G.R. No. 19290. January 11, 1923

The defendant is accused of the crime of arson. The lower court found the
crime to have been proven, and sentenced the defendant to twelve years and one
day of cadena temporal, with the accessories provided by law, to
indemnify the municipality of Bigaa in the sum of P2,300, and to pay the costs.
The defendant appealed from said judgment and makes six assignments of error, to
wit:

“1. The trial court erred in not allowing the accused time to read the
information on the day of his appearance.

“2. The trial court erred in applying to this cause article 550, first case,
of the Penal Code.

“3. The trial court erred in imposing upon the accused a penalty which is
unconstitutional, being excessive, unusual, and cruel.

“4. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty as principal of the
burning of the school building of Pulongubat, Bigaa.

“5. The trial court erred in not permitting the defense to make certain
questions in the cross-examination which would have shown the lack of
consistency and veracity of the testimony of some witnesses for the
prosecution.

“6. The trial court erred in not permitting the defense to prove certain
facts which would have weakened the prosecution.”

The trial court did not commit any error in refusing to give the accused the
time he applied for to read the information. To what section 19 of General Order
No. 58 refers is to the time to answer the information. Neither did it
err in applying article 550 of the Penal Code in this case, in spite of the fact
that the edifice burnt had not been inaugurated, which was to be used as a
public school. The evidence shows that said edifice had already been delivered
by the contractor to the municipality of Bigaa. What makes a building public is
not its inauguration for the purpose intended, but the fact of the State or any
of its agencies having the title thereto.

We do not find ftie penalty of cadena temporal imposed by the law
(art. 550 of the Penal Code) upon a person convicted of the burning of a public
building to be unconstitutional by reason of being excessive, unusual, and
cruel, when the damage caused exceeds 6,250 pesetas. Taking into
consideration the gravity of the crime, which, as observes the illustrious
commentator Viada, causes devastation, terror, and alarm, and accepting the
considerations made by the trial judge about the grave consequences in the
Philippines of the burning of an edifice used as a public school, we are of the
opinion that the penalty provided by the law is not excessive. Neither is it in
itself unusual and cruel. (U. S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil., 386.)

Turning to the fourth assignment of error, which, according to the appellant,
is the principal basis of his defense, we find the evidence to have established
sufficiently and beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the accused as the
person who set fire to the public school mentioned in the information. The
record shows that the accused was disgusted with the erection of said building
in the barrio of Pulongubat and not in that of Santol of which he was a
resident, or on a place midway between the two barrios; that Eugenio B. Cruz
surprised the appellant in the act of setting fire to said school building, and
Feliciano Gonzalez saw him emerge from a side of the edifice when it was already
burning; that some footprints found in the place where the accused was seen on
the night in question coincide with one of the feet of the accused, with the
circumstance of a finger being lacking from the footprints as well as from said
foot of the appellant.

We find in the record no sufficient reason for not giving credit to the
witnesses for the prosecution who testified to the facts above stated. Nor is
there sufficient evidence that the accused is a victim of political intrigues,
which would justify us in disturbing the findings of fact of the lower
court.

Among the circumstances that the defense discussed in his oral argument
before this court, our attention was specially called to two, namely, the two
pieces of bamboo, Exhibits A and B which, it is contended, should have been
burnt much more than they are, if not totally, which are alleged to have been
used by the accused for raising the burning wick to the eaves of the school
building, the said building having been completely reduced to ashes; and the
footprints which extend to the heel of the foot, which the defense argues cannot
be those of a man who is running, the soles of whose feet do not ordinarily
press upon the ground to their full length, but only their anterior parts, the
heels being raised.

As to the canes Exhibits A and B, their ends exhibit traces of burns. The
witnesses for the prosecution do not positively say that these two canes were
not taken out from the eaves after the setting of the fire. The witness Eugenio
B. Cruz says that he has not seen anybody take them out. (Fols. 13, st. n.) Even
supposing that such canes were left resting upon the eaves of the building, it
was not absolutely impossible for them not to be burnt totally or more than said
Exhibits A and B are. The school building had a nipa roof and wooden walls; the
roof to which fire was set would burn before the rest, and as the canes were
resting on the eaves, they could have fallen to the ground when they lost their
support, the flame, if there was any, extinguished upon their falling, and once
on the ground, which was humid, according to the evidence, they could not have
been burnt either by the fire of their own, or by that of the edifice. It is not
impossible for these canes not to be entirely dry, being, as can be presumed,
the surplus canes of an edifice that had just been terminated.

As to the footprints, also it was not impossible in the instant case for the
full length of the foot of one who was running to be marked on that ground,
which was humid, nor is it impossible for the earth to be loose like that taken
out from the excavations of the posts which are usually spread near them in
buildings thus constructed.

In the last two assignments of error the defense contends that the court
below should not have sustained the objection of the fiscal to certain questions
made by defendant’s counsel. The question put in the cross-examination to the
witness Eugenio B. Cruz was properly disallowed, as unnecessary, as well as the
other one put to Feliciano Gonzalez. As to the question made by the court (fol.
21, st. n.), it does not constitute an abuse of discretion, nor of authority, it
being really, as the Attorney-General says, a question to make the previous one
clear, for it leads one to believe that what was intended to get from the
witness was the reason why the accused was caused to tread upon the footprints
and not whether or not the accused had seen such fact.

We hold that the trial court was right in finding the accused guilty of the
crime of arson and in imposing upon him the penalty provided by article 550 of
the Penal Code.

We find, however, no circumstance whatever modifying the penalty, which must,
therefore, be imposed in its medium degree.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the appellant is
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of cadena temporal,
said judgment being affirmed in all other respects.

The costs shall be taxed against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo,
C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ.,
concur.

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VILLAMOR, J.:

I dissent. In my opinion the evidence does
not prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. It is said that
the pieces of bamboo exhibited at the trial, with burning wicks in their ends,
were placed so as to rest upon the eaves of the school building in order to
initiate the fire. The house was completely burnt, and I do not find in the
record any reason why these canes were saved. As to the footprints, it appears
that the accused was taken twice to the place the day following the fire. Under
such circumstances how can it be affirmed with reasonable certainty that said
footprints on the ground were the footprints on the night of the fire and not on
the first time that the accused was taken there after the fire? I think that the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.