G.R. No. 2108. December 19, 1905

Margarita
Jose, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, died in the city
of Amoy, China, on the 4th of February, 1902. Her last will was duly
proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on the 15th
day of April, 1902, and on the same day Engracio Palanca was duly
appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased. He entered upon
the discharge of his duties as such administrator, and is still engaged
therein. As far as appears from the bill of exceptions the estate still
remains unsettled, and no final decree has ever been entered therein.

By her said will Margarita Jose left all her property, amounting to over 50,000 pesos, to her two children, Vicente Barreto, alias Tan-Keng, and Benito Carlos, alias
Doon. On the 8th day of July, 1902, Juana Pimentel, the mother of said
Margarita Jose, commenced this, an ordinary action, in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, alleging that the two children of Margarita
Jose were illegitimate, and that she was the heir at law and entitled
to the whole estate. The prayer of the original complaint was that the
plaintiff be declared the lawful heir and entitled to all the property
of her daughter, Margarita Jose.

The defendant named in this
original complaint was the “Estate of Dona Margarita Jose.” The summons
in the action was served upon the administrator, Engracio Palanca. He
appeared and demurred, on the ground, among others, that there was a
defect of parties, and that the two sons should have been made
defendants. This demurrer was overruled. He took an exception to the
overruling of the demurrer, and answered, denying generally the facts
stated in the complaint. A trial was had in the Court of First
Instance, and judgment was entered in favor of th defendant on the 28th
of July, 1903, the court holding that Vicente Barreto was the
legitimate son of Margarita Jose Plaintiff made a motion for a new
trial, which was granted on the 15th day of September, 1903. On the 22d
day of January, 1904, the plaintiff presented an amended complaint,
naming as defendants Engracio Palanca, as administrator of the estate
of Margarita Jose, and Benito Carlos and Vicente Barreto. The prayer of
that complaint is as follows :

“Por todo lo expuesto la demandante pide al Juzgado:

“(a) Que la Iegalizacion de dicho testamento sea revocada y anulada;

“(b) Que la institucion de los demandados Vicente barreto alias Tan-Keng y Benito Carlos alias Doon como herederos en dicho testamento sea declarada nula por razon de la pretericion de un heredero forzoso.

“(c)
Que la demandante sea declarada heredera de tres cuartas partes de los
bienes de los cuales era duena la citada Margarita Jose al tiempo de su
fallecimiento.

“(d) Que el nombramiento de
administrador conferido por virtud del auto del Juzgado a favor del
demandado Engracio Palanca sea anulado;

“(e) Que el
demandado Engracio Palanca como tal administrador sea requerido a
rendir cuentas de su administracion y a depositar en el Juzgado todo el
dinero que tenga en su poder perteneciente a los herederos de la citada
difunta;

“(f) Que el Juzgado conceda a la demandante cualquier otro remedio adecuado y equitativo.”

The
defendants all answered the amended complaint. A trial was had in the
court below, and on the 7th of April, 1904, judgment was entered in
favor of the defendants. The court held that Vicente Barreto was the
legitimate son of Margarita Jose; that Benito Carlos was an
illegitimate son, and that Margarita Jose had a right to bequeath her
property to these sons to the exclusion of the plaintiff. He held also
that the plaintiff, not having appealed from the probate of the will,
could not maintain this action.

We think that judgment should be entered for the defendants, but not upon the ground stated in the decision of the court below.

The
will of Margarita Jose was made and she died after the present Code of
Civil Procedure went into effect in these Islands. Her will was duly
proved and allowed under the provisions of that code. An administrator
was duly appointed and he is now engaged in settling the affairs of the
estate. The important question in this case is, Can an ordinary action
at law be maintained under these circumstances by a person claiming to
be an heir of the deceased against other persons, also claiming to be
such heirs, for the purpose of having their rights in the estate
determined? We think that such an action is inconsistent with the
provisions of the new code, and that it can not be maintained. Section
600 of the present Code of Civil Procedure provides that the will of an
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands shall be proved and his estate
settled in the Court of First Instance in which he resided at the time
of his death. By section 641 when a will is proved it is obligatory
upon the court to appoint an executor or administrator. By virtue of
other provisions of the code this executor or administrator has, under
the direction of the court, the full administration and control of the
deceased’s property, real and personal, until a final decree is made in
accordance with section 753. During the period of administration the
heirs, devisees, and legatees have no right to interfere with the
administrator or executor in the discharge of his duties. They have no
right, without his consent, to the possession of any part of the
estate, real or personal. The theory of the present system is that the
property is all in the hands of the court, and must stay there until
the affairs of the deceased are adjusted and liquidated, and then the
net balance is turned over to the persons by law entitled to it. For
the purpose of such administration and distribution there is only one
proceeding in the Court of First Instance. That proceeding is not an
action at law, but falls under Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and is a special proceeding. After the estate is fully settled, and all
the debts and expenses of administration are paid, the law contemplates
that there shall be a hearing or trial in this proceeding in the Court
of First Instance for the purpose of determining who the parties are
that are entitled to the estate in the hands of the executor or
administrator for distribution, and after such hearing or trial it is
made the duty of the court to enter a decree or final judgment, in
which decree, according to section 753, the court “shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, and in its
order the court shall name the persons and proportions or parts to
which each is entitled.” (See also sec. 782 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.) By section 704 it is expressly provided that no action
shall be maintained by an heir or devisee against an executor or
administrator for the recovery of the possession or ownership of lands
until there is a decree of the court assigning such lands to such heir
or devisee, or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.

It
seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is
being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding,
no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other
court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or
against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of having
the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined. The very purpose
of the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and
determine those questions, and until they are settled and determined in
that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present
one can be maintained.

An examination of the prayer of the
amended complaint above quoted will show that to grant it would be to
prevent the settlement of the estate of a deceased person in one
proceeding in the Court of First Instance. It would require, in the
first place, the revocation of the judgment probating the will. This
relief can not be obtained in an ordinary action. The plaintiff not
having appealed from the order admitting the will to probate, as she
had a right to do, that order is final and conclusive. It does not,
however, as the court below held, determine that the plaintiff is not
entitled to any part of the estate. The effect of such a decree was
stated in the case of Castaneda vs. Alemany^[1] (2
Off. Gaz., 366). The statements there made need not be repeated here.
The plaintiff in her amended complaint asks also that the appointment
of Engracio Palanca be annulled. This relief can not be granted in an
ordinary action. The plaintiff had a right to appeal from the order of
the court appointing the administrator in this case, and not having
exercised that right such order is final and conclusive against her.
The plaintiff also asks that the administrator be required to render an
account to her of his administration, and deposit in court the money
which he has in his possession. To grant this relief in an ordinary
action between parties would be to take away from the court having in
charge the settlement of the estate the express powers conferred upon
it by law. To grant that part of the prayer of the amended complaint
which asks that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to
three-fourths of the property of the estate, would be to take away from
the court administering the estate the power expressly given to it by
section 753 to determine that question in the proceeding relating to
the estate.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and after the
expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance
herewith and the case remanded to the court below, with instructions to
dismiss the same, with costs, but without prejudice to the right of the
plaintiff to present her claims in the special proceeding relating to
the administration of the estate, when the final decree is made therein
under section 753. No costs will be allowed in this court. So ordered.

Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] 3 Phil. Rep., 426.

---

CONCURRING

ARELLANO, C. J., and MAPA, J., :

In view of sections 753 and 782, we agree with the preceding opinion on the ground therein set forth:

“While
the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special
proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in
any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the
executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose
of having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined.”

The
purpose of this concurring opinion is to reserve the question as to any
other action in connection with the settlement of such estates not
instituted during the period of administration but independently and
which may relate to rights to any part thereof, especially the action
for distribution which differs from the action of partition.