G.R. No. 2270. March 24, 1905

The petition of Jose Diaz y Tan Bauco alleges that he is “illegally
and unlawfully detained and restrained of his liberty in Bilibid Prison
by the warden thereof, George N. Wolfe.”

It appears that he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to fourteen
years eight months and one day imprisonment at a special term of the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas held in Lucena during the judicial
vacation period for the year 1904, and that he is detained by the said
George N. Wolfe, warden of Bilibid Prison, pending decision of his
appeal from said sentence.

It is contended that said trial, conviction, and sentence were
illegal and void because, as it is alleged, the holding of the said
special term of court was not duly authorized by law and the judge
thereof was without jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal cases.

The special term of court in question was held in pursuance of an
order signed by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, which order, it
is alleged, is illegal and void because it directed the holding of a
special term of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Tayabas
at the town of Lucena, a place not regularly designated by law for the
holding of said court for said province; and it is said that the Civil
Governor alone had authority to issue an order directing the holding of
a special term of court at any place other than that designated by law
for the holding of the regular terms thereof.

Acts Nos. 136, 867, and 1153 declare the law touching the holding of
terms of Courts of First Instance in the Philippine Islands. Regular
terms are those held in the place and at the time regularly designated
by law. Special terms are those held at a time or place not regularly
designated by law.

Subsection (f), section 1, of Act No. 867, amending Act No.
136, conferred upon the Civil Governor the authority, “when in his
judgment the emergency shall require, to direct any judge assigned to
vacation duty to hold during vacation a special term of court in any
district, there to hear civil or criminal cases and enter final
judgments therein.”

Paragraph 1, section 1, of Act No. 1153 amends the foregoing
section, transferring the authority to issue such order to the
Secretary of Finance and Justice.

We are of the opinion that in issuing the order complained of, which
directs the holding of a special term of court for the Province of
Tayabas at Lucena during the judicial vacation of 1904, the Secretary
of Finance and Justice complied strictly with the terms of these
provisions of the law, that said order was lawful, and that the alleged
illegality in the proceedings complained of does not exist.

It is alleged that the “special term” referred to in the above-quoted subsection (f)
of section 1 of Act No. 867 are terms special as to time and not terms
held at places other than those designated by law for the holding of
regular terms.

But this construction is forbidden by the rule which requires that
the words of a statute are not to be taken in a limited and restricted
sense, unless they conflict with each other and are inconsistent or
unless a manifest absurdity and injustice would result from giving the
words their natural and common import.

We have not been able to discover any reason for limiting or
restricting the meaning of the words “special terms” in subsection (f)
of section 1 of Act No. 867 so as to exclude special terms held at
places other than those regularly designated by law, and to do so would
defeat the evident intent and object of the statute to give the Civil
Governor the widest possible discretion in case of emergency to set the
machinery of Courts of First Instance in motion during the judicial
vacation period.

It is suggested that the authority of the Civil Governor to direct
the holding of special terms of court at places other than those
designated by law is to be found in section 10 of Act No. 867, and
that, unless we limit the meaning of the words “special terms” in
subsection (f) of section 1 of the same act so as to exclude
these cases, we have two sections of the same instrument conveying
precisely the same authority to the same officer. But even were this
the case, the duplication or overlapping of the provisions of an
instrument is not of itself a contradiction or inconsistency which
would justify the limitation or restriction of the ordinary import of
its words; and it is to be observed that while section 10, in general
terms, provides for the holding of special terms at places other than
those designated by law, we must look to subsection (f) of section 1 for the authority to direct judges assigned to vacation duty to hold such terms in vacation.

Our attention has been called to the last paragraph of section 12 of
Act No. 867, which provides that “all criminal trials must be tried at
the place designated in the law as the place at which the court having
jurisdiction thereof shall be held, unless the Civil Governor shall
otherwise order, as provided in section 10 of this act,” and it is
urged that the authority vested in the Civil Governor by said section
10 not having been transferred to any other person, no order directing
the holding of criminal trials at places other than those designated by
law can be legal unless it proceeds from him. But while it may be true
that the authority vested in the Civil Governor by section 10 has not
been transferred to the Secretary of Finance and Justice in all cases,
we believe that it has been so transferred by subsection (i) of Act No.
1153 whenever it is exercised in vacation through a judge assigned to
vacation duty.

The effect of subsection (f) of section 1 of Act No. 867 is
merely to authorize the Civil Governor in cases of emergency to issue
certain instructions to judges assigned to vacation duty, and in every
instance where this authority is exercised for the purpose of directing
the holding of terms at places not designated by law for the holding of
regular terms it must be exercised as provided in section 10—that is to
say, “whenever in his opinion the same may be necessary to the
economical and speedy administration of justice, and he shall by
executive order so direct.”

We think, therefore, that the proviso excepting from the general
prohibition contained in section 12 of Act No. 867 all cases where “the
Civil Governor shall otherwise order as provided in section 10 of this
act,” includes those cases in which during vacation, orders are issued
to the judges assigned to duty in vacation to hold special terms at
places not designated by law for the holding of regular terms.

We are confirmed in this opinion by an examination of the object,
purpose, and intent of the saving clause in question. The section of
which it is a part is devoted to a declaration of the powers conferred
upon a judge of a Court of First Instance when out of the province
wherein certain matters are pending, but within his judicial district.
Among other provisions it requires that all final hearings in
interlocutory motions or issues shall be held within the province
unless the parties by their counsel consent, in writing, to a hearing
without the province, and it is in this connection that the provision
is inserted which prohibits the hearing of criminal cases by consent or
otherwise at any place other than that regularly designated by law,
“unless the Civil Governor shall otherwise order, as provided in
section 10 of this act”

Evidently the legislature did not intend by this provision to limit
any powers already conferred upon the Civil Governor and on the
contrary its plain purpose and intent is to save intact from the
general prohibition such authority as had already been vested in him.

The application should be denied. So ordered.

Arellano, C, J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

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DISSENTING

JOHNSON, J. :

I can not conform with the doctrine announced in this decision. The
laws of the Philippine Islands designate the pueblos in which courts
shall be held. Section 10 of Act No. 867 gives the Governor-General of
these Islands power to authorize the Courts of First Instance to hold
special terms of the Courts of First Instance in any province in
another place within the province than that fixed by the law, whenever,
in his opinion, the same may be necessary to the economical and speedy
administration of justice. The Commission, however, in delegating this
power to the Governor-General, was very careful to provide that this
power to change the place for holding the courts as provided for by law
should not authorize him to make a permanent change in the regular
places for holding courts as provided for by law. I do not believe that
the Commission ever intended to give any other single member of the
Commission power to change the regular places for holding sessions of
the Courts of First Instance. The rule is well established that
judgments rendered by nisi prius judges during sessions held
at places not authorized by law are null and void. The law authorizing
the holding of special terms of court or terms of court at times other
than that fixed by law does not authorize the changing of the places
designated by law at which courts shall regularly be held.

The prayer of the petitioner should be granted.

Mail on denied.