G.R. No. L-6525. April 12, 1954

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
seeking to set aside certain orders of respondent Judge which direct
the immediate arrest of petitioners for their failure to appear to show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt, and to set aside
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated November 17, 1952,
sustaining and giving effect to the aforesaid orders.

The orders herein referred to had arisen in a case instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal by the Judge Advocate General of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines against Marta Banclos de Esparagoza, et
al., in connection with the disposition of the amount of $1,190.83
accruing to one Aniceto Esparagoza, deceased, as pay in arrears due the
said deceased (Civil Case No. 877). The case was instituted in order
that it may be determined who among the different claimants as heirs of
the deceased is entitled to the amount in question. After due hearing,
the court found that Marta Banclos, the widow, is the only person
entitled to receive the benefits of the estate, and, accordingly, it
ordered that the amount of $1,190.83 be paid to her. However, as the
widow, and her lawyer, in a gesture of nobility, agreed to give
one-half of said amount to the four illegitimate children of the
deceased, the court also included in the decision an injunction that
the widow deposit with the Philippine National Bank said one-half, or
the sum of $595.41, in the name of the four minor children, in equal
shares, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

Two months after the money was received by the widow as directed in
the decision, Angela Fernandez, mother of the four minor children,
demanded that the money be given to her instead of being deposited in
the bank alleging as reason that if it be so deposited, she would
encounter difficulties in withdrawing the money for the benefit of the
children. The widow refused to agree to the request unless the mother
secure from the court an order authorizing her to receive the money in
line with her request. The mother failed to do so, nor was she able to
disclose the whereabouts of the children, and instead the widow camete
know that the children were no longer living with their mother but had
been given away to well-to-do couples who promised to bring them up and
take care of them, and so, upon advice of Atty. Pio L. Pestano, her
counsel, the widow declined to give the money either to the mother or
to the children. The result was that, on March 28, 1952, Angela
Fernandez, the mother, instituted contempt proceedings against the
herein petitioners in view of their failure to deliver the money as
ordered by the court in its decision in Civil Case No. 877.

The petition for contempt was set for hearing, and after the widow
and her counsel were duly heard, the court found the petition without
merit, and denied the same. Six months thereafter, a similar petition
for contempt was filed by Angela Fernandez wherein she reiterated the
same acts of dereliction of duty on the part of herein petitioners,
copy of which was never served on the petitioners. However, the same
was acted upon ex parte by the court who, on October 18,
1952, issued an order directing them to appear and show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for having disobeyed the order of
the court. Copy of this order was served on petitioner Pestano on
October 22, 1952, and on October 25, the latter submitted to the court
a written statement explaining the circumstances why he could not show
cause as directed among which was the failure of the movant to serve on
him a copy of the petition containing the charges for contempt. In said
written manifestation, petitioner Pestano made the special request that
the order requiring his appearance be held in abeyance until after he
shall have been served with copy of the petition for contempt as
required by the rules, and that no action thereon be taken until after
he shall have been given an opportunity to answer said motion. Instead
of acceding to this request, the court, on October 25, 1952, issued an
order directing his immediate arrest and that of his client Marta
Banclos de Esparagoza. They sought to set aside order by bringing the
matter to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari, but their petition
was dismissed for lack of merit.

The only issue to be determined is whether respondent Judge has
exceeded his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing his order of October 25, 1952, directing the immediate arrest
of petitioners herein in view of their failure to appear and show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt for having disobeyed the
order of the court. The determination of this issue would depend upon
an examination of the facts leading to the issuance of the disputed
order.

It should be recalled that because of the refusal of Marta Banclos
de Esparagoza. following the advice of her counsel and co-petitioner,
Pio L. Pestano, to deposit the money belonging to the four minor
children with the Philippine National Bank, or to deliver it to their
mother, Angela Fernandez, as demanded by the latter, Angela Fernandez
filed a petition for contempt in the main case praying that the two be
ordered to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for
their failure to obey the decision of the court. This petition was
acted upon by the court ex parte, and because petitioners therein never received copy of the petition for contempt, they,
submitted a written manifestation to the court praying that action
thereon be held in abeyance and that they be not required to appear
until after they shall have been given an opportunity to answer as
required by the rules of court. This special request was disregarded by
the court and considering their failure to appear as a defiance, the
court ordered their immediate arrest. Is this attitude of the court
justifiable under this rules?

Section 3, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 3. Contempt punished after charge and hearing.—After
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for contempt:

* * * * * * *

“(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge;

* * * * * * *

“But
nothing in this, section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the accused party into court, or from
holding him in custody pending such proceedings.”

As may be seen, a contempt proceeding as a rule is initiated by
filing a charge in writing with the court, and after the charge is
filed, an opportunity should be given the accused to be heard, by
himself or counsel, before action could be taken against him. Here, it
is true, a written charge was filed against petitioners, but no copy
thereof has been served on them, nor have they been given an
opportunity to be heard. The petitioners asked for this opportunity,
but it was denied them. Instead, their arrest was immediately ordered.
It is true that, under the same rule, “nothing * * * shall be so
construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
accused party into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings”, but such drastic step can only be taken if good reasons
exist justifying it. Apparently, this reason does not exist.
Petitioners not having received copy of the written charge, they asked
that they be given one. They also asked that they be given an
opportunity to answer said charge before action is taken against them.
Both pleas were disregarded. Such action, in our opinion, is tantamount
to a denial of due process, which may be considered as a grave abuse of
discretion. As this court has aptly said: “Courts should be slow in
jailing people for non-compliance with their orders. Only in cases of
clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. A
bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of the order or of the
procedural rules should not immediately cause the institution of
contempt proceedings.” (Gamboa vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil., 270.)

Wherefore, the orders of respondent Judge dated October 18, 1952 and
October 25, 1952, are hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered that
before action be taken on the motion for contempt, petitioners herein
be given an opportunity to answer said motion as prayed for in their
written explanation dated October 24, 1952, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.