G.R. No. 1556. December 07, 1905

On the 13th day of November, 1899, the appellant, Joaquin Lafont,
was the owner of an undivided half of the building known as the
Philippine Theater, in Manila, and the appellee, Maria Yia Pascasio,
was the owner of the other half. On the day named these parties made a
contract, the seventh, eighth, and ninth clauses of which are as
follows:

“7. Don Antonio de Elizalde e Isusi en nombre de Don
Joaquin Lafont y Pon vende en este acto a Dona Maria Yia Pascasio en el
concepto de libre de toda carga y gravamen la expresada mitad del
edificio denominado ‘Teatro Filipino,’ que queda deslindado en el
parrafo primero de este documento por precio de mil pesos que recibe en
este acto de manos de la compradora a mi presencia y a la de los
testigos instrumentales por lo que yo el notario de ello doy fe, el
efectivo metalico y a su entera satisfaccion por lo que, formaliza a su
favor la carta de pago mas firme y eficaz que a su derecho y seguridad
convenga obligando a su mandante el saneamiento con arreglo a derecho.

“8.
Que esta venta se otorga con el pacto o condicion de que el vendedor
Sr. Lafont o sus herederos y sucesores, devuelven a la compradora o los
suyos en el termino de seis meses contados desde. el 31 de Octubre
ultimo a cuya fecha retrotraen los efectos de esta escritura los mil
pesos, precio de la presente venta, podran retraer o recomprar la mitad
o participacion vendida de dicho edificio, pero no asi, si dejare
transcurrir el indicado plazo sin hacer uso del derecho de retracto que
por esta clausula se reserva, pues que en este caso adquirira esta
venta el caracter absoluto e” irrevocable.

“9. Es asimismo
condicion convenida la de que durante el termino fijado para la
condicion resolutoria las utilidades o rendimientos producidos por la
mitad o participacion vendida por este documento, seran para el
vendedor Don Joaquin Lafont y Pon y sus herederos, a cuyo efecto le
debera ser entregada por la compradora o los suyos.”

On the 25th of April, 1900, the plaintiff caused to be delivered to
the defendant, by means of a notary public, a letter, a copy of which
is as follows:

“Muy Distinguida Sra. Mia : Estando proximo el dia
fijado para el vencimiento del plazo, por virtud del cual tengo derecho
a recomprar la participacion en el edificio denominado ‘Teatro
Filipino’ que le vendi con el pacto de retro, por medio de mi apoderado
en 31 de Octubre del ano ultimo, y deseando adquirir de nuevo mi dicha
participacion utilizando al efecto aquel derecho, pongo en su
conocimiento que desde esta fecha tengo a su disposicion mil pesos que
satisfizo como precio y que habre” de entregar tan pronto como otorgue
a mi favor la correspondiente escritura de retroventa, para lo cual se
servira entregar al notario que esta carta le presente o al que tenga a
bien designar el documento necesario al objeto de que por 61 se proceda
a la redaccion de la escritura de referenda.”

To this defendant answered as follows:

“Muy Sr. Mio: Contesto la suya fecha 25 de los
corrientes que me fue” entregada por acta notarial. Estoy pronta a
revender a V. su participacion en el ‘Teatro Filipino’ pero la recompra
en los terminos que expresa su dicha carta es un imposible al cual no
puedo acceder en forma alguna.”

On the next day, the 26th of April, the plaintiff; caused to be delivered to the defendant a letter which is in part as follows:

“Muy Distinguida Senora Mia: De conformidad con lo
que en mi anterior carta la manifesto, tengo el gusto de anunciarle que
los mil pesos a que en la misma me referi y que tengo que entregarle
como precio de la participacion que he de recomprar en el edificio
denominado Teatro Filipino,’ se hallan depositados en poder del notario
que esta carta le entregue, a fin de que, a su vez se los entregue tan
pronto como firme a mi favor la correspondiente escritura de
retroventa.”

The answer of the defendant to this letter is as follows:

“Muy Sr. Mio: Contesto a la suya de esta misma fecha
que me ha sido entregada por acta notarial. Reproduzco en esta ani
anterior fechada ayer insistiendo en todo su contenido. En orden a la
segunda parte de su carta de esta fecha, debo de manifestarle que,
duena actualmente en absolute, del edificio ‘Teatro Filipino,’no me
explico pueda V. pretender lo que en dicha carta pretende; pues le
supongo a V. enterado de sus derechos y deberes.”

On the 30th, day of April, 1900, plaintiff deposited 1,000 pesos in
the Court of First Instance as the sum required to be paid by him under
the contract. He brought this action on the 7th of October, 1902, and
in his complaint asked the court to declare, among other things, that
his right to repurchase the property under the terms of the contract
still existed, and that the defendant be required to render an account
of the profits of the theater from the 1st day of March, 1899, to the
time when the property should be resold to the plaintiff. The court
below decided that the only relief to which the plaintiff was entitled
was to an accounting from October, 1899, to April, 1900, as provided in
clause 9, and that he had lost the right to repurchase the one-half
interest in the property. The plaintiff has brought the case here by
bill of exceptions.

The contract of pacto de retro is denned, and the
obligations of the parties thereto are stated, in articles 1507 to 1520
of the Civil Code. The agreement which the parties to this suit made on
the 13th day of November, 1899, is a contract of pacto de retro,
as the same is denned in said articles. It is so called in clause 8,
above quoted. The rights and obligations of the parties must be
determined by a reference to said articles.

It is claimed by the defendant that the plaintiff was required to
deliver the money to the defendant, and she was entitled to receive it
before she was under any obligation to execute a deed. In other words,
that the payment must precede the execution of the deed. This is based
upon the words used in the eighth clause, which the defendant claims
indicate that the money must be returned before the right to reclaim
the property arises. The language used, however, in this particular
contract does not differ from that used in other contracts of a similar
nature which have come before us, and the question raised by the claim
of the defendant is whether in a contract of pacto de retro
the acts of paying the money and executing the deed are simultaneous,
or whether the former must precede the latter. Title IV of Book IV of
the Civil Code relates to the contract of purchase and sale, and the
provisions above cited with reference to an agreement of pacto de retro
are found in chapter 6 of this title. The general laws governing
contracts of purchase and sale were undoubtedly intended to apply to an
agreement of this character. In a contract of purchase and sale the
seller is not required to deliver the thing sold until the price is
paid, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary (art. 1466).
Neither is the purchaser bound to pay the price before the article is
delivered to him (art. 1500.), and we hold in this case that the
payment of the price and the execution of the deed of resale were
simultaneous acts, and that the plaintiff was not required to deliver
the money in advance of the execution of the deed.

The question remains whether the plaintiff did all that he was
required by law to do in order to preserve the rights secured to Him by
the contract. Article 1518, which defines the obligations of the
seller, is as follows:

“The vendor can not exercise the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and furthermore:

“1. The expenses of the contract and any other legitimate payment made by reason of the sale.

“2. The useful and necessary expenses incurred by the thing sold.”

In regard to the payment of the money the plaintiff did all that the
law required him to do. He offered to pay it to the defendant, and
deposited it in the hands of the notary for her.

The defendant in her brief states that repairs exceeding 10,000
pesos in value were made upon the theater, one-half of which the
plaintiff was required to pay before he was entitled to repurchase the
property. But in her answer she did not allege that any such repairs
had been made. Neither in her letter of the 25th of April nor in her
letter of the 26th did she so state. The judgment of the court below
makes no finding upon that subject. Whether any evidence was offered in
the court below in regard to this matter we do not know, for the bill
of exceptions does not contain any of the proof presented at the trial,
except certain documents relating to the ownership of the building.
There is therefore nothing before us to show that any repairs had been
made, and the plaintiff was therefore under no obligation, so far as
this case shows, to pay the defendant anything on that account.

In regard to the expenses of the contract of repurchase, it was not
necessary that the plaintiff should make any tender of this amount to
the defendant. It would be his duty under the law to pay the notary the
fees due to him in this respect. It appears, moreover, that the
plaintiff provided a notary and placed him at the disposition of the
defendant.

It is not necessary to decide the question as to whether the six
months mentioned in the contract expired on the 30th day of April, as
claimed by the plaintiff, or on the 28th day of April, as claimed by
the defendant, for the plaintiff, on the 25th and 26th of April, did
all that the law required him to do to preserve his rights to
repurchase the property.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and after the
expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance
herewith, and the case remanded, with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, with costs, declaring that he has a right to
repurchase the property sold by him by virtue of the contract of the
13th of November, 1899, by paying 1,000 pesos and the expenses
attendant upon the execution of the contract of resale, and requiring
the defendant to render an account, as provided in clause 9 of the
contract, from the 31st day of October, 1899, to the time when the deed
of resale of the property by the defendant to the plaintiff shall be
executed. No costs will be allowed in this court. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.