G.R. No. L-4928. June 11, 1954

This is an appeal taken by defendants, Amado Venegas, Pedro
Rodriguez, and Alejandro Vicente, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan convicting them of the crime of robbery with double
homicide, and sentencing them to life imprisonment, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Valeriano Soriano and Francisco C. Quezon, in the
sums of P580, representing the value of the stolen goods, and P10,000,
and to pay the costs.

It appears from the evidence for the prosecution that, on November
18, 1948, several persons forming part of Squadron 18 of the Hukbalahap
organization, under the leadership of Jose Gabun alias Tuñgol,
descended from the mountains of Bataan and entered the barrio of
Bilolo, municipality of Orion, province of Bataan, for foraging
purposes. Upon arrival, Tuñgol sent for his “contact men,” appellants
Pedro Rodriguez, who was the barrio lieutenant, and Alejandro Vicente.
Tuñgol wanted a jeep borrowed, and, when it appeared that this was not
feasible, he bade Vicente and Rodriguez to call another Huk “contact
man,” Amado Venegas. As Rodriguez and Vicente came back with Venegas,
Tuñgol told him that the organization needed rice. Venegas replied, in
the presence of Vicente and Rodriguez, that said commodity was
difficult to secure, because Valeriano Soriano and his nephew-in- law,
Francisco Quezon, stood in the way and should, therefore, be first
liquidated, adding that, otherwise, it would be impossible to obtain
provisions for the Huks. Soon thereafter, Tuñgol instructed Venegas and
Rodriguez to ascertain the whereabouts of Soriano and Quezon. Hence,
said appellants repaired to the Poblacion of Orion. Later on, they
returned with the desired information. Then Tuñgol and other members of
his squadron, including two men, nicknamed Malugod and Macatao,
accompanied by Venegas, proceeded towards the poblacion.

It appears that in the house of Councilor Francisco Quicho therein, Quezon was then playing chess and Soriano, mahjong.
It was about 10:00 p.m. One of the Huks, wearing a white jacket, khaki
trousers and a fatigue helmet, who, seemingly was Tuñgol, entered said
house, his right hand on the butt of the gun at his waist. Stating that
he was a volunteer guard and that his companions were waiting in a
truck parked in front of the municipal building, he inquired from one
of the mahjong players, Esteban Quiambing, whether Huks used
to come and play in said house and whether any of the men present had a
firearm. Upon receipt of a negative answer and after being introduced
to the players—including Quezon, Soriano and Mrs. Quicho—he called
Quezon aside and conversed with him in a low voice. Then Quezon called
Soriano and, after a brief conference, the three left. About an hour
later, they, together with Malugod, Macatao and appellant Venegas,
headed towards the house of Soriano. Venegas stated that the rice was
ready and told his companions to take charge of Soriano and Quezon.
After receiving Tuñgol’s affirmative answer, Venegas left. Then Tuñgol
went up said house, accompanied by Soriano, and ransacked the premises
in search of firearms. Subsequently, Tuñgol proceeded to the ground
floor, where Malugod and Macatao were waiting. There he took Soriano’s
old rifle and his two pairs of shoes, worth P50; a typewriter, worth
P300; a portfolio, worth P50 belonging to Quezon; and the wrist watch
of his wife, Leoncia Losame, worth P160. Later on, Soriano and Quezon
were taken to a place about 15 meters from said house, where they were
riddled with bullets and killed.

Although not specified in the record, it may be deduced therefrom
that the actual killers were, in all probability, Tuñgol, Malugod and
Macatao, they being the persons closer to the victims. The other Huks,
including Bernardo Jimenez, one nicknamed Zipper, and appellant
Alejandro Vicente, were in the same place, but a few meters away. The
evidence for the prosecution is, likewise, silent on the whereabouts of
appellant Rodriguez at that very moment. Later on, the Huks headed
towards the barrio of Sabitan, accompanied by Alejandro Vicente, who
carried the stolen typewriter. Upon reaching said barrio, Tuñgol bade
Vicente to call the other members of the squadron, and when the same
was complete, it returned to the mountains, passing by the barrio of
Bilolo, where appellant Vicente remained.

Alejandro Vicente merely tried to establish that he did not leave
his house that evening. Pedro Rodriguez, who did not take the witness
stand, limited himself to adopting the evidence of Vicente as his own
(Rodriguez) proof. Amado Venegas, in turn, tried to establish that, on
November 18, 1948, Mayor Agustin Angeles of Orion brought him from that
municipality to Manila; that they spent the night of November 18-19, in
Quezon City; and that he did not return to Orion until November 19, at
about 10:15 a.m. Mayor Angeles, Hermogenes Villegas (a sergeant of
police of Orion) Emilio Gancayco, Emiliano Venegas and Jeremias Carlos,
tried to corroborate the alibi of appellant Venegas. The same is
refuted, however, by the following circumstances:

1. According to the official vouchers, Exhibits L-5 and L-6,
   submitted by Mayor Angeles to collect per dimes and the expenses
   incurred by him in connection with his trip to Manila, he left Orion on
   November 15, at 6:40 a.m., for the purpose of getting rice from the
   NARIC in Manila, where he arrived that same day, at 11:00 a.m., and
   stayed up to November 19, at 6:00 a.m., at which time he departed from
   the city for Orion, which he reached at 10:15 a.m. Having been in
   Manila continuously from November 15 till the morning of
   November 18, according to said official record, Mayor Angeles could not
   have been in Orion on November 18 and brought Venegas to Manila on the
   same date, as he would have us believe. Indeed, if the theory of the
   defense were true, Mayor Angeles would have incurred expenses in
   returning to Orion and, then, coming back to Manila on November 18, and
   would have submitted, therefore, the necessary vouchers to collect the
   corresponding traveling expenses, but he has not done so. This
   conclusively shows that said expenses were not incurred and that
   accordingly the aforementioned trip had not been made.

2. Manuel
   Garcia, driver of one of the trucks hired by Mayor Angeles for the
   transportation of said rice, declared that he had not seen Venegas,
   either in said trucks or in the house in Quezon City where said
   appellant and Mayor Angeles allegedly spent the evening of November
   18-19, 1948.

3. Bernardo Jimenez, a member of the
   group of Huks led by Tuñgol that evening, positively testified on the
   presence of Venegas in Orion, Bataan at the time of the occurrence, and
   on his aforementioned participation in the commission of the crime
   charged. Venegas maintains that Jimenez testified as he did because he
   wanted to be in the good graces of the constabulary. Obviously, this
   pretense takes for granted that the latter wanted at all cost to secure
   the conviction of Venegas, even if he were innocent of the offense
   charged, which is a gratuitous assumption, for the record does not show
   any particular reason or motive therefor. Apart from the foregoing, His
   Honor, the Trial Judge, who observed the behavior of the witnesses,
   during the trial and was, therefore, in a better position than we are
   to pass upon the credibility of their testimony was particularly
   impressed by the veracity of Jimenez, and the record does not disclose
   sufficient facts to justify interference with the conclusions of the
   lower court in connection therewith.

4. Bernardo
   Jimenez was, moreover, corroborated, in several respects, by the
   testimony of Leoncia Losame, Vicente de los Reyes and Teodoro del
   Rosario, and by the affidavits, Exhibits C and D, made by appellants
   Vicente and Rodriguez, respectively, before the Clerk of Court of
   Bataan, soon after their apprehension.

5. The theory
   of the prosecution is bolstered up, and the alibi of Venegas further
   weakened, by the fact that, in addition to being a Huk, said appellant
   has special reasons to perform the acts imputed to him, inasmuch as: a)
   Soriano and Quezon were his bitter political enemies; b) they dissuaded
   several persons from contributing to a fund being raised to defray the
   expenses necessary to secure recognition of a guerrilla organization of
   which Venegas was a ranking officer; and c) he believed that the
   political influence of Francisco Quezon was responsible for the stiff
   penalty imposed upon him in a decision of the Court of First Instance
   of Bataan, in criminal case No. 4415 thereof, for physical injuries
   inflicted upon a principal teacher of Orion (Exhibit H), which, on
   appeal, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, although the latter
   reduced said penalty (Exhibit J)

Needless to say, the foregoing circumstances, likewise, lead to the
conclusion that the version of the prosecution relative to the acts
performed by Venegas was correctly accepted by the lower court.

The alibi set up by Vicente—in support of which he
introduced his testimony and that of his wife, Felicidad Cruz, and his
niece, Maria Cruz—is, likewise, untenable. His presence at the scene of
the occurrence was established, not only by the testimony of Bernardo
Jimenez, but, also, by that of Vicente de los Reyes, a man 70 years of
age, who had no possible motive to commit perjury against said
appellant. Moreover, his alibi is inconsistent with his aforementioned
affidavit Exhibit D, subscribed and sworn to before the clerk of court.

The next question for determination is whether or not, under the
facts proven by the prosecution, appellants are guilty of any crime.
The defense contends that they are not, upon the theory that they had
not participated, directly or indirectly, in the assassination of
Soriano and Quezon. The prosecution has established, however, that
appellants were Huks, whose main task, as contact men thereof, was to
help the Hukbalahap organization secure the necessary provisions; that,
for this reason, upon arrival at Bilolo of Squadron 18, its leader,
Tuñgol, got in touch immediately with appellants Venegas, Vicente and
Rodriguez; that, thereupon, Tuñgol discussed with Venegas, in the
presence of Vicente and Rodriguez, the problem of obtaining rice for
the Huks; that Venegas pointed to the presence of Quezon and Soriano as
a major, if not an insurmountable, obstacle to the accomplishment of
their purpose, and consequently, to the necessity of eliminating Quezon
and Soriano; that Venegas would not have made this observation—which
would have been extremely dangerous—if he and his co-appellants were
not identified with the Huks; that Tuñgol could not possibly have
disregarded said observation, for food is vital to the Huks; that
Venegas and Rodriguez, thereafter, ascertained the whereabouts of
Soriano and Quezon, upon TungoVs advice, which, they must have known,
could have had no other purpose than to carry out the idea suggested by
Venegas; that when Tuñgol was proceeding to the house of Soriano,
together with the latter and Quezon, Venegas told Tuñgol to take charge
of Soriano and Quezon, evidently referring to their liquidation, as
proposed by said appellant; and that appellant Vicente was with the
group carrying the goods stolen from the house of Soriano, and a few
paces from Soriano and Quezon where both were killed. The foregoing
series of acts satisfactorily show that, at least, appellants Venegas
and Vicente had the same purpose as the other members of the band of
Huks above-mentioned—namely, Tuñgol, Malugod and Macatao— and that all
of them were united in carrying out said purpose into execution. In
other words, said appellants were in conspiracy with the
aforementioned members of the Huk organization of which they form
part, for which reason the former are liable for the acts of the latter
in the same manner and to the same extent as if they themselves had
physically killed Soriano and Quezon and abstracted the goods
afore-mentioned.

We agree, therefore, with the lower court that appellants Venegas
and Vicente are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with
double homicide charged in the information. Although the offense was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and nighttime
and by a band, warranting the application of the extreme penalty, the
same can not be imposed owing to the absence of the number of votes
required by law therefor.

With reference to appellant Rodriguez, we are not satisfied,
however, that the evidence on record are enough to sustain the judgment
of conviction rendered against him. The circumstances inculpating
Rodriguez are the fact that he is a Huk, being a contact man of
Hukbalahap organization ; that he and Vicente looked for appellant
Venegas, upon instructions of Tuñgol; that Venegas discussed with
Tuñgol, in the presence of Rodriguez and Vicente, the advisability of
eliminating Soriano and Quezon; and that, in obedience to Tuñgol’s
command, Rodriguez and Venegas went to the poblacion of Orion
for the purpose of ascertaining the whereabouts of Soriano and Quezon.
These facts do not necessarily establish that appellant Rodriguez
favored or shared the idea of liquidating Soriano and Quezon or that he
acted in the manner in which he did for the purpose of assisting in the
execution of said plan. In fact, it appears from his statement Exh. C,
which is part of the evidence for the prosecution, that, when the group
of Huks were nearing the house of Soriano, appellant left his
“comrades” upon the pretext that he had to go to a drug store to buy
some medicine for his child. Moreover, there is nothing to show that he
had profited by the effects of the crime. Obviously, the fact that he
is a member of the Huk organization does not suffice to warrant his
conviction of the crime of robbery with double homicide, for the charge
in the case at bar is based, not upon his aforesaid affiliation, but
upon his alleged participation in the commission of said offense. The
case, as against appellant Rodriguez, should, therefore, be dismissed
for insufficiency of the evidence and the decision appealed from
modified accordingly, with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio.

Appellant Amado. Venegas has filed an “Urgent Motion for New Trial”,
based allegedly upon newly discovered evidence, consisting of the
testimony of Rosalino Macandili, said to be “alias Sampaguita” and
Cipriano de Leon, said to be “alias Malugod”. It is averred in said
motion that these witnesses, who are serving sentences, in the insular
prison in Muntinglupa, for other crimes, have made the affidavits,
attached to the motion as Annex A and Annex B, respectively,
exculpating said appellant; that he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced said evidence at the trial; and
that said convicts made their aforementioned affidavits in response
perhaps to the “qualms of their conscience” upon learning that innocent
men (referring to appellants herein) had been convicted of the crime
charged in the present case. In the aforementioned affidavits,
Macandili and De Leon substantially state that they were members of the
band of Huks who went to Orion November 18, 1948; that Soriano and
Quezon were killed by Tuñgol and Bernardo Jimenez; and that appellants
herein were not at the scene of the crime, when the same was committed.

In conformity with a resolution of this Court deferring action upon
said motion until the case is decided on the merits, we now hold that
the motion should be, as it is hereby denied, the evidence in question
being merely corroborative and insufficient to alter the result of the
case. It tends to show that appellants had not participated in the
actual killing of Soriano and Quezon, which is already established by
the evidence on record, and were not at the scene of the occurrence, in
line with the alibi set up by appellants. Hence, the allegedly newly
discovered evidence would seek to prove nothing new, apart from being
too weak to affect the outcome of the case.

Modified as above stated, as regards appellant Pedro Rodriquez, who
shall be released immediately, and the further modification that
appellants Amado Venegas and Alejandro Vicente shall be jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the indemnity provided for in the
decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all
other respects, with costs against said appellants. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, A., Jugo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.