G.R. No. L-6491. October 29, 1954

This is a petition filed by the labor union “Lakas ng  Pagkakaisa
sa Peter Paul” for the review of an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations dismissing its petition (Case No. 405-V [3]) for the
reinstatement of 58 of its members laid off by the respondent Peter
Paul (Philippines) Corporation, and of the Court a quo’s resolution in banc denying the petitioner Union’s motion for reconsideration.

Said Case No. 405-V(3) arose as an off-shot of.C. I. R. Cases Nos.
405-V (1) and 405-V (2), wherein the respondent corporation was granted
by the lower Court authority to lay off 319 of its employees and
laborers because of the introduction of mechanical improvements in the
corporation’s factory and the decrease in the demand for its
manufactured products, the corporation “to commence its lay-off
effective upon receipt of the order authorizing the same”. The
petitioner union moved to reconsider the order on the ground that the
conditions imposed therein were onerous and the number of the laborers
authorized to be laid off was excessive; but before this motion was
resolved, the respondent corporation had already served notice to 55
laborers that they would be laid off on September 3, 1950. The Union
filed an urgent petition (case No. 405-V[3]) to enjoin the lay-off, but
as no injunction was issued and the respondent company had actually
dismissed 58 laborers, the petitioner union amended its petition,
praying for the reinstatement of the 55 laborers laid off by the
company on September 3, 1950, and of 3 other employees (Antero Barrion,
Florentino Bunga, and Norberto Hernandez) laid off on August 3, 1950.
In the meantime, the lower Court, acting upon the union’s motion to
reconsider its order in Case No. 405-V (2) authorizing the lay-off,
issued a resolution modifying said order by reducing the number of
laborers authorized to be laid off to only 55 men.

Trial on the petition for reinstatement of the 58 laid off laborers and employees was then had, after which the Court a quo
issued on September 27, 1952 an order dismissing the petition (Annex
“E” of the Petition for Review). The Union moved for the
reconsideration of the order, but said motion was, on October 14, 1952
(Annex “F” of this Petition) likewise denied by the lower Court in banc (with two Judges dissenting). The Union then appealed to this Court.

Two arguments are relied upon in support of the appeal, to wit:

(1) That the respondent Court abused its discretion
in ignoring oral and documentary evidence showing that the respondent
corporation, after laying off 58 laborers, hired more “extras” and
“helpers”, which shows that the dis missal of said 58 men left a void
which must be filled to supply normal labor requirements; and

(2)
That the respondent Court erred in holding that Article 302 of the Code
of Commerce, providing for the payment of one month’s salary to
employees who are dismissed without a month’s notice, has been
expressly repealed by the New Civil Code.

In disposing of the contention of the petitioner labor Union that
the evidence showed that for the two months prior to the lay off on
September 3, 1950, the respondent company hired 293 extra laborers,
while two months after the lay-off, the company actually hired and
employed 373 extras (or an increase of 80), this Court must abide by
the finding of the majority of the Judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations that, on the basis of the evidence, the hiring of more extra
employees after the lay-off was made only as an emergency measure to
ensure continuity in the tasks of absent regular employees, so that
said hiring of “extras” did not justify the reinstatement of the
employees who had been laid off.

While the number of extras hired by the respondent company had
increased after the lay-off, the respondent corporation has shown
(without successful contradiction) that such increase was due to a
corresponding increase in the absences of regular employees after the
lay-off, that the corporation attributed to the fact that more
employees did not report for work due to fear of violence in some form
or another during the period immediately following the lay-off (t. s.
n. pp. 111-114, July 11, 1951). However, the resolutions of the Court
of Industrial Relations now under review make no mention of the
established fact that, after the lay-off of the 58 laborers in
September 3, 1950, the respondent company in April, 1951, adopted the
practice of permitting its regular laborers to select and have
“helpers” (other than extra workers previously mentioned) to assist in
their work, although the Company delivered the corresponding
compensation to the regular employees and left the sharing thereof
entirely to them and their helpers, the latter not being carried in the
Company payroll. This practice plainly reveals that the production
needs of the respondent Company since April, 1951 required a higher
number of laborers than that remaining in its employ after the lay-off
subject of these proceedings, and supports the position of the
petitioner Union that the dismissed laborers should be reinstated. One
of the conditions expressly imposed by the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in its order of July 11, 1950, authorizing the
lay-off of the laborers, was that-

“In the event that the company needs more workers
because of increased production, those laid off shall have first
priority over a new man”.

That the practice of allowing “helpers” for the regular laborers
practically doubled the labor force of the Peter Paul Corporation is
clear, and plainly violates the condition above quoted to the prejudice
of the workers laid off, who had priority in reemployment rights. It is
no answer that these “helpers” were not carried in the company’s
payroll, for that is too transparent an excuse to hide the fact that
these helpers supplied the labor needs of the company to maintain or
increase its production. To hold it as a valid excuse would enable the
employer to disregard at will the reemployment conditions imposed upon
and accepted by it.

The failure of the Court of Industrial Relations to consider the
facts on record concerning these “helpers”, is an infringement of
cardinal primary rights of the petitioner, and justifies the
interposition of the corrective powers of this Court (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, 69 Phil., 635).

“(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law Ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs.
McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, ‘the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it is vain.
Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration.’”

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Court a quo
abused its discretion in evaluating the evidence before it and in
dismissing the union’s petition for the reinstatement of its members
laid off by the respondent Company.

The second question raised in this petition for review is the
alleged erroneous conclusion of law made by the Court below that Art.
302 of the Code of Commerce has been expressly repealed by the New
Civil Code. We see no practical need to decide this question squarely,
for the reason that even assuming that the New Civil Code has not
repealed Art. 302 of the Code of Commerce, as insisted by the appellant
Union, the 55 employees laid off by the respondent Company on September
3, 1950 would not be entitled to the payment of one month severance pay
anyway, because the Court below expressly found that they were given
one month’s notice before they were dismissed, and Art. 302 of the Code
of Commerce requires the payment of the mesada only to employees dismissed without such previous notice.

Now, with respect to the cases of Antero Barrion, Florentino Bunga,
and Norberto Hernandez, who were dismissed on August 3, 1950 without
one month’s previous notice, their claims for separation pay were
denied by the Court below on the ground that they were guilty of
serious want of respect for and regard to their employer, on the basis
of the following findings:

“On August 2, 1950, Barrion, Bunga and Hernandez
were asked by the factory manager to report to the personnel office of
the Company. Three separate and consecutive notices were sent to these
employees on that day through Anacleto Orioque, Shift foreman, Pastor
Dalmacion, Mill Superintendent, and Federico Dioso, Personnel
Supervisor (t. s. n. pp. 14-19, 30-33, February 19, 1952; pp. 32-34,
March 5, 1952). Barrion, Bunga and Hernandez admitted they refused to
report to the office although they were not advised at the time the
reason they were asked to report (t. s. n. pp. 30-31, 45, 53, August 3,
1951). There is no showing that the order was for an unlawful purpose.
Their refusal, therefore, was a serious want of respect and regard to
their employer and a lawful ground for their immediate dismissal (Art.
300, par. 3, Code of Commerce; Puerto vs. Gregg Car Co., C. A.-G. R. No. 5620, September 30, 1940).”

We are constrained to disagree with the conclusion of the lower
Court that the simple refusal of Barrion, Bunga and Hernandez to comply
with three notices to report to the office of the respondent
corporation amounted to serious want of respect and regard for their
employer. It should be borne in mind that the names of these employees
were included in the general notice of the lay-off posted by the
company on its bulletin board on August 3, 1950 (Exhibit 1-a); and it
is quite likely that these employees did not report at the company’s
office as required because they suspected that they were to be
interviewed only for the purpose of receiving verbal confirmation of
the posted notice that they were to lose their jobs in a month’s time.
In the absence of showing that the employer had some other purpose in
asking them to report, we do not think these employees are guilty of
such want of respect for their employer as would warrant their summary
and outright dismissal without the right to either 30 days notice or
severance pay.

Wherefore, reversing the orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations dated September 27, 1952 as well as the
confirmatory resolution in banc
of December 5, 1952, in so far as material to this appeal, the
respondent Peter Paul (Philippines) Corporation is ordered (1) to pay
Antero Barrion, Florentino Bunga, and Norberto Hernandez severance pay
equivalent to thirty days’ wages; (2) to reinstate the 58 laborers laid
off on September’ 3, 1950, without back wages; and (3) to pay the costs
of the proceedings.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.