G.R. No. L-3742. December 23, 1952

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals. As
found by said court, the facts are as follows: On May 22, 1940, the petitioner,
Laureano Sia, executed in favor of the respondent, Numeriano Valencia, the
following promissory note:

“Pagare a la orden del Sr. Laureano Sia en Masbate, Masbate, al
plazo de cinco años contados desde esta fecha, la suma de sietecientos
cincuenta y tres con sesenta y tres centimos (P753.63) en moneda filipina, valor
recibido del mismo en virtud de una hipoteca de terreno cocal de que es parte
integrante este pagare.”

On September 4, 1944, Atty. Ernesto Valencia, son of respondent
Numeriano Valencia, offered to pay to the petitioner the mortgage debt of
P753.63 in Japanese military notes, which the petitioner refused to receive,
alleging that the currency had no value and that he wanted to be paid in
Philippine currency. In view whereof, Attorney Valencia, on behalf of his
father, informed the petitioner that he would consign the amount in the Court of
First Instance of Masbate. Accordingly, on September 5, 1944, Attorney Valencia
deposited with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Masbate the sum of
P753.63 in Japanese military notes, and filed a sworn pleading for consignation,
in which it was made to appear that the debt was being paid to the petitioner
who refused to accept the payments, and that the latter was notified of the
consignation. The clerk of the Court of First Instance of Masbate receipted for
the amount thus deposited by Attorney Valencia who thereupon prepared a notice
to the petitioner of the deposit of the sum of P753.63 in Japanese military
notes with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Masbate, which notice
Attorney Valencia personally delivered in the office of the petitioner. The
clerk of the Court of First Instance if Masbate in turn sent a notice of
consignation by registered mail to the petitioner. The latter, however, never
withdrew the money thus consigned.

As a result of the bombing by American planes between September
and December, 1944, the records of Attorney Valencia relating to the
consignation, as well as the records of the Court of First Instance of Masbate,
including the amount of P753.63 deposited by respondent Valencia, were lost or
destroyed.

After the promissory note herein above quoted had matured on
May 2, 1945, the petitioner demanded from the respondent, Numeriano Valencia,
the payment of the mortgage debt in the sum of P753.63. The respondent refused
to accede to the demand, alleging that the debt had already been paid.
Whereupon, on August 5, 1946, the petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Masbate a complaint for the recovery of the debt, with foreclosure
of mortgage. After trial, the court rendered a decision, holding that the debt
in question had already been paid in virtue of the consignation above mentioned,
and dismissing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Upon appeal by
the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.

The petitioner contends (1) that he was justified in refusing
to accept the tendered payment on September 4, 1944, because the Japanese
military notes were almost valueless and the debt was not then due and payable;
(2) that there was no valid consignation; (3) that the loss of the amount
deposited or consigned should not be sufferred by the petitioner; and (4) that,
at any rate, the Japanese military notes deposited in September, 1944, should
not be valued at par with the Philippine peso.

The promissory note executed on May 22, 1940, recited that the
sum of P753.63 was payable “al plazo de cinco años contados desde esta fecha.”
The Court of Appeals held, and correctly, that the expression “Al plazo de cinco
años contados desde esta fecha” may mean as well that payment could be made at
the end of five years from May 22, 1940, or May 22, 1945, as that the debt could
be settled at any time within five years from May 22, 1940; in such case, the
respondent Valencia was justified in offering to pay on September 4, 1944, and
the petitioner, Laureano Sia, had no reason to reject said payment. The
conclusion of the Court of Appeals is well founded, specially because the
refusal of the petitioner to accept the tendered payment was premised on the
allegation that the Japanese military notes were valueless, and not upon the
allegation that the debt had not yet matured.

The contention that the notes tendered by respondent Valencia
were valueless is of course untenable, since it is already settled that the
Japanese war notes were legal tender during the enemy occupation. The result is
that the petitioner was not justified in refusing to accept payment in said
notes on September 4, 1944.

With respect to the validity of the consignation upheld by the
Court of Appeals, the pertinent findings of said court are as follows: “No
tenemos a la vista el documento por el cual se consigno en el juzgado la suma de
P753.63 en billetes mili’tares japoneses y no podemos determiner si tal escrito
era simplemente de consignacion o si ademas se solicitaba del tribunal que, tras
los tramites de rigor, declarase saldada la obligacion y cancelada la hipoteca,
mas, en lo que atane a la consignacion propiamente dicha, puede verse de los
hechos expuestos que se ha cumplido con todos los requisitos prescritos por el
Codigo, De las pruebas consta que se hizo el ofrecimiento de pago en forma al
acreedor, que este recibio los avisos correspondientes antes y despues de hecha
la consignacion judicial; que los billetes militares japoneses, que eran moneda
de curso legal en Filipinas al tiempo de la consignacion, constituian la ‘cosa
debida’ que se deposito a disposicion de la Autoridad judicial; que la
consignacion se ajusto estrictamente a las disposiciones que regulan el pago de
una obligacion que podia liberarse; y, en su consecuencia, que el acreedor a
quien se hizo el ofrecimiento de pago se nego sin razon valida a recibirlo.”

We cannot, therefore, in this instance depart from the finding
of the Court of Appeals that all the steps for a valid consignation had been
taken by respondent Valencia. The only important question that arises is whether
the loss of the amount consigned should be borne by the petitioner or by the
respondent.

In the case of Haw Pia vs. Jose, etc.^[1] decided on May 13, 1947,
44 Off. Gaz., 2704, this court held that the loss of the thing validly
consigned, without the fault of the debtor, is to be borne by the creditor. We
quote the following from said decision:

“But there are certain other considerations which we deem
worthy to be noted. Petitioner lays much emphasis upon the point that the
aforesaid order of January 6, 1944, has become impossible of execution because
she says the amount consigned by respondent Altea in September or October, 1940,
with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance, which was later deposited by said
official with the Provincial Treasurer, was ‘frozen’ by the Japanese
authorities, and she adds that to this day the present government has not made
provision for the payment of said amount;Be this as itmay, and even supposing
that the so-called freezing of said amount and the alleged failure of the
government to provide for its payment have made it impossible for petitioner to
collect the same, the loss, if any there would be, must be suffered by
petitioner.

“Art. 1176. If a creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made should refuse without reason to accept it, the debtor may relieve himself
of liability by the consignation of the thing due.

“The same effect shall be produced by consignation alone when
made in the absence of the creditor, or if the latter should be incapacitated to
accept the payment when it is due, or when several persons claim to be entitled
to receive it, or when the muniments of the obligation have been lost or
mislaid. (Civil Code.)

“The amount consigned was in Philippine genuine money before
the war and the record shows that all the requisites of a valid consignation
were complied with

“* * * Ademas de quedar extinguida la obligacion produce la
consignacion valida el efecto de quedar libre el deudor de responsabilidad por
los riesgos que despues, y sin que procedan de actos suyos, sobrevengan a la
cosa debida y consignaua. (8 Manresa, 4th edition, page 297; italics supplied.)”

Upon the other hand, in the case of China Insurance &
Surety Co., Inc. vs. Berkenkotter^[1] (46 Off. Gaz., 5466), we promulgated on
April 29, 1949, a resolution to the following effect: “On this point, the
reconstituted documents show that while the consignation was really made and the
adverse party notified thereof, the same has neither been accepted by the latter
nor approved by the court, and in any event, there is no clear proof before us
that the essentials of a valid consignation are here present specially the
conformity of the proferred payment to terms of the obligation which is to be
paid. It should be remarked in this connection that strict conformity in that
regard is required, for as Manresa says ‘* * * el acreedor tan solo, y no el
juez, puede autorizar la variacion que para los derechos de aquel suponga la que
se intente en el objeto, cuantia o forma de las obligaciones.’ (8 Manresa, 312.)”
In the case of Padua vs. Rizal Surety & Insurance Co.^[2] decided on July 27,
1950(47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, page 308), it was held that, under article 1180
of the Civil Code, the approval of the consignation by the court is
indispensable to the extinction of the obligation. We quote the following
pertinent passages of said decision:

“Los dos citados autores opinan que es necesaria la aprobacion
judicial de la consignacion, no por disposicion expresa del articulo 1180 del
Codigo Civil, sino por deduccion forzosa. Dicho articulo dice que ‘podra el
deudor pedir al Juez que mande cancelar la obligacion.’ La mocion tiene que
fundarse en algun hecho y no sera otro sino el de que la consignacion ha sido
‘debidamente heeha.’ El Juez no ordenara la cancelacion a menos que se le
demuestre que en la consignacion se cumplieron todos los requisites necesarios
para su validez. For ejemplo, 1. que se ofrecio el pago y fue rechazado; 2.
que se ha heeho la notificacion de la consignacion; 3.” que, hecha al
consignacion, se notified debidamente del hecho al interesado (art. 1180, Codigo
Civil); 4. que la consignacion constituye el pago completo de la obligacion
(art. 1177).

“Si el juez no esta convencido de que la consignacion esta
hecha debidamente,’ no rendira la caneelacion de la obligacion. La extincion de
esta no depende de la sola voluntad del deudor; debe intervenir la autoridad
judicial para comprobar si ha sido debidamente hecha la consignacion. Seria
injusto que dependiese sola-men’e del acto del deudor la cancelacion de la
deuda. El orden publico y el sentido de justicia exigen que un tercero asi lo
dictamine. ‘Mientras el acreedor—dice el articulo 1180—no hubiere aceptado la
consignacion o no hubiere recaido la declaracion judicial de que esta bien
hecha, podra el deudor retirar la cantidad consignada.’ Bajo esta
circunstancia,—que la consignacion esta aun a disposicion del acreedor—su
obligacion queda subsistente. No puede considerarse pagada, como pretende la
apelante. En el caso presente se quemo la consignacion mientras estaba a la
disposicion completa de ella; ella, pues, debe sufrir la perdida, no el
acreedor.

“En conclusion declaramos: primero, que bajo el articulo 1180
del Codigo Civil la aprobacion de la consignacion por el juzgado es
indispensable para que la obligacion se considere extinguida; segundo, que los
P10,000 en papel moneda japonesa depositados no cubren todo el importe de la
sentencia apelada que monta a P10,833.82 ein incluir las costas judiciales, y
por tanto, la apelante no ha hecho una debida consignacion; y tercero, que la
obligacion de la apelante en virtud de la sentencia del Tribunal de Apelacion de
3 de Julio de 1944 queda aun subsistente.”

It would seem, therefore, that while under the earlier case of
Haw Pia vs. San Jose, we held that the loss of the thing consigned, without the
fault of the debtor, is to be for the account of the creditor, under the ruling
in China Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Berkenkotter, and Padua vs. Rizal
Surety & Insurance Co., in order that the debtor may be released from the
obligation, there must first be approval of the consignation by the court.
Although there is an apparent conflict, we may reconcile the decisions by
stating that, where all the requisites for a valid consignation have been
complied with, and there can be no reason for disapproving said consignation,
the loss of the thing or amount consigned occurring without the fault of the
debtor before the acceptance of the consignation by the creditor or its approval
by the court, should be for the account of the creditor. This is obvious even
from the decisions in the two later cases. Thus, in China Insurance & Surety
Co. Inc., vs. Berkenkotter, this court had to make reference to the fact that
“there is no clear proof before us that the essentials of a valid consignation
are here present specially the conformity of the proferred payment to the terms
of the obligation which is to be paid.” And in the case of Padua vs. Rizal
Surety & Insurance Co., the court held as a fact that “los P10,000 en papel
moneda japonesa depositados no cubren todo el importe de la sentencia apelada
que monta a P10,833.82 sin incluir las costas judiciales, y por tanto, la
apelante no ha hecho una debida consignacion.” In the last analysis, therefore,
the decisive consideration is that there be a valid consignation which may not
be disapproved by the court.

In the case before us, as already noted, the Court of Appeals
found that respondent Valencia had performed all the acts necessary to a valid
consignation. It is not pretended that the amount consigned was less than that
specified in the promissory note. If the matter of the approval of the
consignation was therefore presented to the court prior to the loss of the thing
consigned, there can be no doubt about its approval. Our conclusion in this case
merely gives effect and essence to the purposes of consignation. It is true
that, under article 1180 of the Civil Code, at any time before the creditor has
accepted the consignation or the court has declared that it was properly made,
the debtor may withdraw the thing or sum of money consigned, leaving the
obligation in force; but it cannot be denied also that, until the thing or
amount consigned shall have been withdrawn by the debtor, the creditor may
accept the same, with the result that in the meantime the consignation is at the
disposal both of the debtor and the creditor. The risk of loss before acceptance
by the creditor or approval by the court is likewise mutual, because if it be
determined that there was no valid consignation, he loss mus be suffered by the
debtor; othewise, by the creditor.

The petitioner further invokes the equitable consideration that
the amount consigned in Japanese military notes should not have been given a
value at par with the Philippine peso, actual currency. Having come to the
conclusion that the obligation was payable during the enemy occupation, and that
the Japanese war notes were then legal tender at par with the Philippine peso,
we are constrained to disagree with tne petitioner.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed without costs. So
ordered.

Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

---

[1] 78 Phil., 238.

[1] 83 Phil., 459.

[2] 87 Phil., 113.

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DISSENTING

FERIA, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

According to the facts found by the Court of Appeals in its
decision, the action filed by the plaintiff in the present case on August 5,
1946, in the Court of First Instance of Masbate is for recovery of a loan
amounting to P753.63 due from defendant, evidenced by a promissory note issued
on May 22, 1940, and foreclosure of the property mortgaged to secure the payment
of said loan. The defendant in his answer alleged as a defense that he had on
September 4, 1944, made an offer or tender of payment of said amount to the
plaintiff, and upon refusal of the plaintiff to accept it he consigned said sum
on the same date in court. But this was lost and destroyed by fire in December,
1944, together with all the records of the court, and nothing was done by the
defendant-debtor until the plaintiff-creditor filed the present action in
August, 1946.

The promissory note issued on May 22, 1940 by the defendant in
favor of the plaintiff reads as follows:

“Pagare a la orden del Sr, Laureano Sia en Masbate, Masbate, al
plazo de cinco años contados desdc esta, fecha, la suma de setecientos
cincuenta y tres pesos con sesente y tres centimos (P753.63) en moneda
filipina, valor recibido del mismo en virtud. de una hipoteca de terreno cocal
de que es parte integrants este pagare.”

And in order to secure the payment of his obligation, the
defendant executed a deed of mortgage on the same date of a piece of property
therein described which deed reads in part as follows:

“La condicion de esta hipoteca de terreno, libre de toda carga
y gravamen, es que si yo (Numeriano Valencia) pagare o hiciere pagar al
mencionado Laureano Sia, a sus herederos y cansahabientes el pagare de P753,63
que he otorgado a su favor eon esta fecha y que vencera al plazo de cinco años
contados desde esta fecha, esta escritura quedara caocelada, nula y de ningun
valor, qucdando en caso contrario en toda su fuerza y vigor, pudiendo ejercitar
su derecho de hacer cumplir lo aqui pactado.” (Exhibit B.)

After trial, the Court of First Instance dismissed the
plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the offer of payment and consignation
of the amount due having been duly made by the defendant, the loss of the money
deposited or consigned in court must be borne by the creditor and the amount
claimed by the plaintiff should be considered as satisfied.

Appeal was interposed by the creditor to the Court of Appeals
in which the appellant raised, among others, the question (1) whether in view of
the terms of the prom-issory note and deed of mortgage the debtor had the right
to pay his obligation, and the creditor refused without reason to accept it, at
the time the offer of payment and consignation of the sum of P753.63 in court
were made, that is, whether the offer of payment and consignation were validly
made by the defendant and binding upon the plaintiff; and (2) whether the
consequent loss or destruction of the money deposited should be borne by the
creditor.

The Court of Appeals in deciding these questions in the
affirmative held the following:

“Con respecto a la fecha del vencimiento de la obligacion,
tanto el pagare como la escritura de hipoteca disponen que el de la suma de
P753.63 debe hacerse en moneda filipina ‘al plazo de cinco años contados desde
esta fecha,’ expresion algun tanto equivoca, que lo mismo puede significar que
el pago tiene que hacerse exacta-mente a los cinco años contados desde el 22 de
Mayo de 1940, o sea, el 22 de Mayo de 1945, como tambien puede indicar que la
deuda podia amortizarse dentro del tcrmino de cinco años a partir del dia en que
se establecio la obligacion. En relacion con este punto es de advertir que si la
ley no prohibe el que las partes convengan que el pago de una deuda se haga en
un dia determinado y no antes, tampoco hay disposicion alguna legal vigente que
impida, a falta de pacto en eontrario, que el deudor se libre de una deuda
pagando su importe en cualquier tiempo antes de su vencimiento. En el caso de
autos es de notar que si bfen la eantidad de P753.63 sugiere la idea de que en
la misma pudieran haberse incluido intereses a devengar, ni el pagare y la
hipoteca que lo garantiza, ni las pruebas aportadas denotan que las partes hayan
convenido en algo acerca de intereses. Siendo esto asi la prolongacion de la
deuda por todo el pei’iodo de cinco años no reporta ventaja, ganancia o
“beneficio al acreedor, y no habria razon valida o atendible para declarar que
los terminos del pagare y de la escritura de hipoteca (Exhs. A y B) antes
acotados impiden que el deudor hipotecario si su situacion lo permitiese, pague
la deuda lo mas pronto posible, y aun antes del plazo maximo de cinco años
acordado para su vencimiento. Debe tenerse en cuenta, ademas, que al negarse el
acreedor a recibir el importe del pagare que el deudor le entragaba, su objecion
se fundaba en que los billetes militares japoneses careclan de valor y no por
que la obligacion no hubiera vencido todavia.”

According to the provision of article 1127 of the old Civil
Code and the uniform ruling of this court a debtor cannot make a binding tender
and consignation of payment before the time stipulated for making the payment
without the consent of the creditor, even though the obligation does not bear
interest or the interest for the whole stipulated period be offered or paid to
the creditor (Illusorio vs. Busuego,^[1] No. L-822; Osorio vs. Salutillo,^[2] 48 Off.
Gaz., 103; Nicolas vs. Matias,^[3] No. L-1745, pp. 1 and 2; and Ponce de Leon vs.
Syjuco,^[4] No. L-3316). All the justices concurred in the ruling in said
decisions, except Justice Sabino Padilla, and Chief Justice Paras who penned the
majority’s opinion in the present case.

It is therefore obvious that, as the tender of payment and
consignation of the amount due in the present case were made before the
obligation of the debtor to pay became due, the creditor had the right to refuse
to accept it, the debt was not yet then due because according to the promissory
note the amount due “sera pagado al plazo de cinco años” and according to the
deed of mortgage “the promissory note vencera al plazo de cinco años;” that is,
that the loan or the promissory note shall be paid at the end and not before
five years. And plazo is denned in the Encyclopedia Jundica, as the “termino o
tiempo concedido para dar hacer o no hacer alguna cosa o prestar algun
servicio;” and according to the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española says
that “Plazo es (1) el termino o tiempo senalado para una cosa (2) vencimiento
del termino.” Therefore a debt payable al plazo de cinco años, or a promissory
note which will become due al plazo de cinco años, is not payable before the end
of five years.Before the expiration of that period neither the creditor can
compel or sue the debtor to pay it, nor can the latter compel the former to
accept its payment either directly or by consignation of the thing due in
court.

It is evidently wrong to hold, as Court of Appeals does, that
“es de advertir que si la ley no prohibe el que las partes convengan que el pago
de una deuda se haga en un dia determinado y no antes, tampoco hay disposition
alguna legal vigente que impida, a falta de pacto en contrario, que el deudor se
libera de una deuda pagando su importe en cualquier tiempo antes de su
vencimiento.” Because, as above stated, according to law if the parties agree
that “el pago de una deuda se haga en un dia determinado,” it is understood that
it is not payable before that date, and the debtor can not be compelled to pay
and the creditor to accept the payment before the date stipulated. But if the
debtor pays and the creditor voluntarily accepts the payment of the debt before
it becomes due, the debtor is relieved of his obligation to pay the debt, not
because the debtor has the right to pay his obligation at any time before it
becomes due and payable, but because of the subsequent agreement or novation of
the term stipulated in the former contract.

Chief Justice Paras, in his opinion affirming the decision of
the Court of Appeals appealed from, held the following:

“The promissory note executed on May 22, 1940, recited that the
sum of P753.63 was payable ‘al plazo de cinco años contados desde esta fecha.’
The Court of Appeals held, and correctly, that the expression ‘al plazo de
cinco años contados desde esta fecha’ may mean as well that payment could be
made at the end of five years from May 22, 1940, or May 22, 1945, as that the
debt could be settled at any time within five years from May 22, 1940; in such
case, the respondent Valencia was justified in offering to pay on September 4,
1944, and the petitioner, Laureano Sia, had no reason to reject said payment.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals is well founded, specially because the
refusal of the petitioner to accept the tendered payment was premised on the
allegation that the Japanese military notes were valueless, and not upon the
allegation that the debt had not yet matured.

“The contention that the notes tendered by respondent Valencia
were valueless is of course untenable, since it is already settled that the
Japanese war notes were legal tender during the enemy occupation. The result is
that the petitioner was not justified in refusing to accept payment in said
notes on September 4, 1944,”

This opinion is based on almost the same grounds on which the
decision of the Court of Appeals relies, and therefore it is also erroneous.

We have already shown that a debtor has no right to pay a
promissory note which is payable or shall become due “al plazo de cinco años
contados desde Mayo 22, 1940,” at any time within or before the end of said five
years, and therefore the plaintiff had reason to refuse to accept the
defendant’s offer or tender of payment of the money consigned in court on
September 4, 1944. The finding ‘that the petitioner had refused to accept the
tender of payment made on September 4, 1944, on the ground that the Japanese
military notes were valueless and not because the debt had not yet matured, is
contrary to facts as they appear in the record on appeal which is before us. No
evidence was presented at the time of the consignation of the money claimed to
be due and no record of that proceeding was or could be reconstituted. The only
evidence on the matter in the record is the answer of the defendant-appellant
Numeriano Valencia to plaintiff’s complaint in which it is averred “that
plaintiff refused without reason to accept said sum and to release and discharge
the aforesaid sum;” without stating the reason given by the creditor at the time
he had refused to accept the payment (see Record on Appeal, page 9). It is true
that the decision of the Court of First Instance states that the plaintiff
creditor in the action he instituted several years afterward “contiende que
estuvo justificado al rechazar la oferta de pago que le hiciere el demandado
porque el dinero en que se le pagaba entonces era dinero japones y no era moneda
filipina como se ha eonvenido en los Exhibitos A y B” (page 14 of the same
record); but from the fact that the plaintiff made such contention at the
hearing of this case in 1947 and 1948 it does not follow, that he gave the same
reason at the time he had refused to accept the debtor’s offer of payment in
September, 1944. The plaintiff was correct in submitting such contention to the
court, because when the plaintiff held his action on August 6, 1946, and after
the promissory note became due and payable on May 22, 1945 at the end of five
years. The promissory note was according to the terms there payable in
Philippine money and not in Japanese war notes. Besides, it is for the court to
decide and not for the parties to state whether the creditor had reason under
the law in refusing to accept the offer or tender of payment made by the debtor.
Although the reason given by the creditor in refusing to accept the offer or
tender of payment and consignation is not correctly stated, if the creditor had
añother valid reason in not accepting the payment, the obligation cannot be
considered as paid by such offer and consignation. The real reason given in
refusing to accept the tender of payment not having been put in issue in the
present case, creditor may at any stage of the case prove or show the valid
reason he had in refusing to accept the offer or tender of payment made by the
debtor.

To concur as several Justices do in the decision of Chief
Justice Paras would be tantamount to setting aside the ruling laid down by the
majority of the Justices in the above cited cases of Ilusorio vs. Busuego^[1] No.
L-822; Osorio vs. Salutillo, 48 Off. Gaz., 103; Nicolas vs. Matiasa^[2] (No. L-1743,
pp. 1 and 2); and Ponce de Leon vs. Syjuco^[3] (No. L-3316) and to adopt the
ruling in the dissenting opinion of said Chief Justice in those cases to the
effect that a debtor has the right to pay a promissory note or obligation
payable on a certain date either before or after said date, contrary to the
provision of article 1127 of the Civil Code and the long line of decisions of
this Supreme Court above cited and many others not necessary now to mention.

In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the
decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the defendant ordered to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P753.63 with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until paid, and that, upon the failure of the defendant to pay, the
property herein mortgaged should be sold at public auction as by law provided
and the amount due paid out of the proceeds of the sale, with costs against the
defendant.

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[1] 84 Phil., 630.

[2] 87 Phil., 356.

[3] 89 Phil., 126.

[4] 90 Phil., 311.

(1) 84 Phil., 630.

(2) 89 Phil., 126.

(3) 90 Phil., 311.

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DISIDENTE

PABLO, M.:

El Tribunal de Apelacion declaro probados los siguientea
hechos: Que en 22 de mayo de 1940, Numeriano Valencia otorgo un pagax’e a favor
de Laureano Sia del tenor siguiente:

“Pagare a la orden del Sr. Laureano Sia en Masbate, Masbate, al
plazo de cinco años contados desde esta fecha, la suma de sietecientos
cincuenta y tres con sesenta y tres centimos (P753.63) en moneda filipina, valor
recibido del misrao en virtud de una hipoteea de terreno cocal de que es parte
integrante este pagare.”

En 4 de septiembre de 1944, el abogado Ernesto Valencia, hijo
de Numeriano Valencia, ofrecio pagar la deuda hipotecaria de P753.63 en papel
moneda japonesa; pero al acreedor lo rehuso, alegando que queria que se le
pagase la deuda en moneda filipina. Por tal motivo, el abogado Ernesto Valencia,
en nombre de su padre, manifesto que el consignaria, como en efecto consigno, en
el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Masbate, el 5 de septiembre de 1944, dicha
cantidad en papel moneda japonesa.

Con motivo del bombardeo, los archivos del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Masbate se han destruido, entre ellos la cantidad consignada de
P753.63.

Despues de vencido el plazo en 22 de mayo de 1945, Laureano Sia
requirio a Numeriano Valencia el pago de la deuda hipotecaria de P753.63 y el
deudor se nego a hacerlo, alegando que la deuda es’taba pagada por la
consignacion hecha en 5 de septiembre de 1944.

Dos razones existen para declarar que la deuda no esta aim
pagada: la No se necesita hacer esfuerzo alguno para concluir que la
consignation hecha habria sido prematura. El pago no era exigible aiin. No
estaba, por tanto, obligado el aereedor a recibirlo. El documento acreditativo
de deuda dispone que Numeriano Valencia pagara a la orden del Sr. Laureano Sia
en Masbate, Masbate, al plazo de cinco años contados desde esta fecha (22 de
mayo de 1940). El plazo es de cinco años; el pago debe hacerse despues de
vencido el plazo de cinco años, y no dentro del plazo de cinco años; el plazo de
cinco años termina en 22 de mayo de 1945, y no antes.

Pagar al plazo de cinco años no significa pagar dentro del
plazo de cinco años. Pagar al plazo de cinco años significa pagar al cabo del
plazo de cinco años.

Plazo, segun el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, es:
(1) termino 0 tiempo senalado para una cosa; (2) “vencimiento del termino.” Y,
segun Escriche, “El termino 0 espacio de tiempo que se concede a las partes.”
(4) Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudence, 604.

Pagar al plazo de cinco años es equivalente a pagar al
vencimiento del termino de cinco años.

Pagar al cabo del año es pagar al terminar el año. Pagar al
plazo de un año es pagar al terminar el plazo de un año.

Pagar al año es pagar despues del año y no dentro del año.

Pagar dentro del año no es pagar al año O despues del año, sino antes de expirar
el año.

Pagadero al mes es pagadero despues del mes y no dentro del
mes.

Si la intencion de las partes hubiese sido la de que podia
pagarse la deuda dentro del plazo de cinco años, hubieran empleado la palabra
“dentro” o las palabras “en o antes del 22 de mayo de 1945” o “en el plazo de
cinco años.”

La consignacion, por prematura, no obliga al acreedor a
recibirla; por tanto, la perdida de la cantidad consignada debe correr a cuenta
del deudor.

Y aun suponiendo que la deuda fuese pagadera dentro del plazo
de cinco años, el acreedor no estaba obligado a recibir el pago de P753.63, en
papel moneda japonesa porque, segun convenio, que es ley entre las partes, (art.
1090, Codigo Civil), el pago debia hacerse en moneda filipina. Estaban en
circulation en 4 de septiembre de 1944 la moneda filipina y el papel moneda
expedida por el ejercito japones.No debe confundirse una con otra.

La proclama de 10 de enero de 1942 del General en jefe de las
fuerzas japonesas es del tenor siguiente:

“The currencies which shall be sanctioned by the authorities of
the Japanese Army to circulate in the Philippine Islands shall be the Peso
military notes which are issued by the Imperial Japanese Government, and the
Philippine peso currency, which, is already in circulation.

“The circulation of the Yen paper money (paper money issued by
the Japanese Imperial Government, Yen notes issued by the Bank of Japan, Yen
notes issued by the Bank of Chosen, Yen notes issued by the Bank of Taiwan, and
the military notes other than Peso military notes), piastre currency (notes
issued by the Bank of Indo-China), and all other currencies of foreign countries
shall be prohibited.

“However, as for the U. S. dollar currency, the circulation
shall be approved at the rate of two pesos (P2) per one dollar ($1), for the
time being.

“Not only the payer of the above-mentioned currencies, which
are prohibited to circulate as the means of payment of all transactions, but
also the receiver of such currencies shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the martial law.

“As to the treatment of the possession in the market of the
above-mentioned currencies and the U. S. dollar currency which are prohibited to
circulate shall be regulated later on.

“COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE
FORCES”

Como estaban en circulacion legal durante la ocupacion japonesa
la moneda’filipina y la moneda japonesa expedida por el ejereito de ocupacion,
el acreedor tenia perfectisimo derecho de cbligar al deudor a pagar su deuda en
moneda filipina, segun convenio.

El articulo 1170 del Codigo Civil claramente dispone que “el
pago de las deudas de dinero debera hacerse en la especie pactada, y, no siendo
posible entregar la especie, en la moneda de plata u oro que tenga curso
legal.”

No debe olvidarse que la deuda se contrajo en 22 de mayo de
1940, y ninguna de las partes tenia la menor idea de que alguna vez habfa de
circular en Filipinas la rnoneda japonesa. Es de lo mas injusto eonsiderar
pagada la deuda en moneda filipina legitima por medio de la moneda japonesa,
consignada en 5 de septiembre de 1944, que apenas valla en la proportion de P30
por un peso filipino legitimo. Esta es la segunda razon por que no debe
declararse pagada la deuda.

Debe revocarse la decision apelada.

Decision affirmed.