G.R. No. L-6220. May 07, 1954

This is an appeal to this Court from a decision rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Marinduque, wherein the
defendants-appellants are ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellee the sum
of P550, with interest from the time of the filing of the complaint,
and from an order of the same court denying a motion of the
defendants-appellants for the reconsideration of the judgment on the
ground that they were deprived of their day in court.

The action was originally instituted in the justice of the peace
court of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, and the same is based on an actionable
document attached to the complaint, signed by the defendants-appellants
on October 4, 1948, and containing the following pertinent provisions:

“Na alang-alang sa aming mahigpit na pangangailangan
ay kaming magasawa ay lumapit kay Ginang Martina Quizana, balo, at
naninirahan sa Hupi, Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, at kami ay urautang sa
kanya ng halagang Limang Daan at Limang Pung Piso (P550.00), Salaping
umiiral dito sa Filipinas na aming tinanggap na husto at walang kulang
sa kanya sa condicion na ang halagang aming inutang ay ibabalik o
babayaran namin sa kanya sa katapusan ng buwan ng Enero, taong 1949.

“Pinagkasunduan
din naming magasawa sa sakaling hindi kami makabayad sa taning na
panahon ay aming ipifrenda o isasangla sa kanya ang isa naming palagay
na niogan sa lugar nang Cororocho, barrio ng Balogo, municipio ng Santa
Cruz, lalawigang MaYinduque, Kapuluang Filipinas at ito ay nalilibot ng
mga kahanganang sumusunod:

“Sa Norte, Dalmacio Constantino;
sa este, Catalina Reforma; sa sur, Dionisio Ariola; at sa Oeste,
Reodoro Ricamora. na natatala sa gobierno sa ilalim ng Declaration
No……… na nasa pangalan ko, Josefa Postrado.”

The defendants-appellants admit the execution of the document, but
claim, as special defense, that since the 31st of January, 1949, they
offered to pledge the land specified in the agreement and transfer
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellee, but that the latter
refused said offer. Judgment having been rendered by the justice of the
peace court of Sta. Cruz, the defendants-appellants appealed to the
Court of First Instance. In that court they reiterated the defenses
that they presented in the justice of the peace court. The case was set
for hearing in the Court of First Instance on August 16, 1951. As early
as July 30 counsel for the defendants-appellants presented an “Urgent
Motion for Continuance,” alleging that on the day set for the hearing
(August 16, 1951), they would appear in the hearing of two criminal
cases previously set for trial before they received notice of the
hearing on the aforesaid date. The motion was submitted on August 2,
and was set for hearing on August 4. This motion was not acted upon
until the day of the trial. On the date of the trial the court denied
the defendants-appellants’ motion for continuance, and after hearing
the evidence for the plaintiff, in the absence of the
defendants-appellants and their counsel, rendered the decision appealed
from. Defendants-appellants, upon receiving copy of the decision, filed
a motion for reconsideration, praying that the decision be set aside
on the ground that sufficient time in advance was given to the court to
pass upon their motion for continuance, but that the same was not
passed upon. This motion for reconsideration was denied.

The main question raised in this appeal is the nature and effect of
the actionable document mentioned above. The trial court evidently
ignored the second part of defendants-appellants’ written obligation,
and enforced its last first part, which fixed payment on January 31,
1949. The plaintiff-appellee, for his part, claims that this part of
the written obligation is not binding upon him for the reason that he
did not sign the agreement, and that even if it were so, the
defendants-appellants did not execute the document as agreed upon, but,
according to their answer, demanded the plaintiff-appellee to do so.
This last contention of the plaintiff-appellee is due to a loose
language in the answer filed with the Court of First Instance. But upon
careful scrutiny, it will be seen that what the defendants-appellants
wanted to allege is that they themselves had offered to execute the
document of mortgage and deliver the same to the plaintiff-appellee,
but that the latter refused to have it executed unless, an additional
security was furnished. Thus the answer reads:

5. That immediately after the due date of the loan Annex “A” of the complaint, the
defendants made efforts to execute the necessary documents of mortgage
and to deliver the same to the plaintiff, in compliance with the terms
and conditions thereof, but the plaintiff refused to execute the
proper documents and insisted on another portion of defendants’ as
additional security for the said loan; (Italics ours.)

In our opinion it is not true that defendants-appellants had not offered to execute the deed of mortgage.

The other reasons adduced by the plaintiff-appellee for claiming
that the agreement was not binding upon him also deserves scant
consideration. When plaintiff-appellee received the document, without
any objection on his part to the paragraph thereof in which the
obligors offered to deliver a mortgage on a property of theirs in case
they failed to pay the debt on the day stipulated, he thereby accepted
the said condition of the agreement. The acceptance by him of the
written obligation without objection and protest, and the fact that he
kept it and based his action thereon, are concrete and positive proof
that he agreed and consented to all its terms, including the paragraph
on the constitution of the mortgage.

The decisive question at issue, therefore, is whether the second
part of the written obligation, in which the obligors agreed and
promised to deliver a mortgage over the parcel of land described
therein, upon their failure, to pay the debt on a date specified in the
preceding paragraph, is valid and binding and effective upon the
plaintiff-appellee, the creditor. This second part of the obligation in
question is what is known in law as a facultative obligation, defined
in article 1206 of Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

ART. 1206. When only one presentation has been agreed
upon, but the obligor may render another in substitution, the
obligation is called facultative. This is a new provision and is not
found in the old Spanish Civil Code, which was the one in force at the
time of the execution of the agreement.

There is nothing in the agreement which would argue against its
enforcement. It is not contrary to law or public morals or public
policy, and notwithstanding the absence of any legal provision at the
time it was entered into governing it, as the parties had freely and
voluntarily entered into it, there is no ground or reason why it should
not be given effect. It is a new right which should be declared
effective at once, in consonance with the provisions of article 2253 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, thus:

ART. 2253. * * * But if a right should be declared
for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even
though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right
does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin.

In view of our favorable resolution on the important question raised
by the defendants-appellants on this appeal, it becomes unnecessary to
consider the other question of procedure raised by them.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed, and in accordance with the provisions of the written
obligation, the case is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance,
in which court the defendants-appellants shall present a duly executed
deed of mortgage over the property described in the written obligation,
with a period of payment to be agreed upon by the parties with the
approval of the court. Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.