G.R. No. L-8408. February 17, 1955

This petition for a writ of certiorari was filed to set aside an order of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio in the
quo warranto proceedings instituted in said Court (Case No. 465), by
respondent Dr. Andres A. Angara, against petitioner herein Josefina A.
Gorospe.

It appears that respondent Dr. Andres Angara was appointed the City Health
Officer of the City of Baguio, and his appointment was confirmed on April 29,
1947. While discharging his duties as such, said respondent applied on October
21, 1950, and was granted, on May 15, 1953, a PHILCUSA-FOA (MSA) training grant
to study and specialize in the United States. He signed a Training Grant
Agreement to conform to all rules and regulations prescribed by the Philippine
Council for United States Aid and Foreign Operations Administration, and to
render upon his return no less than 2 years’ service to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines for every year of training abroad. Thereafter,
respondent Angara left for the United States, and vacated temporarily his post
as City Health Officer of Baguio; and the petitioner Dr. Josefina Gorospe,
Medical Officer of the Baguio Health Department, was designated Acting City
Health Officer of Baguio.

Dr. Angara returned to the Islands on August 26, 1954. Before his arrival on
August 10, 1954, the United States Foreign Operation Mission to the Philippines
(FOA) sent, to the Secretary of Health a “justification” regarding assignments
of the trainees under the grant, in order to make “the best use of the special
training” they had received. With particular reference to respondent Angara, the
“justification” stated that “he is well equipped to act as Technical Assistant
to the Department of Health in all matters relating to Tuberculosis.” (Petition,
Annexes G and H). Pursuant to this recommendation, Dr. Angara upon his return
was verbally instructed by the Secretary of Health not to reassume the office of
City Health Officer of Baguio, to take a week’s vacation leave, and to await
assignment under the PHILCUSA-FOA agreement. Respondent was appraised of the
recommendation made in his case, and he objected to the same; then, contrary to
instructions, he returned to Baguio and took over the office from petitioner
Gorospe who, unaware of the instructions of the Secretary of Health, raised no
objection.

On September 14, 1954, the Mayor of Baguio, after a telephone conversation
with the Secretary.of Health and receipt of a telegram that Dr. Angara had been
instructed not to assume his old position and that the Department of Health
contended Dr. Gorospe was still acting City, Health Officer, informed Dr. Angara
that the salary as City Health Officer would be paid to Dr. Gorospe, and
suggested that the matter be taken up with the Secretary.

Summoned to Manila for a conference, Dr. Angara directed petitioner Dr.
Gorospe to take up routine matters in his absence. But Dr. Gorospe, under the
authority of the Secretary, reassumed office as Acting City Health Officer and
issued a memorandum to the personnel of the City Health Department to that
effect.

In Manila, the Secretary of Health advised respondent on September 17, 1954,
that he would be given a position as Technical Assistant to the Department of
Health (Answer , p. 55) and on the same day, Department Order No. 167, s. 1954,
was issued, whereby respondent Dr. Angara

“* * * is hereby detailed effective immediately to the Division of
Tuberculosis, Department of Health, to assist the chief of the Division in the
planning, organization and implementation of the activities provided for under
Republic Act No. 1136. This detail shall continue until further
orders.”

Evidently laboring under the impression that he had been ousted from the post
of City Health Officer of Baguio, respondent Angara returned thither and on
September 20, 1954 commenced quo warranto proceedings against
petitioner Gorospe, the Mayor, the Treasurer, and the Auditor of the City of
Baguio, alleging usurpation by petitioner of the functions of the office of City
Health Officer, and praying for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction. The answer opposed the preliminary injunction and pleaded Dr
Angara’s detail under Department Order No. 167, previously quoted; Dr. Angara’s
PHILCUSA-FOA fellowship contract; that Dr. Gorospe in discharging the duties of
Acting City Health Officer of Baguio was merely obeying the lawful orders of the
Secretary of Health; and that the latter was not a party to the proceedings.

On October 11, 1954, the respondent Judge granted a preliminary writ of
injunction upon the filing of a bond for P3,000; and a motion to reconsider this
order having been denied, petitioner Gorospe resorted to this Court, which
ordered a stay of the proceedings.

It is plain from the text of the Department Order No. 167, Series 1954, that
respondent Dr. Angara has not been suspended, removed or ousted from his
position as City Health Officer of Baguio, but was merely detailed to serve
temporarily in Manila, in the Division of Tuberculosis , Department of Health,
as Technical Assistant therein. Such being the case, our decisions in Santos
vs. Mallare, (48 Off. Gaz., (5) 1787) ; Jover vs. Borra, (49
Off. Gaz., (7) 2765), Lacson vs. Romero, (47 Off. Gaz., 1778-); and
Lacson vs. Roque, (49 Off. Gaz., (1) 93) are not applicable. The detail
of respondent Dr. Angara, under Department of Health Order No. 167, is a mere
temporary arrangement which does not have, and is not intended to have the
effect of removing or suspending said respondent from the position he now holds.
Said detail, moreover, is supported by the contractual commitments assumed by
said respondent under the Training Grant Agreement that he voluntarily signed,
promising to render not less than two years service to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines upon his return from training abroad.

The provision in the order in question, that respondent Angara’s detail
“shall continue until further, orders”, can not be construed as an indefinite
assignment, since respondent’s contract to serve the Government of the Republic
limits his service to two years and not more. Hence, the phrase adverted to is
to be understood as merely referring to the particular detail to the
Tuberculosis Division, and not to the duration thereof.

Considerable effort is made for the respondent Dr. Angara to show that his
detail to the Tuberculosis Division is not in line with the special training he
has received under the grant. Assuming that this is a. matter that could
properly be determined in these proceedings, it should be enough to point out
that the agreement subscribed by said respondent (Petition, Annex F) does not
authorize him to insist that his own discretion or judgment should override that
of his hierarchical superior , the Secretary of Health. The revised “Memorandum
to the Agencies of the Philippine Government for the Sending of Filipino
Technicians abroad under the ECA “Technical Assistance Programme” attached to
said respondent’s answer as its Annex 2, and which he admits to set forth the
conditions applicable to his application for specialized training, (Answer, par.
7) contains the following provisions:

“8. Obligations undertaken by participants and by the
Government.—Each participant chosen within the government service is
required to sign an agreement in which, among other things, he binds himself to
render not less than two years’ service to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines upon his return, for every year of training abroad, any period of
training, study, or observation being computed as a minimum of one year for this
purpose. The government undertakes to restore the participant to the position
most advantageous to the government upon the completion of his training
abroad.”

What position should be deemed “most advantageous to the government” for the
respondent to occupy is a question to be decided by the representatives of the
government , and not by respondent Dr. Angara. Respondent’s opinion as to his
qualifications and capacity may not necessarily coincide with that of the
government’s representatives , and in such event, the decision of the latter
must control, since the object is to attain the maximum benefit for the
government itself, not for the respondent. Even if a party were a reliable
judex in sua causa, the government can not be denied the right to
determine, experimentally or otherwise, in what position it could make use of
respondent’s services to the best advantage of the service and of the public. Be
that as it may, the undertaking to place the respondent in the position most
advantageous to the government for “the best use of the special training”
received by him necessarily carries with it the duty of respondent Dr. Angara to
comply with such assignment, even if it does not suit his personal ideas or
convenience. If the government’s undertaking was a duty on its part, respondent
had no right to prevent the discharge of such duty.

Respondent Dr. Angara has not shown, directly or indirectly , that his detail
to the Tuberculosis Division was in any way due to improper motives or purposes,
or that it was made in abuse of discretion or would subject him to indignity or
humiliation, or is otherwise incompatible with his obligations under the
Training Agreement. The undeniable importance of tuberculosis control for the
country at large sufficiently justifies the detail, specially since it is in
line with the recommendation of the authorities who exercised supervision of the
training grants. It is not amiss here to call attention to section 951 of the
Revised Administrative Code:

“Sec. 951. Command of services of medical employees in general—
Subject to the approval of the proper head of Department, the Director of Health
may require the services, without additional compensation, of any medical
officer or employee in the Government service.”

And if the Director of Health can exercise this power, a fortiori,
his superior, the Secretary of Health, may do so, and call upon respondent to
serve.

We have held in Rodriguez vs. Del Rosario,^[*] 49 Off. Gaz. (No. 12) p. 5427, that a
public officer designated temporarily to act as technical assistant has the
right to renounce such designation and return to his official post. Said ruling
does not apply to the case of the respondent Dr. Angara, because the latter, by
his training agreement, has consented to submit for two years to the designation
made by the proper government representatives. His claim that the agreement is
void in so far as it binds him to serve away from the city of Baguio is
untenable, for petitioner is now in estoppel to urge the nullity of his training
agreement after having taken advantage thereof . It appears neither fit nor
seemly that this respondent, after voluntarily applying for and obtaining
special training advantages upon his promise to serve the national government
for two years upon his return, should now endeavor to repudiate those very
promises in consideration whereof he was granted and received the advantages he
now enjoys. It is well to note in this connection that the City of Baguio is not
complaining against the temporary loss of respondent’s services; in truth, its
authorities were made by him defendant in the quo warranto proceedings
interposed against Dr. Gorospe.

We can not agree that respondent’s training contract is against public policy
in so far as it authorizes the Department of Health to detail him to another
position. Public policy requires, as we have repeatedly held, that officials in
the classified or unclassified civil service be not removed, suspended or
indefinitely transferred except with their consent or for sufficient
cause. But this rule aims primarily to protect the tenure of public officials,
to guard them from pressure or imposition, and they may voluntarily relinquish
the protection, at least for a limited period, as this respondent has done
through his training agreement. “There is no sanctity in such a claim of
constitutional right as prevents its being waived as any other claim of right
may be” (Wall vs. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407, 61 L.
Ed. 1229). “A person may, by his act or omission to act, waive a right he might
otherwise have under the Constitution”. (Pierce vs. Somerset Railway
171 U. S. 641, 43 L. Ed. 317).

It follows from all the foregoing that the detail made by Health Department
Order No. 167, Series 1954, was valid and in consonance with the terms of the
agreement voluntarily executed by the respondent Dr. Angara, and that the
temporary occupancy of his position, in ah acting capacity, by petitioner Dr.
Gorospe, did not constitute usurpation or unlawful withholding of the office of
City Health Officer of Baguio. As all the essential facts were laid before the
respondent Judge (as evidenced by the copies of the pleadings in the quo
warranto case in the Court below) and it could not be hidden from him that
no prima facie case of quo warranto existed; that the case
involved the validity of the Department Order No. 167, and that, therefore, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction practically nullified said order
without the Department Secretary being made a party, and being given a chance to
be heard, we have arrived at the conclusion that the issuance of said writ was
done in grave abuse of discretion.

In conclusion, we hold: (1) that a temporary detail of a public officer in
the civil service to another position, pursuant to contract voluntarily entered
into by the officer, is neither a removal, suspension, or transfer in violation
of the Constitution, in the absence of showing of manifest abuse of discretion
or that the detail is due to some improper motive or purpose; (2) that subject
to the same restrictions, where the government undertakes to place the officer
upon completion of his special training abroad to the position most advantageous
to the government, the selection of the position is in the discretion of the
government representatives; and (3) that where the pleadings and facts before
the Court of First Instance disclose no prima facie case for quo
warranto, and all the proper parties are not before the Court, a
preliminary writ of injunction restraining the respondent from discharging the
duties of the office is improper, as issued in abuse of discretion and excess of
jurisdiction.

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio in its
Civil Case No. 465 is annulled and set aside, with costs against respondent Dr.
Andres A. Angara.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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^[*] 93 Phil., 1070.

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DISSENTING OPINION

MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:

I regret my inability to agree to the interpretation given by the majority to
paragraph 8 of the training grant agreement signed by respondent Dr. Angara
before he left for the United States for study under a PHILCUSA-FOA (MSA)
training grant. For purposes of reference 1 am reproducing that portion of the
training grant agreement , to,wit:

“8. Obligations undertaken by participants and by the
Government.—Each participant chosen within the government service is
required to sign an agreement in which, among other things, he binds himself to
render not less than two years service to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines upon his return, for every year of training abroad, any period of
training, study, or observation being computed as a minimum of one year for this
purpose. The government undertakes to restore the participant to the position
most advantageous to the government upon the completion of his training
abroad.”

The facts in the case are correctly stated in the majority opinion, namely,
that respondent. Dr. Angara was in the year 1950 a duly appointed City Health
Officer of the City of Baguio; that he applied for and was later granted in 1953
a training grant by the PHILCUSA-FOA (MSA) to study and specialize in the United
States; that he signed the training grant agreement, paragraph 8 of which is
reproduced above, to conform to all rules and regulations prescribed by the
Philippine Council for United States Aid and Foreign Operations Administration,
and to render upon his return no less than two years’ service to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines for every year of training abroad; that
thereafter Angara left for the United States and temporarily vacated
his post as City Health Officer of Baguio and that Dr. Josefina Gorospe , a
Medical Officer in the Baguio Health Department was designated Acting City
Health Officer of Baguio; that upon Angara’s return he took over his old office
of City Health Officer of Baguio from Dr. Gorospe; that the Secretary of Health
objected to his returning to his old post and issued Department Order No. 167
detailing him, until further orders, with the Division of Tuberculosis,
Department of Health, in Manila; that Angara declined that detail because he
wanted to stay in his old post in Baguio and he commenced quo warranto
proceedings against Dr. Gorospe and obtained an order of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Baguio, which the majority now annuls and
sets aside as having been improperly issued.

The theory of the majority is that in signing the training grant agreement
and in taking advantage of the PHILCUSA-FOA (MSA) training grant to study in the
United States, respondent Angara bound himself upon his return to the
Philippines to render not less than 2 years service to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines for every years’ training abroad, in any capacity,
position, or department that the Government chooses to detail him, although the
majority admits that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in several
cases, among them those of Lacson vs. Romero, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778, and
Santos vs. Mallari, 48 Off. Gaz., (5) p. 1787, and Rodriguez
vs. Del Rosario, 49 Off. Gaz., No. 12 p. 5427, a civil service employee
like respondent Angara may not be removed, transferred, or detailed to another
place or position without his consent.

It is well to remember that Dr. Angara in signing the training grant
agreement and in going to the United States to study, never vacated his post as
City Health Officer of Baguio. The majority opinion itself says that in going to
the United States Angara merely vacated temporarily said post. Consequently
unless he had bound himself upon his return to the Philippines to accept any
transfer or detail to another post, in any place, he had every right to go back
to his old.post in Baguio. It is true that he undertook to render not less than
2 year’s service in the Government for every one year training abroad, but said
service of two years could well be rendered in his old post because it is just
the same service to the Government.

Let us now examine section 8 of the training grant agreement and see whether
as claimed by the majority, the respondent had undertaken or had obligated
himself upon his return to the Philippines to be transferred or detailed from
his post in Baguio to another place; in other words, whether or not he had
signed away his right to resume his old post upon his return to the Philippines.
The majority evidently banks on the last sentence of paragraph 8 which reads:

“* * * The government undertakes to restore the participant to the position
most advantageous to the government upon the completion of his training abroad.”

It will be seen that the whole question depends upon the meaning and
interpretation of the word “undertakes”. In my opinion, in that sentence above
reproduced, the Government merely promised or obligated itself to do something.
It is not a right for but rather an obligation of the Government. According to
Webster’s New International Dictionary, the word Undertake means “to take upon
oneself solemnly or expressly; to lay oneself under obHgation * * * to
guarantee, promise * * * to enter into an engagement * * * to pledge * * * to
give a promise or guaranty or assume responsibility”. In none of these
definitions is there any idea of right; rather there is every idea of obligation
or promise. The very sub-heading of paragraph 8—”Obligations undertaken
by participants and by the Government,” the very word “obligation” is used. As
already stated, all that Angara promised and undertook is that upon his return
to the Philippines he would render service to the Government 2 years for every
year of training abroad. That, he was willing and ready to perform—he assumed
his old post in Baguio and was prepared to render service to the Government. He
never promised to render said service in any other capacity, position, or detail
away from and other than his old post. If the last sentence of paragraph 8 had
said that the Government reserves the right to transfer or detail the
participant (Angara) to the position most advantageous to the Government because
of his special training abroad, it would be different because that reservation
would mean a right, far different from the obligation assumed
by the Government, as the sentence is actually worded.

Supposing that the detail now being imposed by the Government, instead of
being in Manila, were in some far off isolated place like Batanes which would be
quite unpleasant, inconvenient, and undesirable to Jhe respondent and wholly
unsuitable to his health because he and his family had been accustomed to the
climate of Baguio? Under the theory of the majority he would have to accept the
detail anyway whether he liked it or not, whether it would mean separation from
his family or whether his health would suffer by it; or else resign and answer
for any penalty or damages the Government may impose upon him, and all and only
because he promised before his going to the United States to serve the
Government 2 years for every one year of training abroad. If that were the
correct interpretation of the undertaking made by any government official or
employee who is sent abroad, then this arrangement or scheme would be a good and
expedient way of transfering or even removing government officials and employees
because upon their return to the Islands after their training abroad, they could
be detailed to a post so undesirable and so inconvenient that there is no
recourse or alternative left to the employee but to resign.

It should be remembered that when a person accepts a government position, the
duties thereof and the place of station are important considerations to be taken
into account. Perhaps, respondent Angara in accepting his original position in
Baguio, considered that place for purposes of residence as desirable and
suitable to his health and that of his family. According to our rulings already
stated, except for cause he may not be transferred or detailed from that place
without his consent. Here, he is being detailed away from Baguio against his
consent just because he promised, upon his return, to render service to the
Government, without specifying where. Without such specification, it is to be
presumed that that service would be rendered in his old post in Baguio. The
undertaking and promise made by the Government to restore him to a position most
advantageous to the Government, as I have already stated, is not a right but an
obligation, a guarantee or pledge which is up to the participant (respondent
Angara) to enforce or not. The distinction between an obligation and a right is
too clear to require explanation. If the government in giving a government
official or employee a chance to study abroad desires and intends to detail him
upon his return to any position, place, department or capacity it chooses, it
should make that point clear in the contract or grant agreement so that those
accepting the grant may know and decide whether or not to accept the grant.

It may be that respondent Angara in accepting the grant, in taking advantage
of it and in making special studies abroad is morally obliged upon his return to
the Philippines to render service to the Government in any capacity chosen by
the latter, where he could make use of his special training; but here we are
speaking and treating not of a moral obligation but a legal obligation. I want
to give force and substance to the rule and doctrine laid down by this Court,
protecting civil service officials and employees from being transferred or
detailed away from their posts against their will, unless they themselves have
previously and clearly consented to said transfer or detail.

I believe that the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the lower court
was properly issued.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

Writ granted.