G.R. No. L-6442. September 21, 1954

Se trata del cobro de una poliza de seguro contra incendio por valor
de P10,000. El demandante tenia derecho a recibir Pl,100 mensuales de
Melitona Estrella en concepto de alquileres del edificio No. 34 Plaza
Sta. Cruz, Manila, por espacio de cinco arios. El demandante aseguro
este derecho, pago la prima y la demandada expidio la poliza
correspondiente. Dos meses despues de haberse incendiado el edificio, el
demandante requirio a la Traders Insurance & Surety Co. el pago del
importe del seguro. Como la demandada rehusaba pagarlo, el demandante
acudio al Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, el cual dicto
sentencia a favor de este. El Tribunal de Apelacion confirmo la
sentencia.

En recurso de certiorari, la Traders Insurance & Surety Co.
acude a este Tribunal, alegando que el Tribunal de Apelacion cometio dos
errores: 1 (a) al dictar sentencia sin una completa conclusion de
hechos de todas las cuestiones suscitadas, como requiere el articulo 33
de la Ley No. 296, y 1 (b) al no hacer conclusiones de hecho en cuanto a
la aplicacion de la regla de prueba oral; y (2) al dictar sentencia sin
conclusiones de hecho en cuanto a los Exhibits 10-H y 10-I.

Cuanto al error 1 (a). ¿Cuales son las cuestiones que
habian sido propiamente suscitadas ante el Tribunal de Apelacion? La
mejor contestacion es la primera pagina del alegato de la apelante (hoy
recurrente) que dice asi:

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT

“ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRE
INSURANCE POLICY EXHIBIT ‘A’ COVERS ALL APPELLEE’S INTERESTS IN THE
PREMISES NO. 34 PLAZA STA. CRUZ, MANILA, ESPECIALLY HIS RIGHT TO COLLECT
RENTALS THEREFROM.

II

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE
HAD INSURABLE INTEREST CONSISTING OP A RIGHT TO RECEIVE RENTALS BOTH AT
THE TIME WHEN THE INSURANCE TOOK EFFECT AND WHEN THE LOSS OCCURRED.”

Al resolver estas cuestiones el Tribunal de Apelacion, despues de
transcribir toda la decision del Juzgado de Primera Instancia, dijo lo
siguiente en su decision:

“As stated by the lower court, the basic facts on which both
parties base their respective contentions are not disputed, and we
have quoted the decision appealed from in full because we find that
the facts established in the case cannot lead to other conclusions than
those arrived at by the trial judge. There is no doubt in our mind that
both at the time of the execution of the fire policy (Exhibit A) on
April 7, 1949, and on June 5, 1949, when the destruction by fire of the
property for which the said policy was issued took place, plaintiff Juan
Golangco had an insurable interest on the property insured which
included the rents of premises No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila,
Philippines, District 4, Block No. 47; and it is particularly so because
the policy prepared and issued by the very defendant specifically
states that all insurance covered under said policy, includes the ‘rent
or other subject matter of insurance in respect of or in connection with
any building or any property contained in any building’. Under the
evidence on record We cannot alter in the least the decision aforequoted
which is hereby adopted by this Court.”

Las conclusiones de hecho del Juzgado de Primera Instancia (sin
incluir la relacion de hechos) que fueron adoptadas por el Tribunal de
Apelacion son las siguientes:

“After considering the manner of testifying of these witnesses,
the evasiveness of the witness Limpe, the improbability of his
testimony, and the failure of defendant to present Antonio Paredes, the
clerk who admittedly investigated the premises in question, the Court
finds that plaintiff’s version is more credible; that, before the policy
(Exhibit A) was issued, plaintiff made full and clear exposal of hia
interests in the premises; and that the said fire policy, (Exhibit A)
covers all of plaintiff’s interests in the premises No. 34 Plaza Sta.
Cruz, Manila, especially his right to collect rentals therefrom under
the decision of this Court in Civil Case No. 6306 (Exhibit C). This
finding is further strengthened by the fact that paragraph 4 of the said
fire policy (Exhibit A), above quoted, includes insurance ‘on rent’;
and accords with rule that a policy is to be interpreted in favor of the
assured.

“The argument of the defendant that, under section 49 of the
Insurance Law, a policy of insurance must specify the interest of the
insured in the property insured, if he is not the absolute owner
thereof, is not meritorious because it was the defendant, not plaintiff,
who prepared that policy, and it cannot take advantage of its own acts
to plaintiff’s detriment; and, in any case, this provision was
substantially complied with by plaintiff when he made a full and clear
statement of his interests to defendant’s manager.

“Having found that the policy covered all of plaintiff’s interests
in the premises described therein, including his right to receive
rentals, we must next determine whether he had any insurable interest
therein when the policy was issued and when the fire occurred. We find
that he did so have. By virtue of the contract between Tomas B. Lianco
and the Archbishop, Lianco erected the building of which the premises in
question form part and became owner thereof (Exhibit 4-D). He
transferred the ownership of the premises in question to Kaw Eng Si
(Exhibit D), who in turn transferred it to plaintiff Juan Golangco
(Exhibit E). Lianco and the actual occupant of the premises acknowledged
plaintiff’s right to collect rentals thereon in a compromise agreement
which was incorporated in a judicial judgment (Exhibit C). Both at the
time of the issuance of the policy and at the time of the fire,
plaintiff Golangco was in legal possession of the premises, collecting
rentals from its occupant (tr., Nov. 7, 1950, pp. 8, 10). It seems plain
that if the premises were destroyed—as they were—by fire, Golangco
would be, as he was, directly damnified thereby; and hence he had an
insurable interest therein (section 12, Insurance Law).

“Defendant’s contrary contentions are without merit. The contract
between Lianco and the Archbishop only forbade Lianco from transferring
‘his rights as lessee’ (Exhibit. 4-D); but the contracts Lianco made in
favor of Kaw Eng Si (Exhibit D) and plaintiff Golangco (Exhibit C) did
not transfer such rights; and hence no written consent thereto was
necessary. At worst, the contract would be voidable, but not a void
contract, at the option of the Archbishop; but this would not deprive
Golangco of his insurable interest until such option were exercised; and
it does not appear that it was ever exercised.

“The ejectment case filed by the Archbishop against Lianco did not
remove nor destroy plaintiff’s insurable interest: first, because
plaintiff was not a party thereto and cannot be bound thereby; and
second, because the judgment of the Municipal Court, at least as late as
February 14, 1950, had not been executed so far as possession of the
premises were concerned (Exhibit G-10). In fact, not even garnishments
were issued against Melitona Estrella, So Eng Si (her husband) or
plaintiff Golangco, the actual and legal possessors of the premises
(Exhibit F); so that, as far as plaintiff Golangco was concerned, his
right to the premises and to the rentals thereon continued to exist on
June 5, 1949 when the fire took place.”

Las conclusiones de hecho adoptadas por el Tribunal de Apelacion
establecen que el demandante aseguro su interes en el edificio No. 34
Plaza Sta. Cruz, consistente en el derecho de cobrar alquileres y que
dicho interes asegurable existia al tiempo del seguro y al ocurrir el
incendio.

Carece de base, por tanto, la contencion de la recurrente de que la
decision del Tribunal de Apelacion no contiene conclusiones de hecho de
las cuestiones debidamente suscitadas.

Error 1 (b). La contencion de la recurrente de que el
Tribunal de Apelacion debio de haber hecho constar en su decision las
conclusiones de hecho relativas a la aplicacion de la regla sobre prueba
oral tampoco tiene fundamento. Si la apelante queria suscitar la
indebida admision del testimonio oral del demandante, o si queria pedir
el descarte de dicho testimonio, debio de haberlo senalado en la
relation de errores, diciendo que el juez erro al admitir el testimonio
oral del demandante, o que el juez erro al no descartar el testimonio
oral del demandante a pesar de la petition debidamente presentada.

En el parrafo 3 de los argumentos en apoyo del primer error, bajo el
titulo de Argument, (pag. 13 del alegato presentado en el Tribunal de
Apelacion), es cuando tal cuestion se planteo por primera vez, en vez de
suscitarla en la relation de errores: no se planteo, pues, en su debido
lugar y en el tiempo oportuno. (Regla 48, art. 17). El Tribunal de
Apelacion no es un buzo que tiene que buscar en los argumentos del
alegato cuales son los errores cometidos.

En cuanto al segundo error, o sea, que el Tribunal de Apelacion no
ha establecido conclusions de hecho sobre los Exhibits 10-H y 10-I,
opinamos que esta despojado de merito, por dos razones: l.a porque no se
suscito en la relation de errores, y 2.a porque en la decision existen
tales conclusiones, aunque no son del agrado de la recurrente. Ella dice
en su alegato, pagina SI:

“The Court of Appeals adopted the finding of the trial court that
‘not even garnishment was issued against Melitona Estrella, So Eng Si
(her husband), or plaintiff Golangco’. The decision of the Court of
Appeals should therefore contain the following finding of fact:

(a) That Exhibits ’10-H’ and ’10-I’ clearly prove that notice of
garnishment was served on No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz (the property in
question) and the occupants of No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz made return to the
said garnishment.”

Por lo visto, la recurrente desea que este Tribunal enmiende las
conclusiones de hecho del Tribunal de Apelacion sobre los Exhibits 10-H y
10-I, cosa que no podemos hacer. No revisamos las pruebas. De si ha
errado o no el Tribunal de Apelacion en dichas conclusiones, no esta en
nosotros el enderezarlas. No debemos inmiscuirnos en las funciones que,
por disposition de la ley, corresponden a dicho tribunal.

La ley citada por la recurrente dice asi:

“Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it.”

Pero en
espanol dice asi:

“Toda decision del Tribunal de Apelaciones contendra una relacion
completa de los hechos de todas las cuestiones que se susciten ante el
mismo.”

La traduccion al castellano no eg exacta. Si nos atuviesemos a la
traduccion al espanol, la decision del Tribunal de Apelacion no deberia
contener mas que una “relation completa de los hechos de todas las
cuestiones” que se hubieren suscitado en el mismo. Faltaria alga, a
saber: las conclusiones de hecho del tribunal. La “relation completa de
los hechos” no es equivalents a “la relation completa de las
conclusiones de hecho”. La relation de hechos “statement of facts” viene
a ser la narration de los hechos del asunto para que se sepa en que
consiste. La ley en ingles habla de complete findings of fact o
conclusiones completas de hecho. Las conclusiones de hecho (findings of
fact) son las que el tribunal adopta despues de estudiar, discutir y
considerar las pruebas contradictorias presentadas en juicio. Como la
Ley No. 296 se discutio y se aprobo en ingles, tenemos que adoptar el
texto ingles y no la deficiente traduccion al castellano.

El articulo 33 de dicha ley, al hablar de cuestiones que se susciten
debidamente ante el Tribunal de Apelacion, no quiere decir que
este tiene que resolver todas las cuestiones que se susciten en
cualquier estado de la causa o en el curso de los argumentos. No es ese
el lugar apropiado: hay que suscitarlo en la relation de errores. Notese
que emplea las palabras “properly raised” y no raised solamente. No
basta suscitar la cuestion: es necesario suscitarla en el lugar y tiempo
oportunos. Es una bien establecida practica forense la de que no se
considerara ninguna cuestion que no se haya suscitado debidamente en la
relation de errores, a menos que se trate de falta de jurisdiction, que
se puede suscitar en cualquier estado del asunto. (Enriquez y otros
contra Enriquez y otra, 8 Jur. Fil., 574; Capellania de Tambobong contra
Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693; Paterno contra Ciudad de Manila, 17 Jur.
Fil., 26; Santiago contra Felix, 24 Jur. Fil., 391; Tan Me Nio contra
Administrador de Aduanas, 34 Jur. Fil., 992; Granados y Granados contra
Bandelaria, 45 Jur. Fil., 530; Gemora contra Concejo Municipal de Hog,
58 Jur. Fil., 377; Sanchez contra Director de Terrenos, 63 Jur. Fil.,
403; Tan Si Kiok, et al. vs. Macario Tiacho, 45 Off. Gaz., 2466, 79
Phil., 696; y Villareal vs. The People of the Philippines, 47 Off. Gaz.,
191, 84 Phil., 264.)

“Where an appeal is taken to this court from any court, the
appellant shall file with the clerk of the court below, with his
petition for appeal, an assignment of errors, which shall set out
separately and particularly each error asserted. No appeal shall be
allowed unless such an assignment of errors shall accompany the
petition.” (Rule 9, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 11 U. S. Supreme Court Reports Digest.)

“The Supreme Court of
the United States will not consider a question not raised below, not
discussed by the lower court, and not included in the assignment, of
errors.” (Pacific States Box & Basket Co. vs. S. T. White, et al.,
80 L ed., 138.)

Podriamos enumerar una larga lista de decisiones de los Tribunales
Supremos de los estados de la Union Americana que tienen reglamento
similar al nuestro; pero los casos citados bastan.

“Error no apuntado en la relacion de errores en una causa civil se
conaidera error consentido por la parte interesada.” (Vitug vs.
Montemayor, 49 Off. Gaz., 5350.)

Declaramos que una cuestion no especificada en la relacion de
errores no esta debidamente planteada, y el Tribunal de Apelacion no
esta obligado a resolverla.

Se deniega la petition con costas contra la recurrente.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,
Baubista Angelo, Concepcion, y Reyes, J.B.L., MM., estan
comformes.