G. R. No. L-9558. May 24, 1957

On July  30,  1948, plaintiffs executed  in  favor  of  defendants  a  deed of sale of a  parcel of land acquired by plaintiffs under  a homestead patent with right  to  repurchase it within one year from the date of sale.  Because of the failure  of  plaintiffs  to  repurchase  the  land  as stipulated, the sale became absolute on July 30, 1949, although defendants actually consolidated their ownership over the land on January 17, 1953 in accordance with an order of consolidation issued in Special  Proceeding No. 548  (Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur).  However, plaintiffs claim that they can  still exercise the right to  repurchase the land within the period of five years from July 30, 1949 under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law)  and to that effect they tendered to  defendants the repurchase price of Pl,200, and when the latter refused, they consigned the money with the  clerk of court and  instituted  the present action.
 
Defendants moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint  on  the grounds  (1)  that it  does not state a cause of  action and (2) that, in any event, the action was not commenced within the period prescribed by law.  The court sustained the motion and  dismissed the case  without costs.  Hence this appeal.
 
The question to be  determined is whether  the period of five years which Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows  a  homesteader to repurchase a homestead sold by him  should  be  counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with  an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of  the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of  the  homesteader’s  failure to repurchase it.
 
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No.  141  provides: “Every conveyance of land acquired  under the free  patent or.homestead provisions, when  proper, shall  be  subject to repurchase by  the  applicant, his  widow,  or legal  heirs, within the period of five years from the date of the conveyance.”   The language of the law is clear.  It provides that the period of five years shall be counted from the date of conveyance,  regardless of its  nature.  The word conveyance is of American origin.  It  may refer not only to an absolute sale but also to mortgage or any other transaction.   It hag  been defined  as  signifying “every instrument by which any estate or  interest  in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned” (18 C. J., 900; 18 C. J. S., 92).  When the  law is clear, it admits of no interpretation.  It follows  therefore that the pretense  of appellants to the effect that the 5-year  period should be counted from the date the ownership of appellees over the land had become consolidated is untenable.

The above interpretation finds  support in recent decisions of this  Court.  In Blanco  vs. Bailon,  G. R.  No. L-7342, April 28, 1956, the question raised was whether the 5-year period of redemption began from the date of the execution of the contract  or from the date of its registration in the office of the register of deeds, considering that the homestead wa3 registered under the Torrens system.  This court held that it is the former because in so  far as the owner of the homestead is concerned, the conveyance mentioned in Section 119 of the Public Land Law is the actual date thereof, and not the date  of registration of the deed  of sale.  (Citing Galasinao vs. Austria, 97  Phil., 82,  51 Off. Gaz., 2874).

In Galanza  vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil,, 713,  50 Off. Gaz., 4213, the question  that  arose  was  “whether the  period  to repurchase the land in  question  shall be  counted from  the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase  or from the issuance of transfer  certificate of title to the herein defendant” and the Court held that appellant’s title had already become absolute because of  appellee’s failure to redeem the land within five years from the date of sale. The Court added:  “Both  under Section 50 of the  Land Registration Law and under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, the owner of a piece of land is neither prohibited nor precluded from binding himself to an  agreement whereby his right of  repurchase is for a certain period starting from the date of the deed  of sale.”  In  other words, the date of the sale is of paramount consideration.

The order appealed from is affirmed,  with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,,  concur.