G.R. No. L-9334. September 25, 1956

This is a petition  for review of a decision of the Court of  Appeals  rendered  on  March 30,  1955  holding that petitioners  herein filed their  record  on  appeal  outside of  the reglementary period  and, consequently,  dismissed their petition for mandamus.

Petitioners are  among  those  who  claimed  the  registration of  thirty-three  lots of the  Sagay  Cadastre in Cadastral  Case  No.  27  (G.L.R.O. Record  No.  284) of the  Court of  First  Instance  of  Negros Occidental. On October  17,  1952,  the court, after  due hearing, rendered decision  adjudicating said lots to Dominador Lacson and Visitacion Lacson, respondents herein.  Among those who took steps to perfect the,ir appeal were the petitioners.

Petitioners received  copy of  the decision on October 24,  1952.   On  November  20,  1952, they  filed  their notice of appeal.   Four days later, or on November 24, the last day of the period within which  the  appeal may be perfected, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to  file  their record  on  appeal.  This  was  granted  in an  order  dated November  28,  1952,  the  court  allowing fifteen days more to file their record on appeal.  Petitioners  filed two more  motions for extension, each time one day before the expiration of the  period  extended, which were also granted.  On the last day of the period allowed by the court, or on January  3, 1953, petitioners finally filed  their record on appeal without however filing their  appeal bond, which was only filed twenty days thereafter, or forty days beyond the reglementary period.

When the record on appeal was submitted to the court for approval,  respondents  Dominador  Lacson  and  Visitation Lacson registered their opposition on the ground that both  the record on appeal and the appeal bond were filed out of time.  On April 23, 1953, the court ordered the dismissal of the appeal on the  sole ground  that the appeal bond was  filed  beyond  the  reglementary period. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.   On November 16,1953, the motion was denied, the court reaffirming its  order of dismissal.

Dissatisfied  with the  action  of the trial  court, petitioners  filed a petition  for mandamus  in the Court of Appeals.  Respondents  filed an answer thereto  reiterating their  contention that  the record on  appeal  as ‘well as  the  appeal  bond were  filed but of time.   In a decision, promulgated  on July  26,  1954,  the Court of Appeals  found that petitioners’ appeal  bond was  filed  out of time but expressed the opinion that  appeal bonds are not necessary for the  perfection of the appeal in cadastral cases, and since such matter involved a ruling  on a point of  law,  it  resolved  to  certify the  case  to  the Supreme Court,  On October  5, 1954, the  Supreme Court returned the case to the Court of Appeals holding that the latter could  act  upon  the  question involved  in  aid of its appellate jurisdiction.  Finally,  on March 30, 1955, the Court of Appeals  rendered a  new decision finding this time that the record  on  appeal  was  belatedly filed and, consequently,  denied  petitioners’ petition/for mandamus.

It should be  noted that  when  the record on  appeal was submitted by petitioners io the lower court  for its approval, the latter denied  the same and dismissed the appeal,  not on the ground that the same  was filed outside the reglementary  period, but  because  the  appeal bond was filed  out of  time,  the  latter being  the only ground  on which  the  dismissal  was  predicated.  But when the case was taken  to the Court of Appeals  on  a petition  for mandamus,  the latter, though expressed the opinion  that appeal bonds  are not necessary in cadastral cases,  found that  the  record on  appeal was filed out  of  time  and,  consequently,  dismissed the  petition for mandamus.

The question that  now comes  up for determination is:  Under the circumstances of this case,  can the record on appeal be  considered as  having been filed within the reglementary period considering the several extensions of time granted to petitioners by the lower court?

It appears  that  petitioners  received  copy  of the decision on the merits  on October  24,  1952.  On November 24,  1952, the last day of the period for the perfection of the appeal, they filed a motion for extension of time to file their record on appeal.  This motion was granted on November 28, 1952.  Two more motions for extension were filed, each on the  last day of the extended  period, and both motions  were granted.   And on the  last day of the period allowed by the trial  court, or on January ,3, 1953, petitioners finally filed their record on appeal.   These facts clearly indicate  that, while  the  order of the  court granting the last extension was not issued before the expiration of the  period  previously extended,  the  record on appeal was however  filed within the additional period granted  to petitioners by the trial court.  In the circumstances,  we hold that the  record  on appeal was filed on time and the Court of  Appeals erred in considering the appeal to have  lapsed and  in dismissing the petition for mandamus on that ground.

Our reason for this ruling is clear.   While this  Court has held that “The pendency of  a motion for extension of time to perfect  an appeal or to file a brief does not suspend the running of the  period sought to be extended” (Garcia vs. Buenaventura, 74 Phil., 611), however, it was also held “that  when the  order granting  extension  of time  is issued  and notice  thereof  served after the expiration  of the period fixed by  law,  said  extension  of time must be counted from the date notice of the order granting  it  is  received”  (Alejandro  vs. Endencia,  64 Phil., 321, 325), which  implies  that  once a  motion for extension is  favorably acted upon,  the appeal may still be  perfected within  the period  so extended.  And this is justified under the ruling long observed in this  jurisdiction that the  motions  of  this kind are addressed to the sound  discretion of the  court  and may  be  granted if there are justifiable  reasons that warrant  them  (Moya vs.  Barton,  76  Phil., 831;  Reyes vs.  Court of Appeals, 74 Phil., 235).  Here there are good  reasons as pointed out by the trial court in  its order of April 23,  1953.

The question that now  rises  is:  The  Court of  Appeals having dismissed   the petition  for mandamus  on a wrong premise as above pointed out,  can  this  Court now look into  the  issue raised by respondents in their brief to the effect that  said Court of Appeals likewise erred in its view  that  appeal  bonds  are not necessary in the perfection of appeals in cadastral cases  even if this issue is not now raised by petitioners in their petition for review?  In other words,  can respondents raise new issues even if  they have not appealed from the decision of  the Court of Appeals  if their  purpose  is  to sustain that decision on another ground?

Our answer is in the affirmative, following our  ruling that “Appellee,  who is not appellant, may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, though (but) he may not do  so  if his purpose  is  to have the  judgment modified or  reversed, for,  in such a case, he must  appeal.”^[1]   This is the only purpose  or  ground   advanced  by  respondents  namely, to sustain the  decision  of the Court of  Appeals on  a ground different from that on  which  was predicated, and  we are inclined to uphold this view in this  case considering  that the issue involved is important and merits serious consideration.

It should be  recalled that, while the record  on appeal was  filed  by petitioners  within” the additional period granted  them by the lower  court, they  however  failed to file the  appeal bond  on time, the same having been filed forty  days beyond  the reglementary period.  However, the Court of Appeals found that such failure did not  have the effect of defeating the right of petitioners to appeal because in its  opinion appeal bonds are not necessary in  the perfection of appeals in  cadastral cases, basing its ruling on  paragraph (a), section 18, of Act 2259 (Cadastral Law, as amended by Act 3081),  which  provides that “One-tenth of the  cost of the registration  proceedings  and the  cadastral  survey and monumenting * *  *  shall be borne by the  Insular Government; one-tenth shall be paid by the province concerned,  and one-tenth by the city, municipality, municipal district, township or  settlement in which  the land is situated * * *  and  the  remaining seven-tenths  shall  be taxed by the court against each and all of the lots included  in a cadastral proceeding.”  In other  words, it  is the view of that court that since the costs in cadastral proceeding are assessed, not against the losing party but against those declared to be  the  owners of the  lots, an  appeal  bond is unnecessary when a losing party appeals in a cadastral case.

We  disagree  with this point  of view.  In  the  first place,  the cost mentioned in  said  section  18 refer to the  expenses  that are incurred  by the  Government in the  cadastral  survey and monumenting that are undertaken in connection with the cadastral proceedings, and not  necessarily  to the costs of action that are awarded in a court  litigation.  It is  for  this  reason that  under said section 18 (c), as amended by Republic Act No.  1151, the amount of the cost so assessed does not go to the winning party  but to pay “for all services rendered by the Land Registration Commission and the clerk or his deputies in each cadastral proceeding.”  In  the second place, the reason why these costs are not taxed against the  losing party is obvious. Unlike  ordinary registration proceedings which  are voluntary in character, the registration  under the cadastral  law is compulsory,  the  purpose of the law being  to  quiet title to  lands when  public  interest so requires  (section 1).  The proceeding being  compulsory it is but fair  that costs be not charged to those who in response to the call center to court though they may lose their case.  And so it was provided  that these costs be charged against the winner.

It is therefore an error to  consider the costs contemplated  in  section 18 as costs charged  in  an  ordinary litigation.  They have  a  different  nature and  peculiar purpose.  They have been designed merely for the purpose of the cadastral proceedings.   The situation differs  when the losing party appeals from  the  decision of the cadastral court where he has  to perfect his appeal in same manner as  in  ordinary case.  An appeal bond in  this case is necessary to answer for regular costs should he lose his appeal.  These costs have their own legal meaning and import, for, as it was said,  “Costs are in the nature of incidental damages  allowed  to the successful  party to indemnify him against the expense of asserting his rights in court, when the necessity of so doing was  caused  by other’s breach of legal  duty”  (Spicer vs. Benefit Asso., 90 A. L. R., 517)

On the other hand,  Rule 132 of the Rules  of Court provides that “These rules  shall not apply to land registration,  cadastral, and election  cases  *  *  *  except  by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and  convenient.”  And in line with this rule, section 14 of Act 496 (Land Registration Law) provides that “Every order,  decision, and decree of the Court of Land Registration may be reviewed by the Supreme Court in the same manner as an order, decision, decree, or judgment of a  Court  of First Instance might be  reviewed.”  And in section 11 of Act 2259 (Cadastral Act) we also find the following proviso:  “except as herein otherwise provided all of the provisions of said Land Registration Act, as now amended, and  as it hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this  Act.”   An analysis of  all these provisions leads us to conclude that the requirements of our Rules  of Court relative, to  the perfection of an appeal in  an ordinary case apply in  the same manner and with equal force and  effect  to appeals from a decision of a court of first instance in registration and cadastral proceedings.

It  appearing that petitioners have failed  to file  their appeal  bond within  the reglementary  period  it follows that  they have lost their right to appeal.  It is  plain that the Court of Appeals erred in  concluding  that such failure is no legal consequence and in not dismissing  the petition  for mandamus on that ground.  The  finding of said court on this matter should therefore be modified in the sense that the petition for mandamus, should be dismissed not  on the failure to file the record on appeal on time, but on the failure to file  the appeal bond on  time.

Wherefore the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioners.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and  Felix, JJ., concur.

 

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 ^[1] Saenz vs. Mitchell, 60 Phil.,  69, 80; Mendoza vs. Mendiola, 53  Phil., 267; Villavert  vs. Lim, 62  Phil., 178;  Balajadia vs. Eusala,  G. R. No. 42579;  Bunge Corporation and Universal Agencies vs.  Elena Camenforte & Co., 91 Phil., 861, 48 Off. Gaz. p. 3377; Pineda & Ampil Manufacturing  Co., et al. vs. Arsenio Bartolome, et al., 95 Phil., 930.