G.R. No. L-5793. December 03, 1953

The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4, with reference to the
penalty therein provided, was carefully considered. In branding
imprisonment for five years too harsh and out of proportion in this
case, we had in mind that six months was commensurate and just for the
appellant’s offense, taking into consideration his intention and the
degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the constitutional
prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
“The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does
not make it cruel and unusual.” (24 C. J. S., 118701188.) Expressed in
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community.” (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity
for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not
believe that five years’ confinement for possessing firearms, even as
applied to appellant’s and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and
unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to
public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on
constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested neither at
the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was
raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the
Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular
and judicial reaction to the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in
the statute, that some members of the court at first expressed
opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the
appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed
range.

The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant’s conviction under
Republic Act No. 4 likewise had raised close attention and study. There
is no need on our part to add anything to what has been said, except to
point out for clarification that the references to defendant’s previous
uses of his father’s gun and the fatal consequences of his last use of
it, were made simply to emphasize that his possession of the prohibited
weapon was not casual, incidental, or harmless. His previous conduct
was relevant in determining his motive and intention, and to disprove
the claim that his father followed his son so as not to lose control of
the firearm. It was far from the thought of the court to condemn the
appellant for acts with which he had not been charged or of which he had
been pronounced innocent.

The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in accordance
with section 1 of Republic Act No. 4, which reads:

“SECTION 1. Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act Numbered
fifty-six, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition,
disposition, or possession of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition.—Any person who manufactures, deals in, acquires,
disposes, or possesses, any firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition
therefor, or instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition in violation of any provision of
sections eight hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and six,
inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and one day nor
more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the
discretion of the court. If the article illegally possessed is a rifle,
carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun, submachine gun, hand
grenade, bomb, artillery of any kind or ammunition exclusively intended
for such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall be not less than
five years nor more than ten years. A conviction under this section
shall carry with it the forfeiture of the prohibited article or articles
to the Philippine Government.

“The possession of any instrument or implement which is directly
useful in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition on the part of any
person whose business or employment does not deal with such instrument
or implement shall be prima facie proof that such article is
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition.”

This provision does not say that firearms unlawfully possessed or
carried are to be confiscated only if they belong to the defendant, nor
is such intention deducible from the language of the act. We are
inclined to, and do, believe that, except perhaps where the lawful owner
was innocent of, or without fault in, the use of his property by
another, confiscation accords with the legislative intent.

We can foresee the objection that such legislation deprives one
of his property without due process of law. The answer to this is that
ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural right protected by
the Constitution. Above the right to own property is the inherent
attribute of sovereignty—the police power of the state to protect its
citizens and to provide for the safety and good order of society. (16
C. J. S., 539, 540.) Pursuant to the exercise of police power, the
right to private property may be limited, restricted, and impaired so as
to promote the general welfare, public order and safety. (Id.,
611.) The power of the legislature to prohibit the possession of deadly
weapon carries with it the power to provide for the confiscation or
forfeiture of weapons unlawfully used or allowed by the licensed owner
to be used.

The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,
Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.