G.R. No. L-6206. April 13, 1954

On December 23, 1950, plaintiff-appellant Aurelio G. Gavieres filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Emilio
Sanchez, Lorenzo T. Oña, the President of the Hacarin Dairy Farm
Corporation, and the President of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, alleging that in 1931 he was the registered owner and
possessor of 1/3 of lot No. 2386 of Cadastre No. 13 of San Miguel de
Mayumo, Bulacan, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12463;
that on February 6, 1931, he sold his one-third share of the parcel to
Emilio Sanchez for P10,000 payable as follows: P200 on February 6,
1931, Pl,800 at the end of the month, and the balance of P8,000 in
April of the same year; that Sanchez immediately took possession of the
property purchased and that although he had paid only P470 of the
entire price of P10,000, in the same year he sold the property to
Lorenzo T. Oña with right to repurchase for P4,000 and upon his failure
to make the repurchase Oña consolidated his ownership and secured the
cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 12463 and the
issuance to him of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6640; that in 1941
Oña sold the same property to the Hacarin Dairy Farm Corporation
resulting in the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6640
and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27257 in the name
of the purchaser; and that on Septemb3r 29, 1947, the Hacarin Dairy
Farm Corporation mortgaged the property to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation in the amount of P100,000. The complaint prays among other
things that plaintiff be declared real owner and possessor of the
property; that the sale of the same to Sanchez be declared null and
void because of failure to fulfill the conditions of the sale; that the
pacto de retro sale to Oña be declared illegal, including the issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6640 to him; that the sale by Oña
to the Hacarin Dairy Farm Corporation be declared invalid and illegal,
including the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of
title and that the mortgage of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
be declared illegal and invalid, and that furthermore defendants be
made to pay damages in the sum of P20,000.

Sanchez filed an answer stating that the facts alleged in the
complaint did not constitute sufficient cause of action; that the
action had already prescribed, and that the court had no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. Oña filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improperly laid venue. The Hacarin Dairy Farm Corporation
equally filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of sufficient
cause of action and prescription. And, the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
sufficient cause of action. Acting upon these pleadings the trial court
presided over by Judge Gatmaitan issued an order dated January 20, 1951
dismissing the complaint. We reproduce said order.

“Considering the motions to’ dismiss filed by
Lorenzo T. Oña, the Hacarin Dairy Farm and the RFC, the Court finds
that all these motions are well founded. If the action can be
considered as an action to recover the property described in the
original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12463 of Bulacan, it is
the Bulacan Court that has jurisdiction; if, on the other hand, it
should be considered as an action to rescind the contract on the ground
of failure to pay the balance of the purchase price, considering that
according to paragraph 2 of the complaint, the period within which to
pay the balance of the purchase price expired in April, 1931, the cause
of action accrued since then; and as the complaint was filed only on
December 23, 1950, a period of more than eighteen (18) years had
elapsed from the date when the cause of action accrued to the date when
the complaint was filed in that case, it is clear that the same is
already barred by prescription; under Rule 8, Section 1, v subpar. e,
prescription may be availed of in a motion to dismiss. Even assuming
that the Court has venue over the case, and that the action is to
recover real property as from the allegations of the complaint, it is a
case where plaintiff, according to him, was deprived of the ownership
of the property since 1931; again it will appear that the action has
prescribed since defendants got title in 1931. In fact, the complaint
should be considered more of an action to recover the property rather
than to a sum of money (Inton vs. Quintana, L-1236, 26 May 1948;
Baguiso vs. Barrios, 43 Off. Gaz., 2031, August 30, 1946). There is
even no showing that defendant Oña, Hacarin Dairy Farm and the RFC were
purchasers in bad faith; even as to them, there can be no cause of
action. The principal defendant Emilio Sanchez has not filed any motion
to dismiss; but considering the tenor of his answer, he also raises the
preliminary question that there is no cause for action; that the action
has prescribed and that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
From the view we have adopted as shown in the above discussion, it will
appear even as against Emilio Sanchez, the action has prescribed. The
result will be that the case shall be dismissed.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, complaint dismissed, without costs.

SO ORDERED.”

Plaintiff Gavieres first appealed from the above-quoted order to the
Court of Appeals which tribunal after a study of the appeal indorsed
the case to us on the ground that only questions of law were involved.
After a careful study of the issues involved, we agree with the trial
court in its order subject of the present appeal, specially as it holds
that venue was improperly laid. In several decisions rendered by this
Tribunal, as late as 1950, we have held that under Section 3, Rule 5 of
the Rules of Court, an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property must be commenced and tried in the province
where said property lies; that an action for the annulment or
rescission of the sale of property does not operate to efface the
fundamental and prime objective and nature of the action which is to
recover said real property, and that under Rule 8, section 1(b), a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action when venue is improperly laid.^[1]

There is no question that the present action should have been
brought in the Province of Bulacan where the land lies, and that in
bringing the action in the Province of Rizal, venue was improperly laid
thereby justifying the order of dismissal. True, not all the defendants
asked for dismissal on this ground but the purpose of their pleadings
can well be interpreted as to attack venue. And as to prescription, as
already said, there is every reason to believe and to find the
dismissal to be well-founded on prescription, whether the action be
considered as one to recover a sum of money or to recover real property.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Inton vs. Quintana, 81 Phil., 97, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 12, p. 5430 Enriquez vs. Macadaeg, 84 Phil., 674, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 3, p. 1207; Munoz vs. Llamas, 87 Phil., 737.