G. R. No. L-10690. June 28, 1957

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101 Phil. 794

[ G. R. No. L-10690. June 28, 1957 ]

APOLONIO PANGILINAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. FELISA ALVENDÍA, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N



REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition  for certiorari  to  review the decision of the Court of  Industrial  Relations  in  Case  No.  215— Pampanga   (later  transferred  to the  Court of  Agrarian Relations which  denied  reconsideration of the  Industrial Court’s  decision)  authorizing the ejectment  of petitioners from their respective landholdings,  and their  replacement by other tenants of  their landlord’s  choice. It appears that petitioners  Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel  Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendía in barrios San  Nicolas and Sto.  Cristo,  Florida Blanca,  Pampanga, under tenancy contracts  executed  on July 17, 1953  (Exhibits A, B,  C, and  D).  On July 27,  1954,  respondent Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54 and 1954-55, they did not personally  perform the principal work  of plowing  and harrowing on their respective  landholdings, but entrusted said work  to other persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent  that they do  the farm work  themselves.  Petitioners, in their answer, denied respondent’s claims, and alleged that they were the ones working the land although at times, they  were helped by their children  and  sons-in-law;  and  that  respondent  filed  the  ejectment  action against them because they refused to  sign  tenancy  contracts with her on the  45-55 sharing  basis and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.

After trial, the Industrial Court found that petitioners were being helped  either by  their sons, sons-in-law, or grandsons on their landholdings; held that  a contract of tenancy  is personal in nature  and  can  not  be entrusted to a son, son-in-law or  grandson,  especially where there is a  specific  prohibition  in the tenancy contracts against allowing third persons to do the principal phases of farming for the tenants; and authorized petitioners’ ejectment and  replacement by other tenants.  The case  was later transferred to the Court of Agrarian Relations upon its creation where petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the  Industrial  Court’s  judgment,  which was denied. Hence, their present appeal.

The  lower  court  found that the “third persons” referred to by respondent Alvendia to whom petitioners allegedly entrusted the work of  plowing and  harrowing on their respective landholdings  were  either their sons-in-law  or grandsons who  were not, however, dependent upon them for  support  and were living separately from them.  The issue, therefore, is whether  petitioners violated the law and their tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to such relatives.

Republic Act 1199,  which  took  effect on August  30, 1954, defines “tenant”  as:

“*  * *  a person who, himself and  with  the aid available from within his  immediate farm household,  cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed  by  another, with the  latter’s consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under  the share  tenancy system, or paying to the landholder  a price certain or ascertainable  in  produce  or in  money  or  both,  under  the leasehold tenancy system”;

While “immediate farm  household,”  according to the same Act, includes:

“* *  * the members of  the family  of the tenant, and  such other person or persons, whether related  to  the tenant or not,  who  are dependent upon him for  support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise”.

Under  the above  definition of “tenant”  given  by Republic Act 1199, petitioners were within their legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their sons-in-law or  grandsons.  Such relatives fall within the phrase “the members of the family of the tenant”; and. the law does not require that  these members of the tenant’s family be dependent on him for support, such qualification being applicable only to “such other person  or persons, whether related to the  tenant  or  not”,  whom,  as  they  are “dependent  upon him for  support”  and  “usually  help him operate the farm enterprise”, the law considers  also part of the tenant’s immediate household.

But respondent Alvendia  claims that as  her  contracts with  petitioners were  entered  into when  Act  4054, the old Tenancy Act, was still in force, the definition of the word “tenant” given  in said Act  should be applied in this case,  to wit:

” *  *  * farmer  or  farm laborer who undertakes  to  work and cultivate land for another  or a  person who furnishes the labor with the consent of the landlord.”

Granting  that  Act 4054 applies to  this case, there  is, however,  nothing  in  its  above definition of  “tenant”  to prohibit the farmer who undertakes to work and cultivate the  land  of another, from doing  such  work with the assistance of his family, who are under his control and authority.  The above definition is,  in fact,  so broad that it even  includes the  labor of third persons  hired  by the farmer  to work on  his  farm,  under  the  clause  “or  a person who furnishes the labor with  the consent  of the landlord”.  It is the hiring of  third  persons to  do the farm  work  for the  tenant that the  new  tenancy  law, Republic Act No. 1199, eliminated from the old concept of “tenant” under Act  4054,  thus restricting  the  meaning of “tenant”  to  one  “who, himself and  with  the aid avail- able from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the  land  belonging to,  or possessed  by,  another,  with the latter’s  consent * *  *.”  Whether under the  new  or the  old  tenancy law, therefore,  the  work   done  by the members of a  tenant’s family is, in legal contemplation, included in the  work that the tenant undertakes to perform on the land given  to  him in tenancy.  In the  absence  of clear  and categorical imperatives, we will  not construe statutes  in a sense  inconsistent with the traditional unity of the Filipino  family.

Respondent  Alvendia  also  contends that  her tenancy contract with  petitioners, Exhibits  A, B, C, and  D, expressly prohibit the latter from asking for and accepting help in  the  cultivation  of their landholdings from their sons-in-law and grandsons, under the provision in  said contracts that:

“(a)  The Tenant  is  the  one  to plow,  harrow and  prepare the land to be planted, and likewise, he  is the one to plant and fence the  seedbed.  With respect to this work, tho  LANDLORD  shall not  spend  for anything,  but  she has the  power to tell or order the  TENANT when to plow,  harrow,  or what  to  do pertaining  the tenant’s work,”

The above provision  contains  no prohibition  for  the tenant to accept assistance from the members  of his  family

in the plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting, or fencing of his landholding.   It simply enumerates the exact duties expected of the tenant  by his landlord; and the tenant is referred to as “the one” to perform these duties, only to distinguish his  obligations from those of his  landlord. We  see nothing in farming tasks that requires individual specialized  skill.   Besides,  it is  a fact  that petitioners Galang and Santos were  already  74 and 64,  respectively, when respondent signed the tenancy contracts with them in 1953.  Respondent’s having accepted petitioners  Galang and Santos as her tenants in spite of  their advanced age not  only disproves her claim  that they  are  already too old  to  perform  their duties as tenants,  but  proves that she  had  impliedly agreed  that these petitioners would be  helped  by their  families  in  their farm  work, since respondent must have realized that at their  advanced age, these petitioners could  not by  themselves alone  perform all  the  farm work without family assistance.

The decision  appealed from is,  therefore,  reversed, and the  ejectment  action filed  by  respondent  against petitioners  dismissed, with costs  against respondent Felisa Alvendía.   So ordered.

Paras,  C. J.,  Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes,  A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception,  Endencia,   and Felix,  JJ., concur.






Date created: October 13, 2014




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