G.R. No. L-4722. December 29, 1954

This is an appeal, taken by plaintiff, Emilio Strebel, from an order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting a motion to dismiss
filed by the defendants heroin, Jose Figueras, Felipe E. Jose and
Cornelio S. Ruperto, and, consequently, dismissing plaintiffs
complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs, upon the ground
that the facts alleged In said pleading do not constitute a cause of
action.

The complaint purports to set forth three causes of action. The
alleged acts upon which plaintiff’s first cause of action is predicated
may be divided into four (4) groups, namely:

1. That, as lessee of a lot situated at Nos. 735-737 Santa
   Mesa, Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to the Standard
   Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter constructed thereon a Mobilgas
   Station which was operated by Eustaqulo & Co., a partnership
   organized by said plaintiff and one Prime Eustaquio; that, “out of
   spite and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the said property
   for himself and his men,” defendant Jose Figueras tried all he could
   to built a drainage through11 the aforementioned property; that, in
   order to accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and political
   influence, defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor, caused
   his co-defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of
   Manila, to prepare an opinion, dated June 13, 1949, which was signed by
   the City Fiscal, holding that the City of Manila has a right to
   construct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary
   excavations, of about 70 centimeters in width, at the boundary line of
   said lot leased to Strebel and the lot belonging to Figueras; that,
   said opinion induced the city engineer of Manila to write to plaintiff
   Strebel the letter Exhibit B, dated June 22, 1949, reading:

“Republic of the Philippines
City of Manila
DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC WORKS

June 22, 1949

Mr. Emilio Strebel
Manila
Sir:

In
connection with the drainage of a certain dominant estate on Buenos
Aires which flows across a certain servient estate on Sta. Mesa
Boulevard and which was closed by the construction of a gasoline
station by the Standard Vacuum Oil Company on Santa Mesa Boulevard, I
have the honor to inform you that our men will make an excavation on
the strip of land lying between the lot of Mr. Jose Figueras on Buenos
Aires and the gasoline station of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company on
Sta. Mesa Boulevard for the purpose of laying a pipe across the said
strip of land to connect the drainage of the dominant estate
with the drainage of the servient estate occupied by the gasoline
station towards the storm severs on Santa Mesa Boulevard. The
excavation will be backfilled and I the ground restored to its original
condition by our men after the pipe had been laid.

“The
ownership of the strip of land which the excavation will be made a pipe
will be laid by our men is reading to our information, under litigation
between you and Mr. Antonio Isaac, letter is being addressed to you as
of the litigating parties.

Respectfully,

s/ ALEJO AQUINO
t/ ALEJO AQUINO”

and that plaintiff and his partner Primo Eustaquio, protested
against the aforementioned proposed excavation and drainage, which,
accordingly, was not made or construed

2. That on September 14, 1949: defendant Figueras by
   making use of his official and political connections,” was able to
   induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer temporarily, from the
   Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one Dr. Manuel
   Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff’s step daughter; that, thereafter,
   Figueras, “and/or his adviser,” caused to be prepared the following
   letter, Exhibit E”

“December 9, 1949

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Hon. Primitive Lovina
Secretary of Labor
Manila

Dear Sirs

The
undersigned have approached Secretary of Justice Rieardo Nepomuceno
with the idea of requesting him to intervene between us and
Under-secretary of Labor Jose Figueras with the end in view of settling
family misunderstandings. Secretary Nepomuceno advised us to appeal to
you. The origin and cause of these cases were previous personal affairs
which led to serious family troubles and squabbles. In addition, there
were the party differences between us and Undersecretary Figueras.

“As
the election are now over and as we would like to be in peace with Mr.
Figueras, we desire to ask your good self, knowing your interest in the
welfare of common people like us, to intercede for us with Mr. Figueras
so that he may forget our differences. We also desire to ask you to use
your good offices looking towards the return of Dr. Manuel Hernandez
from the Bureau of Prisons to the Bureau of Immigration where he is a
regular Medi.cal Officer. We are confident that, with your influence
and friendship with Mr. Figueras, he would consent to forget the past
and let begones be bygones between us. On part, we promise to treat and
the members of his family as real friends and I hope that his feelings
towards us will be the same.

“Should you be as kind as to effect. This reconciliation, we will be ever grateful to you.

Yours truly,

EMILIO STREBEL                  
LEONOR TIANGCO DE STREBEL
MANUEL HERNANDEZ             

 

CONFORME:

JOSE FIGUERAS”

which is said to be “coercive in nature and derogatory not only to
Dr. Manuel Hernandez but also the herein plaintiff and his wife;” that
upon failure to secure plaintiff’s signature on said letter, “another
one”—copy of which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit F—”was
prepared and submitted at the instigation of defendant Figueras and at
the behest of the then Secretary of Justice, for the signature of the
herein plaintiff, his wife and Dr. Manuel Hernandez” that said Exhibit
F is of the following tenor:

“AGREEMENT

We, JOSE FIGUEIRAS and MANUEL A. HERNANDEZ, OUT OF RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION
for our superior officers, the Honorable Secretary of Justice and the
Honorable Secretary of Labor, have this date mutually agreed to bury
whatever personal differences we may or might have.

I, MANUEL A. HERNANDEZ
hereby promise to do all I can to inform my in-laws E. Strebel and
Leonor S. Tiangco of this mutual agreement to convince them that JOSE FIGUERAS IS
amenable to the return of their friendly relation to ask them to follow
the same spirit and forget the past differences so that they can live
together again as one harmonious family. It is understood that if
Leonor S. Tiangco and or E. Strebel have heretofore filed any complaint
in the Fiscals office or elsewhere against Jose Figueras, they will
from now on withdraw said complaints;

“TO THIS END WE HAVE SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT.

Manila December 11th, 1949.

s/ MANUEL A. HERNANDEZ
t/ MANUEL A. HERNANDEZ
s/ LEONOR S. TIANGCO    
t/ LEONGR S. TIANGCO    
s/ E. STREBEL                
t/ E. STREBEL                

WITH MY CONFORMITY:

s/ JOSE FIGUERAS
t/ JOSE FIGUERAS
s/ OK.

Nepomuceno”

that after the foregoing “agreement” had been signed by plaintiff
“just to please defendant Figueras,” said Dr. Manuel Hernandez was,
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice, returned to his former
assignment in the Bureau of Prisons;

3. That, on or about, September 15, 1949, “making
   use of his official and political influence,” and with the cooperation
   of his former secretary, defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant
   City Fiscal of Manila, as well as “in connivance with the Director of
   Labor” which office was then held by defendant Felipe E. Jose, “and
   other employees in the Department and Bureau of Labor,11 defendant
   Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against plaintiff
   Strebel, and his partner, Prime Eustaqul, of Criminal Case No. 11005
   of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling
   several employees to work more than eight (8) hours a days in violation
   of Commonwealth Act No, 444, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 303,
   although before the filing of the information “the defendants
   collectively and singly knew that the allegations therein are false;11
   that said criminal case was subsequently dismissed by the Court of
   First Instance of Manila for failure of the prosecution “to establish
   even a prima facie case against the accused”; and

4. That, prior thereto, defendant Cornelio Ruperto, in connivance with his
   co-defendant Jose Figueras, had secured the dismissal of two criminal
   cases against the “bodyguards and cohorts” of the latter, “altho the
   information in both cases were filed after careful in vestigation of
   fiscals of proven integrity.”

It is further alleged in the complaint that, through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants have “caused moral and mental suffering to the * * * plaintiff, his
wife, and his entire family, and damage to his business in the amount
of P15,000.00, besides actual damages in the amount of P1,500.00 paid
to his attorney in defending himself from the malicious charge,” which
sums plaintiff prays that the defendants be sentenced to pay 3ointly
and severally.

With reference to the first group, it should be noted, that,
according to the very allegations of the complaint defendant Figueras
went no further than to secure the opinion of the City Fiscal favorable
to the construction of a drainage between his (Figueras) lot and that
of Strebel, and a letter of the City Engineer informing Strebel of said
proposed construction, which was not undertaken, or even
began, in view of Strebel’s opposition thereto. In other words, the
plan to built said drainage was seemingly abandoned before plaintiff’s
property rights could be violated. There was nothing wrong, either
legally or morally, in the desire of Figueras to seek an outlet for the
water coming from his property. On the contrary, it is required by the
elementary principles of health and sanitation. Besides, there is no
allegation that any lot other than that of plaintiff Strebel was
better suited for the purpose. Hence, we do not see how plaintiff could
have a cause of action on this count.

Neither could he have any arising from the assignment of his wife’s
son-in-law from the Bureau of Prisons—to which he had been previously
assigned temporarily, pursuant to Section 79(B) of the Revised
Administrative Code—to tine Bureau of Immigration, for

1. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the assignment
in question and the validity thereof, under said legal provision, are
admitted. Hence, it is not claimed that said officer may be held
civilly liable for the aforementioned assignment. This being the case,
how can such responsibility be exacted from Figueras who, it is urged,
merely instigated said assignment?

2. Even if we assumed the act complained of to be wrong or to have
caused injury, the right of action hypothetically resulting therefrom,
if any—on which we need not, and do not, express any opinion—would have
accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandez—who is not a party in the present
action—not plaintiff herein.

“As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental
suffering resulting from “bodily injuries is restricted to the person
who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for
distress caused by sympathy for another’s suffering, or for fright due
to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to
the safety of others who may be in personal peril from the same cause
cannot be taken into consideration.

‘* * * damages are not
recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as result of
willful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property of
person seeking recovery; hence plaintiff; is not entitled to recover
against administratrix of sister’s murderer for fright or shock caused
by viewing mutilated body of murdered sister. (Koontz v. Keller, 3 N.E.
2d 694, 52 Ohio App. 265)’ “(25 C.J.S. S 67 and footnote P. 554)

The rule on this point, as stated in the American

Jurisprudence, is:

“Injury or Wrong to Another.—In law mental. anguish
is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises
from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another’s suffering or which
arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another.
Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for
mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other’s
suffering.” (15 Am. Jur. PP. 597-598) (Italics supplied.)

In this connection, it should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter’s wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence, Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a relative
by affinity of said plaintiff. It would be extremely dangerous, apart
from unjust, to sanction a recovery, by the plaintiff, of moral damages
for the temporary transfer of Dr. Hernandez. If the mental anguish
allegedly suffered by plaintiff in consequence thereof ware sufficient
to give him a cause of action therefor, there would be no valid legal
reason to deny the same relief to any other person who might have thus
been inconvenienced, such as the friends of Dr. Hernandez, and public
officials similarly situated, as veil as those who may have been
adversely affected by the deterioration, if any, in the service of the
office or bureau which had been temporarily deprived of the services of
said physician.

For the rest, we find in the letter, Exhibit E, and the “agreement”,
Exhibit F, both of which are transcribed in the foregoing pages,
nothing “coercive” or “derogatory” to plaintiff herein, or which may
give occasion for any material, mental or moral anguish or damage
whatsoever.

As Regards the aots pertaining to the third group, the allegations
pertinent thereto purport to establish that the defendants are guilty
of the crime formerly known as false or malicious prosecution, defined
and punished in Article 326 of the Penal Code of Spain, which reads:

“The crime of false accusation or complaint is
committed by any person who falsely charges another with acts which, if
committed, would constitute an offense upon which a prosecution might
be instituted by the Government on its own motion, if such charge be
made to any executive or Judicial officer whose duty it is to
investigate or punish such felony.

“Nevertheless, no action
shall be take against the person making the accusation or complaint
except by virtue of a final judgment or order of dismissal by the court
before which the offense charged shall have been tried.

“The
court shall order the prosecution of the person making the accusation
or complaint whenever the principal case discloses facts sufficient to
justify such prosecution.”

It is noteworthy, however, that, pursuant to the said Article 326,
as construed by this Court (U.S. v. Rubal, 37 Phil. 577; U.S. v.
Barrera, h Phil. 4-61), an action for malicious prosecution may not be
instituted unless the court, in dismissing the first case, explicitly
orders the prosecuting attorney to proceed against the complainant for
violation of said provision, and that no such directive has been made
in the order dismissing Case Ho. 11005 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila. Furthermore, in People v. Rivera (59 Phil. 236, 240) the
decision of a lower court dismissing a case for malicious prosecution
was affirmed upon the ground that “article 326 of the Codigo Penal does
not appear in the Revised Penal Code which contains no offense
denominated, ‘acusacioa denuncia falsa’ or its equivalent.”

In order to circumvent this feature of the case, plaintiff says in his brief:

“Plaintiff is evidently suing the defendant not on
the ground of malicious prosecution arising from a criminal act but for
misconduct or malfeasance arising from an action ex delicto or a
tortious act.” (p. 21, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant.)

By specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of
Philippines, however, moral damages may not be recovered in cases of
crime or tort, unless either results or causes “physical injuries,”
which are lacking in the case at bar. Although the same- article
permits recovery of said damages in cases of malicious prosecution,
this feature: of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff
herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in
1949, or before said Code became effective, and Articles h and 2257 thereof declare:

“ART. 4.—Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”

“ART.
2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty
or a deprivation pf rights to acts or omissions which were not
penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when
said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the
omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.

“If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied.

“If
a continuous or repeated act or omission; was commenced before the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or Is
maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become operative,
the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Gode shall be applied, even
though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty
therefor.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Little need be said relative to the acts falling under the fourth
group. The allegation in the complaint to the effect that the
informations in the cases against “the bodyguards and cohorts” of
Figueras “were filed after careful investigation of fiscals of proven
integrity,” is not enough to render the dismissal of said cases either
illegal or improper, for additional facts or evidence may have been
found or secured by the prosecution, after the institution of said
cases, to show that the same are devoid of merit. Apart from this,
there is no allegation that plaintiff was the complainant or had any
particular interest in said cases. Hence, even if the dismissal thereof
were unlawful or wrongful, plaintiff would have no cause of action by
reason thereof.

It is clear, therefore, that the averments made in the so-called
first cause of action of plaintiff herein do not entitle him to the
relief prayed for: thereunder.

In support of his second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that,
“with a view to further injuring” him “and besmirching his good name in
the community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relation between
Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers,” defendants Felipe E. Jose and
Cornello S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that
plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had flagrantly violated
the provisions of the Eight-Hour Law and that said Criminal Case No.
11005 had been dismissed by the court on a flimsy ground; and that this
statement had “caused moral and mental suffering to the herein
plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of P5,000.00
which he prays “that the defendants, particularly Felipe Jose and
Cornelio S. Ruperto be condemned jointly and severally to pay” to him.
The aforementioned statement is allegedly contained in the following
news item, marked Exhibit L, and published in the Evening News of
September 19, 1950:

“JOSE, FISCAL RAP DECISION

Director of Labor Felipe B. Jose branded this noon
as highly prejudicial to the interest of labor the decision of the
court of first instance dismissing the case filed by five laborers
against two owners of gasoline station’s, who according to the director
flagrantly Violated the provisions of the eight-hour labor law.

“The
director announced that he and the city fiscal will appeal the case to
the supreme court until the two violators are punished accordingly.

“Cornelio
S. Ruperto, assistant city fiscal, charged that, without taking into
consideration the pertinent portions of Commonwealth Act the court
dismissed the case on the flimsy argument of the counsel for the
defendants that affidavits of the laborers shoved the latter never
complained against the action of the owners, Emilio Strebel and Primo
Eustaquio to anybody, including the department of labor.

“Ruperto
declared that the argument which cause the dismissal of the case is
impertinent and immaterial in the instant case, because, he said the
of the law on the matter is clear and implicit.

“Section
6 of the law says that ‘any agreement or contract between the employer
and the labors or employee contrary to the provisions of this act shall
be null and void ab initio therefore, Ruperto said, the agreement
between the five laborers and the owners is illegal and that the action
of

the latter is subject to the penal provision of the said law

“According
to the case. Eduardo Gonzales, Emilio Samson, Rodolfo Quintos, Pedro
Bensira, and Silverio, Trinidad were compelled to work more than the
required eight hours not secured from the department of labor which
requires overtime payment for work rendered in excess of eight boors,

“It
is recalled that in the celebrated Cuevo-Barrado case the adverse
decision of the judge who handled the case was appealed to the supreme
court which accordingly reversed the decision In favor of the laborer.
The action of the judge aroused the ire of the late President Quezon
who ordered the immediate dismissal of the judge.” (Record on Appeal,
pp. 131-133).

This news item mentions, neither the number of the case referred to,
nor the names of the persons accused therein, Moreover, it merely
contains a criticism of the action taken by the court. The reference,
therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of
the eight-hour labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the
theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the; prosecution had adopted by
filling the information in said case. Being a matter of court record,
which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a
decision already promulgated, said theory was open for public
consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or statement thereof, in
order to justify said criticism, is not actionable.

Again, said allusion was not made by defendant Ruperto, who, the
news item shows, said nothing against the plaintiff. It is apparent,
therefore, that as a whole, the allegations made in support of the
second cause of action do not establish a right of action against him.
Moreover, there is absolutely no allegation under said cause of action
connecting defendant Figueras with the statement already referred to or
rendering him liable therefor.

The so-called third cause of action is premised upon allegations to
the effect that, acting in cooperation and confabulation with Assistant
City Fiscal, Andres Reyes, and had filed, one Antonio P. Isaac,
defendant Jose Figueras on December 30, 1949, Criminal Case No.
B-53033-A of the Municipal Court of Manila against plaintiff Strebel,
his wife Leonor S. Tiangeo and Primo Eustaqulo for unjust vexation,
although there was no evidence in support thereof, for which reason the
case was dismissed on March 18, 1950; and that said unjust, malicious
and frivolous acts had

“caused moral and mental suffering to the herein plaintiff to the
tune of P10,000.00, and actual damage of P500.” Apart from seeking
judgment for these sums, plaintiffs pray:

“(d) That all the defendants be condemned jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages;

“(e)
That an order be issued directing the proper authorities to prosecute
all of them for malicious prosecution and libel or such other crime as
this Honorable Court may deem proper in filing and pressing the false
information and in issuing slandertius and libelous language after his
acquittal;

“(f) That thereafter proper
recommendation be made to the proper authorities for their immediate
suspension and/or dismissal from the service; and

“(g)
That plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as this
Honorable Court may deem Just and equitable in the premises.” (Record
on Appeal, p. 23.)

It is not alleged in the complaint that defendants Felipe Josa and
Cornelio Ruperto had any participation whatsoever in the filing of the
information for unjust vexation. Obviously, they are exempt from
liability in connection therewith. Upon the other hand, the assistant
city fiscal who signed said information and Antonio Isaac, the offended
party therein, have not been included as defendants in the case at bar.
At any rate, insofar as defendant Figueras is concerned, the situation
as regards the third clause of action is substantially identical to
that obtaining under the third set of facts alleged in support of the
first cause of action. What has been said above in relation to the
aforementioned set of facts is equally applicable, therefore, to the
third cause of action and suffices to demonstrate that the allegations
thereunder do not establish the existence of a right of action In favor of plaintiff herein.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from Is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ. concur.

Mr. Justice Padilla took no part.

Mr. Justice Alex Reyes took no part.

Mr. Justice Marceliano Montemayor took no part.