G.R. No. L-6600. July 30, 1954

This is a petition for review  of  a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two deeds of donation executed  on the first day  of December, 1939 by  the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe  Bonsato, to be void  for being donations  mortis causa accomplished without  the formalities required by law for testamentary  dispositions.

The  case was initiated  in  the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan  (Case No. 8892)  on June 7, 1945,  by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased.  Their complaint  (for annulment and damages)  charged that  on the first day of December,  1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a  widower, had  been  induced and  deceived  into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land  covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and  12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos,  Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in  the  same act  and documents.   Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis  causa  and void for  lack of  the  requisite formalities.  The defendants, Juan Bonsato  and  Felipe Bonsato,  answered averring  that the  donations made in their favor were  voluntarily  executed  in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the  same  were  executed freely  without the  use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for  the dismissal of the case and  for damages in the sum of P2,000.

After trial,  the Court  of  First  Instance rendered its decision on November 13, 1949, finding that the deeds of donation  were  executed by  the donor while  the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation;  that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any  condition making their  validity  or  efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively  conjugal,  having been acquired during  the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea  Nacario, the donations were only valid  as to  an  undivided one-half  share in  the  three parcels  of land  described therein.

Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals,  assigning as primary  error the holding  of the court below  that the donations are inter vivos; appellants contending that they  were mortis causa donations, and invalid because they had not been executed with the formalities required for testamentary disposition.

A division  of  five  of the Court of Appeals took the case under  consideration, and on  January  12,  1953, the majority  rendered  judgment holding the aforesaid donations to  be  null  and  void,  because they were  donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed  by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties   in litigation   to  the  plaintiffs-appellants.   Two Justices dissented, claiming that the said  donations should be  considered as donations inter vivos and  voted  for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of First Instance.

The donees then sought  a review by this Court.

The  sole  issue  submitted  to this Court, therefore, is the juridical nature of  the donations  in question.  Both deeds  (Exhs. 1 and 2) are couched in identical terms, with the exception of the names of the donees and the number and description of  the properties  donated.   The principal provisions are the following:

“ESCRITURA DE DONATION”
“Yo,  Domingo Bonsato,  viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor  de edad, vecino y residente del municipio de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., por la presente declaro lo siguiente:

“Que mi sobrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino  de  Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de su largo servicio a  Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hago  y  otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de  terreno palayero  como  se describe mas abajo.

(Description omitted)
“Que  durante su menor  de edad de mi  citado . sobrino Felipe Bonsato hasta en estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y estimado como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido  todas  mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su  pobriza sea movido  mi sentimiento para dar una recompense de sus trabajos y aprecios a mi  favor.

“Que en este de  1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados pero de los productos mientras vive el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como duefio y la parte como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato.

“Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatario Felipe Bonsato tomara posesidn inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a  su favor.

“Que despues de la muerte  del  donante  entrara en vigor  dicha donacion y el  donatario Felipe  Bonsato tendra todos los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueiio absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad  y gravamen y pueda  ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente.

“En  Testimonio de Todo lo Cual,  signo la  presente en Agno, Pangasinan, I. F.,  hoy dia 1.° de Diciembre, 1939.

Domingo  (His  thumbmark)  Bonsato

“Yo,  Felipe  Bonsato,  mayor de edad, casado,  Vecino de Mabini, Fangasinan, I.F.,  declaro por  la presente  que  acepto la donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi favor.

	(SGD.) FELIPE BONSATO
SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE	(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE

The majority  of  the special  divisions of  five  of  the Court  of Appeals that took  cognizance of this case relied primarily  on  the last paragraph,  stressing the  passage:

“Que despues de la muerte  del  d&nante  entrara en vigor  dicha donation . . .”

while  the minority opinion lay  emphasis  on  the  second paragraph, wherein the donor states that he makes “perfect,  irrevocable,  and consummated  donation”  of  the properties to the  respective  donees, petitioners herein.

Strictly speaking,  the issue is  whether the  documents in question  embody valid donations,  or else legacies  void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the  widespread use of the term “donations mortis causa,” it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889,  in its Art. 620, broke away from  the Roman  Law tradition, and followed the  French  doctrine that no one may both donate and retain (“donner at retenir ne vaut”), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis cavm with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.

Art. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon  the death of the donor  partake of  the nature of disposals  of  property  by will and shall  be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.

Commenting  on this article,  Mucius Scaevola  (Codigo Civl, Vol. XI, 2  parte, pp. 573, 575  says:

“No ha mucho formulabamos  esta pregunta: Subsisten  las dona ciones mortis causa,  como institucion independiente, con propia  autonomia y  propio  compo  jurisdiccional?  La respuesta  debe  ser negativa.

*             *             *             *             *             *             *
Las  donaciones  mortis causa  se  consevan  en  el  Codigo como se conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un  Museo.  Lai asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de muerte  y  las transmissiones por testamento es  perfecta.”

Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th  ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses the same  opinion:

“La disposition  del articulo 620 significa,  por lo tanto:  1..’, que han desaparecido las llamadas antes donaciones mortis causa por lo Que el Codigo  no se ocupa de ellas  en absoluto; 2.°, que toda dispo sicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue  las reglas  estable cidas para la  sucesion testamentaria.”

And Castan, in his Derecho Civil,  Vol.  IV  (7th  Ed., 1953), p. 176,  reiterates:

(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las  donaciones mortis causa? De lo que  acabamos  de  decir  se desprende que  las  donaciones mortis causa han  perdido  en  el Codigo Civil su caracter distintivo y  su naturaleza y  hay que considerarlos hoy como una institucion suprimida, refundida en el  legado  * * *.  Las tesis de la  desaparicion  de las donaciones mortis  causa  en nuestro Codigo  Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el proyecto  de  1851 puede decirse que constituye una  communis opinion  entre nuestros  expositores. incluso los mas recientes.”

We  have insisted  on  this phase  of the  legal theory in order  to emphasize that the  term “donations mortis causa” as commonly  employed is merely  a  convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.

Did the late Domingo  Bonsato make  donations inter vivos or  dispositions  post mortem in favor  of the petitioners herein?  If the latter,  then the documents should reveal any or all  of the following characteristics:

(1)  Convey  no title  or ownership to the  transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same  thing,  that the  transferor should retain  the ownership (full  or  naked)  and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs.  Posadas,  58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);

(2)  That before his death, the transfer should be re vocable by the transferor at will,  ad  nutum; but revocability  may be provided  for indirectly by means  of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the  properties conveyed  (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G.  R. L-4326, November 18, 1952);

(3)  That the transfer should be void if the  transferor should survive  the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits  1 and 2,  executed by the late Domingo  Bonsato.  The  donor only reserved for  himself, during his lifetime, the  owner’s  share of the fruits or produce (“de los productos mientras  viva el donante  tomara  la parte que corresponde  como dueño”), a reservation  that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property  remained  with  the  donor.   Most  significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the  contrary, the  deeds expressly declare  them  to be  “irrevocable”, a  quality  absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causm where revocability is  of the essence  of  the act, to the extent that a testator can not  lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation  (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil  Code, Art. 828).

It  is  true  that the  last  paragraph in  each  donation contains the phrase “that after the  death of the  donor the aforesaid donation shall become  effective”  (que despues de la  muerte del donante entrara  en vigor dicha donacion”).  However,  said  expression  must  be  construed together with the  rest of the paragraph,  and thus  taken, its meaning clearly  appears to be  that after the donor’s death, the  donation will take  effect  so as  to  make the donees the absolute  owners of the donated  property, free from  all liens and encumbrances;  for it must be remembered  that the  donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated.  Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that  would disappear  upon the donor’s  death,  when  full title  would  become  vested in the donees.

“Que despues de la muerte del donante  entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueiio absoluto de la propiedad lib re de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y puede  ejercitar su derecjio que crea conveniente.”

Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to  conflict  with the irrevocability  of the donation and Its consummated character, as expressed in the first part of the deeds of donation, a conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1285; New Civil Code, Art. 1374; Rule  123,  sec. 59, Rules of Court).

“Que mi sobrino FELIPE BONSATO,  casado, tambien  mayor de edad, vecino  de Agno, Pangasinan, I. F., en consideration de su largo servicio  a Domingo Bonsato, por la  presente hago  y  otorgo una donacion perfecta  e irrevocable consumada a favor  del citado Felipe Bonsato de  dos parcelas de  terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.”

In  the cases  held  by this  Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid  for not having  been executed with  the  formalities  of testaments, the  circumstances clearly indicated the  transferor’s intention to  defer the passing of title until after his death.   Thus, in Carino vs. Abaya,  70 Phil.,  182,  not only were the  properties not to be given until  thirty days after the  death of the last of the donors, but  the  deed also referred to the donees as “those who had been mentioned to inherit from us”, the verb “to inherit” ‘clearly implying the acquisition of property only from and  after the death of the alleged donors.

In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil., 244, the alleged donor expressly reserved  the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time before his death, and limited the donation “to whatever property or properties left  undisposed by me during  my lifetime”,  thus clearly retaining their ownership until his death.  While in David vs. Sison,  42  Off. Gaz.  (Dec. 1946)  3155,  the donor not only reserved  for herself all the fruits of the  property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that “without the knowledge and consent of the donor,  the  donated properties could not be disposed of in any way”, thereby denying to the transferees  the  most essential attribute qf ownership, the  power to dispose of the properties.  No similar restrictions  are found in the deeds of donation involved in this appeal.

That the conveyance  was  due to the affection  of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds Exihibits 1 and 2 constitute  transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may  have identical motivation.

Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the  express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of  any reservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that the act  was inter vivos.   Hence, it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that  Exhibits 1 and  2 were invalid because the formalities  of  testaments were not observed.   Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code, and  it is  undisputed that these were duly complied with.  As the properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not affect  the half  interest inherited by  the respondents Joaefa Utea, et al. from the predeceased wife of the donor.

The decision  of the Court of Appeals  is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is revived and given effect.  Costs against respondents.

Paras,  C.  J., Pablo,  Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes, A.,  Jugo, Bautista Angela, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.