G.R. No. L-5263. February 17, 1954

Oliva Villapaña died in Tarlac, Tarlac, on December 13, 1948. On
December 31, 1948, a petition was filed by Agustin Barrera in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed by
Oliva Villapaña on July 17,1948, and for the appointment of the
petitioner as executor. According to the petition the properties left
by the testatrix are worth P94,852.96, and the heirs instituted are
nephews and nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. Jose
Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco, alleged grandchildren of the testatrix
in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming that the will was not
executed and attested in accordance with law, that the testratrix
lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence and
pressure in its execution, that the signature of Oliva Villapaiia was
obtained by fraud and trickery, and that the testamentary provisions
are illegal. Consorcia Lintang, Nemesio Villapaña, Marcos Villapaña,
Jesus Villapaña, Vicente Villapaña, Ursulo Villapaña, Avelina Villapaña
and Rosario Villapaña, alleged nephews and nieces, also filed an
opposition on substantially the same grounds on which the opposition of
Jose and Victoriano Tampoco was based. After protracted trial, and more
than a year after the submission of the case, a decision was rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on August 11, 1951.
disallowing the will. The court found that Oliva Villapaña had
testamentary capacity, that there was no forgery, fraud, trickery or
undue influence in the execution of the will, and that preterition of
forced heirs is not a ground for denying probate; but the will was
disallowed because it was not the personal last will and testament of
the deceased and it was not based on the finding that Oliva Villapaña
did not furnish the names of the persons instituted as heirs and that
the will was not read to her before she signed it. The second ground is
premised on the conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio was
not present when Oliva Villapaña and attesting witness Honorio Lacson
signed the will; that Antonio only partially saw the signing by
attesting witness Modesto Puno; and that Oliva Villapaña saw Antonio
sign only two or three times. From this decision the petitioner has
appealed.

According to appellant’s evidence, two or three days before July 10,
1948, Pilar Tañedo called on Modesto Puno, a lawyer and justice of the
peace of Concepcion, Tarlac, and requested the latter to come to Manila
for a conference with Oliva Villapaña, aunt of Pilar. On July 10, 1948,
Atty. Puno, complying with this request, went to the house of Pilar
Tañedo in Singalong Street where Oliva was staying. The latter, after
preliminary greetings and courtesies, informed Atty. Puno that she
wanted him to prepare her will, giving the names of the heirs and the
properties to be left. Oliva Villapaña asked Atty. Puno to get the
description of the properties from the herein appellant, Agustin
Barrera, husband of Pilar Tañedo. Atty. Puno noted the wishes of Oliva,
and, as there was then no available typewriter, he informed the old
woman that he would prepare the will in his office in Concepcion and
come back with it on the following Saturday. As promised, on or July
17, 1948, Atty. Puno returned to the house of Oliva Villapaña in
Singalong, carrying with him one original and three copies, in
type-written form, of the will he drafted in accordance with the
instructions of Oliva Villapaña. Atty. Puno arrived at about noon. He
read the will to Oliva to find out whether it conformed to her wishes,
and she indicated that it was all right. After lunch Atty. Puno
manifested that two other witnesses were necessary, whereupon Pilar
Tañedo requested Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, who were then
living in the first floor of the house, to come up. Lacson and Antonio
did as requested. Asked by Olivia Villapaña if they could act as
attesting witnesses to her will, both agreed. Oliva Villapaña, Atty.
Puno, Lacson and Antonio were then seated around a small rectangular
table in the sala, and at this juncture Atty. Puno gave a
copy of the will to Oliva, Lacson and Antonio, while he retained one.
The attorney again read the will aloud, advising the rest to check
their respective copies. As Oliva Villapaña agreed to the will, she
proceeded to sign all the four copies, on the lines previously placed
by Atty. Puno, followed successively by Lacson, Atty. Puno and Antonio,
all in the presence of each other. After the signing, Atty. Puno gave
the original and a copy to Oliva, and retained the other two copies.
Atty. Puno, Lacson and Antonio stayed for a while and even ate merienda
prepared by the sisters Pilar and Beatriz Tañedo. Oliva Villapaña
delivered her will to Agustin Barrera for safekeeping on October 17,
1948 when she was taken to the U. S. T. Hospital where she remained
until November 7, 1948. On this date her doctors lost all hope for her
recovery and Oliva Villapaña was brought to Tarlac, Tarlac, her home
town, where, as already stated, she died on December 13, 1948.

According to the evidence for the oppositors-appellees, the will
presented in court by the petitioner was not executed in accordance
with law, in that attesting witness Laureano Antonio did not see the
testatrix and attesting witness Lacson sign the will or any of its
copies, that he saw Atty. Puno when the latter was already half thru
signing the document, and that the testatrix did not see Antonio sign
all the copies.

After a thorough study of the record and mature reflection on the
conflicting evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the trial
court erred in denying probate of the will.

Of the three attesting witnesses, namely, Atty. Modesto Puno,
Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, the first two testified positively
that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three witnesses in
the presence of each other, and that it was read to the testratrix
before being signed. In view of the opposition filed by the two sets of
oppositors, the third attesting witness, Laureano Antonio, had to be
presented by the petitioner but, contrary to expectations, Antonio
testified that he arrived at the scene of the execution of the will
after the testatrix and Honorio Lacson had already signed and after
Atty. Puno was half through affixing his signatures, and that the
testatrix left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. By
numerical superiority alone, the weight of the testimony of Atty. Puno
and Honorio Lacson outbalances the probative value of the testimony of
Laureano Antonio. Intrinsically, we cannot state that Laureano Antonio
spoke the truth on the witness stand, since, in the first place, the
attestation clause signed by him contradicts his pretense and, in the
second place, there is enough evidence on the record to show that in
his conferences with Atty. Barrera before taking the witness stand,
Antonio never gave the slightest indication that he was not present
when the testatrix and the other witnesses signed the will or that the
testatrix left before Antonio finished signing. Modesto Puno is a
lawyer and at the time a justice of the peace, and it is improbable
that he would unnecessarily risk his honor and reputation. Indeed, the
trial court gave the impression that Atty. Puno was anxious to strictly
meet the requirements of the law and in the absence, as in the case at
bar, of any reason for a hasty completion, we do not believe that Atty.
Puno would have allowed the signing of the will to be proceeded with
unless three attesting witnesses were already present. On the other
hand, we can fairly state that there was in fact no hurry on the part
of any of the participants in the will, because the testatrix Oliva
Villapaña was not dying (she died some five months after the execution
of the will) and the parties could therefore take all the time that
they wanted, Indeed, none of the three witnesses, left the house of
Oliva Villapaña and they even stayed therein until after merienda time.

The fact that Atty. Puno is the brother of Jose Puno who is the
husband of Carmen Tañedo, one of the beneficiaries of the will, and
that Honorio Lacson is the husband of Bibiana Lacson who is a first
cousin of Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner and husband of Pilar
Tafiedo, is not sufficient to make them biased witnesses. If Atty. Puno
had any material interest, this fact should have caused him to be more
careful in seeing to it that the formalities of the law were strictly
complied with, and this should be true with respect to Honorio Lacson.

In deciding against the probate of the will, the trial court
believed the testimony of Laureano Antonio to the effect that he
arrived at the place of the signing at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and
thereby found that a greater part of the proceeding was finished,
because Atty. Puno declared in one place that “the signing of the
testament commenced around between one o’clock and two o’clock” and in
another place that the signing took place “around between two and three
o’clock;” and Honorio Lacson declared that he was called by Pilar
Tañedo to act as witness at around two o’clock or two thirty. From the
testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson the court concluded that the
signing actually commenced between one and two o’clock. We are of the
opinion that the specification of the time of the signing refers to an
immaterial or unimportant detail which, in view of the lapse of time,
might have been a mistake by one or the other participant in the
execution of Oliva’s will. What is important and decisive—and this
should be impressed in the mind of an attorney preparing and taking
charge of the signing of will,—is that the testatrix and each of the
three attesting witnesses must affix their signatures in the presence
of one another. In the case before us, Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson
both attesting witnesses, categorically affirmed that this procedure
was followed. At any rate, even under the testimony of Atty. Puno and
Honorio Lacson, the signing could have taken place at about or after
two thirty, since the former declared that it took place between two
and three o’clock and Honorio Lacson stated that the time was two or
two thirty.

Another point invoked by the trial court against the probate of the
will is the circumstance that, while Atty. Puno testified that he
placed the lines on which the testatrix and the witnesses were to sign
before he read the document to the testatrix to whom he gave the
original,witness Lacson testified that Atty. Puno read the original
after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reacting Atty. Puno
placed the lines for signatures. This discrepancy again refers to a
minor detail which is not sufficient to negative the truthfulness of
Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson on the main and important fact that the
will was signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in
the presence of each other.

Oppositors-appellees presented in corroboration of the testimony of
Laureano Antonio, Joaquin Villapaña and Consolacion del Mundo. Joaquin
Villapaña, a painter, allegedly painted the house of Agustin Barrera in
July, 1948 and saw the execution of the will. Consolacion del Mundo
allegedly was then the maid of Oliva Villapaña. Apart from the fact
that there is evidence to show that both Joaquin Villapaña and
Consolacion del Mundo were hot yet employed in the house of Oliva when
the latter’s will was executed, there is little or no reason for their
version to prevail over the positive testimony of Atty. Puno and
Honorio Lacson, considering that the latter’s testimony is even
corroborated by two other witnesses, Bibiana Lacson and Beatriz Tañedo.
Certainly the story of Joaquin Villapaña and Gonsolacion del Mundo can
have no greater weight than that of Laureano Antonio.

In holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaña, the trial
court found that it was not read to her; and this finding was premised
on the alleged contradiction of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacspn regarding
the sequence of the reading of the will and the placing of lines for
signatures, and regarding the question whether a copy or the original
was handed to the testatrix. As we have already observed, the
discrepancy relates to an insignificant matter which cannot vitally
detract from the credibility of Atty. Puno to the effect that upon
arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaña at about noon, he read the will
to her with a view to finding whether she was agreeable thereto. It is
not necessary that said will be read upon its signing and in the
presence of the witnesses.

The trial court also concluded that the testatrix could not have
furnished the names of the heirs instituted under the will, because (1)
Salvador Tañedo, one of such heirs, was long dead and (2) Marcelo
Villapaña, another instituted heir, was non-existent, since Oliva
Villapaña did not have a grandson by such name. It is true that
Salvador Tañedo was already dead and me testatrix knew about it, but it
is not uncommon for a woman of old age, confused by the big number of
her relatives, to commit the mistake of unwittingly mentioning a dead
one. With respect to the instituted heir, Marcelo Villapaña, while it
appears that Oliva did not have a grandson answering to that name,
there is evidence tending to show that Pioquinto Villapaña, a child of
Ruperta Pineda, must have been referred to, because Oliva, who was the
child’s god-mother, originally wanted said child to be baptized as
Marcelo, after his father. Moreover, if Atty. Puno had supplied the
names instituted as heirs, he would have consulted all the interested
parties and would be sure that no mistake of the kind was made.

As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives
of Oliva Villapaña in leaving her properties to the person named in the
will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to
state that the trial court itself found the will to have been executed
free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with Oliva
having testamentary capacity; and in such a situation it becomes our
duty to give expression to her will.

Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by
Oliva Villapaña on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed. So ordered without
costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.