G.R. No. 9919. March 24, 1916

Elisa Torres de Villanueva applied to the Court of Land Registration  for the  registration  of two parcels of land; one situated in the barrio of Santa Rita of the municipality of Batangas,  Batangas,  contiguous on the north with the land of Damiana Baliuag and Ramon Genato; on the east,. with that of  the said Genato, a creek without name  and the land of Juliana Macatangay; on  the south, with the provincial road leading  to Bauan; and on the west,  with the lands of Leoncio Hernandez, Catalino Bizcocho, Vicente Faraon, and  Ramon Genato; the other parcel, situated in the same town of Batangas, contiguous on the north with Callejon M. Salvador; on the east,  with Calle P. Prieto; on the south, with Callejon M. Natividad and the land of Lino Endaya; and  on the  west, with the land of the said  Endaya and that of Leocadio Arceo.   The first parcel contains 141,932 square meters, and the second,  1,174 square meters. This  application  for registration was opposed by John T. Macleod, as guardian of the property of the incompetent Vicente S. Villanueva,  applicant’s husband, and by  The Standard Oil Company, as Villanueva’s creditor, possessing an executory judgment in its favor.  These objectors aver that the property described in the application belongs to Villanueva.

  The Court of Land  Registration decreed the registration on October  11, 1913; but as a new  trial  was  requested it was granted and, after the rehearing, by a judgment of January 17,  1914,  the  application was denied.  The  applicant  thereupon appealed and is entitled to  have  the evidence reviewed.

  The facts are the following:  On July 6, 1875, Vicente S.  Villanueva  executed in behalf of his future wife, Elisa Torres, a public instrument in  which he promised—”to said Elisa Torres, his future wife, en arras and as a gift propter nuptias 2,000  pesos, which sum he acknowledges is comprised within the tenth part of the unencumbered property he now  holds and, if it is not therein contained, he assigns that amount out of the property belonging to  his mother Dona Josefa del Rosario who has consented to  this assignment and in witness thereof has signed this instrument or, at her (Elisa Torres’)  option,  out of such property as he may  in future acquire in order that  she  (Torres) may enjoy the privilege  conferred by this  kind  of gift or of whichever one may  be more favorable and useful to her, should the marriage to which  she  has agreed take place, she being faithful to him during the same, but  on no other condition, etc.”

Villanueva’s mother, Josefa del Rosario, did  in fact sign this instrument together with him (Exhibit E).

On July 17, 1875, Villanueva and Torres were married to each  other,  and on  October  3, 1877, the former received his share of  his father’s  estate.  Said share  was worth 6,370 pesos 7 reales  and 8 cuartos, and included the Santa Rita land in the municipality of Batangas, the first parcel mentioned in  the application in the  present  case  (Exhibit C).   On March 24, 1884, Villanueva obtained title by com- position with  the state for this land  in  the barrio of Santa Rita  (Exhibit D).

On October 15, 1894, Villanueva executed an instrument on  stamped paper of the period from 1894 to  1896 of  the following tenor:

“That, by virtue of the  gift propter  nuptias by me executed on  March 6, 1875, in  behalf of  my wife, D.a Elisa Torres, a Peninsular Spaniard, a native  of Madrid and a resident of this provincial capital, and I being in lawful possession of certain lands  inherited  from my  deceased parents, D. Gregorio Villanueva and D.a Josefa  Rosario; and having no money at present wherewith  to pay said debt of two thousand pesos  in cash, which is  the amount of said gift, I have  determined to grant and convey to my said wife, D.a Elisa Torres, the ownership and full control of a  parcel of agricultural land  situated in the barrio of Santa Rita within the limits of this provincial capital (here follows a description of the land).   I also cede to my said wife, on account of my said debt, a building  lot situated in this town,  the area and boundaries of which are shown in its title deeds and on which our dwelling house stands, etc.”   (Exhibit F.)

  Together with these documents the application for registration was filed.   The trial court, weighing the probatory value of the last document (Exhibit F), said that it had been proven beyond doubt, at the hearing, that said instrument was authentic and bore the signature  of Vicente  S. Villanueva, written therein on the same date the instrument was executed; that  the private  instrument  (Exhibit  F) was not one of a gift between  husband and wife, but was a conveyance of land in behalf of the applicant, Elisa Torres, by her husband in satisfaction and fulfillment of a contract, propter nuptias, and, in the opinion of the court, was valid. The court proceeded to  cite articles 1327 to 1333 of the Civil Code in support of his opinion.  The oppositions were therefore overruled.

  Said court  reiterates these same considerations in his last judgment, now on appeal; but he took into account article 1458 of the Civil Code and the fact that said two parcels of land, the subject matter  of the  application, had  been  attached by the objector, The Standard Oil Company; hence the oppositions were  finally sustained, the court saying, however, that “although she was for  many years in possession of the lands in question, the  court  cannot  rule that with respect to her husband she held them adversely, in a public and notorious manner and in face of all the world.”

  But there  is no proof whatever that the two parcels of land, the subject matter of the application,  were  attached by  The Standard Oil Company, nor by any  person whomsoever.  The only evidence on this point to be found in  the record is a writ of execution in behalf of  The Standard Oil Company for the sum of P1,521.25, issued on February 15, 1910, but there  is no evidence to  show  that this writ was carried  into effect by the levy  upon any  real or personal property belonging to Vicente S.  Villanueva by  the sheriff.  Exactly the contrary appears  in the record of case No. 8642 recently decided by us  (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Babasa, ante, p. 354), to wit, that the two parcels of land in the present proceedings were not attached because the judgment creditor was unwilling to give bond.  Though it is not shown that this writ was executed, it is enough to consider that there is  no proof  that the  lands  were attached,  for a writ of execution issued for the purpose of attaching property is not proof that  any given  property was in fact attached.

  Other evidence presented as proof is the  right claimed by John T. Macleod  (as “special guardian of the incompetent Vicente S. Villanueva  for the special  purpose of selling any property which he might be able to find belonging to said Villanueva in order to pay the latter’s debts and obligations”) to sell the two parcels of land now in question and announce  their  sale,  a claim which  was opposed by  the applicant; but it does not follow from this fact that  these lands have been attached, or that in any manner they have become so liable for any obligation on the part of Vicente S. Villanueva that they may be sold.   J. T. Macleod’s  claim was filed in the  proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for Vicente S. Villanueva, not in  any action to oppose the ownership of the two parcels of  land, a  matter which is only now brought into question.

  So that the idea of said two parcels of  land being attached is erroneous.

  Neither can the judgment appealed  from find support in the provisions  of  article 1458 of the  Civil Code, which prohibit the husband and the wife reciprocally from selling property to each other, except in cases where a separation of their property has been agreed upon,  or where a judicial separation of the said property has been decreed.   Pursuant to the first of the transient  provisions of the Civil Code, “Rights arising under  the legislation preceding  this code shall be governed by said preceding legislation, even  when this  code  regulates them in another  manner or does not recognize the same.”

  The pledge  (arras)  or nuptial  gift offered,  and subsequently fulfilled or made by Vicente S. Villanueva to  his future wife, does not come within the scope of  the  Civil Code which was not then (in 1875) in  force, but is governed by the laws in force at that time.  Escriche defines the word arras as: “That which is given as a sign of betrothal and in pledge of the future marriage,” or,  as  said in  Law  I, Title 11, of the  Fourth Partida: “Pledge that is given between parties that the promised marriage will take place.” “Among ourselves,” he continues, “the husband may give a pledge (arras) to the wife and also the wife to the husband or it may be given by  their parents in guaranty of the projected marriage, as may be seen by Law 84, Title 18, of the Third Partida, and Law 1, Title 11, of the Fourth Partida.  The pledge (arras) may consist of money, or of real or personal property.   (Law 84, Title  18, Third Partida, supra).  The arras must be really and  actually delivered because it is a sort of contract of pledge, as ‘a pledge given’ etc., according to Law  1, Title 11, of the Fourth Partida. This gift or promise may be made before or after the cele- bration of the marriage, for it is not a simple gift, but a gift propter nuptias, as declared by  Antonio Gomez (in Law 50 of Toro, No. 12)  and Covarrubias (part 2, On Marriage, Chapter 3, par. 7, No. 14), and this distinction is observed in pratice.  The amount of the pledge (arras) cannot exceed one-tenth of the present or future unencumbered property of the husband  who gives or promises the pledge (Laws  1 and 2, Title 2, Book 3, of the Fuero Real, and Law 50 of Toro, which  is  Law 1, Title 3, Book 10, of the Novlsima Recopilacion).  The excess may be claimed by  the donor or his heirs according to said Law 1, Title 2, Book 3, of the Fuero Real.”

  Gutierrez y Fernandez, the renowned author of the work on Codes or Fundamental Studies  on Spanish Civil Law which were taught  for so many years in the Santo Tomas University, says:

   “As the preceding law speaks of delivered pledges (arras) Law 2 (of Title 11 of the Fourth Partida,  above-mentioned) deals with promised pledges.  ‘If anyone  should be so poor at the time of his marriage as not to have anything  where- with to give an arras, and should promise  to give it from what he might afterwards earn, we order that whenever she (the wife) shall demand of her husband that he deliver the pledge that he promised he shall deliver it to her, provided that he shall not give  her more than one-tenth of what he may have at the time  the pledge is demanded of him.’  If the husband  (he continues) proffers a certain amount as a pledge, with the statement that it is contained in his present property  or,  when not so contained,  if he assigns  such amount out of the property he may acquire in the future, the offer is valid, provided that the sum pledged does not exceed one-tenth of his property  *   *  *  if  the law is strictly complied with, no  difficulties will arise:  *   *  *   what is given or offered, whether taken from the owner’s present property or whether from  that which  may be acquired up to the day of the delivery, must not exceed one- tenth of such property.”

  What was effected in 1894  by  means  of the  document executed on stamped paper, in accordance with Law 84, Title 18, of the Third Partida,  is not therefore, a simple  gift, but a gift propter nuptias; it was not  a  sale made by the husband to the wife, but was the  fulfillment of  the pledge promised in 1875, all in conformity with the laws in force, but the provisions of the Civil Code in no wise apply thereto. Therefore, neither in 1875, nor in  1894, could the husband and  wife  have intended to defraud any  creditor, for the record does not show that they then had any creditor. The judgment appealed from is reversed, without special finding as to coats.  The registration applied for shall be made.   So ordered.

Torres,  Moreland, and Araullo,  JJ.. concur.
Trent, J., reserved his vote.