G.R. No. 11068. March 29, 1916

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of  Manila in favor of the plaintiffs requiring:

“Wherefore,  it  is hereby ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff have and recover judgment against the defendant for the sum of PI, 106.45, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum  from the 21st day of October,  1914, the date of the filing  of the complaint in this  case, and for the further sum of P350, with interest at the same rate, from the 5th day of November, 1914.

“It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendant pay to  the  plaintiff  the sum of P50 for each and every month during the period beginning November 1,  1914,  and ending  June 30,  1917,  both dates  inclusive, the monthly payment to  be  made on or before the 5th day of the next succeeding month, and  to  draw interest  at the  rate of 6 per cent per annum from that date until paid.  Upon the occurrence of  any fortuitous event which under existing laws would have  extinguished the obligation on the part  of the defendant to pay  rent under the lease here in question this judgment shall be regarded as satisfied as to the payment not yet due  at the time of the occurrence of the event.”

The case comes to this court on a stipulation of facts in which it appears that, on the 1st day of July, 1913, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff leased to the defendant the premises described therein for a period of four  years from the date of said lease for a monthly rent of P350 payable by the lessee “within the first five days of each following month.”  The lessee entered into possession of the  premises and occupied the same until the 8th day of August, 1914, when he served on the lessor notice in the form  of a letter addressed to him that he had elected to terminate the  lease and that the premises were  at the disposal  of the lessor thenceforth.   The lessee turned the premises over to the lessor’s caretaker notwithstanding the fact “that plaintiff did not  wish  the  surrender of  the premises  and desired  that defendant should  continue  to occupy them  under the lease.”  The letter of the  lessee to the lessor is as follows:

  “Gentlemen: By the terms of agreement entered into between us on July 19, 1913, for lease of building No. 53-55 Plaza McKinley, district of Intramuros, Manila,  the  same has, under the provisions  of the first and tenth sections thereof, automatically lapsed.

“You are hereby notified that I am now prepared to pay the rental of said  building for the month of July,  1914, and for that part of the month of August during which the above-named lease  was in  force  and effect, viz.,  from  the first to fifth day inclusive.”

On the  25th of August, 1914,  the attorney for the lessor called the  attention of the lessee to what he termed  the latter’s breach of the provisions of the lease asking him to reconsider his  determination  to  vacate  the premises and warning him that, in case he continued in his present attitude, the  plaintiff would attempt to rent the  premises  to some other tenant and  would hold the lessee responsible for all  resulting  damage.   On the 27th of  August the lessee replied to this letter stating:

“Your favor of the 25th  inst., with reference to the contract of lease between the  Sres.  Fernandez Hermanos and me, is received.

“I regret my inability to agree with the construction  of the contract  as expressed  by you, and am constrained  to maintain that under its terms as specifically stated, the contract lapsed on August 5, 1914.”

The stipulation of facts states:

“That since the defendant left the premises in  question to the disposition  of the plaintiffs, they tried  to lease the same under the most advantageous conditions possible, and advertised them for rent by notice posted on the premises and by publication in the daily newspapers, the Daily Bulletin and El Comercio from the month of August to the month of October,  1914, and paid for the publication of notice the sum of thirty-seven pesos and  ninety centavos (P37.90).

“That notwithstanding the efforts made  by the plaintiff to lease the premises  under the most advantageous conditions possible, they only succeeded in leasing them to Don Mariano Lim on the 10th day of October, 1914, the contract . of lease to take effect on the 1st day of November of the same year and copy of the contract of lease  is attached hereto marked Exhibit E and made a part hereof, and is the best lease which the plaintiff succeeded in making.”

The stipulation  further says:

“That the defendant has not paid  the  rent beginning with the month of July, 1914, nor the cost of water used upon the premises during the third quarter of the year 1914, which amounts to the sum  of eighteen pesos and fifty-five centavos (P18.55).

“That the  premises were unoccupied from the time that the defendant gave notice of termination of lease  on  the 8th day of August  until the 1st day of November, 1914, at  which  time  they were occupied by  the  present tenant, Don Mariano Lim, and that the plaintiff has received no rent for the premises during that period.

“Parties further agree that the court may  enter judgment upon the foregoing statement of facts without further trial of the issue raised by the pleadings, the parties reserving only the privilege of presenting briefs—the plaintiff, fifteen (15) days from date hereof  and the defendant, fifteen (15) days after the receipt of plaintiff’s brief.”

The appellant bases his whole contention on paragraph 10 of the lease which reads as follows:

“Tenth. Failure on the part of the lessee  to comply with all or any of the terms of this lease, and more particularly of that set forth in paragraph first of this  agreement will cause the rescission of this  lease on the part of the lessor and lessee being thereby obliged to immediately vacate the premises.”

Placing himself upon this paragraph appellant maintains that his failure to  pay rent for the  month of July, 1914, automatically produced under paragraph 10 the rescission of the contract, and released him from the  obligation thereby imposed; and that he was accordingly at liberty to leave the premises any moment thereafter.  We cannot agree with this interpretation of paragraph 10; but are constrained to accept the construction placed thereon by the trial court. Appellant has overlooked not only certain important words in the  paragraph referred to but also  the general principles of law which, in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, prohibit a party from taking advantage of his own wrong.   Appellant seems to have forgotten that  the very first  paragraph of the lease imposes upon him  the obligation to occupy the premises and pay rent for a period of four years from the date of the lease.  This obligation cannot be avoided without the consent of the lessor.  In the absence of a stipulation by the terms of which the lessee could terminate the lease, the provision fixing the duration of the lease at four years  is binding on the lessee and he cannot  legally  escape therefrom.   Paragraph  10 is not a provision by which  the lessee may terminate the lease; it is rather  a provision  whereby  the lessor may  rescind  the contract and collect from the lessee damages resulting from the acts of the lessee which gave the lessor the right to rescind. The paragraph itself provides  that  the  only rescission  which can take place will  be one which proceeds from  the lessor himself and to that end  it disposes  that the lease shall continue in  full force and effect  until  the performance of some act on the part of the lessee which “will cause the rescission of this lease on the part of  the lessor.”  The  lease containing no provision  by which  the lessee  may release himself from  the obligation imposed thereby, any act performed by the lessee which is in violation of its terms is a wrong against the lessor.  Being a wrong the wrongdoer can take no advantage therefrom.   If a person could rescind  an  obligation by the simple act of refusing to  fulfill  it  then  contracts  would be worthless things; and  if one  may take advantage of his own wrong then there is no inducement to do right.

There being no objection  by either party to  the form of the  judgment it is  hereby affirmed,  with costs against the appellant.  So ordered.

Torres, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., dissents.