G.R. No. L-9785. September 19, 1956

Petitioners herein are all attorneys of  record of Oscar Castelo accused of murder in Criminal  Case  No. 3023-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal  which was presided over by Hon. Emilio Rilloraza.  Castelo filed a motion dated September 7,  1955 for the disqualification of Judge Rilloraza  to try said case anew by  virtue of a new trial granted by the Supreme Court.  On September 24,  1955, Judge  Rilloraza issued an order which reads as follows: 

“In order to protect the integrity and dignity of this Court and the Judiciary, the accused-petitioner Oscar Castelo is hereby ordered to appear before this Court on  September 29, 1955, at 10:30  o’clock a.m.,  to show cause why he should  not be punished for contempt for having made contemptuous  statements  and malicious imputations  and  insinuations  or intimations that  are  absolutely without foundation  in truth and in fact in  his petition for recusation  or disqualification dated September 7, 1955,  among which statements read, in part, as follows:

‘ * * * This belief on the part of Melencio of the futility, of defending himself in  the face of an apparent conspiracy between the Presiding Judge and the prosecutors was not without justification. What indeed would have been the use of  further resistance when the Judge and the prosecutors could talk over the telephone with such familiarity and apparent rapport indicating  connivance  between them,’ * * *

‘Significantly, or is it strange  that the  failure  to  extort P100,000.00  from herein petitioner  (Oscar Castelo) resulted in his conviction to death?’

* * * 

“The attorneys of record of said accused, petitioner Oscar Castelo, namely, Mariano H. de Joya, Estanislao A. Fernandez, Roberto A. Guianzon, Pelicisimo Ocampo, Constancio  M. Leuterio, Lauro Esteban and Alejandro  de  Santos,  are hereby likewise ordered  to appear  before this  Court on September 29, 1955, at 10:30  o’clock a.m.,  to show cause why they should not  be punished for contempt for having prepared the statements referred to above and/or  having counselled the accused-petitioner Oscar Castelo to make said statements, or  for having otherwise  given him advice concerning the same statements  and  imputations  and  insinuations and intimations.”

Castelo filed his own answer to the charge.   Atty. Mariano H.  de Joya filed  a  separate answer, while the  other respondents  filed  a joint  answer.   These  answers   were sworn to  respectively by Castelo and respondent attorneys. After hearing,  respondent judge found Castelo  and his attorneys guilty of direct contempt.   Castelo was  ordered to pay a fine  of P200 while his attorneys, now petitioners herein,  were  ordered to pay a fine  of PICO  each,  payable on or  before noon  of October 8,  1955,  with  subsidiary imprisonment in  case of non-payment of the fine Hence the present petition for certiorari  imputing grave  abuse of discretion  to respondent judge.

The incident arose in view of certain alleged contemptuous statements  contained in a motion for disqualification filed with the  court  on  September  7,  1955  which was signed and sworn to exclusively by  Oscar  Castelo but the notice  of hearing set forth therein  appears  to  have been subscribed by  all  his  attorneys, petitioners  herein,  although only one of them, Alejandro de Santos, has  actually signed.  Said  notice reads:

“NOTIFICATION

To:	The Clerk of Court Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasay City Branch
Sir:
	Please set the foregoing  petition for hearing1 on  September 10, 1955, at 8:30 in the morning or as soon thereafter as the  Honorable Judge  may be pleased to hear the same.
	Mariano H. de Joya	Constancio M. Leuterio
	Estanislao A. Fernandez	Lauro Esteban
	Roberto A. Guianzon	Alejandro de Santos
	Felicisimo Ocampo
		By: Alejandro de Santos
		303 Monte de Piedad Bldg. Sta.  Cruz, Manila”

On the other  hand,  the statements contained  in the motion for disqualification which were considered  by the court to  be contemptuous appear in two of  the grounds alleged in  support  thereof which  are quoted hereunder in  full:

“Fifth Incident

In connection with Exhibits 9-  9-A-,  and 9-B-Melencio (also marked  Exhibit JJ and  (Exhibit II)  Melencio testified during the trial that  these statements, were prepared  by, and with the collaboration of MPD Sergeant Felicisimo .Lazaro and  Fiscal  Andres Reyes; that the contents thereof were the product  of these people’s collective efforts, and that they were concocted preparatory to the prosecution’s plan to utilize Augusto Melencio as another state witness principally to implicate Castelo after the prosecution had realized that  the testimony  of Robles  was  insufficient  and  unreliable and that the events that preceded the preparation  of these exhibits were attended by subtle  dissimulations in the beginning,  later progressing into misrepresentation,  chicanery,  deception, promise  of discharge from the information, and winding up finally into plain coercion and threats calculated to get Melencio inextricably  involved in the scheme to implicate petitioner at all  cost.  Finding himself too far gone in the snare, Melencio was left no alternative but to sign said statements.  Melencio .testified that as a  means  of  impressing him with the hopelessness of his situation as a defendant, he was  made to hear a conversation through the telephone between Fiscal Andres Reyes  and the Presiding Judge on May 24, 1954 in  which the former, in a very  familiar tone of voice  told the latter  that he  (Melencio)  was  not yet ready  and that there was need  for further postponement.  In fact the trial was again postponed to May 26, 1954.  This conversation between Fiscal Andres Reyes. and  the Presiding Judge, according to Melencio,  had  the effect of  convincing him  that  his salvation was possible only through submission to the desire of the  prosecutors to have him testify as a  witness  against petitioner.   This belief  on  the  part of Melencio of the futility of defending  himself m the face of an apparent conspiracy  between the Presiding Judge  and the prosecutors  was not  without justification.  What indeed would have  been  the use of further resistance when  the Judge and the prosecutors  could talk over  the telephone with such familiarity and apparent rapport indicating  connivance  between them?. Such  was  the situation, Melencio explained, when he  was made to sign the  statements.  The name of the Presiding Judge was thus significantly mentioned by Fiscal  Andres  Reyes to Melencio  as having  a  connection  with  the postponements granted by the Judge  on the ground of  feigned illness.  And yet there was never an  attempt on  the part of Fiscal Andres  Reyes to take the witness stand and  deny Melencio’s  testimony on the  matter  of the  conversation  between him and Judge Rilloraza  over the telephone.  The  Presiding  Judge viewed this matter with an indifference which does  not speak well of his being above  this questionable alliance  with Fiscal Andres  Reyes,  if  indeed  he  was above it.  The Presiding Judge  could have, or should have, cited Fiscal Andres  Reyes and Sgt. Felicisimo Lazaro for  contempt  for deceiving the court in being  a party  to  the feigned illness of Melencio which caused the suspension, of the trial for about two weeks. Judge Emilio Rilloraza did  not.  This failure on the part of Fiscal  Andres Reyes to deny Melencio’s statement involving  him, and  the omission on the part of the Presiding  Judge, by  remaining passive on a matter which demanded action on his part, rules out all  conclusions but that  Presiding Judge  was too consumed  with  bias to care, and that Fiscal Andres Reyes  had been licensed to do what he pleases  with the  Judge’s name with  brazen impunity.”  (pp.  53-56)

“INCIDENTS AFTER THE TRIAL

First Incident

Before the promulgation  of the  decision in this  case  on March 31,  1955, the name of Honorable Judge Emilio Rilloraza was  bandied  about during the conversation between Mrs.  Saldana, owner of the  San Juan de  Dios Coffee Shop on Dewey Boulevard, Pasay City, Mrs.  Eugenia L. Co, who claims kinship with the Presiding Judge and  Miss Adelaida Reyes, one of the former accused in  the case.  Miss Reyes was contacted by the two ladies (Mrs. Saldana and Mrs. Co) in the evening of March 10, 1955 and informed that herein petitioner together with all the defendants in this case were to be convicted by Judge  Emilio  Rilloraza and that the  penalty was one of death.  Mrs. Eugenia  L. Co assured Miss Reyes that she  had read the  decision which was  shown to her by ‘Tiong’— the  Presiding Judge. Mrs. Co, pretending to take  pity on Miss Reyes who  broke down into tears upon  being informed of this said news, stated that ‘there is nothing  that could  be remedied’ and she started foisting  herself as a ‘relative’, ‘business partner’ and very  influential  with the Presiding Judge whom she calls  ‘Tiong’ Mrs.  Co further represented  to  Miss Reyes that there  is  nothing that she could not secure from  her ‘Tiong’,  adding that her husband who  was a Chinese citizen was able to obtain his  Philippine citizenship through Judge Emilio Rilloraza, which  assertions were confirmed by  Mrs. Rufina  Saldana.   When  Miss Reyes  asked  the two ladies what could be done about the matter, Mrs. Eugenia L. Co readily  and brazenly  told Miss Reyes to convey to herein petitioner a demand for the sum of f 100,000 in consideration for his acquittaX, It was impressed upon Miss Adelaida Reyes.by  Mrs. Eugenia L.  Co and  Mrs. Rufina Saldana that with the payment of PI 00,000,  the decision which according to Mrs. Co the  Presiding Judge  allowed her to read could be  changed and the acquittal  of herein petitioner secured.

Apprised of this demand,  herein  petitioner was  enraged, and reported the  matter to  the  Army  and Constabulary authorities on  March  11, 1955.  Major Teodulo Natividad and  Major Delfin de la Cruz  of the Philippine  Constabulary  investigated the  matter and  gathered  what evidence they could and later sought clarification from the Presiding Judge as to his knowledge  or participation in the  attempted  extortion.  Judge  Rilloraza’s reaction  to   Major Natividad’s inquiry in the matter was a mere denial  of any knowledge of the affair and a refusal to cooperate with the PC authorities.

It is  a serious  matter for a  judge’s name to be made  capital of in a transaction which reflects upon his integrity  and upon the dignity  of  the court  presided over by him.  And when,  as  in this incident, his name is  inextricably linked, positive action on his part is imperative. But the Presiding Judge viewed this  incident with indifference if not  with  plain tacit acquiescence.  He could  have cited  Mrs.  Eugenia L.  Co and  Mrs. Rufina Saldana for contempt of court.  He  did not—which  is pregnant with meaning.

Significantly, or is it strange  that the failure to extort P100,000 from  herein petitioner resulted in his conviction to death?  And  as previously conveyed by Mrs. Eugenia L. Co to Miss Reyes on  March 10 and March  H, 1955  all the accused including the  petir  turner were condemned to death.”  (pp. 59-61).  “(pp. 2-5,  Answer of Solicitor  General)

In  his answer,  respondent Castelo avers  that he assumes full responsibility for the preparation  and filing of the petition for disqualification  of  respondent  judge; that  his attorneys  of record have absolutely no participation nor intervention  in  the  preparation of said petition  their only intervention being to sign the notice of bearing  addressed  to the  clerk of court; and that the statements alleged  in the  charge do  not constitute  contempt.  Castelo further  avers that, as the supposed  contumacious act constitute  merely contempt, the proceedings must  commence with the filing of a charge.  And  that as  the charge  was  filed by respondent judge  himself,  he should  inhibit himself from hearing and  deciding the same.  “He cannot be the  complainant, prosecutor,  and judge at the same  time.”

With the exception of respondent De Joya, who  filed a separate answer, the other respondent attorneys, in their answer,  over that  they  had no intervention in the  preparation of, nor have they counselled Castelo in making the statements  in,  his petition  for disqualification, their only  intervention being  to  sign the notice of hearing of said  petition.  They  further aver  that,  as the  alleged statements constitute indirect contempt and the judge himself has made the  charge,  respondent judge is disqualified to hear and decide the  same.

Respondent De Joya, in his answer, avers,  among other things, that he did not  take part in the preparation of the petition for disqualification and knew nothing  of the conditions  and  circumstances  under which  it was  prepared; that said petition was signed and  sworn to only and exclusively by Oscar Castelo and he came to know of its existence only  after  it  had been filed; that in  connection therewith his name had been included only in the notice of hearing; that said petition for  disqualification is privileged in nature; that contempt proceedings being criminal in nature, no  one can be held responsible for a statement made by another; and that courts of justice and judicial  officers should never  act with vindictiveness  in the preservation of judicial decorum.  He prayed that the charge be dismissed as to him.

The questions to be  determined  are:  (1) Are the alleged statements imputed to petitioners  contemptuous  in character?; (2) If so, do  they constitute direct contempt?; and  (3)  Has respondent judge erred in finding  petitioners guilty of the charge? 

1. It should  be  noted that one Augusto Melencio  is one  of the witnesses who testified for the prosecution  in the murder case then pending against Oscar Castelo and among the  incidents cited  in the  petition for  disqualification  to bolster up  the  claim that respondent judge should  inhibit himself in  trying the case anew is the insinuation that Melencio was made to sign certain statements in line with the prosecution’s  plan to utilize  him as a state witness principally to implicate Castelo after the prosecution has realized that  the testimony of Robles was insufficient and unreliable to serve as basis of Castelo’s conviction.  It was stated that Melencio, as a means of impressing him of the hopelessness of his situation, was made to  hear a conversation through the telephone between Fiscal Andres Reyes and  respondent judge which, according to Melencio,  had  the effect  of  convincing  him that his salvation was possible only  through  submission to the desire of the prosecutors to have him testify as a witness  against Castelo,  and,  in the last part of the narration, the following  comment appears:  “This belief on the part of Melencio of the futility of defending himself  in the face of an apparent  conspiracy between the presiding judge and the prosecutors was  not without justification.  What indeed would have been the use of further resistance when the judge and the  prosecutors  could talk over  the telephone  with such familiarity, and  apparent rapport  indicating connivance between them?”

Another incident cited in  the petition refers  to  the alleged attempt to bribe respondent judge to secure the exoneration of  Castelo.  It  was  stated  that, before  the promulgation of the decision in the murder case on March 31, 1955, two ladies, Mrs. Saldana and Mrs. Eugenia L. Co, informed Miss Adelaida Reyes that Castelo  and his co-acussed were sure to be convicted and given the penalty of death, which  made Miss Reyes  break down into  tears. When Mrs. Co informed Miss Reyes that she was a relative and  very influential with respondent judge and that there  was nothing that  she could  not secure from him, she asked Mrs.  Co what could be done about the matter. It was then that Mrs. Co brazenly told  Miss Reyes that the remedy was for Castelo to offer the  sum of P100,000 for his acquittal.  It was impressed upon Miss  Reyes by Mrs. Co and  Mrs.  Saldana that with such  payment of P100,000 the decision could  be changed and  the acquittal of Castelo  secured.  Informed of  this  incident, Castelo was enraged  and reported the matter to the  army  and constabulary authorities.  The narration  of the  whple incident closes  with the following comment:   Significantly, or is it  strange  that the failure to extort P100,000 from herein petitioner resulted in his conviction to  death?  And as previously conveyed by Mrs.  Eugenia L. Co to Miss Reyes on March 10 and March 14, 1955 all the accused including the petitioner were condemned to death.”

There  is no doubt that the  insinuations or imputations contained in the above statements appearing in the petition  for disqualification  are not only contemptuous  but have no basis in the  evidence.  They are  contemptuous because,  on  one hand, they accuse respondent judge of conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of Oscar Castelo  and, on  the other hand they implicate the judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from Castelo on a promise  or assurance of  his  acquittal.  Obviously, such insinuations  or imputations are highly derogatory  and serve  nothing  but to discredit  the  judge  presiding the court in an attempt to  secure his disqualification.  They are derogatory for,  under the circumstances they were uttered,  they cannot but reflect on  the honesty and integrity of the judge.  They have no place in a court pleading and, if uttered  by a member  of the bar, constitutes a serious disrespect.  “As an officer of the  court, it is his sworn and moral  duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the  high  esteem and regard towards the  courts so  essential  to the proper  administration of  justice” [People  vs. Carillo,  43, Off. Gaz., (12)  p. 5012]. 

2. The alleged  contemptuous  statements, having been made in a pleading submitted to the court, constitute1 direct contempt within the meaning of  the law. As  held, by this Court in the case of Salcedo vs.  Hernandez (61 Phil., 724), the act of a lawyer in inserting a paragraph, containing contemptuous phrases,  in a motion  filed in a case pending before  the Supreme Court, “constitutes a contempt in the case of the  Court  (in  facie  curiae).”   Similarly, in the case of  Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil., 86,  the facts of which are on all  fours with the incident at  bar, it was held that the trial judge did not act without or  in  excess of his jurisdiction, nor abuse his discretion, when he found a lawyer in contempt of court for submitting an urgent motion praying that the trial judge  inhibit himself from hearing  on retrial a criminal  case against the  client of said lawyer,  which  urgent motion, in the opinion of the judge, tended to make the public believe that  he was incapable of administering justice to  the accused. Indeed, the act of petitioners constitutes direct contempt within the meaning  of section 1, Rule 64,  of the Rules of Court, for it is  tantamount to a “misbehavior in the presence of or so near a cpurt or judge as to  interrupt the administration of justice.”   Verily, with  such  conduct  or mis-behavior the proceedings relative to the retrial have been unnecessarily delayed to the detriment of the administration of justice.   

 

3. In connection with the responsibility of petitioners, it is true that Castelo stated in his answer that he assumes full  responsibility for  the preparation  and filing of  the petition for  disqualification  containing  the contemptuous statements and that his  attorneys of record  have had absolutely  no participation or  intervention in  the  preparation of said  petition other  than signing the notice of hearing appearing  therein addressed to the clerk of court.  But,  this averment of  Castelo  notwithstanding, there appears on the face of the same petition  a circumstance which belies such statement.  Thus, in  the opening statement of said petition the following appears: “Comes now  the accused Oscar Castelo  who, only for  the purpose of this petition, hereby enters his appearance in collaboration with his attorneys of record, and to  this Honorable Court respectfully manifests:”   (Italics supplied). This statement is an indication that both Castelo and his attorneys joined in submitting the above petition for disqualification.

It is likewise true that the notice of hearing appears signed only by Atty. Alejandro  de Santos, although  the names of the other attorneys merely appear written therein.   Apparently, this gives the impression that the notification was  placed in the petition without  the knowledge and  consent  of the attorneys who have  not  signed and common sense dictates that  they should not be made accountable thereof.  But this  surmise  or assumption is belied by the subsequent development of the case for  the record shows that during the hearing of  the  petition  for disqualification held on September 10 and 12,  1955,  the herein petitioners not  only appeared for accused Castelo but  urged  its approval, which shows that at least they acted with  full knowledge of  the contents thereof and took  notice of their import and significance.   In urging for its approval they indirectly endorsed  and gave force and validity  to the  statements and arguments embodied therein.  With such  a behavior they cannot now be heard to contend that they are ignorant of the contemptuous statements contained in the  petition in an  effort to  escape  liability. In the  circumstances, we  are persuaded to conclude that  respondent  judge did not commit any abuse of discretion  in  issuing the order  subject  of the present petition.

Petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs. The writ of injunction issued by this Court is  hereby dissolved.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.