G.R. No. L-6395. June 30, 1954

Dionisio Ynza, of Spanish descent, single, and a resident of Iloilo
City, died on September 3, 1932, leaving a will (Exhibit A) which was
probated on October 6, 1932, in Special Proceedings No. 2025. He left
extensive properties, real and personal, in the City of Iloilo and in
the Province of Negros Occidental. The paragraphs of his will pertinent
to and involved in the present case are the following:

“Cuatro. Ordeno que todoa mis bienes arriba relacionados y loa que
posea en el dia de mi muerte, asi como todo el dinero efeotivo que
encuentre en caja, en los Bancos depositados en mi nombre, los azucares y
otros bienes y derechos que me corresponden sean repartidos en la
siguiente forma:

“1. Lego a Julia Ynza, soltera de 25 anoa de edad, una tercera
parte de todos mis bienes y derech°s.

“2. Lego a Jose Ynza, soltero de 23 anoa de edad, una tercera
parte de todos mis bienes y derechos.

“3. Lego a Maria Cristina Ynza de 21 anas de edad, una tercera
parte de todos mis bienes y derechos.

“Quinto. Es mi voluntad que si alguno de mis legatarios arriba
nombrados, falleciere sin sucesion entonces la parte 4 61 legada
acrecera a la porcion 6 porciones correspondiente a los demas legatarios
que le sobrevivan.”

The will designated one Enrique Pijuan as. executor and the probate
court appointed plaintiff-appellant Jose Ynza as co-administrator.
Subsequently, however, because of ill-health Pijuan resigned as executor
and Jose Ynza remained sole administrator of the estate. It might be
stated incidentally that the three legatees Julia Ynza, Jose Ynza and
Maria Cristina Ynza were, according to the record, adulterous children
of the testator Dionisio Ynza, said to be children by different married
women. The fact that in his will Dionisio Ynza affirmed that he was a
bachelor and he did not mention any blood relationship with his three
legatees lends support to this fact of illegitimacy of said three
children.

In the month of December, 1932, about three months after the death
of the testator and after the will was probated, one of the children and
legatees, Maria Cristina Ynza who was then residing in Spain, came to
the Philippines with her husband. Inasmuch as she wanted to keep her
residence in Spain, she decided to sell as in fact she sold her share of
one-third of all the estates of Dionisio Ynza, to her co-legatees Julia
Ynza and Jose Ynza, for the sum of P118,000, thereby leaving Jose and
Julia sole co-owners of said estates. A project of partition (Exhibit B)
was submitted by Jose Ynza as administrator and it was approved by the
court on January 14, 1933 (Exhibit D).

On April 24, 1934, Jose Ynza sold to his co-legatee and co-owner
Julia his one-half share of the estate situated in the City of Iloilo as
a result of which, he remained half co-owner only of the properties
situated in Negros Occidental.

Julia Ynza died without issue in Iloilo on November 22, 1949,
leaving a will (Exhibit E) which was probated On January 9, 1950, in
Special Proceedings No. 652 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. In
said will Julia left all her properties, real and personal, in the City
of Iioilo to the Sisters Sofia Staub and Claudia Staub with a proviso
that they have under their care her protegee Carmen Danuya, and that
upon her attaining majority she be given the sum of P5,000 by the
executor. Her properties situated in Negros Occidental were disposed of
thus:

“A Jose Ynza lego Una Cuarta Parte; a los hijos de Maria Cristina
Ynza lego UNA CUARTA PARTE; a Maria Luisa Lahorra lego Una Cuaeta Parte;
y a Aida Milagros Rodriguez lego UNA CUARTA PARTE, de todas mis
propiedades ubicadas en la provincia de Negros Occidental, con todos sus
mejoras, que mas specificamente se mencionan mas arriba.”

One Jugo P. Rodriguez was appointed executor, and as regards the
properties in Negros Occidental, he was appointed trustee in the
following words:

“Con el fin de que los bienes que dejo, ubicados en la provincia
de Negros Occidental los cuales han sufrido grandes dafios durante la
pasada guerra, pueden ser rehabilitados, organizados y administrados
debidamente, al efecto de ponerlos en buen estado economico antes de ser
distribuidos a mis legatarios o fideicomisarios, es mi voluntad que se
conserven dichos bienes en estado de fideicomiso por espacio de 15 años *
* *”

With the approval of Jose Ynza and his co-legatees under the will of
Julia, Hugo P. Rodriguez qualified as executor of the will and as
trustee of the properties in Negros Occidental, and with the conformity
of the legatees, including Jose Ynza, he filed a motion for the
declaration of heirs and for the approval of the subject of partition,
which project was approved by; the court which ordered the distribution
of the properties among the legatees (Exhibits 9 and 10). Later, in a
motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 11) Jose Ynza for himself and for
the children of Maria Cristina Ynza, questioned the propriety of the
appointment of Hugo P. Rodriguez as trustee and he asked the court to
order him to deliver to the movant Jose Ynza his one-fourth portion of
the V2 of the real properties in Negros Occidental, left by the deceased
Julia Ynza as well as the one-fourth portion corresponding to the
children of Maria Cristina Ynza.

On December 22, 1950, Jose Ynza filed Civil Case No. 1855 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against Jugo P. Rodriguez
as executor of the will of Juiia Ynza and as guardian ad litem
of his daughter Aida Milagros Rodriguez, Jose Lahorra as guardian ad
litem of his daughter Maria Luisa Lahorra, and Regina Lacambra as
guardian ad litem of Alicia Ortega Ynza and Maria Rosa
Ortega-Ynza (children of Maria Cristina Ynza), alleging that he (Jose
Ynza) was the absolute owner of one-half pro indiviso with the
late Julia Ynza of the three haciendas Nervion, Victoria-Ynza and Sta.
Filomena situated in Negros Occidental as well as one-fourth of the
one-half belonging to the estate of Julia Ynza or a total of five-eight,
and that as such owner of five-eight he had the right to demand the
partition of said three haciendas, and since it was not possible to
divide or sell said properties without prejudicing the interests of the
parties, it was advisable that said haciendas be ceded to one of the
legatees who could pay to his or her co-legatees the amount or value of
their respective shares, and that for this purpose three commissioners
be appointed to fix said amount. The defendants answered the complaint
expressing conformity to the partition of the properties in Negros
Occidental and even to the appointment of the commissioners should the
parties be unable to come to an agreement regarding partition. The court
appointed three commissioners who later filed their report (Exhibit
12-F) and a project of partition whereby each of the three haciendas
were divided into two parts, one to pertain to Jose Ynza and the other
to the estate of Julia Ynza. In the course of the hearing of the case
and the report of the commissioners, plaintiff Jose Ynza moved for the
sale at public auction of at least one of the haciendas for the reason
that partition of the same would disfigure the hacienda and would result
in the reduction of its value. On September 4, 1951, the court decided
the case approving the report of the commissioners, except that portion
referring to personal properties, the court leaving their partition to
the parties to decide. The portion alloted to Jose Ynza according to the
project of partition prepared by the commissioners was adjudged and
decreed to him and the portion alloted to the estate of Julia Ynza was
adjudged and decreed to said estate “to be held and enjoyed by the
legatees and assigns subject to the will left by the deceased Julia
Ynza.” Plaintiff tried to appeal this decision but due to his failure to
file the necessary appeal bond the decision became final and on
November 25, 1951, a writ of execution (Exhibit 12-T) was issued and the
writ was executed on February 27, 1952, whereby Emilio Lacambra in
representation of Jose Ynza delivered to the Provincial Sheriff the
properties belonging to the estate of Julia Ynza situated in the
Province of Negros Occidental (Exhibit 12-V). In the meantime, Jose Ynza
as plaintiff in case G. R. No. L-4957 filed mandamus proceedings in the
Supreme Court to compel the court in Civil Case No. 1855 to sell at
public auction the properties subject of the partition proceedings. His
petition for mandamus was later dismissed at his own instance by
resolution of this court of November 23, 1951 (Exhibit 23).

In an attempt to stop the Negros Occidental court from executing its
judgment, plaintiff filed prohibition proceedings in the Supreme Court
against Judge Jose Teodoro as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, the clerk of said Court, the Register of Deeds of
that province and Hugo P. Rodriguez as administrator of the estate of
Julia Ynza, in case G. R. No. L-5330, but the petition was summarily
dismissed for lack of merit by resolution of this court of December 18,
1951. Then plaintiff Jose Ynza instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 2281, against Hugo P.
Rodriguez as administrator of the estate of Julia Ynza, Sofia Staub,
Claudia Staub, Jose Lahorra as guardian ad litem of his
daughter Maria Luisa Lahorra; Alfredo Javellana and Gloria Salvador;
Rosario A. de Rodriguez as guardian ad litem of her minor
daughter Aida Milagros Rodriguez; Maria Cristina Ynza for herself and as
guardian ad litem of her minor daughters Alicia and Maria Rosa
Ortega-Ynza; and Sofronio N. Flores and Cirilo Abrasia, to declare
himself absolute owner of all the properties left by Julia Ynza
including their products, by virtue of the right of accretion
established in the conditional legacy by Dionisio Ynza under paragraph 5
of his will (Exhibit A). For purposes of ready reference we again
reproduce said paragraph 5 of the will (Exhibit A), to wit:

“Quinto. Es mi voluntad que si alguno de mis legatarios arriba
nombrados, falleciere sin sucesion, entonees la parte a el legada
acrecera a la porcion 6 porciones correspondientes a los demas
legatarios que le sobrevivan.”

After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo presided over by
Judge Manuel Blanco held that the three legatees Jose Ynza, Julia Ynza
and Maria Cristina Ynza had not respected but on the contrary had
violated the wish of their father contained in paragraph 5 of his will,
because they had been buying and selling the whole or part of the
legacies received by them; as for instance Maria Cristina Ynza sold her
share to Jose and Julia for P118,000 and Jose Ynza sold his one-half
share of the properties situated in Iloilo left by his father to his
co-legatee Julia Ynza. Again, Jose Ynza had agreed to the provision of
the will of Julia Ynza regarding the distribution of her properties and
also agreed to the project of partition on the basis of said will
whereby said properties were given to other persons other than Jose Ynza
and Maria Cristina Ynza despite the fact that Julia Ynza died without
issue. As a result the trial court absolved the defendants from the
complaint, with costs. Jose Ynza is appealing from that decision.

We are in full accord with the lower court that the attitude and
conduct of the plaintiff-appellant in this case is far from consistent
with the condition imposed in paragraph 5 of his father’s will. He was
the first to violate said condition or provision. Furthermore, by his
conduct he led hist co-legatees under the will of Julia Ynza to believe
that said condition need not be followed, and that consequently,
although Julia Ynza died without issue she could dispose of all her
property by will; that said disposition by Julia’s will was valid and
could be carried out, and that he (Jose Ynza) was agreeable to getting
only one-fourth of the properties of Julia Ynza situated in Negros
Occidental and nothing from the properties situated in the City of
Iloilo.

Going back to this fifth paragraph of the will of Dionisio Ynza, it
may not be considered as accretion as apparently contemplated by the
testator by his employment of the word “accrecera”. Under the old Civil
Code, Article 982 thereof, there is right of accretion in testamentary
succession when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance
or to the same portion thereof without special designation of parts, and
one of the persons so called die before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or be incapable of receiving it. In the present case, the
three persons called to the inheritance, namely, Rose, Julia, and Maria
Cristina, survived the testator. However, the condition imposed in
paragraph 5 of the will of Dionisio Ynza might possibly be regarded as a
charge or trust’ limiting the ownership and disposition of the 1/3
portion alloted to each of the legatees. The, intention of the testator
might have been as contended by plaintiff-appellant to prevent the
property from going into the hands of strangers and at the same time
giving a right to the surviving legatee or legatees the right to receive
intact the one-third portion of the legatee, who dies without issue.
This right may naturally be renounced or waived by any of the legatees
who stand to benefit by it; and as to the condition that none of the
properties or estate of Dionisio Ynza should go into the hands of
strangers, since it is a condition not entirely unselfish, and it is not
affected with public interest but on the contrary, is rather against
public policy in that it limits the rights of ownership and free
disposal of private property, said condition may not be enforced at the
instance of the State. It may be enforced only by the legatees who have
an interest in its enforcement; but surely not by the legatee who from
the very beginning not only had violated that condition but had
renounced his right to it. Under the condition imposed by paragraph 5 of
the will of Dionisio Ynza, it may be supposed that in order to carry
out the condition that the portion of the legatee dying without issue
should go to his surviving co-legatees, none of the legatees may dispose
of his one-third portion in his lifetime; and yet, both Jose Ynza and
Julia Ynza not only allowed Maria Cristina to dispose of and sell her
legacy of one-third portion, contrary to the provision of the will of
their father but they (Jose and Julia) bought that third portion of
Maria Cristina. By so doing they violated the wish of their father
contained in his will. They also renounced their right to inherit or
receive Maria Cristina’s one-third portion should she die without issue,
a possibility at the time.

After Jose Ynza who had become one-half co-owner with his sister
Julia Ynza of the estate left by their father Dionisio Ynza by reason of
their purchase of the legacy given to their sister Maria Cristina, he
(Jose Ynza) again violated the condition contained in paragraph 5 of the
will by selling his one-half share of the estate situated in the City
of Iloilo. Lastly, upon the death of Julia Ynza and upon the disposition
of her propetries under her will, giving all her properties in Iloilo
to the Sisters surnamed staub and her properties in Negros Occidental in
the proportion of three-fourth to strangers and only one-fourth to Jose
Ynza, said disposition again constituted a violation of the condition
imposed in the will of their father Dionisio Ynza and
plaintiff-appellant not only consented to said violation but he also
agreed to the distribution of the property by accepting his share of
one-fourth of the properties of Julia in Negros Occidental and agreed to
the project of partition and distribution in favor of other persons.
Not only this; in the partition proceedings held in the court of Negros
Occidental, first he (Jose Ynza) proposed that instead of partition, a]l
the properties of the estate of Julia in that province be given to one
of the legatees who would then pay in cash the portion corresponding to
the other legatees. This proposition was also a violation of the
provision of the will because the whole estate may go to strangers,
contrary to the intention of the testator Dionisio Ynza. Later, he
proposed the sale of the estate of Julia Ynza in Negros Occidental and
reiterated this proposition in the mandamus proceedings initiated by him
in the Supreme Court to sell said properties at public auction, all
contrary to the condition contained in paragraph 5 of his father’s will.
All this conduct and attitude of plaintiff-appellant is hardly
consistent with his theory of the enforcement of the provisions of
paragraph 5 of his father’s will. He led the defendants herein to
believe that the disposition of Julia’s property according to her will
and the distribution among her legatees was valid and proper. He is now
estopped from claiming or maintaining otherwise. Furthermore, the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental approving
the project of partition and disposing of the properties involved in
accordance with the project of partition has become final and executory.
It has now acquired the status of res judicata.

But plaintiff-appellant claims that at the time that he agreed to
the partition of the properties in Negros Occidental he was unaware of
the condition imposed in the will of his father. This contention is
hardly tenable considering the fact that he must have been quite
familiar with the contents of his father’s will (Exhibit A), because he
was the very person who had it probated by the court and afterwards he
was appointed co-administrator with the executor of the will, and when
said executor resigned, plaintiff-appellant was left as the sole
administrator and the only one in charge of carrying out the provisions
of the will.

In view of the foregoing, denying the petition for injunction, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
plaintiff-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

---

PABLO M.:

El parrafo 5.o del testamento del finado Dionisio Ynza es del tenor
siguiente: “Es mi voluntad que si alguno de mis legatarios arriba
nombrados, falleciere sin sucesion, entonces la parte a el legada
acrecera a la porcion o porciones correspondientes a los demas
legatarios que le sobrevivan.” El demandante alega que, habiendo
fallecido Julia Ynza sin sucesion, “ella no puede legar a las aqui
demandadas Sofia y Claudia Staub, Maria Luisa Lahorra, Aida Milagros
Rodriguez, Alicia y Maria Rosa Ortega Ynza las propiedades que habia
recibido del finado Dionisio Ynza como legataria condicional de este * *
*.” Concluye que las propiedades de Julia Ynza deben acrecer su
participation y, por eso, pide en sn demanda que “todas las propiedades
dejadas por la finada Julia Ynza con sus productos sean declaradas su
propiedad en virtud del derecho de acrecion.” Por carecer de base, esta
peticion debe desestimarse.

“Los derechos a la sucesion—dice el Codigo Civil—de una persona se
trasmiten desde el momento de su muerte.” (Articulo 657) y “La sucesion
se difiere por la voluntad del hombre manifestada en testamento y, a
falta de este, por disposicion de la ley. La primera se llama
testamentaria y la segunda, legitima”. Tambien puede trasmitirse, una
parte de los bienes por voluntad del hombre, y otra por disposicion de
la ley. (Articulo 568,. Codigo Civil espanol.)

Julia Ynza habia otorgado un testamento disponiendo de sus bienes;
despues falkcio; su testamento fue Iegalizado; entonces ella fallecio
con sucesion testamentaria. No cabe, por tanto, el derecho de
acrecimiento que reclama el demandante porque Julia fallecio con
sucesi6n. Algunos confunden la sucesion con la descendencia son dos
cosas distintas. Los descendientes como los legatarios suceden al
finado. El descendiente sucede por ley o por testamento, o por ambos; el
legatario sucede por testamento: ambos, descendiente y legatario,
suceden a un finado.

En el casb presente, Julia Ynza fallecio sin descendiente pero con
sucesion. Dionisio Ynza, el testador, dispuso que “si alguno de mis
legatarios arriba nombrados, falleciere sin sucesion (fijese que no dijo
falleciere sin descendiente), entonces la parte a el legada acrecera a
la porcion o porciones correspondientes a los demas legatarios que le
sobreyivan.” Si el testador hubiera dispuesto en su testamento que si
alguno de sus legatarios falleciere sin descendiente, entonces Jose Ynza
tendria derecho a lo que reclama.

Algunos dicen que el Codigo de Procedimiento Civil dispone la
reversion de bienes al Estado (escheat); por dicha ley—arguyen—el Estado
sucede al finado. Esta contencion es infundada. El articulo 750 del
Codigo de Procedimiento Civil dice asi; “Cuando una persona, duena de
bienes muebles o inmuebles en las Islas Filipinas, muera intestada, sin
dejar herederos ni quien legitimamente le suceda, el presidente y el
concejo del municipio en donde el difunto tuvo su ultima residencia, en
el caso de haber vivido en las Islas, y en caso contrario los del
municipio en donde tenia bienes, pueden presentar al Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de la provincia, a nombre del municipio, una solicitud para
que se practique una investigacion en la materia. El Juzgado senalara
entonces el tiempo y lugar para la vista y fallo de la peticion, y hara
que se publique un anuncio al efecto en un periodico de mayor
circulacion en la provincia en donde residio ultimamente la persona, si
hubiera muerto en las Islas Filipinas, y en caso contrario en otro de
igual circulacion en la provincia en donde tenia bienes. El anuncio
manifestara en sustancia los hechos principales contenidos en la
solicitud, el tiempo y lugar en que deben comparecer y ser oidos los que
reclamen los bienes. Debera publicarse este anuncio por lo menos
durante seis semanas consecutivas, debiendo aparecer la ultima
insercion, por lo menos seis semanas antes del tiempo designado por el
juzgado para hacer la indagatoria.”

El municipio no sucede al nnado. El municipio adquiere los bienes de
un finado si el muere sin dejar herederos o personas que le sucedan de
acuerdo con la ley o, en otras palabras, si no deja sucesion. Esta
transmision juridica se llama reversion—no sucesion—de bienes al Estado.
Los bienes dentro de la nacion son del Estado; los que fuesen
adquiridos por sus habitantes se convierten en propiedad privada; los
propietarios pueden disponer de sus bienes; pero, si fallecen sin
sucesidn, dichos bienes se revierten al Estado. El Estado por medio de
su Legislatura encomendo al municipio en donde estuviesen dichos bienes o
la ultima residencia del finado la reclamacidn de dichos bienes para su
reversion.

Por esta razon voto por la confirmacion de la decision apelada.