G.R. No. 1491. March 05, 1904

The defendants were charged with entering the house of one Alejo
Tiongson on the night of February 20, 1903, armed with deadly weapons,
against the will of the said Alejo Tiongson.

The evidence shows that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company
with his wife, Alexandra San Andres, and his wife’s sister, Marcela San
Andres. On the night of the 20th of February, 1903, between 8 and 9
o’clock at night, the accused, one of whom was armed with a gun and the
other two each with a bolo, entered the house of the said Alejo
Tiongson without first obtaining the permission of any person. It
appears from the proof that there was a light burning in the house at
the time the accused entered, which was immediately put out by one of
the accused; that Alejo and his wife had retired for tlie night; that
Marcela was still sitting up sewing; that as soon as Marcela had
discovered the accused in the house she awoke Alejo and his wife; that
immediately after the accused were in the house, one of them wounded,
by means of a bolo, Alejo Tiongson, the owner of the house; that the
accused appropriated to their own use a certain quantity of money; that
the accused took and carried away out of
the said house toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and ill
treated her.

The evidence on the part of the defense tended to prove an alibi.
The court below found that this testimony was not to be believed. We
find no occasion, from the proof, to change this finding of fact

The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of the
crime of entering the house of another, with violence and intimidation,
which crime is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the
Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for the term of
three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional,
and also imposed upon each a fine of 271 pesos and costs. In reaching
this conclusion the court took into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime and the extenuating circumstance provided for
in article 11 of the Penal Code.
Article 491 of the Penal Code provides that—

“He who shall enter the residence (dwelling house) of another
against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with the
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.”

Subsection 2 provides that—

“If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision correccional in the medium and maximum grade, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250
pesetas.”

Under the facts presented in this case, was the trial court
justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of
entering the residence of another against his will and with violence or
intimidation? We think that it was. We are not of the opinion that the
statute relates simply to the method by which one may pass the
threshold of the residence of another without his consent. We think it
relates also to the conduct, immediately after entrance, of him who
enters the house of another without his consent. He who being armed
with deadly weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime,
without consent, and immediately commits acts of violence and
intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of another with violence
and intimidation and is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of
the Penal Code. (See Viada, vol. 3,
p. 303; Gazette of Spain of the 28th of March, 1883; Viada, vol. 6, p. 363; Gazette of Spain of the 19th of May, 189B, p. 165.)

The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all
the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of
civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another without
the consent of its owners or occupants.

The privacy of the home—the place of abode, the place where a man
with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his
wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in rare
cases—has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most
sacred personal rights to which men are entitled. Both the common and
the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the
privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with
majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest
citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the
face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which
was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest
and most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how
frail or humble
it is, bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm
and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts, but
the king may not enter against its owner’s will; none of his forces
dare to cross the thresh old of even the humblest tenement without its
owner’s consent.

“A man’s house is his castle,” has become a maxim among the
civilized peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become a
matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain, as
well as in other countries.

However, under the police power of the state the authorities may
compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the owners for
sanitary purposes. The government has this right upon grounds of public
policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all its
people. A man can not insist upon the privacy of his home when a
question of the health and life of himself, his family, and that of the
community is involved. This private right must be subject to the public
welfare.

It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of another
is not liable unless he has been forbidden—i. e., the phrase “against
the will of the owner” means that there must have been an express
prohibition to enter. In other words, if one enters the dwelling house
of another without the knowledge of the owner he has not entered
against his will. This construction is certainly not tenable, because
entrance is forbidden generally under the spirit of the law unless
permission to enter is expressly given. To allow this construction
would destroy the very spirit of the law. Under the law no one has the
right to enter the home of another without the other’s express consent.
Therefore, to say that when one enters the home of another without his
knowledge he does not enter against the will of the owner, is to say
that one’s home is open for the entrance of all who are not expressly
forbidden. This is not the rule. The statute must not be given that
construction, No one can enter the dwelling house of another, in these
Islands, without rendering himself liable under the law, unless he has
the express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking entrance
comes within some of the exceptions dictated by the law or by a sound
public policy.

So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy,
unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they might even take the
life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. This was also the
sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: “Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscu jusque civium.”

It may be argued that the offense punishable under article 491 of
the Penal Code corresponds to the crime of burglary at the common law.
It is true that the offense of entering the house of another without
the latter’s consent and the common-law crime of burglary are both
offenses against the habitation of individuals. But these crimes are
distinctively different. The punishment for burglary is “to prevent the
breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime
for the purpose of committing a felony therein,” while the object of
article 491 is to prevent entrance into the dwelling house of another
at any time, either by day or by night, for any
purpose, against the will of its owner.

In burglary there must have existed an intent to enter for the
purpose of committing a felony, while under article 491 of the Penal
Code entrance against the will, simply, of the owner is punishable.
Under the provisions of the Penal Code entrance in the nighttime can
only be regarded as an aggravation of the offense of entering.

We are of the opinion, under all of the facts in the case, that the
extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code
should not be considered in favor of these defendants.

We find that the defendants are guilty of the crime of entering the
house of another with violence and intimidation, without the consent of
the owner, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and hereby
impose the maximum degree of prision correccional, and the fine provided for in subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code should be imposed.

The sentence of the court below is therefore modified, and each of
the said defendants is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term
of six years of prision correccional, and each to pay a fine of 271 pesos and the costs of this suit or in default thereof to suffer subsidiary imprisonment.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Cooper and McDonough, JJ., dissent.