G.R. No. L-5810. January 18, 1954

This is an appeal by certiorari against a decision of the Court of
Appeals, in C. A.-G. R. No. 7853-R. Felicisimo Ronquillo,
plaintiff-appellant, and Francisco Marasigan, defendant-appellee. The
circumstances leading to the appeal may be briefly stated as follows:

1. On April 10, 1943 Ronquillo brought action against
   Marasigan to compel him to deliver a parcel of nipa land which the
   latter had agreed to lease to Ronquillo for a period of 10 years and to
   execute the corresponding deed of lease therefor.
2. After trial and on September 1, 1947, the court of first instance rendered judgment ordering,

“That the defendant Marasigan deliver immediately
the possession of the land described in the amended complaint to the
plaintiff Ronquillo; that the defendant Marasigan execute a contract of
lease covering the said land for a period of 10 years in favor of the
plaintiff Ronquillo, as of December 1, 1941, by excluding therefrom the
five years period from September 1, 1942, to August 31, 1947,
inclusive, with a consideration of P14,000 minus the amounts of P1,200,
P1,277.70 and P600, the amount of P1,277.70 being additional advances
received by the defendant Marasigan and the last amount of P600 being a
reserve fund for the payment of the land taxes; and that the defendant
Marasigan will assume his former position as assistant manager with a
compensation of P60 monthly.

The contract of lease embodying
the above conditions must be executed and ratified before a notary
public within 10 days from the date this decision would become final.

The complaint against the other defendants is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

The defendant Francisco Marasigan shall pay the costs of this action.”

3. The case having been brought to the Court of
   Appeals, this court entered judgment on April 10, 1950 modifying the
   above judgment in some parts and affirming it as to all others, thus:

“Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified in the sense that defendant Marasigan shall not be compelled
to assume his former position as assistant manager in the business of
the plaintiff, unless he be willing to serve as such, with compensation
at the rate of P60 per month. The decision is affirmed in all other
respects, with the understanding, however, that defendant Marasigan
shall pay to the plaintiff the damages that the latter may prove to
have suffered if the provision regarding the execution of a new
contract of lease of said land could not be carried out for any legal
impediment. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.’

4. After the return of the case to the court of
   first instance for execution and on August 1, 1950, plaintiff deposited
   the amount of P10,922.30 with the clerk of court, in compliance with
   the judgment, and asked for an order against the defendant to deliver
   the land immediately to him and execute the deed of lease provided for
   in the decision. This petition was granted on November 10, 1950 over
   the defendant’s opposition.

5. On November 27, 1950 defendant
   submitted a draft of a deed of lease, which he claimed to conform to
   the decision of the court, and on December 12, 1950 he was authorized
   to withdraw the amount deposited by plaintiff.

But in an order dated January 18, 1951, the court
disapproved the draft of the contract of lease submitted by defendant
and approved another one prepared by the sheriff. This contract merely
recites the judgment, insofar as the term of the lease is concerned,
but objection to it was interposed by plaintiff on the ground that
under its terms the duration of the lease would be limited to the
period ending on November 30, 1951 merely. According to the court,
however, the period of lease is ten years from December 1, 1941, the
date when plaintiff was placed in possession, excluding the period from
September 1, 1942 to August 31, 1947 and, therefore, the lease should
end on December 1, 1956 (Orders of January 18, 1951, as amended by
order of March 13, 1951.)

6. Upon appeal against the above orders the Court of Appeals promulgated the decision, now appealed from as follows:

“Wherefore, the orders of March 13 and April 19,
1951 are hereby set aside and the defendant Francisco Marasigan is
hereby ordered to execute a contract of lease embodying the conditions
set forth in the decision of the lower court, with the understanding
that the contract should be for a period of 9 years and 3 months more,
to begin from November 10, 1950, until said period is covered in full.
If within 10 days from the receipt of the corresponding notice from the
lower court after this decision shall have become final the defendant
fails to execute in favor of plaintiff Felicisimo Ronquillo the
contract of lease herein provided, then, in pursuance of section 10,
Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan or any other person whom the lower court may
authorize, shall execute said deed of lease in the precise terms as
specified in this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.”

In arriving at the above judgment, the Court of Appeals reasoned, thus:

“Predicated on these reason, we did not modify but
affirmed the decision of the lower court in so far as it refused to
award damages to plaintiff. Anyway, and even assuming that we cannot
clarify the scope of the decision of the lower court as slightly
modified by us, and that by such decision the contract of lease to be
executed’ by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff should be as
decreed in the appealed order of March 13, 1951. We shall not forget
that Marasigan demanded and received the sum of P14,000 as payment in
full of a whole term of ten years of lease, and even if by virtue of
the decisions rendered in this case he could not be compelled to
execute the lease contract for the remaining period of 9 years and 3
months, yet by his own act of withdrawing the sum of P10,922.30, which
together with other sums previously received made the total of P14,000
which corresponds to the rentals for the entire period of ten years, he
contracted the obligation, independently of said decision, to execute a
deed of lease of the property in question for the unenjoyed term of 9
years and 3 months, as otherwise he would receive payment of rents for
the period from September 1, 1947, to November 10, 1950, during which
he (Marasigan) and not the plaintiff was in possession of the land in
controversy and enjoying the proceeds thereof.”

The rule is absolute that after a judgment becomes final, by the
expiration of the period provided by the rules within which it so
becomes, no further amendment or correction can be made by the Court
except for clerical errors or mistakes. Thus, it has been held:

“The general power to correct clerical errors and!
omissions does not authorize the court to repair its own inaction, to
make the record and judgment say what the court did not adjudge,
although it had a clear right to do so. The court cannot under the
guise of correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment it
never made or rendered, or add something to either which was not
originally included although it might and should have so ordered or
adjudged in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own lapses
and omissions to do what it could legally and properly have done at the
right time. A court’s mistake in leaving out of its decision something
which it ought to have put in, and something in issue of which it
intended but failed to dispose, is a judicial error, not a mere
clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by adding to the entered
judgment the omitted matter on the theory of making the entry conform
to the actual judgment entered.” (Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec.
141, p. 273.)

“But the failure of the court to render
judgment according to law must not be treated as a clerical misprision.
Where there is nothing to show that the judgment entered is not the
judgment ordered by the court, it cannot be amended. On the one hand,
it is certain that proceedings for the amendment of judgments ought
never to be permitted to become revisory or appellate in their nature;
ought never to be the means of modifying or enlarging the judgment or
the judgment record, so that it shall express something which the
court did not pronounce, even although the proposed amendment embraces
matter which ought clearly to have been so pronounced.” (Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 141, pp. 274-275.)

The change ordered by the Court of Appeals was made when the
judgment was already being executed; and it can not be said to merely
correct a clerical error because it provides for a contract of lease of
nine years and three months duration, from November 10, 1950, which is
different from one of ten years from December 1, 1941, excluding the
period from September 1, 1942 to August 31, 1947. The modification is,
however, sought to be justified by two circumstances, namely, the
withdrawal by the lessor of the amount of P10,922.30, which amount,
together with sums previously received, total P14,000, and which is the
rental for a full ten year term, and the injustice caused to lessee
because he was not placed in possession from September 1, 1947 but
only on November 10, 1950, when the court ordered the execution of the
judgment.

The reasons given above are not entirely without value or merit; but
while they may entitle the lessee to some remedy, the one given in the
appealed decision flies in the teeth of the procedural principle of the
finality of judgments. When the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
first appeal was rendered, modification thereof should have been sought
by proper application to the court, in the sense that the period to be
excluded from the ten-year period of the lease (fixed by the judgment
of the Court of First Instance to begin on September 1, 1942 and end on
August 31, 1947) be extended up to the date when the land was to be
actually placed in the possession of the lessee. This full period
should be excluded in the computation of the ten-year lease because the
delay in lessee’s taking possession was attributable to the lessor’s
fault. Whether the failure of the lessee to secure this modification in
the original judgment as above indicated is due to the oversight of the
party, or of the court, or of both, the omission or mistake certainly
could no longer be remedied by modification of the judgment after it
had become final and executory.

As to the acceptance by the lessor of the full amount of the price
of the lease for a full ten year period, from which acceptance the
judgment infers an acquiescence in a lease for fully ten years from
November 10, 1950 (the date when lessee was placed in possession after
judgment), it must be stated that as such act of acceptance was made
after the date of the final judgment, it may not be permitted to
justify its modification, or change, or correction.

Said act of acceptance may create new rights in relation to the
judgment, but the remedy to enforce such rights is not a modification
of the judgment, or its correction, but a new suit or action in which
the new issue of its (acceptance) supposed existence and effects shall
be tried and decided.

The judgment appealed from should be as it hereby is, reversed, and
the orders of the court of first instance of January 18, 1951 and March
13, 1951, affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.