G.R. No. L-6940. March 23, 1954

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94 Phil. 617

[ G.R. No. L-6940. March 23, 1954 ]

MARIANO LICLICAN, DIONISIA CASTROG AND ISABEL CASTRG, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MANUEL ARRANZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ISABELA AND BRIGIDA TOMAS, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N



BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 20, 1952, Brigida Tomas filed an action for forcible
entry and detainer against Mariano Liclican, Dionisia Castrog, and
Isabel Castrog in the justice of the peace court of Cordon, Isabela. In
due time, defendants filed an answer with a counterclaim to the
complaint.

On January 10, 1953, the court rendered judgment ordering defendants
to deliver the property in litigation to plaintiff, and to pay him,
jointly and severally, ten cavans of palay, or their current value, for
the agricultural year 1952-1953, plus the costs of action. From this
decision, defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, and, as
required by the rules, the record of the case was transmitted to the
latter court, it having been docketed as Civil Case No. 545.

Three days from receipt from the clerk of court of the notice that
the case had been docketed, defendants submitted their answer stating
therein that they were reproducing the answer they had filed in the
justice of the peace court which was already attached to the record.

On June 16, 1953, defendants filed a motion praying for the
postponement of the hearing on the ground that their attorney could not
be present because he was sick, attaching to the motion the necessary
medical certificate. On the date of hearing, June 17, 1953, the court
denied the motion for postponement, but entertained the motion for
default which was filed by plaintiff on the same date on the ground
that defendants failed to file their answer within the reglementary
period, whereupon it declared said defendants in default.

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
answer they had filed on March 10, 1953, wherein they were reproducing
the answer filed by them iii the justice of the peace court, was
sufficient in contemplation of the rules and, therefore, they cannot be
declared in default. This motion having been denied, defendants
interposed the present petition for certiorari.

The pleading which, according to petitioners, they filed in the lower court as an answer to the complaint, reads as follows:

“Come the defendants and appellants in the above
entitled case through their undersigned attorney, and, in answer to the
complaint hereby manifest that they reproduce the answer and
counterclaim filed in this case in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Cordon, Isabela, which is already attached to the record of the case.”

Petitioners now contend that the above answer which seeks to
reproduce the answer and counterclaim filed by them in the justice of
the peace court is a sufficient compliance with the rules, and,
therefore, respondent Judge committed an error in disregarding it and
in declaring them in default.

Section 7, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 7. Reproduction of complaint on appeal.—Upon
the docketing of the cause under appeal, the complaint filed in the
justice of the peace or municipal court shall be considered reproduced
in the Court of First Instance and it shall be the duty of the clerk of
court to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail, and the
period for making an answer shall begin with the date of the receipt of
such notice by the defendant.”

While the above-quoted rule provides that, upon the docketing of the
cause under appeal, only the complaint filed in the justice of the
peace court shall be considered reproduced, and not the answer, so much
so that the party defendant is required to put his answer within the
reglementary period from the date of the receipt of the notice to be
given by the clerk of court, however, the filing of such answer in the
form required by the rules is not necessary when the defendant has
filed a written answer in the justice of the peace court. In lieu
thereof, he may merely reproduce his answer by making a proper
manifestation to that effect within the period required for the filing
of the answer. To require otherwise would be a useless formality
especially if the party concerned is not disposed of modifying the
stand he has taken in the inferior court.

In the case of Canaynay, et al. vs. Tan,[*]
et al., L-2336, April 27, 1949, this Court had occasion to state the
reason why an answer is not deemed reproduced when a case is appealed
from a justice of the peace or municipal court. We there said:

“It must be stated in this connection that what is
deemed reproduced in the Court of First Instance upon the docketing of
the case therein, is only the complaint but not the answer filed in the
court justice of the peace or municipality court. The reason is that
there may be no answer filed in the justice of the peace court or that
if there is any file therein, it may be changed in the Court of First
Instance where a trial de novo is to be held. Although
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant may change on appeal in the
Court of First Instance the questions raised by the pleadings in the
inferior court, a denial that may have been made in the justice of the
peace court may be changed into admission, or a special defense
interposed therein may be withdrawn in the Court of First Instance. It
is then necessary for the defendant to redefine his stand in the Court
of First Instance by filing an answer in due time, and his failure to
do so is ground for default.”

The present case should be differentiated from the Canaynay case. In
the latter case, while the defendant filed an answer in the justice of
the peace court, he failed to make a written manifestation expressing
his desire to reproduce the answer he had already filed. This
manifestation is necessary in order to apprise the court of his desire
to reproduce the same answer, and having: failed to do so, he was
declared in default. In the present case, defendants submitted on time
such written manifestation. We declare that this is a substantial
compliance with the rule and is in line with the reasoning advanced by
this Court in the Canaynay case.

Petition is granted without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.




*[*] 83 Phil., 429.






Date created: October 08, 2014




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