G.R. No. 1770. March 16, 1905

On April 29, 1903, the plaintiff in this case filed a complaint
wherein she prayed the court to award damages against the defendant for
breach of promise of marriage, alleging therein that trusting in the
promises of marriage made to her by the defendant and being convinced
that he would not fail to keep said promises, she had consented to her
own dishonor at the solicitation of the defendant.

On May 23, 1903, the defendant filed a demurrer to this complaint,
alleging that the facts set forth therein did not constitute a cause of
action under existing law.

Thereafter, and without waitin for a ruling upon said demurrer, the
plaintiff, with the permission of the court and over the objection of
the defendant, filed an amended complaint, wherein she set out
substantially that in the year 1900 she was a virtuous woman of 20
years of age; that at that time and on various occasions thereafter,
the defendant made proposals of marriage to her and to her father for
her; that on a certain occasion the defendant surprised her alone in
her house, and by use of force and violence had carnal connection with
her; that for some time there-after, trusting to the defendant’s
promises of marriage and because “she had lost her virginity,” she
consented to continue illicit relations with the defendant; that as a
result of said relations she had later given birth to a child; that the
defendant, since that time, had refused and continued to refuse to
comply with said promises of marriage, and therefore because and on
account of said breach of promise of marriage, and because and on
account of the birth of the child as a result of said illicit carnal
relations, and because and on account of the grave injury to her
reputation, and because and on account of all the facts set out, the
plaintiff prayed the court to give judgment against the defendant in
the sum of $20,000, United States currency. The plaintiff alleged that
she first met the defendant in the year 1898, when she went to his
house with a female friend who had some favor to ask of him; that
thereafter on various occasions the defendant made improper advances,
which she refused to admit because she “put no credence in his words;”
that on the 30th of January, 1900, at about 4 in the afternoon, the
defendant unexpectedly entered her house, and finding her alone with
her two nephews, he forcibly violated her, and that thereafter she had
continued for some time in illicit relations with the defendant, in
consideration of his renewal of his promises of marriage, and “because
she considered herself disgraced already.”

On cross-examination she stated that the house wherein the alleged
rape was consummated stands directly in front of the Divisoria market
place and is adjoined by other houses on the same street; that the room
she occupied at the time opened directly upon the street fronting the
market place, and that one Juliana Ventura occupied the upper floor of
the house, but could not say whether she was or was not at home on that
occasion,

In reply to questions of the trial judge, she said that she did not
cry out nor ask for help because she “was asleep when defendant entered
the house, and because she was ashamed and because he caught her by the
throat,” and that she did not tell her father of the occurrence at the
time because she was ashamed to do so; and to the question whether she
had resisted the forcible efforts of the defendant, she replied, “What
could I do? I was only a woman.”

The father of the plaintiff admitted knowledge of illicit relations
between the defendant and his daughter, but insisted that these
relations were based on various promises of marriage made to her and to
him, and that aside from these promises of marriage he had never
received anything from the defendant in consideration of his
acquiescence in the dishonor of his daughter.

The defendant himself went on the stand and frankly admitted his
illicit relations with the plaintiff and his paternity of the child
mentioned in the complaint, insisting, however, that these relations
were the result of mutual agreement and in consideration of gifts and
money advanced to the father and the daughter; lie further declared
that he had never made any promise of marriage to the plaintiff or her
father and that all the evidence touching the alleged rape of plaintiff
was absolutely false and untrue in every particular.

The judge below was of opinion that the alleged rape had not been
committed, and that the allegations of the complaint and the evidence
of plaintiff upon that point were incredible and false, and therefore
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.

Counsel for defendant moved the court to make a specific finding as to the alleged breach of promise, which was denied.

We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether the
amended complaint in this cause should have been admitted over the
objection of the defendant, but we think that, having admitted said
complaint, and having admitted evidence in support of the allegations
of rape and of breach of promise, upon which it bases its prayer for
judgment, the trial court, having been requested so to do by the
defendant, ought to have made a finding of facts touching both causes
of action.

After a careful examination of the record in this case, we are of
opinion that the evidence wholly fails to sustain either the allegation
of rape or of breach of promise upon which the complaint is based, and
therefore, that the judgment of the trial come in favor of the
defendant, with costs in both instances against the plaintiff, should
be affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.