G.R. No. 19462. January 16, 1923

STATEMENT

The petitioner is a shipping company now operating the steamship
Venus, which was formerly used on the Manila-Vigan-Currimao-Aparri route.
At its request and by virtue of a decision of the Public Utility Commissioner
October 13, 1920, authority was given to take the steamship Venus from
that route and use it on the Manila-Iloilo route on certain conditions, the
first of which reads as follows:

“First. That the applicant shipping company, in the operation of its steamer
Venus on the Manila-Iloilo route, will observe the following schedule of
trips:

“Sailing from Manila	Sailing from Iloilo
“On Tuesdays at 5 p. m.	On Fridays at 5. p. m.

“And will not make any change in the schedule of trips nor withdraw or
suspend the operation herein authorized of the said vessel except upon previous
authority from this Commission to which all accidents in connection with its
operation will be reported, furnishing therewith a detailed account of their
causes, as soon as possible after the occurrence.”

November 10, 1920, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner to change the
sailing schedule of the steamship, so as to leave Manila Wednesday at 4 p. m.
and Iloilo Saturday p. m., and, among others in the petition, alleged the
following reasons:

“This is to inform you that, from actual practice, the sailing from Manila to
Iloilo on Tuesdays of the steamship Venus is not to the best interest of
those concerned in view of the fact that it reaches Manila on Sundays when there
is no labor available and the only two working days left are not enough for the
unloading and loading, we have decided that its sailing from Manila be at 4
o’clock in the afternoon every Wednesday beginning this week. In view of this,
and the vessel sailing from Manila on Wednesdays, it will reach Iloilo early
Friday morning and will return therefrom on Saturday afternoon, arriving in
Manila early on Monday morning, and it will thereby have three working days here
which is necessary in order that the weekly service be rendered efficiently and
satisfactorily.

“Praying that you approve this slight change which favors both us and the
public in general, and with sincere thanks in advance, we remain,

       “Very truly yours.”

The petition was treated as a separate case, and on November 16, 1920, the
usual order of publication was made for a hearing which was set for December 3,
1920, at 10.30 a. m. November 18, 1920, the petitioner applied to the
Commissioner for a temporary permit to use the sailing date proposed in the
change pending the hearing, and the Commissioner then issued a temporary permit
for two trips, the first on November 24, and the second on December 1, 1920,
which was later extended until the final decision was rendered.

Numerous protests and objections were filed against the granting of the
petition, upon which a large amount of evidence was taken ana” several hearings
were had covering a period from December 7, 1920, to December 21, 1921. As a
result on July 27, 1922, the Public Utility Commissioner rendered a decision in
which the temporary permit was revoked, and it was ordered that the steamship
Venus strictly comply with the .decision of the Commissioner rendered on
October 13, 1920, in case No, 1947. His decision was later affirmed by the
Board, from which petitioner appeals to this court, claiming that the
respondents erred:

“In holding that the Public Utility Commissioner is empowered by law to
control the sailing schedules of ships operating as common carriers in the
inter-island trade in the manner attempted in this case.

“In ruling that the Compañia Maritima has acquired a prior right to Wednesday
of each week as a sailing date from Manila and to Saturday of each week as a
sailing date from Iloilo.

“In holding that the public convenience would be subserved by denying the
petition of the Ynchausti Steamship Company to change its sailing days from
Tuesday to Wednesday of each week from Manila, and from Friday to Saturday of
each week from Iloilo.”

JOHNS, J.:

The case is brought before this court under section 37 of Act No, 2307, known
as the Public Utility Law, which provides as follows:

“Any order made by the Board may be reviewed on the application of any person
or public utility affected thereby, by certiorari in appropriate cases, or by
petition, to the Supreme Court, within thirty days from the date upon which such
order becomes effective, as herein provided; said petition shall be filed with
the clerk of the Supreme Court and a copy thereof served upon the secretary of
the Board either personally or by leaving same at the office of said Board in
the City of Manila. The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to review
said order of the Board, and to set aside such order when it clearly appears
that there was no evidence before the Board to support reasonably such order, or
that the same was without the jurisdiction of the Board. The evidence presented
to the. Board, together with the finding of the Board and any order issued
thereon, shall be certified by the Board to the Supreme Court.”

Assignments of error Nos. 2 and 3 present questions of fact only, upon which
there is a sharp conflict in the evidence. Upon both assignments the Public
Utility Commissioner made findings against the petitioner, and the evidence
reasonably supports his findings.

Upon those points there is a material conflict in the evidence, and we cannot
say, as a matter of law, that it is not sufficient. Upon the remaining point,
section 16 of Act No. 2694, as it amends section 19 of Act No. 2307 and Acts
Nos. 2313 and 2362, among other things provides:

“* * * Nor shall any public carrier by land or water within the Philippine
Islands or any public utility, without the approval o£ the Commission first had,
make any permanent change in its time tables and sailing schedules or in its
service, or fail to continue to call at any of its regular points or ports of
call.”

This law was enacted March 9, 1917.

Section 14 of original Act No. 2307 provides:

“The Board shall have general supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and
control over, all public utilities, and also over their property, property
rights, equipment, facilities, and franchises so far as may be necessary for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act. * * * “

The legal force and effect of the argument for the petitioner is that section
19 above quoted is not a delegation of legislative authority, and, for such
reason, is invalid. The language of the section is clear, positive and certain.
It expressly says that no public utility by land or water shall ever make any
permanent change in its time tables, its service or sailing schedules without
the approval of the Commission first had and obtained. That carries with it and
implies legislative power vested in the Commission to fix sailing schedules as a
condition precedent to the granting of a license to do business; otherwise, that
portion of section 19 would be a nullity. It is clear that the Legislature
intended to vest that power in the Commission. The remaining question is whether
or not the Legislature itself has the power to fix the sailing schedules. In a
certain sense the waterways of the Philippine Islands correspond to its roads
and highways. No case direct in point has been cited by counsel on either side,
and in so far as we are advised, the important question here has never been
decided by any court, hence, it is one of first impression in this court.

Section 390 of Pond on Public Utilities, p. 450, says:

“The control of the streets and highways is in the state in trust for the
public for whose use and convenience they are dedicated as a means of
transportation and communication, thereby affording to the public the means by
which they may go from place to place, communicate with each other and enjoy
such other conveniences as the various kinds of service provided by municipal
public utilities afford. As the streets and highways are dedicated exclusively
for the use and convenience of the public generally, it follows that the
legislature acting for the state, or any municipal agency to which this power
may have been delegated, should make no grant which will materially interfere
with the uses for which the streets and highways are
dedicated.”

And section 414, p. 476, says:

“The rule of law is now universally accepted that when private property is
devoted to a public use it is subject to public regulation and control. In
recognition of this doctrine and as furnishing a forceful definition and a
current application of it to modern industrial conditions for the purpose of
controlling public service corporations providing any public utility service,
the leading and most important case is that of Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.
S., 113; 24 L. ed., 77). Under this decision property is clothed with a public
interest and devoted to a public use when used in a manner to make it of public
consequence, and to affect the entire community, so that when one devotes
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he virtually grants to
the public an interest in that use, and submits it to public regulation and
control for the common good to the extent of the interest so
granted.”

The whole tenor and trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Utility
Commission with power to regulate and control the operation of public utilities
under reasonable rules and regulations in the interests of the public. That was
the purpose of the amendment. Here, as elsewhere, the Commission is vested with
a large, discretionary, administrative power, and, as a general rule, courts
will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and
reasonable and founded upon a legal right. In the instant case, a large amount
of testimony was, taken upon all of the questions of fact involved. Upon which
the Commissioner found against the petitioner. The Legislature has, in legal
effect, vested the Commissioner with power to fix sailing schedules of ships and
after an exhaustive hearing, the Commissioner found that it would be against the
interests of the public to grant the proposed change in the sailing schedule of
the steamship Venus. We are not prepared to say that the law is
unconstitutional. Neither can we say, as a matter of law, that the findings of
the Commissioner are not sustained by the evidence, or that they were made “in
excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law.”

The writ is denied and the ruling of the Commissioner sustained, without
costs to either party. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm,
Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.