G. R. Nos. L-9462-63. July 11, 1957

Teodoro Yuzon  alias Yallejo, together  with four  other defendants  whose  names  and whereabouts were unknown, was.charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with  the  complex crime  of  kidnapping with  murder  of Francisco  Pineda  and Quintin Pineda  in two separate informations  (crim. cases  Nos. 2041  and 2041-A).   The information in the first case, where the victim is Francisco Pineda, is couched in the following terms:

That on  or about the 19th  day  of May, 1951., at sitio Bisucul of barrio Irong, municipality of  Mabalacat,  province of Pampanga, Philippines,” and  within the jurisdiction of this  Honorable  Court, the said accused being then private individuals and known members of the HUK organization, all armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and all  helping one  another,  did then and there willfully, unlawfully and  feloniously, and for the purpose  of killing one Francisco Pineda as a suspected government spy, kidnap, carry away, detain, and later, after, having  taken him to an uninhabited place in barrio Malamon, Magalang, Pampanga, with treachery,  to wit: while the said Francisco  Pineda. was deprived  of  his liberty, with his two hands tied  behind his back and way very weak as a result  of the physical injuries which had been previously  inflicted upon him  by the said accused,  stabbed  him in the vital parts  of his body with a bayonet, thereby inflicting upon him  physical injuries which caused directly  the death  of said  Francisco Pineda.

The information in the  second case,  where the victim  is Quintin Pineda, is  couched  in similar  terms.

Before arraignment Teodoro Yuzon  moved to  quash the informations in the two cases on the ground that he had been  previously convicted  of  the crime of  rebellion and sentenced  to suffer 1 year, 1 month and 10 days  of prision correcional by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (crim. case No.  985), after withdrawing his plea  of not guilty to the original  information for  rebellion with  murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping and entering one of guilty to the crime of rebellion  under the  provisions of section 4, Rule 114.

The prosecution objected to the motion to quash contending that the crime with which the defendant was charged did  not place  him  in danger of being  convicted of  the same offense for which he  had  been previously  convicted and  sentenced, as there is  neither identity  nor similarity between the  complex crime  of  kidnapping” with  murder and  that  of  rebellion;  that  the crime of  rebellion  does not necessarily include  or is necessarily included  in  that of murder, arson,  kidnapping  or robbery; and that  the offense with which  the  defendant is  charged in  the  cases at bar  was not included  nor charged  in  the  information filed in criminal case No. 985 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

The Court  held—

* * * that when the accused  pleaded  guilty  and was  sentenced by Judge Hilario in Criminal Case  No.  985 of   the amended information upon which he  was re-arraigned and finally convicted  necessarily included the offenses  of kidnapping1  with  murder  embodied in the informations in  Criminal Cases Nos, 2041  and 2041-A  tmd  that, therefore, if such informations  were  allowed to  stand, the accused would be in danger of being- tried and/or convicted  again of the same offense.  The  ground of double jeopardy  is well  founded, and  granted the motion to quash.  The State appeals.

In  his  brief the  Solicitor General quotes  from  the transcript part of the  proceedings  had  in criminal  case No.  985 of the Court of First  Instance  of Tarlac which is as follows:

If  your Honor, pleases:  The Army Screening Board has recommended that the accused in these  cases can plead guilty to the lesser crime of simple rebellion,  on the  honest and sincere belief  that these accused can be redeemed and return, once more  to the democratic “ways of life.  Furthermore,  if your Honor, please  some of the accused have already been in  jail for more than two years, and to continue the prosecution of these  cases for the complex crime will mean  the presentation  of mere  than 200  witnesses  in  each  case. In the case of Layug, we agree to his pleading to  the simple: crime of rebellion with reservation to  prosecute  him further  for other crimes  as the evidence  may warrant taking- into consideration the recommendation of the Screening Board.  In this connection, therefore, all allegations in  the information for the complex crime of rebellion are hereby discarded and only allegations for the crime of simple rebellion as member or executor shall remain as subsisting in the  information.   (Assistant  Provincial  Fiscal  Fernando Bartolome speaking; p. 80, record.)

The record  of criminal  case  No.  985  of the  Court  of First Instance of Tarlac is not before this Court.  Attorney for the appellee does not,  however, dispute the correctness of the  quotation made  by the Solicitor General.

Counsel for the State contends that all the allegations in the information filed in that  case constituting the complex crime  of rebellion with  murder, arson,  kidnapping and robbery  were  discarded  or striken out  and  only the allegations  constituting  the crime  of simple rebellion remained subsisting in the amended information.  The  statement of the  prosecuting attorney in that case was to the effect that while he agreed to the entry by the defendant of a plea of guilty to the crime of simple rebellion, he reserved  his  right to  prosecute the defendant for  other crimes committed by him which the evidence might war- rant.   Counsel  for  the appellee contends  only that  the statement made by the prosecuting  attorney above quoted did not amount to or constitute a further amendment of the amended information,  as   intended  perhaps  by  the prosecuting attorney,  because there was  no such  further amendment;  that  by entering a plea of guilty for a less serious  offense  included in  the  amended  information  the defendant was convicted and sentenced for the less serious offense  under the unamended amended information; and that because there was  no further  amendment to  the amended information, the defendant did not waive his right to plead  double jeopardy  in subsequent  prosecution  for crimes included in the information filed in the previous case where he entered a plea of guilty.   The Solicitor General, on the other  hand, claims that “by consenting to dismissal, accussed had waived  his constitutional right” to  be placed  twice in jeopardy for the same offense, as such right may be waived.¹

But even  without an amendment to the amended information  filed in criminal case No. 985 of the  Court of First Instance of Tarlac,  which amendment would have excluded other crimes alleged therein  except  that  of  rebellion, and granting:  that there had been no  waiver on the part of the defendant of his right not to be prosecuted for crimes included in the crime for which he had been prosecuted,  convicted and sentenced,  still in the information filed  in the Court of First  Instance of Tarlac there is no specific  reference  either to the  date stated in the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga or  mention of the names  of Francisco  Pineda and Quintin Pineda.  The  only allegation in the informations filed in the Court of  First Instance  of Pampanga  which might involve  or include the death  of Francisco Pineda and Quintin Pineda in the crime of rebellion for which the appellee had been prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of  Tarlac are the  following:  “the  said  accused  being then private individuals and known members of the HUK organization * *  *  did then  and there willfully, unlawfully and  feloniously, and  for the purpose  of  killing” one Francisco Pineda as a  suspected government  spy, kidnap,  carry away,  detain, etc.”   The  term  “known members  or the HUK organization” may be  deemed  descriptive of the appellee and his  companions who are still at  large;  and although the term used  in the  information “as a suspected government spy” may reveal  by inference the motive  of the  crime, still  as there  is  no  evidence to  show that  the murder committed in this  case was in furtherance of the  rebellion  movement, the  dismissal of the information was rather  premature and unwarranted. If it be shown by the evidence that the murders committed by the appellee and his four other companions were linked to and were  in furtherance of  the  rebellion,  then the trial  court  would be  justified in applying the  rule  laid down in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.,  515, 52 Off. Gaz. 5506  and People vs. Geronimo, 100  Phil., 90, 53 Off. Gaz., 68.

The appellee not having entered a plea to the informations filed in  these  cases, the appeal by the:  State  from the order quashing the informations and the trial of the appellee to determine whether the crime committed by him was in connection  with  or in  furtherance  of the rebellion  movement  do not and cannot  constitute double jeopardy.

The  order appealed from  is  set aside and the  cases remanded  to the  Court  of  First  Instance from whence they came for further proceedings in accordance  with law, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

---

DISSENTING OPINION

Reyes, J. B. L. ;

I regret to differ from the opinion of the majority.   It is conceded that  having been already  accused and  convicted ” in the  Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the crime  of rebellion, the  appellant may not be  tried again for the same  crime or for any act  absorbed  in that  of rebellion without infringing the  constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.  The reservation made by the prosecution in the Tarlac case,  quoted in the majority opinion, was  one “to  prosecute  him for  other  crimes;” hence it did not retain  the privilege of prosecuting appellant  again for  rebellion or any  of its component acts, even granting that  such right could have  been reserved.

In the present case, appellant and his co-accused “being known members of the Huk organization”, are charged with killing “one Francisco Pineda as a suspected government spy”.   Descriptive or not, these words plainly charge  an act of rebellion, since it is a matter of public knowledge, of which we can take judicial notice, that the Huk organization has rebelled and still is against the government; and it is not denied that the killing of government spies (actual or suspected) is an act in furtherance of the objective to overthrow the government.  Hence it is clear, right now, that the crime charged  in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was an act included in the  charge of  rebellion in the Court of Tarlac to which the appellant has pleaded guilty and for which he has  already been sentenced.

It is idle to speculate  that the Fiscal may have intended to charge  appellant with a  private crime, a  killing done with personal motives and not  in  furtherance of political objectives.  If any such intention existed, why should  the prosecuting attorney insert in the information the phrases “being known members of  the  Huk  organization” and “killing  one Francisco Pineda as a suspected government spy”?   These words have no relevancy whatever,in a case of ordinary murder;  on the other hand, they constitute an admission  of the political motivation behind the killing’ and  would  bind  the  prosecution.  The  trial  now ordered would  thus seem to  be pure  ceremony.

To prolong  appellant’s detention and  his’ uncertainty concerning his  fate  until the  political character of the offense charged is further evidenced, when it is so apparent on the face of  the  information is, I  submit, a  violation of the  well established rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. The judgment of the  Court  of. First Instance is correct and” should be sustained.

Paras, C.J., Reyes, A., Conception, and Reyes,  J. B.  L., JJ., concur.