Adm. Case No. 145. December 28, 1956

On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.  Aspiras, alleging substantially that:

1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing  himself as single,  courted her  and eventually  won her affection; 2. on December  22, 1952,  following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after December 31, 1952, upon being assured  of  marriage  she allowed him to  live with  her as her  husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a  marriage license was.applied for, with the son of  the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants; 5.  upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love  with the  latter; 6. after the marriage,  she and  respondent continued  cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent, who was a  married man and who used his knowledge and education to  abuse and destroy her.

On April 9, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to “withdraw and/or  dismiss” alleging  that the  contents  of her complaint did  not  “represent her true sentiments”, the respondent acted in good faith, and her  marriage to respondent’s son, Cesar Aspiras, was “without any fraud or deceit whatsoever”.

Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal  profession^[1], this Court denied the motion to dismiss, and  required the respondent to answer.

On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous  or sexual relations with her.   He also said she knew all the time he was a married man.

On May 13, 1953, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor  General  for investigation, report  and  recommendation.

On November  2,  1953,  the Solicitor General reported that in view of the  motion to withdraw filed by the petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the  case.

Of course, for  lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed  on November 5, 1953.

However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion  to re-open the matter, alleging that she had asked for  dismissal before the office of  the Solicitor  General pursuant to an amicable  settlement with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and wife, from April to November, 1953 at No.  383  Int. 5 Tejeron,  Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result she was on the family way.  She also  charged the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live with them, for the purpose of “camouflaging their living together”.

On January 5, 1954, this  Court granted the above petition to re-open  and  referred the papers to the Solicitor General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.

After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him,  the  Solicitor General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his disbarment, on the  ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up his illicit  relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on  January 14, 1953; and,  what is worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having  sexual relations with the  spouse of his own son.

On May. 6, 1955, this Court ordered  the  respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government prosecutor. He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court.  Then  he asked  for, and was granted, a  chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs  submitted to, and forwarded by, the Solicitor General.  Yet he failed to produce any.

At the oral argument he did not appear to  defend himself, but asked  for  permission to  file  a memorandum— which he afterwards presented.  Therein he maintains that the complaint’s allegations were not supported by the evidence, that the petitioner is in pan delicto and deserves no remedy, and that the alleged misconduct is not  sufficient ground for disbarment.

In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish  beyond reasonable doubt the following facts:

In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed mother in Sar wang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon.  Sometime in August, of that year she met the respondent.  Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who represented himself as single, although ne was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had seven children.

A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he  finally conquered hers trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the  mother, because  without much ado she approved of him. The climax came when on  a certain night of November, 1952, he was invited to stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging.  About 3 or 4 a.m., while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina’s room and after glibly promising marriage, succeeded in seducing her.  From that time on, and without the benefit  of marriage she gave him the privileges of a husband.  Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila in December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother’s desire to have the marriage celebrated  the following month of April, so as to  enable  her to continue teaching until the  end  of the school term.  She  stayed with  her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.

Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila  City Hall,  where  for the  first time, she met his son Cesar, who was  introduced (by respondent) as his nephew,  and  her bridegroom-to-be.  She says respondent again told her to follow his “instructions”, and left the two  of them  (with Atty. Espino)  at the City Hall.  He  then departed for  Cebu.   She filled  up the application for  marriage  (Exhibits 7, 8,  Respondent)  and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.

In connection with the above “instructions”,  it is probable that before filing the application  Josefina discovered or was told that respondent was a married man.  But she was persuaded  by respondent to  enter into a sham  marriage with his  “nephew” Cesar,  so that she  may rightfully claim to be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her face before her  relatives and  acquaintances who had  known her amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.

Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josenna and Cesar were married^[2] at  the Manila City Hall before  Judge Aragon,  with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar’s aunt) as  witnesses.  After the ceremony, the  two contracting parties  separated,  never to  Jive together as husband and wife.   However, the respondent continued up to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josenna, as a result of  which  she gave birth to  a  baby  boy on January  24, 1954.

Josefina’s sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be  single and promised marriage, is confirmed by his love letters, portions of  which say:

“* * * You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world * *  * I will bring you along with me before  the  altar of matrimony * * *.” (Exhibit A-6, September  22, 1952.)

“Through thick  and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the  first, middle  and the last in my life.  In  short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to  say to you.”   (Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)

And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife,  with herein respondent is borne out by  his  letters  to Josefina’s mother dated February 9,  1953  and  March 6,  1953—Exhibits A-19 and A-21.

Obviously the courtship and  seduction by  respondent was morally wrong,  and this obliquity became worse when he made  use  of his minor son  Cesar  to “redeem” his promise of marriage and/or to cover up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor General  alleged.   He corrupted his own descendant  by  turning him  into  an accomplice  of his marital  infidelities.

But he says, the marriage was  a true marriage,  the contracting parties being actually in love with each other. Granted.  Then his moral delinquency becomes all the more unpardonable: he cohabited with the wife of his own son after the marriage which he  himself arranged  and witnessed.

It is immaterial that Josefina  Mortel the complainant was also  at fault—in pari delicto, respondent suggests— because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession  of  unworthy members, to protect the  public and  the courts^[3].  So  much  so that even if she should presently ask for dismissal, the matter may not be dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant disciplinary  action.  Anyway,  pari delicto is not always a complete defense.^[4]

Supposing that respondent’s conduct is not one of those mentioned in  the  Rules for  which an attorney  may be disbarred,^[5] still,  in this  jurisdiction, lawyers  may  be removed from office on grounds other than those  enumerated by the statutes.  (In re Pelaez,  44 Phil. 567.)  And we recently applied that principle in Balinon vs.  De Leon, 50  Off. Gaz.,  583.

In  the United States where from  our system of legal ethics derives, “the continued possession * * * of a good moral character is a requisite  condition for the rightful continuance  in the practice of the law * *  *  and  its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though  the statutes do not  specify that  as a ground for  disbarment.” (5  Am. Jur.  417.)

As stated by Mr. Justice  Owen, of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

“One of  the  requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she shall be of good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities  of an attorney at law.  This  is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one  to admission  to the bar, and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of this  court. The charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity.  Just as it was the duty of this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a  showing that he lacked the necessary  qualifications, so is it its duty now to remove him upon like proof.”   (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55  A. L. R. 1361.)

Perhaps  mere moral  transgression  not amounting  to crime  will  not disbar,  as some cases  hold^[6]  and on this we do not  decide.  But respondent’s  moral  delinquency having been aggravated  by  a  mockery of the inviolable social  institution of marriage,  and by corruption  of his minor son or destruction of the latter’s honor, the  under signed all  agree he is  unfit to continue exercising the privileges and responsibilities of members of the bar.^[7]

Wherefore it becomes the duty  of this  Court to  strike, as  it  does  hereby  strike his  name  from  the Roll  of Attorneys.   So ordered.

Paras,  C. J., Padilla,  Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,  Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Proceeding may be taken for removal of attorney by the Supreme Court on its own motion.  (Section 1, Rule 128.)
^[2] Went through the motions of a marriage ceremony.
^[3] That is why Solicitor General intervenes.
^[4] Cf. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209.
^[5] Concubinage is not considered now, because his wife  has  not complained, and no criminal conviction has been obtained.
^[6] See People vs. Smith, 9 A. L. R. 183 (111.) and note at page 202.
^[7] See 7 C. J. S. p. 735.