G. R. No. 3556. July 13, 1907

From the record the following facts appear:

(1) That on the 28th day of January, 1905, the acting provincial treasurer of the Province of Pampanga issued to one S. S. McVey, a certificate of tax sale for certain land sold at a tax sale in said Province of Pampanga.
 
 (2) On the 10th day of August,  1906, the said S. S. McVey,  assigned the  said certificate of tax sale  to the plaintiff herein.
 
 (3) On the  13th day of September,  1906, the plaintiff herein filed a petition in this  court, praying that  a writ of mandamus be  issued against the  defendant herein, as treasurer of said Province of Pampanga, to compel  him to issue to the plaintiff a tax deed to the lands described in said certificate of tax sale.
 
 (4) On the  30th  day of October, 1906, the Attorney-General of  the  Philippine Islands, representing the said treasurer, filed a demurrer to said petition for mandamus, upon the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, specifically stating the reasons therefor. Said demurrer was heard by this court on the 12th day of November, 1906.

The question presented is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a writ of mandamus under the provisions of law in force in the Philippine  Islands.   It is the general rule that a  writ of mandamus will not lie against a corporation,  board, or officer  to compel  him or them to perform any specific duty unless, such duty is clearly defined by the law or by virtue of an official duty or relation.
 
Section 80 of the Municipal Code (Act No. 82) provides: “In case the taxpayer shall not redeem the land sold as above provided within  one year from the date of sale, the provincial treasurer, or his deputy,  in  the name of such treasurer, shall, as grantor,  execute  a deed in  form and effect sufficient under the laws of the Islands to convey to the purchaser so much  of the land against which the taxes have been assessed as has been  sold, free from alliens of any kind whatsoever, and the deeds shall succinctly recite all the proceedings upon which the validity  of the  sale depends.”
   
It will be noted from the above provision  of the said Municipal Code, that the treasurer or his deputy shall execute the deed, under the provisions of said Municipal Code,  to  the  purchaser.   The plaintiff herein is the assignee of the purchaser.   The law gave  to the purchaser at the tax sale alone,  the right to have the deed executed to him.   The law made no provision to have the said tax deed issued to the assignee of the purchaser.  This provision of the said Municipal Code seems to have been taken from section 489 of the Statutes of the  State of Vermont,  and the courts of that  State have held, together with nearly all the States of the Union,  that every  statute which provides a method by which a person  may be divested of his property  under a  special authority, must  be construed strictly.
 
 In the case of Thatcher vs. Powell (6 Wheaton, 119,123) the Supreme Court of the United States said:

“That no individual or public officer can sell and convey a good title to  the land of another, unless authorized so to do by express law, is one of those self-evident propositions to which the  mind assents without hesitation; and that the person invested with such a power must pursue with precision the course prescribed by law, or 7m act is invalid is a principal which has  been repeatedly recognized in this court.”

And again in  the case  of Alexander vs. Savage (90 Ala.,383) the Supreme Court of  Alabama held:

“A tax deed made to one substituted  for the purchaser, or to any grantee other than the  one  sanctioned by  the statute, is void.  The, statutory authority to convey must be strictly pursued and  the deed made only to those to whom  he  is authorized  by law to execute it;  (Keen  vs. Houghton, 19  Maine, 368.)”

The  law in  the present case required the  defendant to execute the deed to the purchaser under  the tax sale.  The demurrer  is therefore hereby sustained and the plaintiff  is hereby given ten days from the notice of this decision within which  to  amend  his complaint, or otherwise the case  will be dismissed with costs to  the plaintiff.   So ordered.
 
 Arellano, C. J., Torres, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.