G.R. No. 2520. May 01, 1905

On the 15th day of February, 1905, a complaint charging Harry J.
Collins with theft was filed in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila. This complaint alleged that the theft was committed in the
Province of Rizal, within 200 yards of the city of Manila and within
the police jurisdiction of said city. Upon this complaint the defendant
was arrested on the 21st day of February, 1905.

On the 1st day of March, 1905, Collins presented in the Court of
First Instance a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that the
place where the crime was alleged to have been committed was not within
the jurisdiction of the court. On the 13th day of March the court below
entered an order overruling the demurrer. Collins was then required to
plead to the complaint, which he refused to do, and the court ordered a
plea of not guilty to be entered and set the case down for trial for
the 24th day of March.

On the 25th day of March Collins presented in this court his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
and he claims that the court below can not try him for the offense set
out in the complaint because it was committed outside the jurisdiction
of that court.

It will thus be seen that the petitioner, by means of a writ of habeas corpus,
is attempting to obtain in this court a review of the order of the
lower court overruling his demurrer. From this order the defendant had
no right to appeal directly to this court in advance of final judgment.
(Fuster vs. Johnson, 1 Phil. Rep., 670.) He is seeking to avoid this provision of the law by using a writ of habeas corpus.

In In re Chapman (156 U. S., 211) the court said, at page 215:

“The general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus
will not issue unless the court, under whose warrant the petitioner is
held, is without jurisdiction, and that it can not be used to correct
errors. * * * Ordinarily the writ will not lie where there is a remedy
by writ of error or appeal. * * * Yet in rare and exceptional cases it
may be issued although such remedy exists.”

This same statement is repeated in In re Belt (159 U. S., 95).

The petitioner should have proceeded with the trial of the cause in
the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him he can
then appeal, and upon such appeal present the question which he is now
seeking to have decided.

In the case of Cook vs. Hart (146 U. S., 183) the court said, at page 195:

“The party charged waives no defect of jurisdiction
by submitting to a trial of his case upon the merits, and we think that
comity demands that the State courts, under whose process he is held,
and which are equally with the Federal courts charged with the duty of
protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his constitutional rights,
should be appealed to in the first instance. Should such rights be
denied, his remedy in the Federal court will remain unimpaired.”

In the case before us this court is asked to exercise not its appellate but its original jurisdiction in habeas corpus.
In the exercise of its original jurisdiction it has no more power,
except as to territorial limits, than any judge of the Court of First
Instance. If we pass upon the merits of this case it would have been
the duty of a judge of the latter court to have done so had this
petition been presented to him instead of to us. If the petition had
thus been presented to one of the judges of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, that judge in deciding it would be sitting as a court of
appeal over a decision rendered by a judge of the same rank. If the
petitioner were unsuccessful before the first judge, he could apply in
succession to the other two judges of that court for the same relief.

Moreover, if such relief can be asked when the trial court has
overruled a demurrer, we know of no reason why it could not be asked
when, during the progress of the trial, any ruling adverse to the
defendant is made upon any objection which he may claim would make the
judgment rendered in the case absolutely void. The contests between the
judges that might arise under such circumstances and the delays that
would be occasioned to a trial actually in progress by such proceedings
can readily be imagined. A seemly and orderly conduct of the business
of the trial courts forbids the adoption of any practice that would
lead to such results.

We have no hesitation in saying that when a prisoner charged with a
criminal offense has been brought before a court of general
jurisdiction and that court has made a decision upon any point, whether
jurisdictional or otherwise, no other court or judge, except in very
special cases, should issue or hear a writ ot habeas corpus for the purpose of deciding upon the correctness of such a ruling.

That a court or judge is not bound to pass upon the merits of the petition in such cases is well settled.

The case of Chapman above cited was very similar to this case.
Chapman had been indicted in the supreme court of the District of
Columbia for a criminal offense. He demurred to the indictment on the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction to try him. That court
overruled the demurrer. From the order overruling the demurrer Chapman
appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the order and remanded
the case to the trial court, with directions that the defendant be
required to plead to the indictment and that the court proceed with the
case. Thereupon Chapman presented a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
to the Supreme Court of the United States. That court applied the same
rule to proceedings pending in the courts of the District of Columbia
or in the circuit courts that it had previously applied to proceedings
pending in the State courts, and said, page 217:

“In the case before us, the question as to the jurisdiction of the
supreme court of the District of Columbia has indeed already been
passed upon by that court, and also by the court of appeals, upon a
demurrer to the indictment, but the case has not gone to final judgment
in either court and what the result of a trial may be can not be
assumed. We are impressed with the conviction that the orderly
administration of justice will be better subserved by our declining to
exercise appellate jurisdiction in the mode desired until the
conclusion of the proceedings. If judgment goes against the petitioner
and is affirmed by the court of appeals and a writ of error lies, that
is the proper and better remedy for any cause of complaint he may have.”

In the case of Cook vs. Hart, above cited, the court said, at page 195:

“While the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to State
courts, which are proceeding in disregard of rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, may exist, the practice of
exercising such power before the question has been raised or determined
in the State court is one which ought not to be encouraged.”

At page 194 the court said: “While the Federal courts have the power
and may discharge the accused in advance of his trial, if he is
restrained of his liberty in violation of the Federal Constitution or
laws, they are not bound to exercise such power even after a State
court has finally acted upon the case, but may, in their discretion,
require the accused to sue out his writ of error from the highest court
of the State or even from the Supreme Court of the United States.”

The writ of habeas corpus heretofore granted in this
proceeding is vacated and the prisoner is remanded to the custody of
the Warden of Bilibid Prison. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.

---

DISSENTING

JOHNSON, J.:

This was an application for the writ of habeas corpus. It
alleged, among other things, “that the petitioner is held in custody by
virtue of a pretended order of commitment signed by the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; that said order was
issued without warrant and authority of law; that on or about the 15th
day of February, 1905, a complaint was lodged with the Hon. John C.
Sweeney, judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
pretending to charge the petitioner with the offense of larceny; that
upon said complaint the petitioner was arrested; that said complaint
charged the alleged offense of larceny to have been committed at El Deposito,
in the Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, something like 200 yards
from the actual limits of the city of Manila and within the police
jurisdiction of said city; that said Deposito is not within
the actual limits of the city of Manila and is not within the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila;
that on the 1st day of March, 1905, the petitioner was brought before
the Hon. John C. Sweeney, judge of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila, for trial upon said complaint. The petitioner declined
to plead and filed a demurrer to the jurisdiction of said court; that
on the 13th day of March, 1905, said court entered an order overruling
said demurrer; and the petitioner, still protesting against the
jurisdiction of said court, declined to plead to said complaint,
whereupon the court ordered a plea of not guilty to be entered for him
and set the case for trial March 24, 1905.”

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was presented in this court on or about the 25th day of March, 1905.

The majority opinion filed in the cause refuses to consider the
question whether or not the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the
said cause against the said Collins, alleging that this court will not
grant the writ of habeas corpus except under special conditions.

I agree with the doctrine that the writ of habeas corpus
should never be granted except under special conditions. But when a
defendant is brought before a court and he claims that the court has no
jurisdiction to try him for the reason that the offense was not
committed within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the
court, and squarely raises that question before said inferior court,
these facts present special conditions justifying an application for
the writ of habeas corpus. Or, to say the least, this court
ought to examine the question for the purpose of determining whether or
not such inferior court has or has not jurisdiction in the case. The
complaint filed against the petitioner in this cause “alleged that the
defendant had committed the crime of larceny in the Province of Rizal,
Philippine Islands, something like 200 yards from the actual limits of
the city of Manila and within the police jurisdiction of said city.” To
this complaint a demurrer was presented and overruled. The question of
the jurisdiction of the inferior court to try the defendant was thus
directly raised.

The question presented is, Have the Courts of First Instance of the
city of Manila jurisdiction over offenses committed in the Province of
Rizal, a territory outside the actual limits of the city of Manila but
within what is generally known as the territory over which the city of
Manila attempts to exercise jurisdiction for police purposes only? I
express no opinion upon the question whether or not the courts of
Manila have jurisdiction over offenses committed within this police
zone. I simply desire to state that it was the duty of this court to
examine into the question and to decide once for all whether or not
said courts had actual jurisdiction over offenses committed in such
zone. This question has been pending in the Courts of First Instance of
Manila, to my certain knowledge, for more than two years. The Courts of
First Instance have been embarrassed by reason of the fact that the
Supreme Court has never passed upon the question. This case presented
the issue squarely, and I claim the court should have at least
considered it.

A defendant, after having raised the question of the jurisdiction of
the inferior court to try him, alleging that the crime was not
committed within the territorial limits of the court, and the inferior
court has decided against him, has a perfect right by means of the writ
of habeas corpus to present that same question to the Supreme
Court at once, without being compelled to go through a long and
expensive trial. For example: Suppose the complaint in this case had
alleged that the crime with which the defendant was charged had been
committed in the Province of Pangasinan, a province far removed from
the city of Manila, and he had raised the question of the lack of
territorial jurisdiction of the courts of the city of Manila to try him
and the court had resolved this question against him, and he then had
presented an application for the writ of habeas corpus to
this court. This example presents exactly the same question presented
in the petition in this case, the only difference being that the
province in which the offense in alleged to have been committed in our
example is further removed from the city of Manila than the case which
we have actually before us. If the majority opinion contains the true
doctrine, then this court under the example supposed would refuse to
consider the question at all, holding that there were no special
circumstances and therefore the application should be denied. I can not
give my consent to this doctrine.

The majority opinion holds that at the termination of the trial, if
the defendant still insists upon having the question of the
jurisdiction of the court to try him settled, he may then appeal. But
why submit him to the embarrassment and expense of a long trial if the
fact exists that the court has no jurisdiction to try him?

Suppose, for instance, that in the example above given this court
refuses to consider the question whether or not the inferior court had
jurisdiction and denies the application for the writ of habeas corpus
and remands the defendant to the court below to be tried. He submits
himself to the trial, and is convicted. He appeals to this court and
presents as one of the grounds of appeal the fact that the court below
had no territorial jurisdiction. How long would it take this court to
decide that question under the example supposed? The court certainly
would hold, under the example supposed, that the court had no
jurisdiction and would remand the defendant to the proper court to be
tried again. The defendant would then be under the necessity of
undergoing another expensive trial.

I maintain that this court should have examined the question
presented by the petitioner for the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not the Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila have
jurisdiction over what is commonly known as the police zone, and should
have decided it.