G.R. No. L-6663. July 30, 1954

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95 Phil. 490

[ G.R. No. L-6663. July 30, 1954 ]

REMIGIO PILLADO AND PEDRO SARNATE, PETITIONERS VS. ESTELA FRANCISCO.DE LASALA AND VIVENCIO LASALA. RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N



LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari against an order of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in Civil Case No. 2458,
entitled Estela Francisco de Lasala and Vivencio Lasala, plaintiffs vs.
Pedro Sarnate and Remigio Pillado, defendants. The order complained of
is dated October 30, 1952, and denies a motion to dismiss filed in the
said case by the defendants. It also grants a writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the defendants in the said case from further
committing acts of disposession against the plaintiffs, after the
filing by the latter of a bond.

The land subject of said Civil Case No. 2458 was purchased on April
9, 1952, by the plaintiffs from the Bacolod branch of the Philippine
National Bank. As a result Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9455 was
issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of the plaintiffs. The land
was mortgaged on March 20, 1940, to the Philippine National Bank by
Luis Pillado, father of Remigio Pillado, to secure the payment of a
loan of P300. Upon failure of the mortgagor to pay the indebtedness,
the land was sold on September 15, 1952, pursuant to the provisions of
Act 31335, and the purchaser at the sale was the Philippine National
Bank, Bacolod branch. Upon purchase of the said property by Estela
Francisco de Lasala and Vivencio Lasala, three different actions were
instituted:

First. On May 26, 1952, by Estela Francisco de Lasala against Pedro
Sarnate (Tenancy Case No. 47-N) to eject defendant, who is alleged to
be a tenant, from the land for his refusal to recognize plaintiff as
owner thereof.

Second. On May 8, 1952, by Remigio Pillado, Enrique Pillado,
Anacleto Pillado, and Mamerto Pillado, alleged children of the deceased
Luis Pillado, against Estela Francisco de Lasala and the Philippine
National Bank, to annul the deed of sale executed by the Philippine
National Bank in favor of Estela Francisco de Lasala, and to allow
plaintiffs to pay the accounts of the previous owner of the land, the
father, to the Philippine National Bank.

Third. On August 29, 1952, Civil Case No. 24458 (the case where the
present order complained of was issued), for the recovery of possession
of land from the defendants, the collection of damages for the illegal
occupation of said land, and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction during the pendency of the action.

When the plaintiffs Estela Francisco de Lasala and Vivencio Lasala
instituted Civil Case No. 2458, the third suit, the defendants
immediately presented a motion to dismiss, alleging that there are
other pending actions between the same parties, namely, the tenancy
case and the action to annul the deed of sale, both already set forth
above. This motion was denied and upon refusal of the court to
reconsider the same, the present action for certiorari was instituted
in this Court, alleging that the order of the court below is an abuse
of discretion. It is contended in support of this claim that all the
three cases, the tenancy case, the case for the annulment of the
contract of sale, and the action for recovery of possession, involve
the same cause of action for the reason that they refer to the same
parcel of land, and all of them affect the title.

It is evident that this claim is without any legal foundation.
Although all the three actions affect the same subject, the land, the
causes in each of the three cases are different. In the first case (of
tenancy), the cause of action is the refusal of the tenant to recognize
the owner as his landlord. In the second case, the cause of action is
the alleged invalidity of the contract of sale executed by the
Philippine National Bank in favor of the vendee. In the third case, it
is the recovery of possession of the property based on the right
thereto of a registered owner. The trial court was, therefore, fully
justified in denying the motion to dismiss the present action.

The alleged invalidity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction has not been insisted upon in the argument, and it is not
necessary for us to pass upon the same.

For the foregoing considerations, the petition for certiorari should
be as it is hereby, denied, with costs against the appellants.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result because a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is interlocutory.






Date created: October 08, 2014




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