G.R. No, L-9414. September 07, 1956

Appeal by certiorari against a decision  of the Court of Industrial Relations  in Tenancy Case No. 39  of Bulacan. From the decision appealed from it appears  that petitioner herein Ciriaco San Antonio received from  Pablo Valencia, deceased husband of Asuncion  Espinola, the possession of a parcel of land  containing three hectares  for purposes  of cultivation.  At that time  Valencia obtained by  way of  loan from San Antonio the sum of P550 at a yearly interest of  8  cavans  of palay.  Besides cultivating the land on a share basis, San Antonio was also allowed to  construct a  house thereon.  After the  death  of  her husband,  Espinola was  able to pay the  indebtedness, and in  the  year 1953  she filed  this  petition  in the Tenancy Division of  the Court of Industrial  Relations, praying that she be allowed to work the land herself with her two sons, claiming that the latter were able  to  do the work  of cultivation and that  she had sufficient number  of carabaos inherited from  her parents  with which  to work the land. San Antonio opposed the petition,  alleging that her claim that she and  her children could  cultivate the  land and that they had carabaos were false.  In further support of her petition to get back the land; Espinola further alleged that the land was given to San Antonio in consideration of the loan and not by  virtue of a contract of tenancy.  This claim was found  to  be untrue by the  Court of Industrial Relations, which  held  that a contract of tenancy existed. However, it held’that Espinola had the rights to get back her property for the purpose  of cultivation by herself and her children, declaring in the decision as follows: 

“In view of all  the  foregoing, petitioner Asuncion  Espinola is hereby granted authority  to eject respondent Ciriaco San Antonio from the landholding in question located at  San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan,  effective at the close of the agricultural year 1954-1955, subject to the condition  that  the petitioner and  her  two sons shall work said  landholding, and subject,  furthermore,  to  the provisions of Sections 21 and 22 of Act No. 4054, as amended. “Should the petitioner and her sons fail  to work the land  and instead entrust the  cultivation thereof to another person, the Respondent  shall, upon complaint to and after due hearing by  this. Court, be reinstated as  tenant thereon with  all the rights accorded and obligations imposed by law.”  (p. 12 of the decision.)

Both parties were not satisfied with the judgment.   San Antonio presented a motion  for reconsideration on January 5,  1955, which the court in bane denied.  Espinola on her  part presented  an earlier motion for reconsideration. As there was  delay in  the enforcement of the decision as  to the possession of the land, Espinola presented an  urgent  motion dated March  26,   1955,  alleging that inasmuch as the agricultural year 1954-1955 had ended and  San Antonio had refused to give up the land and give her share in the harvest, that the court order San Antonio to deliver to her the  whole harvest for the said year 1954-1955.

The motion  for reconsideration that Espinola filed was dated October 27, 1954 and  it questions the correctness of the finding  of the court to the effect that  the relationship between her and San Antonio was  that of landlord and  tenant and not that of borrower and lender as she had contended.  At a hearing of the motions for reconsideration filed by both parties, Espinola asked the court to “dismiss her motion  for reconsideration.”   The court made no ruling on this motion  for dismissal  until June 27, 1955. At that time  Republic Act No. 1267, which was  approved and took effect on June 14, 1955 had already taken effect. Taking advantage of the passage of said law, San Antonio filed his present  petition, alleging that the Court of Industrial Relations had lost jurisdiction over the case and  had no authority  on June  27, 1955  to grant the motion  for dismissal  of   the  motion  for   reconsideration  filed   by Espinola, and that  the  findings and conclusion  of  the Court &f Industrial,Relations as to the capacity of Espinola and her sons to  cultivate the land are false and not  justified by the evidence.

We  can not review $he findings  of fact made  by  the Court  of Industrial Relations as to the ability and right of Espinola to cultivate the property and her consequent right, to” the  possession of  the  land in question.  Under the law only questions of law may be raised and appealed from the decision of the Court  of Industrial Relations to this Court: 

“SEC.  13. Appeal may “be taken from an order or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations promulgated  under  the  provisions of I3iis  Act  and a review of such order  or decision may be obtained in the Supreme Court by filing in such court within fifteen days from receipt  of notice  of  such order  or decision a written petition  praying that it be  modified  or set aside in whole or in part.  The review  by the court shall be limited to questions  of law, and findings of  fact when  the  decision is not supported by substantial evidence.”   (Republic Act No. 1267, as  amended by Republic  Act No. 1409.)

The only valid issue before us, therefore, is the validity of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations of June 27, 1955, approving the supposed “dismissal” of the motion for  reconsideration  filed by Espinola.  The  importance of this question  lies in the fact  that as San Antonio  had not  appealed  from the decision of the  Court of Industrial Relations the  judgment rendered by that court would be final and executory if the supposed  “dismissal”  of the motion  for reconsideration filed by Espinola is  valid, as it was only because of the motion for reconsideration that the judgment rendered by the  Court  of Industrial Relations had not and could not be declared final and executory.

The motion for reconsideration  in  question is not attached to the record, altho it is admitted that it  was filed for the  purpose of questioning the finding of  the  trial court that the  relationship between  Espinola  and  San Antonio is that of landlord and tenant.   The name given to the motion seems to be incorrect.  It is called a “motion for dismissal”  of her  motion;  it was  in fact and  in  law a withdrawal of a motion for  reconsideration.  The import of the withdrawal of the  motion for reconsideration is in conformity to the judgment of the Court of Industrial Relations.  Such conformity to the judgment and willingness to  abide by its terms and conditions do not need the court’s  approval.  The presentation of the motion to the court is sufficient to  make it  effective  even without its (court)   approval.  As the court’s  approval was not necessary the grant thereof was a superfluity and  produced no effect at all  upon the status of the proceedings.   The objection raised by the  petitioner herein that the court had no  jurisdiction  on the matter after the approval of Republic Act No. 1267 avails  him nothing.  His petition for the annulment of  the said order and  the transfer of the case to  the Agrarian Court  is,  therefore,  without merit.

The  petition  is  denied,  and the writ  of preliminary injunction issued in this case is  hereby dissolved  with costs  against the petitioner.

Paras, C.  J., Bengzon, Paddlla,  Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.  B. L. Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.