G.R. No. 21183. August 31, 1923

The appellee, Gabino Barretto Po Ejap, presented a motion to dismiss the
appeal of the municipality of Tacloban. The action was commenced by the Director
of Lands in cadastral survey No. 3, G. L. R. O. No. 153. The motion is based
upon the ground that the bill of exceptions was not presented within a period of
thirty days from the date of the notice of the decision. It is alleged in the
motion to dismiss that the lower court rendered its decision on the 30th day of
January, 1923; that the attorney for the municipality of Tacloban received
notice of said decision on the second day of February, 1923, and that a motion
for a new trial was presented on the 6th day of February, 1923.

The motion to dismiss further alleges that the motion presented in the lower
court for a new trial did not state “generally the nature and grounds of the
motion and when and where it would be heard,” and that said motion did not have
the effect of extending the time within which the bill of exceptions should have
been presented, and cites in support of that allegation the case of Manakil and
Tison vs. Revilla and Tuaño (42 Phil., 81).

In reply to the motion of the appellee, the attorney for the appellant
alleges that final decision by the lower court was not rendered until the 2d day
of June, 1923; that he had thirty days from notice of that decision within which
to present his bill of exceptions, and that the bill of exceptions was presented
within thirty days from notice of said decision.

An examination of the bill of exceptions shows that the same was presented,
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Leyte, on the 20th day of
June, 1923. It will be seen, therefore, that if the allegation of the appellant
is correct, that the decision of the lower court was not rendered until the 2d
day of June, 1923, that his bill of exceptions was presented within thirty days
required for presentation of bills of exceptions in land registration cases.

An examination of the record, in relation with the motion to dismiss and the
answer thereto, shows the following facts:

(1) That after the close of the trial of the cause on the 12th day of
September, 1922, the Honorable Eulalio E. Causing, judge, rendered what is
generally known as a “sin perjuicio” decision on the 30th day of January, 1923,
which decision was a mere pronouncement of his judgment, without stating any of
the facts in support of his conclusion;

(2) That notice of said decision (30th day of January, 1923) was sent and
received by the attorney for the municipality of Tacloban, the appellant herein;
that the attorney for the appellant (municipality of Tacloban) on the 6th day of
February, 1923, presented a motion for a new trial, together with an exception
to the decision of the 30th day of January, 1923, and that a copy of said
decision was served personally upon the attorney for the defendant, Gabino
Barretto Po Ejap on the 5th day of February, 1923;

(3) That on the 2d day of June, 1923, the attorney for Gabino Barretto Po
Ejap presented a motion praying that the so-called motion of the appellant for a
new trial should be disregarded, for the reason that it had not complied with
the rules of the Court of First Instance, and that the decision of the 30th day
of January, 1923, be declared final and cited in support of his motion the case
of Manakil and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuaño (42 Phil., 81). The Judge
denied the motion for a new trial upon the ground “that it was unfounded and had
not been presented in accordance with the rules of the court.”

(4) That on the same day (2d day of June, 1923) the Judge denied the motion
presented by the attorney for the appellee, Gabino Barretto Po Ejap, to dismiss
the motion of the appellant for the reason “that he had not presented any
objections thereto with reference to its sufficiency and had renounced his right
to be notified of said motion;”

(5) That on the same day (2d day of June, 1923), the trial judge prepared and
filed with the clerk his decision amplifying his decision theretofore rendered
on the 30th day of January, 1923, in which he sets out in full all of the facts
upon which he relied to justify the conclusion announced in his “sin perjuicio”
decision of the 30th day of January, 1923;

(6) That on the 8th day of June, 1923, the attorney for the municipality of
Tacloban presented an exception to the decision of the 2d day of June, 1923, and
on the 12th day of June, 1923, he gave notice of his intention to present a bill
of exceptions. On the 15th day of June, 1923, he presented a motion for a new
trial upon the ground that the decision of the lower court was “contrary to the
law and the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause,” which motion for a
new trial was denied by the court on the 19th day of June, 1923. On the 20th day
of June, 1923, the attorney for the appellant excepted to the order denying his
motion for a new trial and gave notice of his intention to present a bill of
exceptions;

(7) That on the 20th day of June, 1923, the bill of exceptions was presented
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Leyte.

Granting, for the purposes of the argument, (a) that the “sin
perjuicio” decision of January 30, 1923, was a final decision; (b) that
the motion presented by the appellant on the 6th day of February, 1923, complied
with the rules of the Court of First Instance; (c) that the appellee had
due notice thereof, and (d) that said motion was not acted upon until the
2d day of June, 1923, then, and under those conditions, the bill of exceptions
which was presented on the 20th day of June, 1923, was presented within thirty
days, eliminating the time during which the court was considering said motion
(from the 6th day of February, 1923 to the 2d day of June, 1923). (Layda
vs. Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83; Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs.
Director of Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba, and Zarate vs.
Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil., 774;
Director of Lands vs. Municipality of Dingras, 40 Phil., 242; Director of
Lands vs. Maurera and Tiongson, 37 Phil., 410; Santiago vs. Manuel
and Tumale, 39 Phil., 869; Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abural, 39 Phil., 996.)

The purpose of the law and the rules requiring that a bill of exceptions
shall be presented within a definitely fixed period, is to definitely and
finally fix the time when a decision is final so that it may be executed and the
litigation terminated. Without some fixed way of determining when a decision is
final, the parties litigant could never know when they could enforce their
rights under the judgment or when the litigation is, in fact, terminated.

But was the “sin perjuicio” decision of January 30, 1923, a final decision?
Suppose the defeated party had perfected his appeal and presented his bill of
exceptions, would this court have considered the appeal, in view of the
provisions of section 133 of Act No. 190? A reading of the “sin perjuicio”
decision shows that it was nothing more or less than the conclusion of the lower
court with reference to the rights of the parties. It did not contain a
statement of the facts which were essential to a clear understanding of the
issues presented by the respective parties as to the facts involved. Had the
appeal come to this court it would, undoubtedly, in view of what it has done
heretofore, have returned the record to the lower court, requiring it to comply
with the mandatory provisions of said section 133. (Braga vs. Millora, 3
Phil., 458.) That being true, did not the appellant have a right to wait until
the lower court should render a decision in accordance with the requirements of
the law?

In view of the decision of this court in the case of Braga vs.
Millora, supra, and many other published decisions, in which the doctrine
there announced has been followed, we are of the opinion, and so declare, that
the appellant, even though he attempted to perfect an appeal against the “sin
perjuicio” decision, had a perfect right to wait until the final decision was
filed, complying with said section 133, and then to perfect his appeal, thereby
avoiding a possible delay of having the record returned to the lower court with
directions to prepare and file a decision in accordance with the provisions of
said section.

If we are correct in that conclusion, then the bill of exceptions in the
present case was presented within the thirty days required by law, and the
motion to dismiss the appeal should be, and is hereby, denied, without any
finding as to costs.

The practice of the lower court in pronouncing “sin perjuicio” decisions and
then later, after the expiration of many months, complying with section 133, is
a practice which should not be followed and cannot be looked upon with favor. So
ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and
Johns, JJ., concur.