G.R. No. 19740. March 22, 1923

STATEMENT

The following instrument, known in the record as Exhibit A, omitting the
description of the lands and other personal property, was executed February 2,
1918:

“DEED OF DONATION EXECUTED BY SEVERA MAGNO Y LAURETA IN FAVOR OF PEDRO EMILIO MATA

In the municipality of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, Philippine Islands, I, Severa Magno y Laureta, widow, seventy years old

and resident of the municipality of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, Philippine
Islands, a proprietor by occupation, hereby declare that for the purpose of
giving the young Pedro Emilio Mata, single, seventeen years old, resident of
this municipality and son of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and Ester Magno, a
reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection
toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate
‘mortis causa’ to said youth all the properties described as follows:

(Here follows an accurate description of a large number of parcels of real
estate, and a large amount of personal property.)

“I declare that all the rice lands above mentioned are my exclusive property,
and to identify in a clearer manner the halves mentioned in some of the
foregoing clauses I hereby state that they are the one-half that was allotted to
me in the partition had between me and the heirs of my deceased husband, and,
therefore, all the part that was allotted to me in the said partition is the
subject of this donation.

“I also declare that I likewise donate to the said youth the right to, and
usufruct of, two parcels of land situated in Mariquet, on which I hold a
mortgage for the sum of P250, subject to the conditions stipulated in the
document executed to evidence the said mortgage.

“I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee
cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor,
and in the event of her death the said donee shall be under obligation to cause
a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also to
defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.

“I, Ester Magno, widow, of age, resident of the municipality of Solsona, and
mother of the young Pedro Emilio Mata, the donee under this document, hereby
accept this donation on behalf of my said son, thanking the donor for her
liberality and affection toward my said son, Pedro Emilio Mata, the donee, with
all the conditions imposed by the donor.

“In testimony whereof we affixed our marks to these presents in Solsona, this
2d day of February, 1918.

(Marked) “SEVERA MAGNO
(Sgd.) “ESTER MAGNO
	(Sgd.) “PEDRO EMILIO MATA
“Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) “IGNACIO FLORES
		(Sgd.) “ELIAS DULDULAO”

(Then follows the notarial acknowledgment in due and regular form.)

It is admitted that at the time of its execution, the grantor was the owner
in fee simple of all the lands therein described. In the course of time the
grantor died and at the time of her death Pedro Emilio Mata, the grantee in the
deed, and Ester Magno, entered upon and took possession of the lands.

The plaintiff applied for and was appointed administrator of the estate of
the grantor Severa Magno y Laureta, deceased, and made a demand upon the
defendants for possession of the lands which was refused, resulting in this
action by the plaintiff as administrator, to recover possession of the premises
and the sum of P9,000 as the value of the products of the land from April 9,
1918, until the termination of the case, for the sum of P1,200 damages, for the
unlawful and wrongful withholding of possession, and costs.

For answer the defendants made a specific denial of all of the material
allegations of the complaint, and pray judgment for costs.

Upon such issues the case was tried and submitted upon a stipulation of facts
to the effect that any title or right of possession which Pedro Emilio Mata has
to the possession of the premises is founded upon Exhibit A.

The lower court rendered judgment to the effect that the plaintiff was
entitled to the possession of the lands in question and the sum of P1,050, the
agreed rental value and costs, from which the defendants appeal, assigning nine
different errors, the combined substance of which is that the lower court erred
in holding that the donation made by the deceased, known as Exhibit A, should be
construed under the provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code, and that the
defendants did not acquire title to the lands under it, that their possession
was illegal, and that the land was the property of the heirs of the deceased,
and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff, and in overruling the defendants’
motion for a new trial.

JOHNS, J.:

Its execution having been admitted, the question involved is the
construction, legal force, and effect of Exhibit A. Among other things it
recites that I, Severa Magno y Laureta, widow, seventy years old * * * hereby
declare that for the purpose of giving the young Pedro Emilio Mata, single,
seventeen years old, * * * and son of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and Ester
Magno, “a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my
affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I
hereby donate ‘mortis causa’ to said youth all the properties described as
follows.” In the second paragraph it is said: “Therefore, all the part that was
allotted to me in the said partition is the subject of this donation.” In the
third it recites: “I also declare that I likewise donate to the said youth the
right to, and usufruct of, two parcels of land situated in Mariquet, etc.” In
the fourth—”I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the
donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the
donor, etc.”

The donee, Pedro Emilio Mata, was the son of Pastor Mata, deceased, and was
seventeen years old at the time the instrument was executed. The instrument
further recites that Ester Magno, a widow and the mother of Pedro Emilio Mata,
with all the conditions imposed by the donor, accepted the donation on behalf of
her son, and thanked the donor for her liberality and the affection for her
son.

The plaintiff contends and the trial court found that Exhibit A should be
construed under the terms and provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code as
follows:

“Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake
of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the
rules established for testamentary successions.”

As we analyze it, Exhibit A is a donation in praesenti and conveyed
the fee simple title to the lands in question subject only to the life estate of
the donor. It must be conceded that during her lifetime the grantor had a legal
right to convey the fee simple title to her lands to any person in her
discretion, reserving to herself a life estate. In legal effect, that is what
she did here, The conveyance of the lands took effect upon the making and
delivery of the deed, reserving a life estate only in the donor. The conveyance
itself was not “to become effective upon the death of the donor,” but took
effect at the time of its execution. The instrument does not recite that the
conveyance itself is not to become effective until the death of the donor, but,
in legal effect, it recites that an actual conveyance is made subject to the
life estate of the donor. Upon its face Exhibit A comes squarely within the
provisions of article 623 of the Civil Code, which reads:

“A donation is perfected as soon as the donor has knowledge that it has been
accepted by the donee.”

Here, it appears from the instrument itself that Ester Magno accepted the
donation on behalf of the son, and the acceptance is incorporated in the body of
the instrument and made a part of it, and is signed by the donor and acceptor in
the presence of witnesses and the instrument as a whole is legally acknowledged
before a notary public.

Again, when the instrument is construed as a whole it shows upon its face a
delivery and acceptance. The donor conveys the lands, and in and by the same
instrument the mother of the donee accepts the conveyance upon the terms and
conditions stated in the deed.

Corpus Juris, vol. 18, p. 208, says:

“Where, however, a deed containing a provision that it is not to take effect
until the grantor’s death is actually delivered to the grantee during the
lifetime of the grantor, it will be sustained as a present grant of a future
interest.”

That is this case. Legally speaking, it was a delivery and an acceptance of
the deed. The facts bring the case squarely within article 623 of the Civil
Code. Here, there was a donation and an acceptance both in the same instrument
which made it a perfected donation within the meaning of article 623.

Commenting on article 620 of the Civil Code in volume 5, page 82, of the 1910
edition, Manresa says:

“In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with
a resolutory condition the property is of course conveyed to the donee during
the life of the donor and as to this point there is no question.

“When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property
donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is
related to his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it we must distinguish
between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the donation
is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean
the delivery of the property must be made during his life or after his death.
From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such
disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and
irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until the day arrives or until the condition
is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot be realized.
Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a certain date, even though to
take place at his death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another. If the thing is lost thru the fault of the donor, or if it is damaged,
indemnity may be recovered. Regarding donations with suspensive conditions, it
is sufficient to read articles 1120 and 1122 to understand the effects which
this kind of donation has during the lifetime of the donor. He who makes a
donation effective after his death, makes a donation, not a legacy. 1’he mere
name of the act, when a different intention does not clearly appear, is enough
in order to make applicable thereto the rules of law referring to donations.
However, if the ill-named donor not only postpones the date of the execution of
the donation until his death but also reserves the right to revoke said act at
his pleasure, then this act is not valid as a form of contract; this is in truth
a disposition of property mortis causa which requires the same
solemnities as required in making a will.”

Although it is not included in the stipulation of facts, it does appear from
the record that some of the property described in Exhibit A was sold and
disposed of by the donee during the lifetime of the donor.

In any event, Exhibit A was a donation in praesenti as distinguished
from a gift in futuro, hence does not come under the provisions of
article 620 of the Civil Code.

The effect of this decision is to hold that Pedro Emilio Mata took and
acquired a valid title to the premises in dispute at the time Exhibit A was
executed, subject only to the life estate of the donor, and he is now the owner
of the lands described in the pleadings. But the defendants made a general
denial, and did not ask for affirmative relief, hence none can be granted.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed, with costs in favor of the defendants. So ordered.

Araullo,
C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.