G.R. No. L-6730. October 15, 1954

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
convicting the appellants Pedro Gabriel and Avelino Natividad of simple
trespass to dwelling on facts found by said court to be as follows:

“* * * Sherman Jones and his wife, Josefina Jones,
were occupying the house No. 9-B, M. H. del Pilar St., Malabon, Rizal,
having as neighbor their comadre Mariquita Beltran. The electric meter
of the premises was installed on a wall in the balcony, and visible
from the porch of the house (Exhibit 1). At about 7:00 o’clock in the
evening of April 19, 1949, accused Pedro Gabriel, Avelino Natividad and
Miguel Evangelista arrived at the house, presented themselves as
Meralco light inspectors to Mrs. Jones who was then on the stairs of
the house with Mariquita and inquired from the ladies for Sherman
Jones. Mrs. Jones told them to wait on the porch; she entered the
living room, closed the door behind her and went to the family bedroom
where Sherman was then in the act of changing his clothes. While Mrs.
Jones was inside the bedroom and informing her husband of the presence
of the Meralco inspectors, accused Gabriel inspected the electric meter
and then shouted to his co-accused Natividad: “Naty, atras ang
contador.” Natividad rushed into the living room and then entered the
bedroom where Sherman and his wife were talking. Natividad pushed the
door of the bedroom with such force that the said door brushed aside
Mrs. Jones who was then leaving behind it. Accused Gabriel followed
Natividad to the bedroom and, with the help of flashlights, both
searched for a gadget which they suspected Sherman used in order to
steal electric fluid. Notwithstanding Sherman’s protest of their
intrusion, the two accused continued their search. Finding that Sherman
meant business, the intruders left the bedroom hastily, boarded their
jeep and went away with the other accused Evangelista to Sangandaan
Street where they met policeman Pablo Malosido of Caloocan. The trio
requested the policeman accompany them to Sherman’s house in order to
explain to him that they had. no intention to do him any harm. The
policeman accompanied them, but upon noticing the presence of several
Americans in the house, they left. They noticed later that a truck
commonly known as 6×6 started from Sherman’s house and followed them.
They were able to hide and later went to the municipal building of
Caloocan, at which Sherman and his companions subsequently arrived to
complain. Sherman’s complaint, however, was referred to the police
authorities of Malabon who had jurisdiction over the case.”

In asking for the reversal of the judgment below counsel for
appellants argue that inasmuch as the original entry was with the
permission of the occupant of the house and therefore lawful, nothing
that happened afterwards could “convert the original lawful entry into
an unlawful one.” The argument assumes that appellants entered a
dwelling with the consent of the householder. But the assumption is
gratuitous and unwarranted, the Court of Appeals having found “that the
entry was against the will of the spouses.” That will was, we think,
clearly manifested by the lady of the house when she told appellants to
wait on the porch and closed the door behind her as she entered the
drawing room. She did not, it is true, in so many words tell the
appellants not to enter. But when she made them wait outside and shut
the door to the interior of the house, her action spoke louder than
words. The porch is an open part of the house, and being allowed to
wait there under the circumstances mentioned can in no sense be taken
as entry to a dwelling with the consent of the dweller.

Counsel cite the cases of U. S. vs. Dionisio and Del Rosario, 12
Phil., 283; U. S. vs. Flemister, 1 Phil., 354; and People vs. De
Peralta, 42 Phil., 69. But those cases were decided upon facts
different from those of the present case.

In the case first cited, U.S. vs. Dionisio and Del Rosario,
the defendants found the principal door of a house half-open. Entering
without opposition from the occupant of the lower part of the house,
who was present, they proceeded to the upper story, also without
opposition, and there conversed with one of the inmates, who invited
them to sit down and allowed them to stay for about two hours. Then
trouble arose when defendants, posing as detectives, started doing
something illegal. In declaring defendants not guilty of the crime of
trespass to dwelling, this court there held that the facts and
circumstances from which, in a given case, the opposition of the
occupant may be inferred, must have been in existence prior to or at
the time of the entry, and in no event can facts arising after an entry
has been secured with the expenses or tacit consent of the occupant
change the character of the entry from one with the assent of the
occupant to one contrary thereto. That case is to be distinguished from
the one before us in that there the defendants entered a half-opened
door and went inside the house without opposition, express or
implied, from any of the occupants. Here, on the other hand, the lady
of the house clearly be it only impliedly manifested her opposition to
appellants’ entry by telling them to wait on the porch and closing the
door behind her as she left them there.

In the second case, U. S. vs. Flemister, the defendant, an American,
went to a ball uninvited, danced with somebody and then left. Returning
a short time thereafter, he was met near the door by the host, who took
him by the hand and asked him if he had come to dance and even invited
him to be seated, but tried to prevent him from entering the sala
where there was a guest, another American, with whom he had a quarrel
pending. The defendant, however, rudely brushed the host aside,
proceeded to the sala and quarreled with the other American.
“It seems clear to us,” said this Court in declaring the defendant not
guilty of trespass to dwelling, “that the purpose of the owner of the
house was to prohibit the defendant not from entering his house but
from entering the sala in order to avoid a quarrel between
the two Americans. His taking the defendant by the hand, asking him if
he came to dance, and requesting him to be seated, are inconsistent
with the idea that he was attempting to’ keep the defendant from
entering the house.” Again, unlike the appellants in the present case,
the defendant in the case cited was not prohibited from entering the
house; on the contrary, it would appear that he was welcomed into it.

In the third case, People vs. De Peralta, the accused, the new
president of the Philippine Marine Union, called at the door of a room
which his predecessor in office was allowed to occupy as his dwelling
in a house rented by the union, pushed the said door and without the
permission of the occupant entered the room to take away a desk glass
which he believed was union property. There was no evidence that the
occupant “had expressed his will in the sense of prohibiting (the
accused) from entering his room,” and it was to be supposed, this Court
said, “that the members of the Philippine Marine Union, among them the
accused, had some familiarity which warrants entrance into the room
occupied by the president of the association, particularly when we
consider the hour at which the act in question happened (between half
past ten and eleven in the morning), the fact that the door of the room
was not barricaded or locked with a key, and the circumstance that the
room in question was part of the house rented to said association.” Upon those facts, this Court acquitted the accused of the charge of
trespass to dwelling, following the uniform doctrine here and in Spain
that “this crime is committed when a person enters another’s dwelling against
the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance is effected without
his knowledge or opposition.” It is to be noted that the entry in that
case was effected without express or implied opposition from the
occupant of the room and under circumstances warranting an entrance
without previous leave. In the present case, the entry was, as already
noted, against the will of the lady of the house, who, by her action if
not by direct words, made it plain to the appellants that they were
not to enter her dwelling.

Lastly, counsel contend that appellants are exempt from criminal
liability under the third paragraph of article 280 of the Revised Penal
Code, because “they rendered a service to justice” when, as Meralco
line inspectors, they “followed Mrs. Sherman Jones to the bedroom” and
there found her husband “hiding a transformer in an ‘aparador’ ” Here
again, counsel assume something which was not believed by the Court of
Appeals, that is, that appellants saw Jones in the act of hiding a
transformer used by him “in stealing electricity,” this claim being
characterized by the court as nothing but a “vain effort on the part of
the appellants to fit the facts of the case to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that a person who enters a dwelling
for the purpose of rendering service to justice, is not guilty of
trespass.” In other words, the Court of Appeals believed that
appellants merely suspected that there was a transformer in
the house. That alone did not give them the right to enter the house
against the will of its owner, unarmed as they were with a search
warrant.

It appearing that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with
law and the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B, L., JJ., concur.