  Only his hierarchical superiors can do that; the control is from above, not from below.  Hence, the fact that 90 per cent (or even  100 per cent) of the faithful in the  diocese should  be composed of Filipino citizens is totally devoid of significance from the standpoint of the  constitutional restrictions in question (see Codex, Canons 1518 and 1530, paragraph 1,  No. 3).

Moreover, I do  not  think that  the body of Catholic faithful in the Davao diocese can be taken, for the  purpose here under consideration, as the Church represented by the Ordinary of Davao.   That body does not  constitute an entity  or unit separate and apart  from the rest of  the faithful  throughout  the  world that compose the Roman Catholic  Church  that  has always claimed  ecumenical (universal) character.   There is no Catholic  Church  of Davao district and independent  of the Catholic  Church of Manila, Lipa or Rome.  All those professing Catholic . faith are members of only one single church or religious group.  Thus the  Iglesia Filipina  Independiente  is  not part of the Catholic  Church, precisely  because of its independence.

If,  then, the Catholic Church of Davao  is  part and parcel  of the universal  Catholic Church,  it can not be considered separate and apart from it  in this case.  And if considered  with it, obviously the condition of  60  per cent Filipino  membership  is not  satisfied  when  all  the Catholic  faithful in the world are  taken  into account.

The  unity and  singleness  of the various  dioceses of the church appears  expressly recognized in  section 163 of the Corporation Law, which  provides  that the corporation  (sole)  shall  hold the temporalities, not  for  the diocese; but for the  benefit “of  the church  of which  the diocese—is an  organized or constituent part.“‘

“SEC.  163.  The right to administer all temporalities and all prop- erty held or owned by  a religious order or society, or by the diocese, synod, or district organization of any  religious denomination or church shall, on its incorporation,  pass to the corporation and shall be held in trust for  the use, purpose, behoof, and benefit  of  the religious society or order so incorporated or of the church of which the diocese,  synod, or district organization  is  an  organized and constituent part.”

So that, even from the standpoint of beneficial owner- ship, the diocese of Davao can not be viewed as a  group legally isolated from the Catholic Church  as  a whole.

Nor does court control over the acts of the corporation sole constitute a guarantee of Filipino  control.that  would satisfy  the purposes  of  the  constitution,  for the  reason that  under section 159  (last  proviso)  of the  Corporation law,  the court intervention is dispensed with where the rules  and discipline  of the church already  regulate the acquisition and disposition of real estate  and  personal property.

“Provided however, That  in cases  where  the rules,  regulations and discipline of the religious  denomination, society,  or church  concerned represented by such corporation sole  regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and mortgaging  real estate  and personal  property,  such  rules,, regulations,  and  discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be weessary.” (emphasis supplied.)

It  is argued that a distinction’ must  be drawn between the lands to  be devoted to purely religious  purposes and the lands  held in  ordinary ownership.  But where in the Constitution  is  such  a  distinction  drawn?  Under  it, capacity to acquire agricultural  land for  the erection of a church is capacity to acquire agricultural land for any lawful purpose, whether it be for convents  or schools  or seminaries or haciendas  for their support or land  to  be held  solely  for  enjoyment  of  the  revenue.  Once  the capacity to acquire is granted, the way is paved  for the revitalization  of religious  landholdings  that proved  so troublesome in  our past.   I   can not  conceive  that  the Constitution intended  to  revive them.

It ia  also  argued  that, before  the Constitution was adopted, the  corporations  sole  had, by  express statute, the right to acquire agricultural land; and that the Constitution was  not  intended  to  destroy  such  “acquired property rights.”   If followed, the argument destroys the constitutional  restrictions.  All aliens had  a capacity to acquire agricultural land before the Constitution came into effect,  because no prohibition  existed  previously.  Must their right to acquire and  hold  agricultural land be conceded  in spite of the Constitution?

That the law should have expressly conferred capacity to acquire  land upon corporations  sole  was  not due  to any special predilection for them; it  was exclusively due to the  principle that corporation,  as  artificial entities, have no inherent  rights,  but only those  granted by the sovereign.  Unless  conferred, the corporate right  would not exist.

Furthermore, a  capacity to acquire in futuro, is not  in itself a vested or existing  property right that the Constitution protects from impairment.   For a property  right to be vested  (or acquired) there must be a transition from the  potential,  or contingent, to the actual,  and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it  must have become “fixed or established” (Balboa vs.  Farrales, 51 Phil. 498).   If mere potentialities  can not be  impaired, then the law  would  become unchangeable,  for  every variation in  it will reduce some one’s legal ability  to  do or not to do.  Already in Benguet Consolidated vs. Pineda,^* 52 Off.  Gaz. 1961, we have ruled that no one has a vested right in statutory  privileges or exemptions.  And in his concurring opinion in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil.  259  (cited  by Justice Felix), Mr. Justice Laurel squarely declared that “contingency or expectation is  neither property nor property right.”  (cas. cit., p. 269.)

Finally, the  point is also made that the  Ordinary,  as religious corporation sole,  has no  citizenship, and is not an alien.  The answer is  that  under the Constitution  of the Republic, it is not enough that the acquirer of agricultural land be not an alien; he must be  a B’ilipino  or controlled  by  Filipinos.

Wherefore,  I am constrained  to  conclude:

(1) That  the capacity of  religious   corporations  sole to  acquire agricultural  land  depends  upon  60 per cent Filipino membership of the group or body exercising control of the  corporation;
(2) That if control of any such corporation  should be vested  in a  single  person, then such  person must be a Filipino  citizen;
(3) That in  the absence  of  evidence on these  points, the  order  appealed from,  denying registration   of  the conveyance, should  be affirmed.

Concepcion, J., concur.

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^* 98 Phil., 711.