G.R. No. L-9565. September 14, 1956

On November 30, 1953, Nena Micaller was dismissed by the Scoty’s Department Store owned and managed  by petitioners  herein, from her  position as  salesgirl.  Contending that her  dismissal was unjustified, Micaller sued her employers in  the Court of Industrial Relations which, after trial, rendered judgment finding  petitioners  guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to reinstate her to  her  former position and to pay her wages in arrears (Case  No.  135-ULP).  This case was appealed to the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-8116).

On March 30, 1955,  Nena  Micaller obtained a writ of execution of  the  judgment  which orders her reinstatement,  but  petitioners  instead  of giving her back her former position as salesgirl, set her to work as canvasser of  prices outside  of the store.  On the  same date, March 30,  1955, petitioner tendered to  Nena Micaller  a check in the amount of  P124.80 corresponding to her salary for one month,  and advised her in writing that  her employment was terminated pursuant to the  provisions of Republic Act No. 1052.

Without losing time, Nena Micaller filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations in the same case praying that the manager Yu Ki Lam be declared in contempt of  court and,  after due hearing, the court,  in  an order entered on  May 10, 1955, while declining to punish him for contempt,  ordered him  “to  readmit Nena  Micaller to  her. former employment under the same  conditions of  employment existing  before the dispute  arose; and if he fails  to  do  so, he will be  committed to jail  until  he  complies with this order, upon proper motion.”  After their motion for  reconsideration  was denied, petitioners appealed to this Court by  way of certiorari disputing the validity of the aforesaid order of the  Court of Industrial  Relations.

The questions for determination is whether an employee, who has  been dismissed by  an  employer and  who has  been ordered  reinstated pursuant  to a  judgment finding in guilty  of unfair labor  practice, can again be dismissed  under the  provisions of Republic Act No. 1052.

Section 1 of.said Act provides: 

“Sec. 1. In cases of employment, without a definite  period, in  a commercial, industrial, or agricultural  establishment or enterprise, neither the employer nor the employee shall terminate the employment without serving notice on the order at  least one month in advance. 

“The employee, upon whom no such notice was  served, shall be entitled to one month’s compensation from the  date of termination of his employment.”

Does the above  provision apply to the  present  case? Commenting on the applicability  of said law to  the case at bar, the industrial court said:  “It  is the  unanimous opinion, among the members of the Supreme Court, that Republic Act No.  1052  authorizes the  employer,  under some conditions, to terminate relationship  with his employee, when the dismissal is not  prohibited by law.   But, when the employee is dismissed because of Union activities, like the case of Nena Micaller, or in  violation  of express statutory provisions, the employer  cannot take refuge in Republic Act No. 1052  to justify or  legitimate such dismissal.”

We agree to this  point  of view. While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by  serving notice on him one month in advance,  or, in the absence  thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the  date of the termination of his employment, such Act does  not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate, the employment  regardless of  the cause or purpose behind  such termination Certainly,  it cannot  be  made use of  as  a cloak  to circumvent a  final  order  of the court or  as  a scheme to trample  upon the right of  an  employee who has been  the victim  of an unfair  labor  practice.  In other words, the privilege given by that Act to an employer cannot be  resorted  to  if  to do so  would infringe the law that Congress had enacted to protect labor as against the  abuses of  capital.   One of  such abuses  which  our law condemns  and  which has given  rise  to  the  many social problems which mark the relationship of labor and capital  is  unfair labor  practice,  and this is  the act of which said petitioners  were condemned.  To  allow  them  to  take refuge under  that Act  and obtain by  indirect action  what they had  been expressly enjoined  by  an express order  of  the Court would  be  a mockery of law and a travesty of justice.  Such  cannot be  the intent of Congress.  This is in keeping with the social policy that “The relations between  capital  and labor  are  not merely contractual.  They are  so impressed with public  interest that  labor contracts must yield  to the  common good’ (Article 1700, New Civil Code).

The behavior observed by petitioners in connection with the reinstatement of Nena Micaller, far from being within the purview of said  Act, is contemptuous.  On March 30, 1955, the court decreed that she  be  reinstated, but she was not.  As the industrial court found, “She was told that she could not  come inside the store, and she was ordered to work  outside, to canvass for prices of articles and to  report  to the management  in  the evening after everybody was out of the store.  Micaller tried to comply with  that instruction, but at the  close of business, hours of that  same date, March 30, she was again dismissed”, invoking the provisions  of Republic Act No-1052.   It is for this reason that the court warned manager. Yu  Ki Lam that if  he should  fail to reinstate her immediately, he will  be committed to jail until  he  complies with the order.  We find this injunction  justified.

Wherefore, petition is denied, with costs  against  petitioners.

Paras, C.  J., Bengzon, Labrador,  Concepcion,  Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix,  JJ., concur.

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CONCURRING:
 

MONTEMAYOR, J.,

While I  agree  with  the majority when  through Mr. Justice  Bautista it says that the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052 may not be invoked  or used by an employer as a cloak or a means to circumvent the final order of the Court of Industrial Relations, I feel  that clarification or explanation of said ruling is advisable, even necessary, for the  information and  benefit  of  both employer and employee.   The question involved in  the present case is correctly stated by the majority as follows:

“The question for determination is whether an employee, who has been dismissed by an employer and who has been ordered reinstated pursuant to a judgment finding him guilty of unfair labor practice, can again be dismissed under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052.”

The majority practically answers  the  question  in the negative.  It seems to me that said answer would be productive of confusion and  future misunderstanding.  The majority itself states that  “Republic Act  No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in  the absence thereof, by  paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment”  However,  the above statement or interpretation of the law is  practically nullified and rendered vain  in that, when an  employee has  been dismissed from the service because of his union affiliation or activities and so must be reinstated, with back pay, the majority says, without any limitation  or qualification, that the benefits of the provisions of  Republic  Act No.  1052 are no  longer available  to the employer.

But it seems clear that such a ruling is not and  cannot be absolute because, if after reinstatement and after the payment  of the back salary, the employer,  later,  and in good faith finds the services  of the  said employee to be  no longer needed  and necessary,  or even  prejudicial to the interest of the employer, the latter, by complying with  the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052, may validly and properly terminate his services, specially if the interval pr  period  of  time between  the original dismissal constituting the unfair labor  practice  and the second dismissal, is sufficiently ample and long to remove all suspicion. or possibility that said second or last  dismissal had any relation  whatsoever with union activity, past or present. For this reason,  I believe  and  I am sure that majority will agree with me that, for the sake of clarity, and to avoid  misunderstanding, we  should state for the benefit and information of labor and management, that when an employee is improperly dismissed because say, of union activity  and affiliation, constituting unfair labor practice, he must be reinstated, even with back pay; But that such reinstatement does not give him a  permanent and vested claim  to the employment  because later  if  through  his Inefficiency or because his services  are no longer  needed, he  may  properly and validly be dismissed m accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052,, unless said dismissal is made again due  to union affiliation or activities.

Padilla, J., concurs.