G. R. No. L-9914. December 19, 1957

Rev,  Fr.  Martin  S.  Alcazar was the  original owner of 2 parcels of land: one  located  at Earlis,  Pilar, Sorsogon, containing  an area  of 34.8471  hectares,  and the other at Burabon, Loreto, Castilla,  of  the same  province, with an area of 440.3326 hectares (Exh.  1).  In  an absolute deed of  sale  dated February 17,  1953, Fr.  Alcazar appeared to have sold  the aforementioned  parcels  of land together with a.  house of strong materials  erected on the Land of Frank  Hoeizi at  Putiao, Pilar, Sorsogon,  to the  Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva  Caceres in  consideration of the sum of P12,000.00.  It  was specifically  provided  for in said instrument that as the said parcels  of land were not yet brought under the Torrens system, although at the time of the  transaction the proceeding for the  registration of the same was still pending (GLRO No. 2, Rec. No. N-728), the deed of  sale should be  registered  under  Act  3344.  On July 14, 1953, Original Certificate of Title No.  0-32 covering  the parcels of land above-mentioned was actually issued  in the name of  Fr.  Martin  S. Alcazar.   It does not appear from the record  that the deed of sale  (Exh. 1)  was ever registered under the provisions of Act 3344 as agreed upon.

On January 17,  1954, after the demise of Fr.  Martin Alcazar, the deed of sale (Exh.  1) was presented to the Register of Deeds  of Sorsogon for registration, together with an instrument  executed  by  Monsignor  Pedro  P. Santos  ceding all the property rights and interests that he had  as  the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres over the properties subject of the  sale in favor of the Roman Catholic.  Bishop  of Legaspi, with Mons. Flaviano B.  Ariola as  incumbent  (Exh.  D).  As a consequence thereof, O.C.T. No. 0-32 was cancelled and Transfer  Certificate of  Title  No. 656  was issued to Mons. Pedro  P. Santos, but said  certificate  was  likewise  cancelled on the same day and Transfer Certificate of  Title No.  657 was issued  in the  name  of Mons. Flaviano  B. Ariola  in  virtue of  the  cession  of rights executed  by Mons.  Santos in favor of the Roman Catholic  Bishop of Legaspi.

On April 20, 1954,  Concepcicm H. Luna,  Alfredo  Hoeizi, Carmen A. Hoeizi,  Elizabeth A. Hoeizi, Ignacio A. Luna, Juan Alcazar, Reynalda Alcazar, Gloria  Amparo Huab, Francisca H.  Javier,  Angela A. Buencamino, Lourdes Alcazar Dellosa,  Irineo Dellosa, Ruperto  Alcazar, Jr.,  Jose Alcazar, Rigoberto  Alcazar,  Purita Alcazar, Thelma Alcazar, Lorencita A. de Vera  and Delfin de Vera, nephews and  nieces and alleged heirs of the  late Fr. Martin Alcazar filed a  petition with  the Court  of First Instance of Sorsogon, which was docketed as Special Action No. 879, contending that  the cancellation of O.C.T.  No. 0-32 and  the subsequent issuance of T.C.T.  Nos.  656 and 657 were illegal  because the  alleged  right of  Mons. Pedro P. Santos  was deemed abandoned upon  the issuance  of the  original certificate of title in the name  of  Fr. Alcazar  without the said  deed of sale being annotated therein,  and consequently, the transfer of said right in favor of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Legaspi was equally null and void.  Thus  they prayed the  Court to order  Mons. Flaviano B. Ariola to surrender T. C. T. No. 657 to the Register of Deeds  of Sorsogon; to  order said Register of Deeds to cancel the game and  issue a new certificate of title in substitution of the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-32 in the name of the late Fr.  Alcazar,  and for such other  relief as may  be  deemed  proper in  the premises.

In his answer, Mons.  Pedro  P. Santos  averred that although.the deed of sale was executed  during the pendency of  the proceedings for the  registration of  the  2 parcels of land, they did not  cause  the proper substitution of applicants therein  to avoid  the trouble  of amending the application; that the expenses for  said registration were borne by  Mons. Santos;  that  as  the  petitioners knew  that  the  procedure followed  in  the  cancellation of O. C. T, No. 0-82 was legal,  the filing of said petition was malicious.   Mons. Santos thereby prayed the court for the dismissal of the  same and claimed P10,000.00 for moral  damages,  for attorney’s  fees and for  such  other relief as may be deemed just  and equitable under the circumstances.

Monsignor  Flaviano  Ariola in  his separate  answer, which  was  later  amended to include  a  counterclaim for moral  damages in  the sum  of  P100,000.00, alleged that in view of the fact  that the deceased  left  debts,  petitioners had  no  capacity  to sue since  the rights  and interests of a decedent could only be asserted by a judicially appointed administrator  if the deceased died with  assets in the possession  of third parties.  It was prayed by this respondent that the petition be correspondingly dismissed.

Petitioners, in their reply to the  answer of Mons. Santos, advanced the argument that the deed of sale was without consideration because neither Mons.  Santos nor  the Diocese of Nueva  Caceres paid for the value stated there in ; that actually Fr, Alcazar intended to donate said  properties to  the congregation of the  Redemptorist Fathers of Manila, but as  this religious association was composed of foreigners, they simulated this deed of sale to go around the prohibition of the law.  They also disputed the Archbishop’s right to moral damages, and in addition  to their prayer contained  in  the petition,  they asked the court to declare the deed of sale (Exh. 1)  null and void.

On August 31, 1955, the court rendered  judgment holding that the sale  of the properties  in controversy was valid based on the findings that although Mons.  Santos admitted having paid only  the sum  of P2,200.00, which payment  was annotated in  the notebook of Fr.  Alcazar, the vendor left the balance of P9,800.00 in his  care  for the purpose of adding the same to the original P50,000.00 which the late Fr. Alcazar also entrusted to the Monsignor for the  purpose of establishing  a  mission house  in  the’ diocese of Nueva  Caceres; that  said  amount was  not intended by the deceased for the use  of the Redemptorist Fathers  as the selection  of the proper congregation  or order to establish the  mission was left at the discretion of Mons. Santos;  and that  it was the  Archbishop  himself who made arrangements  with  the  Redemptorist Fathers to carry on this purpose.   The court thus ruled that  the cancellation of  O.C.T. No. O-S2 and the  subsequent issuance of the transfer certificates  of title were  proper. It dismissed,  however,  respondents’  counterclaims  for moral  damages on the ground that  the  filing  of said petition was not given such publicity  as to discredit said church dignitaries, aside from  the fact that no proof was presented that the  petition was filed in bad faith or with malicious intent.   From this decision, petitioners brought this matter on appeal to this Court, and the interrelated issues  assigned  in  this appeal  could  be boiled down to the sole question of whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the deed of  sale executed by Fr.  Martin Alcazar in favor of the Roman  Catholic Bishop of  Nueva Caceres as  valid, and consequently  whether the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon  acted properly in cancelling  O.C.T. No. 0-32 and issuing T.C.T. Nos. 656 and 657.

In trying to  assail the jurisdiction of the lower court, appellants start on the premise that the  petition for the cancellation of T.C.T. No. 657 issued in the name of Mons. Ariola was pursuant to the  provisions  of Section 112 of the Land  Registration Act and filed with the  Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in its capacity as a Land Registration Court.  Thus,  they  argued,  it being a court of limited jurisdiction,  it cannot take cognizance of the ques- tion of the validity or invalidity  of a document  for  it has to be resolved  by a  court exercising  general jurisdiction. Appellants, however, forget that they  were the ones who  raised the legality  of the transfers  of’ the certificates on the basis of  said instrument  (Exh,  1)  and even  if said question  had  to be resolved  by  the lower Court as a Land Registration Court, under the principle laid down  by Us in the case of Government of the P. I. vs. Serafica,  61 Phil. 93,  and  reiterated in  the case of Caoibes vs. Sison  (supra, p.  19).  We find no reason to declare that  the  Land Registration  Courts,  that are at the same  time Courts  of First  Instance and of  general jurisdiction could  not have,  at least  for  the sake  of ex- pediency, entertained and disposed of the question  of the validity or invalidity of the instrument referred to above

On  the other hand,  Section 112 of  the  Land Registration Act  (No. 496)  relied  upon by appellants, reads  as follows:

Sec.  112. No  erasure,  alteration or amendment shall be  made upon the registration book after the entry of  a  certificate  of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by tho clerk  or any register of deeds, except by order  of  the court. Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply  by  petition to the court, upon the ground that  registered interests of any descriptions whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate, have terminated and ceased;  or that  new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; or  that any  error omission,  or mistake was made in entering  a  certificate  or any  memorandum thereon, or  on any duplicate  certificate; or that the  name  of any person on the certificate has been changed;  or that the registered owner has been married; or if registered as  married, that the marriage has been terminated; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has  not conveyed the  same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any  other reasonable ground; and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order  the entry of a new certificate, or entry or cancellation of  a memorandum upon a  certificate, or grant any  other relief upon such terms and conditions,  requiring security if  necessary,  as  it may  deem proper:   

*  *  *Any petition filed under this section and all  petitions  and motions filed under  the provisions of this Act after the original registration  shall  be  filed and entitled  in the original  case ‘in which the decree of registration was entered.

Contrary  to  appellants’ line  of  argument that the petition was filed with  the  lower  Court as a land registration court, We cannot fail  to  notice that  said  petition mentions  the nature  of  the proceeding  and  carries the docket-number  as Special Action No. 879  and not  of the original land  registration proceedings   (G.L.R.O.  No.  2, Rec. No. N-728) as exhorted by  the the last paragraph  of Section  112  of Act  496.  Appellants contend that this was merely  an  error  committed by the Clerk  of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon who gave it  a new number instead  of filing the same under the  original case. Appellants, however, did  not  furnish Us with a  certified copy of the  original  petition in order  to establish  how was the caption thereof,  nor  have they reproduced it  in the  record on appeal  to substantiate  their  contention that it was  a  mistake  on  the part of  the  Clerk of  Court a  quo, to open  a new case.   Under the  circumstances of the  case  at  bar, We  cannot  countenance this excuse because in the  absence  of evidence and without the  Clerk of Court being called  to testify  in support of their  point, the  docket number given  in the  case by said Clerk must be considered as conclusive proof that said number  corresponds to the action instituted by appellants and no  other, the intention of the parties to the contrary notwithstanding.

Moreover,  subsequent acts of appellants and their theory during the  trial  likewise belie their contention  and strengthen our belief that the case was  actually instituted as an independent civil action.  In the proceedings had in the lower  Court, appellants vigorously asserted that the sale was void  for being  without consideration, stressing and hammering the point that it was merely  a simulated sale designed to camouflage  the true  intent of  the decedent, i.e.,  to  donate said  properties to  the Redemptorist Fathers  in order  to enable  and finance the establishment of  a  mission  in the diocese of  Nueva  Caceres under  the management  of said  religious organization. With the records of the  case, it is  indeed clear to Us that appellants sought the intervention of the Court in the exercise  of its general jurisdiction, probably having in mind the fact that as they  were impugning  the intrinsic validity of the deed of sale  (Exh.  1) such matter had to be threshed out in an ordinary civil action, which procedure  is also  proper, following our  ruling in  the case of Garcia vs. Belzunce,  (84 Phil.,  802, 47  Off. Gaz., 1820). Having arrived at such conclusion, there can  be no question that  the Court of First Instance of  Sorsogon, as a court of general jurisdiction, had  authority  to  pass upon the validity of the  instrument  in controversy and We find no reason to reverse the lower court’s ruling that the act of the Register of Deeds in cancelling O.C.T. No. 0—32 and issuing T.C.T.  Nos. 656 and 657 is proper. Anent respondents’ appeal from the ruling of the Court dismissing their counterclaim for moral  damages, We likewise find no  basis for a reversal of the same.

Wherefore, the decision dated  August  31,  1955,  appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost against appellants. It is so ordered.

Paras,  C.  J.,  Bengzon, Padilla,  Bautista  Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur. Montemayor, JJ., concurs in  the result.