G.R. No. L-7075. November 18, 1954

The herein respondents, with others were charged with malversation
of public funds in four information’s docketed as criminal cases Nos.
3896., 5897, 3898 and 5899 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
After a joint hearing, during which numerous witnesses were presented
both by the prosecution and by the defense, Judge Jose B. Rodriguez
rendered a decision dated June 28, 1951, consisting of 152, pages,
acquitting all the accused, except Treasurer Francisco Martinez who was
found guilty of malversation through negligence and given only one
penalty. Judge Rodriguez transmitted his decision from Laoang, Samar,
to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Leyte who, on July 5,
1951, made the following entry in the criminal docket:

“July 3.1951, Court decided; Francisco Martinez
convicted from 8 years, 1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days, to
suffer perpetual disqualification and to pay P655,965.69 and
proportionate costs. The rest are acquitted. This decision includes
criminal cases Nos. 3896, 3897, 3898 to 5899,”

The clerk of court issued a notice for the accused. Francisco
Martinez to appear on July 7, 1951, for the reading of the sentence in
the four criminal cases, out the latter asked for postponement until
July 14, 1951, when only the dispositive part of the decision was
actually read to him, as he waived the reading of its full text,
although copy of the decision was received by Martinez and the fiscal.
Upon the other hand, no requirement was made for the appearance of the
respondents and other accused who were acquitted, but copies of the
decision were served upon each of them. Counsel for respondents
Ildefonso Tierra and Delfin M. Reyes actually received a copy from the
clerk of court on July 20, 1951.

The prosecution filed in the four cases (1) a motion for
reconsideration dated July 19, 1951, seeking to modify the decision of
Judge Rodriguez of June 28, 1951, so as to condemn those acquitted to
pay jointly and severally, by way of indemnity and reparation, the
amount involved; and (2) a motion for reconsideration praying that all
the accused toe convicted except Baldomero Perez. Respondents Ildefonso
Tierra and Delfin M. Reyes, through counsel, filed the corresponding
opposition. Accused Francisco Martinez in turn filed a notion for new
trial. The prosecution subsequently- filed a memorandum in support of
its two motions for reconsideration, assailing the decision of June 28,
1951, on the grounds that four separate judgments should have been
rendered; that the result does not conform to the findings contained in
the decision; and that said decision was not validly promulgated. On
December 26, 1951, counsel for the respondents received a notice from
the clerk of court to the effect that the reading of the decision in
the four criminal cases would take place on January 10, 1952. Upon
inquiry, the respondents were informed by telegram by the clerk of
court that the promulgation of the new decision rendered by, Judge
Sulpicio V. Cea, scheduled for January 10, referred to the same four
cases against all the accused. On January 4, 1952, counsel for
respondents accordingly filed a manifestation and motion, alleging that
Judge Cea had no jurisdiction or authority to render a new decision.
This was overruled by Judge Cea on January 9, 1952, at the same time
setting the promulgation of his new decision for January 16 and later
for February 7, 1952.

The respondents thereupon filed with This Court a petition for
prohibition (G-. R. No. L-5389), seeking to restrain Judge Cea from
further proceedings in the four criminal cases, but said petition was
dismissed, this Court pointing out that respondents” remedy was appeal
if convicted. On February 19, 1951, Judge Sulpicio V. Cea issued an
order setting the reading of his decision for March 4, 1952, with the
warning that failure on the part of the accused to appear would result,
in the confiscation of their bonds and their arrest. On this latter
date, Judge Cea issued (1) an order denying the motions for new trial
dated July 25, 1951, on the ground that no decision had as yet been
legally rendered; (2) an order disallowing the appeal of respondent
Nicolas Ybañez on the ground that the appealed order dated March 6,
1952 was interlocutory; and (3) an order denying the motion of attorney
for respondent Ildefonso Tierra, praying that the promulgation of a new
decision be suspended.

The respondents filed on March 20, 1952, a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals against Judge Sulpicio V. Cea and Fiscal
Alberto Jimenez of Leyte, praying that the orders of Judge Cea in the
four criminal cases, particularly those dated January 9, February 27
and 29, and March 4, 1952, and till his proceedings subsequent to the
decision of Judge Rodriguez of June 28, 1951, be declared null and
void; and that Judge Cea be restrained from rendering a new decision in
derogation or modification of the decision of acquittal already
rendered by Judge Rodriguez, after proper proceedings, the Court of
Appeals rendered on August 51, 1953, a decision the dispositive part of
which reads as follows: “In the light of the foregoing, we hereby grant
the petition. He declare all the orders of the respondent Judge issued
in said four criminal cases Nos. 3396, 3897, 3898 and 5399, Court of
First Instance of Leyte, particularly the order dated January 9, 1952,
February 27, 1952 and March 4, 1952, and any acts of said respondent
Judge in the proceedings subsequent to the decision of June 28, 1951,
null and void; ordering said respondent Judge or any Judge in his place
to desist from rendering and promulgating tiny new decision in said
criminal cases, in derogation or in modification of the said decision
of June 28, 1951; and making the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in these proceedings, definite and permanent; without pronouncement as
to costs.” From this decision the present appeal by certiorari was
taken in behalf of Judge Cea, Fiscal Jimenez, and the People of the
Philippines.

There is now no dispute that the new decision rendered and sought to
be promulgated by Judge Sulpicio V. Cea is one of Conviction; and the
principal question that arises is whether it can validly replace the
decision of Judge Rodriguez in the manner and under the facts already
above related. While the herein petitioners contend that the decision
of Judge Rodriguez of June 23, 1951, had not been duly promulgated
because it was not read to the respondents and other accused acquitted,
the respondents argue that the actual reading in the presence of the
accused is an indispensable requisite only in case of conviction. The
provision necessarily involved is section 6 of Mule 116 of the Rules of
Court which reads as follows:

“SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.—The
judgment, is promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the
presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who has rendered
it. The defendant must be personally present if the conviction is for a
grave:, or less grave offense; if for light offense, the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of his attorney or representative. And
when the judge is absent or outside of the province, his presence is
not necessary and the judgment may be promulgated or read to the
defendant by the clerk of the court,”

It is noteworthy that this rule makes the general statement that a
judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the defendant.
This is followed by a more specific mandate that the defendant must be
personally present in case of conviction for a grave or less grave
offense, and that the presence of his attorney or representative is
sufficient in case of conviction for a light offense. As the rule has
to be construed in its entirety, the phrase “in the presence of the
defendant” appearing in the first sentence should be deemed o. s having
reference only to the specific cases mentioned in the second sentence.
Otherwise this second sentence would have been worded in such a way as
to order the presence of the defendant in case of conviction for
acquittal of a grave or less grave offense, and the presence of his
attorney or representative in case of conviction fox or acquittal of a
light offense. By the same token, it cannot be pretended that the
presence of the judge is necessary in all cases; because the phrase “in
the presence” of the judge appearing in the first sentence of section 6
should be considered in relation to the third sentence which dispenses
with such presence when he is absent or outside of the province.

The reasons for requiring the attendance of the accused in case of
conviction for grave or less grave offense have already been enumerated
by this Court in the case of U.S. vs. Beecham, 28 Phil. 258,
as follows: “The common law required, when any corporal punishment was
to be inflicted on the defendant, that he should be personally present
before the court at the time of pronouncing the sentence. (1 Chitty’s
Crim. Law [5th Am. ed.], 693, 696) Seasons given for this are, that the
defendant may be identified by the court as the real party adjudged to
be punished (Holt, 599); that the defendant may have a chance to plead
or move in arrest of judgment (King vs. Speke, 3 Salk, 358);
that he may have an opportunity to say what he can say why judgment
should not be given against him (2 Bale’s Pleas of the Crown, 4C1,
402); and that the example of the defendants, who have been guilty of
misdemeanors of a gross and public kind, being brought up far the
animadversion of the court and the open denunciation of punishment, may
tend to deter others from the commission of similar offenses (Chitty’s
Crim. Law [5th ed.], 693, 696). * * *.” It is needless to state that
none of these reasons is applicable to an accused who is acquitted.

Section 6 of Rule 116 provides that a judgment is promulgated by
“reading” it in the presence of defendant. Since the presence of the
defendant is, as already stated, required only in case of conviction
for a grave or less grave offense, and “to read a writing or a document
means to make known its contents” (Valentine’s Law Dictionary, 48th
Ed.), there had been due promulgation of the decision of Judge
Rodriguez of June 28, 1951, after the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte entered it in the criminal docket and after the
respondents were served with copies of said decision. Indeed, “a
statute providing that accused must be present for purpose or judgment,
‘if the conviction be for an offense punishable by imprisonment,’
applies only where he is found guilty and in case of an acquittal his
presence is not necessary,” (24 C. J. S. 79); and “under a statute
which by implication requires accused’s presence only in case of
conviction, the voluntary absence of accused at the time that the jury
are ready to return their verdict does not deprive him of his right to
have a judgment of acquittal entered on a verdict of not guilty after
its rendition and publication,” (24 C.J.S. 80).

The other point raised by the petitioners is that, the petition for
certiorari filed in die Court of Appeals by the respondents, was barred
by our resolution in G.R. No. L-5389, dismissing respondents’ petition
for prohibition on the ground that their remedy was appeal if
convicted. It being now conceded that the new decision of Judge
Sulpicio V. Cea, intended to be promulgated by him is one of
conviction, the resolution invoked is no longer controlling, since
appeal was suggested in the absence of any conclusive allegation that
Judge Cea would convict the respondents. Said resolution did not
exclude any other remedy, more adequate and speedy, for preventing the
promulgation of a new decision of conviction, if and when already
certain.

In view of our conclusion that the judgment of acquittal rendered by
Judge Rodriguez had already been validly promulgated, no other
decision, much less that of Judge Cea convicting the respondents, may
be promulgated without violating the rule against double jeopardy. As a
matter of fact, the position of the petitioners is that Judge Cea could
either modify or change entirely the decision of Judge Rodriguez only
if it be conceded that the latter decision was not duly promulgated. In
commenting upon section 7 of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, with
respect to the modification of judgment, former Chief Justice Moran in
his Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 2, page 867, stated
that “the provision refers to a judgment of conviction, because if it
is one of acquittal, it becomes final immediately after promulgation
and cannot thus be recalled thereafter for correction or amendment .”

Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of appeals is hereby affirmed. So ordered without costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes A., Jugo, Bautista, Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ. concur.

Mr. Justice Padilla took no part.