G. R. No. L-9768. June 21, 1957

Defendant-appellee Dominador  Sanchez  y  Aglibut  was charged  with  a  violation of Circulars  Nos. 20 and  45, as amended by Circular No. 55,  all of the Central Bank of the Philippines, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No.  265, alleged to have  been committed  as  follows:

“That on or about the  20th day of December,  1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines,  the said  accused,  having in his possession the amount of $400.00,  did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail and refuse to  declare the same  with  any authorized agent of the  Central  Bank  of  the  Philippines upon  his  arrival  in  the Philippines as prescribed by Circulars 20 and 42 as amended  by Circular 55 of the Central Bank.

” When  first arraigned, he entered the  plea of not guilty. Later on, however,  he was  allowed by the  court  on  re-arraignment to change his former plea  to that  of guilty, on the basis of which, he was  sentenced  thus:

“WHEREFORE,  upon recommendation of  Asst. Fiscal Jose T. M. Mayo,  the accused  Dominador Sanchez is  hereby sentenced to pay a fine of FIFTY (P50.00)  pesos and five (5) days imprisonment, and to pay the costs.

“The $400.00 taken from the accused, referred to in the aforecited information, are hereby  ordered to  be  exchanged at the  Central Bank of  the Philippines with  Philippine  Currency and delivered to Dominador Sanchez, the owner of said money”.

Defendant  Sanchez did  not  appeal  the decision.  But the  Government,  through the Solicitor  General, took an appeal from  it, particularly, the  last paragraph  of  the dispositive portion  of the  decision aforequoted,  claiming that  inasmuch  as under the  provisions of Article 10  of the  Revised Penal  Code, the said code  shall  be supplementary to special laws punishing offenses, unless such laws specially provide  otherwise;  that  there is  no such special provision  in the law violated  to the  effect  that the Revised Penal Code should  not be considered supplementary to it;  that consequently,  the provisions  of the Penal Code are applicable, particularly, the provisions  of Article 45  of  said code, referring to  confiscation  and forfeiture of the proceeds  of the crime  and the instruments with  which the crime was  committed.  The  Government counsel believes that since the  $400.00  involved in the offense can clearly be  considered  as proceeds  of  or an instrument in committing the offense, inasmuch  as without said money, there  would have been  no  violation of the law, then said amount should  have  been forfeited to the Government instead of  having  been ordered  returned to defendant-appellee  after  exchanging it at the Central Bank with Philippine  pesos.

The Solicitor  General cites a long line  of  decisions in support  of  his  contention  and  we are inclined to agree with  him.  However,  counsel  for defendant-appellee says that the appealed decision is already final and  conclusive, for the reason that the terms thereof  had been  satisfied and  complied with  by  the  accused,  he having not only paid  the fine  of P50.00, but also served the  five-day imprisonment.  This claim of  service  of the  sentence by the accused is  not only not refuted by the Solicitor  General, but would appear to  be borne  out by the  certificate of Police Sergeant Ruflno  C.  Mendoza of  the Manila City Jail where the defendant was confined for five days and later released  after serving his sentence.  We also agree with defendant’s counsel who  cites several decisions of this Tribunal to the effect  that a sentence in  a criminal case in this jurisdiction may become  final in  two ways: First,  by the lapse of fifteen days after rendition thereof; and second, by  defendant  complying  with the terms of the  same.   (U.S. vs.  Hart,  24 Phil.  278;  People vs. Quebral,  76 Phil. 294;  Gregorio vs. Director of Prisons, 43  Phil.  650).   Moreover,  under  Section 7  of  Rule 116, Rules  of  Court, a judgment  in a criminal  case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an  appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right  to appeal.  Under  the circumstances, the sentence having become final, no  court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if erroneous, as claimed by the Solicitor General.

Furthermore, and this is  equally important, in a  similar case¹  involving a violation of  the  same  circulars  of the Central  Bank,  where  the  trial court in sentencing the accused failed to provide for the disposition of the amount ill. dollars  involved,  but  by  a subsequent resolution, it provided  that  the  same  should  not  be  confiscated  but should be exchanged with pesos at  the Central Bank and then delivered to the accused, from which resolution the Government tried to appeal, we said:

“With the view we take of’  the  propriety and  legality  of the appeal,  we find it unnecessary  to  go into the  merits of the con- tention  of  the parties,  although it  may  not be out  of place to state that  according  to the  decision of  June  10,1955,  as well as  the  appealed  resolution, the penalty  imposed  which  did not include  the confiscation of the amount  of 83,140.00, was upon the recommendation of the prosecution itself. In the first place, the confiscation  or  forfeiture of  the  above mentioned sum  would be an  additional  penalty  and  would  amount to  an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the  accused.  To reopen the case for the  purpose of increasing the penalty, as is  sought in the Government’s appeal, would be  placing the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118, Section  2  of the Rules of Court, the Government cannot appeal  in a  criminal case if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.  (People vs.  Cornelio  Ferrer, G. R. No. L-9072, October 23, 1.906; People  vs.  Ang Cho Kio, G. R. No. L-6687-88, 50  Off Gaz. No. 8, p.  3563; People vs. Luis M. Taruc, G.R. No. L-8229, November  28,  1955.)   In  the present case, the defendant-appellee  did not file any  brief, .naturally, this  point of the legality of the appeal of the Government is not raised;  even so, this Tribunal feels it is its duty  to apply the law, specially when it favors the accused in a criminal  case.  In  the second  place, the  record shows that at the time the  appealed  resolution was issued on July 30, 1955, the decision  of June 10, 1955 had already become final  and no longer subject  to  modification  for  the  reason  that the accused had  already served  the  sentence, not partially but totally.”

In  view of the foregoing  the  appeal is hereby dismissed, with  costs de oficio.

Paras,  C.  J.,  Bengzon,  Padilla,  Reyes,  A.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,  Reyes, J. B.  L., Endencia,. and Felix, JJ.,  concur.

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¹ People  vs. Alejandro  Paet  y Velasco 100  Phil., 357,  53  Off. Gaz., [3]  668).