G.R. No. L-6038. March 19, 1955

On February 26, 1952 proceedings were instituted before the Deportation Board
against the petitioner, Federico M. Chua Hiong, who is alleged to have secured
the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration with the Bureau of
Immigration on October 31, 1945, through fraud and misrepresentation (in
claiming to be an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother named Tita Umandap
when as a matter of fact he is the legitimate child of a Chinese woman by the
name of Sy Mua) and to have maliciously and illegally exercised privileges and
rights belonging to citizens of the Philippines, such as the right of suffrage,
the acquisition of real estate and lumber concessions, knowing that he is a
Chinese national. Upon the institution of the proceedings, a warrant for his
arrest was issued on February 27, 1952. He filed a bond for his release and
thereafter petitioned said Deportation Board for the dismissal of the
proceedings against him on the following grounds: (1) the jurisdiction to deport
aliens exists only with regard to aliens, those who are admittedly so; (2)
respondent is a citizen of the Philippines and his claim is supported by
evidence that, if believed, is sufficient to entitle him to a declaration of his
citizenship; and (3) his Filipino citizenship has already been declared by the
Secretary of Labor, in representation of the President of the Philippines, and
the same is binding on the other executive branches of the government, the
Deportation Board including. The motion to quash was denied by the Deportation
Board on July 7, 1952, on the ground that the mere plea of citizenship does not
divest the Deportation Board of its power over the deportation proceedings; that
the Deportation Board has the judicial power to pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence that the respondent may submit to support his claim of citizenship;
that the passport and other documents submitted by the respondent to prove his
claim of citizenship are inconclusive; that the Deportation Board is not barred
from determining the claim of respondent’s citizenship notwithstanding previous
findings of executive officials of the Government; that an analysis of the
evidence of the respondent made by the Department of Justice shows ample reasons
for justifying the Chief Executive in redetermining respondent’s citizenship;
and that only may the Board be prohibited from continuing the proceedings if it
is convinced that the evidence submitted by the respondent shows that he is a
Filipino citizen.

These proceedings were instituted in this Court on September 3, 1952, and it
is sought herein that a writ of habeas corpus issue in favor of petitioner
against the Deportation Board on the ground that his arrest was made without
jurisdiction, as the claim submitted by him of his Filipino citizenship is
supported by evidence; that the Board be prohibited from continuing the
deportation proceedings against him; and that a writ of preliminary injunction
issue to restrain the Deportation Board from hearing the case until after his
petition is heard by this Court. On September 15, 1952, the Solicitor General,
on behalf of the Deportation Board, filed a return, claiming, among other
things, that the Deportation Board has in the first instance jurisdiction to
pass on the question of petitioner’s claim of Filipino citizenship; that the
papers submitted to the Board by petitioner to support his claim of Filipino
citizenship are inconclusive; and that it may review a previous determination by
the Secretary of Labor on petitioner’s Filipino citizenship. The return alleges
the same reasons that the Board had set forth in denying petitioner’s motion to
quash the proceedings. On October 15, 1952, petitioner filed a reply to the
return, attaching other documents relative to the petition.

The legal foundation of the petitioner’s claim is contained in three
propositions, namely, (a) that only an is subject to deportation or
repatriation, and that when a resident denies that he is an alien and claims to
be a citizen of the Philippines, he challenges or puts in issue a jurisdictional
fact, alienage; (b) that the evidence which he has submitted to the
Deportation Board as to his Filipino citizenship is substantial, for as a matter
of fact various officials of the executive department have recognized such
citizenship and had made a finding that he is not subject to the provisions of
the Alien Registration Act; and (c) that as his liberty as a citizen is
involved, the constitutional guarantee of due process of law demands that his
alleged citizenship should first be determined in judicial proceedings. The
first proposition above set forth is admitted in the return. It is well settled
that proceedings for deportation or repatriation can be instituted only against
aliens. (2 Am. Jur. 524.)

The second proposition appears to be justified by the documents attached to
the record, especially the letter of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs under
the Japanese Military Occupation, dated August 17, 1944 (Annex I), the letter of
the Secretary of Labor dated October 31, 1945, finding the petitioner a natural
son of a Filipino woman and, therefore, a Filipino citizen, and therefore exempt
from the provisions of the Alien Registration Act (Annexes K, J and L), and the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Case No. 565, entitled
Federico M. Chua Hiong, petitioner, to the effect that petitioner is the
illegitimate son of a Filipino woman by the name of Tita Umandap and is,
therefore, a Filipino citizen (Annex 2), although this decision was afterwards
set aside in view of the dismissal of the appeal in the Supreme Court. But the
above documents are contradicted by the findings of a member of the Board of
Special Investigation of the Bureau of Immigration (Annex 4, respondent), who,
after an analysis of the evidence, concludes that the testimony of Tita Umandap,
alleged mother of petitioner, has certain discrepancies which render it of
doubtful veracity. The Secretary of Justice, in his communication of May
17,1952, addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration, has also found that
petitioner’s claim to citizenship is not satisfactorily proved, so he ordered
that he be required to register in accordance with the provisions of the Alien
Registration Act. We might add that the petitioner herein had obtained original
entry into the Philippines as the son of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother,
which fact entirely contradicts his claim of Filipino parentage on his mother’s
side, although this fact may perhaps be explained by the desire of his father to
hide the illegitimate filiation of his son, a natural tendency of man. We have
therefore a case where the evidence is neither decisively conclusive in favor of
petitioner’s Filipino citizenship, nor decisively conclusive against said
claim.

The third proposition contained in petitioner’s claim and as set forth above,
seems to have been already passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Ng Fung Mo. vs. White, 66 L. ed. 938, wherein it was
stated:

* * * To deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him of
liberty as was pointed out in Chin Yow vs. United States, 208 U.S. 8,
13, 52 L. ed. 369, 370, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201. It may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living. Against the danger of
such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the 5th
Amendment affords protection in its guaranty of due process of law. The
difference in security of judicial over administrative action has been adverted
to by this court. * * *.

“It follows that Gin Gang Get and San Mo are entitled to a judicial
determination of their claims that they are citizens of the United States; * *
*.”

The Solicitor General, however, contests said ruling, citing the case of U.S.
vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 168-189, 48 L. ed, 917, 920-921, which
holds that the regular order of deportation proceedings may not be interrupted
summarily as a matter of right.

“In order to act at all the executive officer must decide upon the question
of citizenship. If this jurisdiction is subject to being upset, still it ia
necessary that he should proceed if he decides that it exists.* * *.

“We perfectly appreciate, while we neither countenance or discountenance that
argument drawn from the alleged want of jurisdiction. But while the consequence
of that argument, if sound, is that both executive officers and Secretary of
Commerce and Labor are acting without authority, it is one of the necessities of
the administration of justiee that even fundamental questions should be
determined in the ordinary way. If the allegations of the petition for habeas
corpus setting up want of jurisdiction, whether of an executive officer or of an
ordinary court, are true, the petitioner theoretically is entitled to his
liberty at once. Yet a summary interruption of the regular order of proceedings,
by means of the writ, is not always a matter of right.”

And he adds that only in case it is convinced that a respondent is a Filipino
citizen will it refrain from further proceedings in any case.

There is no
question that as the power to deport is limited to aliens only, the alienage of
the respondent in deportation proceedings is a basic and fundamental fact upon
which the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board depends. If the alienage of the
respondent is not denied, the Board’s jurisdiction and its proceedings are
unassailable; if the respondent is admittedly a citizen, or conclusively shown
to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its proceedings are null and void
ab initio and may be summarily enjoined in the courts. Naturally the
Board must have the power, in the first instance, to determine the respondent’s
nationality. And the respondent must present evidence of his claim of
citizenship before the Board and may not reserve it before the courts alone in a
subsequent action of habeas corpus. (Carmona vs. Aldanese, 54 Phil.,
896.) It must quash the proceedings if it is satisfied that respondent is a
citizen, and continue it if it finds that he is not, even if the respondent
claims citizenship and denies alienage. Its jurisdiction is not divested by the
mere claim of citizenship. (Miranda, et al., vs. Deportation Board, 94,
Phil., 531.)

There is also no question that a respondent who claims to be a citizen and
not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship
reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. When the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin
the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts
for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the
legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence
thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the
deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the
Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. The legal basis of
the prohibition is the absence of the jurisdictional fact, alienage.

The difficulty arises when the evidence is not conclusive on either side, as
in the case at bar. Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue
till the end, or should the question of alienage or citizenship of respondent be
allowed to be decided first in a judicial proceeding, suspending the
administrative proceedings in the meantime that the alienage or citizenship is
being finally determined In the courts? The highest judicial authority in the
United States has answered the second question in the affirmative. (Ng Fung Ho
vs. White, supra.) The case of U. S. vs. Sing Tuck,
supra, must be considered as having been modified by the case of Ng
Fung Ho vs. White, which a of a later date. It is also more applicable to the
case at bar where the petitioner is not seeking admission, but is already in the
Philippines and is being expel’ed. If the citizen’s right to his peace is to be
protected, it must be protected preferably through the medium of the courts,
because these are independent of the other branches of the government and only
in their proceedings can we find guarantees of impartiality and correctness,
within human limitations, in the ascertainment of the jurisdictional fact in
issue, the respondent’s claim of citizenship. And if the right is precious and
valuable at all, it must be also protected on time, to prevent undue harassment
at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use
is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only
after the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the
citizen’s name before the bar of public opinion? However, it is neither
expedient nor wise that the right to a judicial determination should be allowed
in all cases; it should be granted only in cases when the courts themselves
believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship,
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim
is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in the sound
discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding.

In the case at bar, we find that the evidence of which petitioner and the
State may avail is of such substantial nature as to afford belief that only an
impartial judicial investigation can evaluate it with fairness to the petitioner
and with justice to all concerned. Besides, the Executive department has seen it
proper that the issue of petitioner’s citizenship be determined in a judicial
proceeding, a criminal action for violation of the Alien Registration Act having
been filed against the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Manila, No.
21740, People of the Philippines vs. Federico M. Chua Hiong. (See Annex
to Manifestation of counsel for petitioner of March 6, 1953.) Wherefore, let the
preliminary injunction issued in this case continue subject to the results of
the aforesaid criminal action against the petitioner. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Preliminary injunction to continue subject to the results of the criminal
action.