G.R. No. L-7325. July 16, 1954

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. From
the allegations of said petition and its annexes as well as of the
answer filed by respondents, we gather the following:

Respondent Dee C. Chuan Co. (to be later referred to as Chuan Co.)
is the owner of quite a large parcel of land situated in the City of
Manila and adjoining the Juan Luna Sub-division and the North Bay
Boulevard. A portion of the same of about 1,000 square meters was
leased to respondent Standard Vacuum Oil Co. (to be later referred to
as Oil Co.). Sometime prior to 1947, without the knowledge and consent
of Chuan Co. (owner) and the Oil Co. (lessee), a number of people
including the petitioners entered the parcel, particularly that portion
under lease, and erected thereon temporary houses (barong-barong), and
thereafter refused to leave the same despite repeated demands made upon
them by the owner and lessee. The oil company filed a suit in ejectment
in the Municipal Court of Manila against the petitioners and obtained a
favorable judgment ordering petitioners to vacate the portion occupied
by them and denying their counterclaim. Petitioners as defendants
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila which rendered
judgment against them on December 27, 1949. For purposes of reference
particularly as to the facts of the case, we are reproducing said
decision, to wit:

“This is an ejectment case appealed from the Municipal Court.

The
lower court in its decision ordered the defendants to vacate the
premises in question and denied defendants’ counter-claim. Hence the
appeal of the defendants to this Court. While the case was pending
trial, Dee C. Chuan prays the defendants be ejected from the premises
and to pay jointly and severally a monthly rental of P90 from May 5,
1947 to October 5, 1949. Subsequently, counsel for the defendants filed
a motion asking for the suspension of the trial of the case on the
ground that the government was negotiating for the purchase of the land
in question from the plaintiff-intervenor, Dee C. Chuan & Sons,
Inc. Because the hearing of the case had been postponed already several
times on the same ground, without any positive results having come out
from said supposed negotiations, the petition was denied, and trial was
then commenced. After the plaintiff has presented their evidence,
counsel for the defendants asked for postponement alleging, as their
reason, that not all the defendants were present in Court. To give the
defendants their day in court, the case was then postponed to an agreed
date among the parties. But on the said date, counsel for the
defendants failed to appear on the unverified ground that he was
indisposed. Further postponement of the case was objected to by the
other parties, and and the case was then submitted for decision.

“It
appears that the plaintiff is the lessee of a parcel of land, as
evidenced by a contract of lease (Exhibit “A”) between plaintiff and
the owner, who is the plaintiff-intervenor herein; that the defendants,
prior to February, 1947, without the knowledge and consent of the owner
or plaintiff-intervenor, illegally entered and occupied the premises in
question and erected barong-barong therein; that, in spite of repeated
demands of the plaintiff-intervenor, as well as the plaintiff (Exhibits
B, B-1, B-2, C, C-1 to C-5), the defendants refused to vacate the
property.

“Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering all the defendants to vacate the premises in
question, and each of them to pay the plaintiff-intervenor a monthly
rental of P5 from May 1947 to October 1949. Defendants are further
ordered to pay the costs in both instances.

“So ordered.

The judgment above reproduced apparently became final and executory.
Why it was not then executed, the record does not show. In July, 1950,
the Republic of the Philippines instituted expropriations proceedings,
Civil Case No. 11525, concerning a portion of the parcel belonging to
Chuan Co., including that portion leased to the Oil Company, under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 538. By reason of said expropriation
proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila, deciding the
ejectment case against petitioners, suspended execution of its judgment
by order dated April 17, 1951. Early in 1953, Chuan Co. moved to lift
the order staying execution. We quote the order dated February 21, 1953
granting the motion:

“After a careful consideration of the grounds
advanced by Counsel for Intervenor Dee C. Chuan &. Sons, Inc., in
support of the motion to lift order staying execution, the Court has
reached the conclusion that said motion is well taken and meritorious,
and hereby grants same.

“The defendants, not being bona-fide
tenants or occupants of the land in question, and having failed, on the
other hand, to pay to the land owner, or to deposit in Court, the
current reasonable rental for the land they illegally occupy, can not
avail themselves of the provision of Commonwealth Act No.538.

“Accordingly,
the Order of April 17, 1951, suspending the execution of the Judgment
rendered in the case, is hereby lifted and set aside.

“So ordered.

Manila, Philippines, February 21, 1953.

(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO J. PANLILIO       
Judge        

A copy of said order was duly served on counsel for the defendants
in said Civil Case No. 5654 (now petitioners herein). It was only on
November 23, 1953, that defendants-petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of February 21, 1953, which was denied by
order dated November 26, 1953. Claiming that in issuing the orders of
February 21, 1953 and November 28, 1953, the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
petitioners have filed the present petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction.

We are reproducing section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538 by virtue
of which the expropriation proceedings, as already stated, was
initiated by the Government.

“SECTION 1. When the Government seeks to acquire,
through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any
estate or chaplaincy (capellania), any action for ejectment against the
tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such
time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the
necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter
case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.

“To
avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenant shall pay
to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the
same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.”

We agree with the trial court and the herein respondents that
petitioners are in no position to invoke the benefits of Commonwealth
Act No. 538, particularly section 1 there- of. As found by the trial
court in the ejectment case, they are not bona fide occupants or
tenants because they entered the land without the knowledge and consent
of the owner and lessee thereof. The relationship of landlord and
tenant has not been established; on the contrary, as soon as their
illegal occupation of the land was noted the owner and lessee made
demands upon them to vacate the premises, which demands were ignored.
Petitioners have not paid anything for their occupation. Even after
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance against them
ordering them to vacate the land illegally occupied by them and
ordering them to pay a reasonable amount for their occupation, fixed by
the Court, up to this time they have paid nothing. Commonwealth Act No.
538 contemplates the expropriation of lands lawfully occupied, where
said occupancy is known and permitted by the owner under an agreement,
express or implied, of tenancy, and where the tenants and occupants are
observing the terms of the agreement by paying the rentals agreed upon,
or, a reasonable amount ascertained by the court for the use and
occupation of the premises. The purpose of the law is to aid and
benefit the lawful occupants and tenants, by making their occupancy
permanent and giving them an opportunity to become owners of their
holdings. This is not the case with respect to petitioners.

Petitioners annexed to their petition a copy of an alleged agreement
(Exhibit “E”) between Chuan Co; the Oil Co., and the Rural Progress
Administration to the effect that the land subject of expropriation
would be leased to the owners of the houses standing thereon on a
monthly rental not to exceed 1 per cent of the assessed value of the
land for the current year. Respondents in their answer explained that
this agreement was made the basis of the motion for dismissal of the
expropriation case, resulting in the dismissal of the same. However,
with the abolition of the Rural Progress Administration and the taking
over of its functions by the Bureau of Lands, the latter upon the
instigation of the petitioners themselves, impugned the validity of the
agreement, thus resulting in the lifting of the order of dismissal in
the expropriation case. Moreover, the agreement itself excludes from
its operation a portion of about 900 square meters which is apparently
the portion involved in the ejectment (now occupied by the
petitioners), the agreement providing for the removal from said portion
of the houses and other improvements made by the petitioners.

In conclusion, we find that the respondent court did not commit any
abuse of discretion, much less did exceed its jurisdiction in issuing
its order of February 21, 1953 and in denying the motion for its
reconsideration. The present petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction is hereby denied, with costs against petitioners. The writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, is hereby dissolved.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J, B. L., JJ., concur.