G.R. No. L-6277. February 26, 1954

The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the
last world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a
lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March
12, 1946, accused of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code in an information filed in the People’s Court. But before the
accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on
January 13, 1947, indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408,
otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court created
by authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing
three charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of treason
consisting in giving information and aid to the enemy leading to the
capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese
reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and
cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having certain
civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third
charges but guilty of the second, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by
the military court to life imprisonment.

With the approval on June 17,1948, of Republic Act No. 311
abolishing the People’s Court, the criminal case in that court against
the petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred
to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of
treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended
information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the
jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his
previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the
motion and, after petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to
trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding
with the trial and dismiss the case.

The petition is opposed by the Solicitor General who, in upholding
the jurisdiction of the trial judge, denies that petitioner is being
subjected to double jeopardy.

As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the
military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the same
offense in the civil courts.

The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In the
case of U. S. vs. Tubig, 3 Phil., 244, a soldier of the United States
Army in the Philippines was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga with having assassinated one Antonio Alivia. Upon arraignment,
he pleaded double jeopardy in that he had already been previously
convicted and sentenced by a court-martial for the same offense and had
already served his sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the
grounds that as the province where the offense was committed was under
civil jurisdiction, the military court had no jurisdiction to try the
offense. But on appeal, this court held that “one who has been tried
and convicted by a court martial under circumstances giving that
tribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and of the offense, has been
once in jeopardy and cannot for the same offense be again prosecuted in
another court of the same sovereignty.” In a later case, Grafton vs. U.
S. 11 Phil., 776, a private in the United States Army in the
Philippines was tried by a general court martial for homicide under the
Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court, he was prosecuted
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for murder under the general
laws of the Philippines. Invoicing his previous acquittal in the
military court, he pleaded it in bar of proceedings against him in the
civil court, but the latter court overruled the plea and after trial
found him guilty of homicide and sentenced him to prison. The sentence
was affirmed by this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, the sentence was reversed and defendant
acquitted, that court holding that “defendant, having been acquitted of
the crime of homicide alleged to have been committed by him by a court
martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under the authority of the
United States, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a
civil court exercising authority in the Philippines.”

There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil
and military law and subjects the offender to punishment by both civil
and military authority, a conviction or an acquittal in a civil court
cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the military court, and vice versa.
But the rule “is strictly limited to the case of a single act which
infringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to
constitute two distinct offenses, one of which is within the cognizance
of the military courts and the other a subject of civil jurisdiction”
(15 Am. Jur., 72), and it does not apply where both courts derive their
powers from the same sovereignty. (22 C. J. S., 449.) It therefore, has
no application to the present case where the military court that
convicted the petitioner and the civil court which proposes to try him
again derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed
that the charges of treason tried in the court martial were punishable
under the Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedly
admitted by the Solicitor General that the two courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over the offense charged.

It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military
court is different from that charged in the civil court and that even
granting that the offense was identical the military court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People’s Court
had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that
the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first
point, it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those
charged in the military court. But we note that while. certain overt
acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were
not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are
embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous
offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many
crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt acts “he has done or
might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense.”
(Guinto vs. Veluz,^[1] 44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4570,^[2]
promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged
in the amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
is treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration
of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment
before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt
acts do not in themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from
that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly held that a person,
cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of
overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt
acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple
reason that those overt acts are not separate offense distinct from
that of treason but constitutes ingredients thereof. Respondents cite
the cases of Melo vs. People,^[3] 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, and People vs. Manolong,^[4] 47 Off. Gaz., 5104, where this court held:

“Where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the
time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be
said to be second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.”

But respondents overlook that in the present case no new facts have
supervened that would change the nature of the offense for which
petitioner was tried in the military court, the alleged additional
overt acts specified in the amended information in the civil court
having already taken place when petitioner was indicted in the former
court. Of more pertinent application is the following from 15 American
Jurisprudence, 56-57:

“Subject to statutory provisions and the
interpretation thereof for the purpose of arriving at the intent of the
legislature enacting them, it may be said that as a rule only one
prosecution may be had for a continuing crime, and that where an
offense charged consists of a series of acts extending over a period of
time, a conviction or acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that
period will bar a prosecution covering the whole period. In such case
the offense is single and indivisible; and whether the time alleged is
longer or shorter, the commission of the acts which constitute it
within any portion of the time alleged, is a bar to the conviction for
other acts committed within the same time. * * *.”

As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction over the
case, well known is the rule that when several courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring
jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the
others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which
the first charge was filed. (22 C. J. S., pp. 186-187.) The record in
the present case shows that the information for treason in the People’s
Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet been
arrested or brought into the custody of the court—the warrant of arrest
had not even been issued—when the indictment for the same offense was
filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited,
mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give
that court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being
necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has
custody or jurisdiction of the person of defendant.

It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in
the civil court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction
to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one
sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court to the
petitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a
bar to petitioner’s further prosecution for the same offense in the
Court of First Instance of Zambales.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted
and the criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in
that court ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 77 Phil., 801.         ^[3] 85 Phil., 766.

^[2] 93Phil.,521.           ^[4] 85 Phil., 829.